Włodzimierz Brus and Kazimierz Laski
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198283997
- eISBN:
- 9780191596032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198283997.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic Systems
The first practical application of the idea of market socialism (but not necessarily along Lange's model) was made in early 1950s in Yugoslavia after the break with the Soviet Union, and in ...
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The first practical application of the idea of market socialism (but not necessarily along Lange's model) was made in early 1950s in Yugoslavia after the break with the Soviet Union, and in conjunction with countrywide system of ‘workers’ self‐management’. As for the Soviet‐bloc countries, the dissatisfaction with the command system and a tendency to introduce some elements of market mechanism manifested itself openly in (failed) in Poland, as well as in several other countries starting from mid‐1950s. However, by the beginning of the 1980s, out of all these attempts, only the Hungarian ‘New Economic Mechanism’ survived, albeit not in the initial form of combining central planning with elements of market mechanism. The Hungarian NEM improved somewhat the economic performance, but in fundamentals, it also failed, becoming reduced to a shift from direct bureaucratic control to indirect control from the centre.Less
The first practical application of the idea of market socialism (but not necessarily along Lange's model) was made in early 1950s in Yugoslavia after the break with the Soviet Union, and in conjunction with countrywide system of ‘workers’ self‐management’. As for the Soviet‐bloc countries, the dissatisfaction with the command system and a tendency to introduce some elements of market mechanism manifested itself openly in (failed) in Poland, as well as in several other countries starting from mid‐1950s. However, by the beginning of the 1980s, out of all these attempts, only the Hungarian ‘New Economic Mechanism’ survived, albeit not in the initial form of combining central planning with elements of market mechanism. The Hungarian NEM improved somewhat the economic performance, but in fundamentals, it also failed, becoming reduced to a shift from direct bureaucratic control to indirect control from the centre.
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804775663
- eISBN:
- 9780804778961
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804775663.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
After World War II, the Hungarian Communist Party took control of the country's political life and immediately launched a socialist experiment based on the Soviet model with its characteristic ...
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After World War II, the Hungarian Communist Party took control of the country's political life and immediately launched a socialist experiment based on the Soviet model with its characteristic central planning, hierarchical enterprises, and state ownership of the mode of production. The Soviet model was also imposed on the profession of economics and neoclassical economics was declared “bourgeois” by Party leaders because of its ideological ties to capitalism. The result was a novel form of market socialism known as “goulash communism.” Neoclassical economics served as an analytical tool and a normative model for Hungary's reform economists to develop this kind of market socialism. This chapter explores Hungary's goulash communism and its New Economic Mechanism reforms of 1968. It also discusses how Party-state elites promoted an apparently narrow form of neoclassical economics, which actually maintained existing hierarchical institutions.Less
After World War II, the Hungarian Communist Party took control of the country's political life and immediately launched a socialist experiment based on the Soviet model with its characteristic central planning, hierarchical enterprises, and state ownership of the mode of production. The Soviet model was also imposed on the profession of economics and neoclassical economics was declared “bourgeois” by Party leaders because of its ideological ties to capitalism. The result was a novel form of market socialism known as “goulash communism.” Neoclassical economics served as an analytical tool and a normative model for Hungary's reform economists to develop this kind of market socialism. This chapter explores Hungary's goulash communism and its New Economic Mechanism reforms of 1968. It also discusses how Party-state elites promoted an apparently narrow form of neoclassical economics, which actually maintained existing hierarchical institutions.
Dorie Reents-Budet (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813029535
- eISBN:
- 9780813039503
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813029535.003.0010
- Subject:
- Archaeology, Prehistoric Archaeology
This chapter discusses the social context that surrounded cacao drinking during the ancient Maya period. Cacao was both prized delicious food and a repository of financial strength in the Classic ...
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This chapter discusses the social context that surrounded cacao drinking during the ancient Maya period. Cacao was both prized delicious food and a repository of financial strength in the Classic Maya society. Among the ruling elite of the Mayan culture, cacao and cacao-drinking were tightly associated with the fundamental political processes of alliance formation and socioeconomic enrichment. This relationship between cacao and social process in the Maya culture were discerned from the pictorial representations found on Classic Maya pottery used for feasting events. By the Early Classic period, feasts under the control of the ruling elite became an important social, political and economic mechanism. In the Classic Maya culture, cacao, politics and economics formed a formidable relationship in the never-ending pursuit for social prestige, political influence and economic power.Less
This chapter discusses the social context that surrounded cacao drinking during the ancient Maya period. Cacao was both prized delicious food and a repository of financial strength in the Classic Maya society. Among the ruling elite of the Mayan culture, cacao and cacao-drinking were tightly associated with the fundamental political processes of alliance formation and socioeconomic enrichment. This relationship between cacao and social process in the Maya culture were discerned from the pictorial representations found on Classic Maya pottery used for feasting events. By the Early Classic period, feasts under the control of the ruling elite became an important social, political and economic mechanism. In the Classic Maya culture, cacao, politics and economics formed a formidable relationship in the never-ending pursuit for social prestige, political influence and economic power.
