Randy E. Barnett
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159737
- eISBN:
- 9781400848133
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159737.003.0016
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
In this afterword, the author reflects on the lessons that he has learned since the publication of the book's first edition in 2004 from the realms of both constitutional scholarship and ...
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In this afterword, the author reflects on the lessons that he has learned since the publication of the book's first edition in 2004 from the realms of both constitutional scholarship and constitutional law. He highlights some areas where his thinking has developed since the book's original publication in ways that should be of interest to readers. These include individual popular sovereignty and presumed consent, whether the Constitution protected economic liberty, how judges can protect the rights retained by the people without identifying them, the empirical nature of the new originalism, the gravitational force of originalism, and the so-called “Constitution in Exile movement.” The author concludes by rejecting the notion that this book offers a “libertarian” interpretation of the Constitution.Less
In this afterword, the author reflects on the lessons that he has learned since the publication of the book's first edition in 2004 from the realms of both constitutional scholarship and constitutional law. He highlights some areas where his thinking has developed since the book's original publication in ways that should be of interest to readers. These include individual popular sovereignty and presumed consent, whether the Constitution protected economic liberty, how judges can protect the rights retained by the people without identifying them, the empirical nature of the new originalism, the gravitational force of originalism, and the so-called “Constitution in Exile movement.” The author concludes by rejecting the notion that this book offers a “libertarian” interpretation of the Constitution.
John Tomasi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691144467
- eISBN:
- 9781400842391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691144467.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter examines market democracy, a hybrid approach to liberal theory building that combines a concern for private individual economic liberty with a commitment to social justice. As such, ...
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This chapter examines market democracy, a hybrid approach to liberal theory building that combines a concern for private individual economic liberty with a commitment to social justice. As such, market democracy offers an alternative to both classical liberalism and to high liberalism. After explaining exactly what market democracy is, the chapter considers its conceptual space. In particular, it explores why market democracy asserts that economic freedoms should be treated as basic but not absolute, and why it thus allows taxation in support of a limited range of social service programs. The chapter then compares the views espoused by advocates of libertarianism, classical liberalism, and modern or high liberalism. It also looks at market democracy as a research program, its institutional requirements, and the challenges that it faces from both the left and from the right.Less
This chapter examines market democracy, a hybrid approach to liberal theory building that combines a concern for private individual economic liberty with a commitment to social justice. As such, market democracy offers an alternative to both classical liberalism and to high liberalism. After explaining exactly what market democracy is, the chapter considers its conceptual space. In particular, it explores why market democracy asserts that economic freedoms should be treated as basic but not absolute, and why it thus allows taxation in support of a limited range of social service programs. The chapter then compares the views espoused by advocates of libertarianism, classical liberalism, and modern or high liberalism. It also looks at market democracy as a research program, its institutional requirements, and the challenges that it faces from both the left and from the right.
John Tomasi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691144467
- eISBN:
- 9781400842391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691144467.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter discusses high liberalism, starting with its conception of equality based on an equal sharing of material goods. Compared to the classical liberal ideal pursued by Americans, the ...
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This chapter discusses high liberalism, starting with its conception of equality based on an equal sharing of material goods. Compared to the classical liberal ideal pursued by Americans, the European vision of liberal equality saw property rights not as guardians of equality but obstacles to its realization. This notion of property rights extends back at least to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The chapter first considers the high liberalist views on property and equality, focusing on the arguments advanced by Rousseau, Karl Marx, and John Stuart Mill, before discussing the rise of social justice and the decline of economic liberty. It then examines John Rawls' idea of justice as fairness and the emergence of libertarianism as the leading philosophical alternative to high liberalism. It also explores the fundamental ideas of high liberals with regard to economic liberty and the role of the state in regulating economic affairs in pursuit of the distributional requirements of social justice.Less
This chapter discusses high liberalism, starting with its conception of equality based on an equal sharing of material goods. Compared to the classical liberal ideal pursued by Americans, the European vision of liberal equality saw property rights not as guardians of equality but obstacles to its realization. This notion of property rights extends back at least to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The chapter first considers the high liberalist views on property and equality, focusing on the arguments advanced by Rousseau, Karl Marx, and John Stuart Mill, before discussing the rise of social justice and the decline of economic liberty. It then examines John Rawls' idea of justice as fairness and the emergence of libertarianism as the leading philosophical alternative to high liberalism. It also explores the fundamental ideas of high liberals with regard to economic liberty and the role of the state in regulating economic affairs in pursuit of the distributional requirements of social justice.
John Tomasi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691144467
- eISBN:
- 9781400842391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691144467.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter examines the process of “thinking the unthinkable,” which for high liberals means considering the possibility that the basic moral commitments of late twentieth-century liberal ...