Roger W. Spencer and David A. Macpherson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262027960
- eISBN:
- 9780262325868
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027960.003.0020
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
This chapter looks at the career of Eric S. Maskin, Nobel Prize recipient in 2007. Maskin was born in 1950 and completed his doctorate in mathematics at Harvard University in 1976. Ken Arrow, Leo ...
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This chapter looks at the career of Eric S. Maskin, Nobel Prize recipient in 2007. Maskin was born in 1950 and completed his doctorate in mathematics at Harvard University in 1976. Ken Arrow, Leo Hurwicz, and Andy Postlewaite influenced Maskin's decision to switch his specialism to economics. He became a professor of economics at MIT in 1981 and an Adams University professor at Harvard in 2012. He worked on mechanism design, the engineering part of economic theory. Two applications of mechanism design theory he is very concerned with are climate change and the ongoing financial crisis. Taxation, Incomplete Markets and Social Security and Reforming Pensions: Principles and Policy Choices, 2008 are two of his key works.Less
This chapter looks at the career of Eric S. Maskin, Nobel Prize recipient in 2007. Maskin was born in 1950 and completed his doctorate in mathematics at Harvard University in 1976. Ken Arrow, Leo Hurwicz, and Andy Postlewaite influenced Maskin's decision to switch his specialism to economics. He became a professor of economics at MIT in 1981 and an Adams University professor at Harvard in 2012. He worked on mechanism design, the engineering part of economic theory. Two applications of mechanism design theory he is very concerned with are climate change and the ongoing financial crisis. Taxation, Incomplete Markets and Social Security and Reforming Pensions: Principles and Policy Choices, 2008 are two of his key works.
Thomas A. Weber
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262015738
- eISBN:
- 9780262298483
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015738.001.0001
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Probability / Statistics
This book bridges optimal control theory and economics, discussing ordinary differential equations (ODEs), optimal control, game theory, and mechanism design in one volume. Technically rigorous and ...
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This book bridges optimal control theory and economics, discussing ordinary differential equations (ODEs), optimal control, game theory, and mechanism design in one volume. Technically rigorous and largely self-contained, it provides an introduction to the use of optimal control theory for deterministic continuous-time systems in economics. The theory of ordinary differential equations is the backbone of the theory developed in the book, and Chapter 2 offers a detailed review of basic concepts in the theory of ODEs, including the solution of systems of linear ODEs, state-space analysis, potential functions, and stability analysis. Following this, the book covers the main results of optimal control theory, in particular necessary and sufficient optimality conditions; game theory, with an emphasis on differential games; and the application of control-theoretic concepts to the design of economic mechanisms. Appendices provide a mathematical review and full solutions to all end-of-chapter problems. The material is presented at three levels: single-person decision making; games, in which a group of decision makers interact strategically; and mechanism design, which is concerned with a designer’s creation of an environment in which players interact to maximize the designer’s objective. The book focuses on applications; the problems are an integral part of the text.Less
This book bridges optimal control theory and economics, discussing ordinary differential equations (ODEs), optimal control, game theory, and mechanism design in one volume. Technically rigorous and largely self-contained, it provides an introduction to the use of optimal control theory for deterministic continuous-time systems in economics. The theory of ordinary differential equations is the backbone of the theory developed in the book, and Chapter 2 offers a detailed review of basic concepts in the theory of ODEs, including the solution of systems of linear ODEs, state-space analysis, potential functions, and stability analysis. Following this, the book covers the main results of optimal control theory, in particular necessary and sufficient optimality conditions; game theory, with an emphasis on differential games; and the application of control-theoretic concepts to the design of economic mechanisms. Appendices provide a mathematical review and full solutions to all end-of-chapter problems. The material is presented at three levels: single-person decision making; games, in which a group of decision makers interact strategically; and mechanism design, which is concerned with a designer’s creation of an environment in which players interact to maximize the designer’s objective. The book focuses on applications; the problems are an integral part of the text.