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This chapter examines the process of “thinking the unthinkable,” which for high liberals means considering the possibility that the basic moral commitments of late twentieth-century liberal philosophers, while undoubtedly high, were defectively narrow. The phrase “thinking the unthinkable” is associated with the New Labour movement in Britain during the 1990s; it refers to the party's reconceptualization of even the most basic planks of their platform. For Labour leaders, thinking the unthinkable was an exercise in practical political strategy. The chapter first considers economic growth in the United States and in western liberal democracies before discussing liberal arguments for economic exceptionalism in relation to populism and political philosophy. It then explains how a thick conception of economic liberty intersects with democratic legitimacy and concludes by reflecting on the possibility for a realization of liberal justice that is normatively fuller and more ambitious than that of high liberalism—this is the essence of market democracy as opposed to social democracy.Less
This chapter examines the process of “thinking the unthinkable,” which for high liberals means considering the possibility that the basic moral commitments of late twentieth-century liberal philosophers, while undoubtedly high, were defectively narrow. The phrase “thinking the unthinkable” is associated with the New Labour movement in Britain during the 1990s; it refers to the party's reconceptualization of even the most basic planks of their platform. For Labour leaders, thinking the unthinkable was an exercise in practical political strategy. The chapter first considers economic growth in the United States and in western liberal democracies before discussing liberal arguments for economic exceptionalism in relation to populism and political philosophy. It then explains how a thick conception of economic liberty intersects with democratic legitimacy and concludes by reflecting on the possibility for a realization of liberal justice that is normatively fuller and more ambitious than that of high liberalism—this is the essence of market democracy as opposed to social democracy.
John Tomasi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691144467
- eISBN:
- 9781400842391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691144467.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter offers an intellectual history of liberalism, focusing on the classical view that was eventually displaced by modern, “high” liberalism. It first considers classical liberalism's notion ...
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This chapter offers an intellectual history of liberalism, focusing on the classical view that was eventually displaced by modern, “high” liberalism. It first considers classical liberalism's notion of equality and property rights as well as economic liberty before discussing the ideas of thinkers like John Locke, Adam Smith, David Hume, and F. A. Hayek. It then explores the emergence of market society, with particular emphasis on what Smith called “the system of natural liberty.” It also examines classical liberal ideas in action during under revolutionary America and concludes with an analysis of the essential features of classical liberalism: a thick conception of economic liberty grounded mainly in consequentialist considerations; a formal conception of equality that sees the outcome of free market exchanges as largely definitive of justice; and a limited but important state role in tax-funded education and social service programs.Less
This chapter offers an intellectual history of liberalism, focusing on the classical view that was eventually displaced by modern, “high” liberalism. It first considers classical liberalism's notion of equality and property rights as well as economic liberty before discussing the ideas of thinkers like John Locke, Adam Smith, David Hume, and F. A. Hayek. It then explores the emergence of market society, with particular emphasis on what Smith called “the system of natural liberty.” It also examines classical liberal ideas in action during under revolutionary America and concludes with an analysis of the essential features of classical liberalism: a thick conception of economic liberty grounded mainly in consequentialist considerations; a formal conception of equality that sees the outcome of free market exchanges as largely definitive of justice; and a limited but important state role in tax-funded education and social service programs.
John Tomasi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691144467
- eISBN:
- 9781400842391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691144467.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter examines what it calls “social justicitis”—a strongly negative, even allergic, reaction to the ideal of social or distributive justice. Social justicitis is a malady from which many ...
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This chapter examines what it calls “social justicitis”—a strongly negative, even allergic, reaction to the ideal of social or distributive justice. Social justicitis is a malady from which many defenders of private economic liberty suffer. For libertarians, arguments on behalf of social justice may be as threatening as a bee sting is to some people. In the case of classical liberals, social justicitis arises as an adverse reaction to talk about social justice at the level of public policy. The chapter first considers the notion of distributional adequacy condition from the perspective of classical liberalism and libertarianism before discussing the arguments of classical liberals and libertarians regarding property and the poor. It also explores F. A. Hayek's critique of social justice and the implications of his theory of spontaneous order with respect to distributional ideals.Less
This chapter examines what it calls “social justicitis”—a strongly negative, even allergic, reaction to the ideal of social or distributive justice. Social justicitis is a malady from which many defenders of private economic liberty suffer. For libertarians, arguments on behalf of social justice may be as threatening as a bee sting is to some people. In the case of classical liberals, social justicitis arises as an adverse reaction to talk about social justice at the level of public policy. The chapter first considers the notion of distributional adequacy condition from the perspective of classical liberalism and libertarianism before discussing the arguments of classical liberals and libertarians regarding property and the poor. It also explores F. A. Hayek's critique of social justice and the implications of his theory of spontaneous order with respect to distributional ideals.
Aaron James
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199846153
- eISBN:
- 9780199933389
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199846153.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter elaborates and defends three basic principles of structural equity. A first requires that “losers” be compensated, in light of a proposed general conception of when a person or social ...
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This chapter elaborates and defends three basic principles of structural equity. A first requires that “losers” be compensated, in light of a proposed general conception of when a person or social class is harmed by trade. The second and third principles concern how the gains of trade are distributed, across and within societies. For reasons of “priority for the worse off,” departures from equality of gain are justifiable when unequal gains flow to developing countries. The chapter also challenges appeals to utilitarianism, economic liberty, legitimate expectations, equality of opportunity, fair-risk imposition, and “cosmopolitan” conceptions of fairness.Less
This chapter elaborates and defends three basic principles of structural equity. A first requires that “losers” be compensated, in light of a proposed general conception of when a person or social class is harmed by trade. The second and third principles concern how the gains of trade are distributed, across and within societies. For reasons of “priority for the worse off,” departures from equality of gain are justifiable when unequal gains flow to developing countries. The chapter also challenges appeals to utilitarianism, economic liberty, legitimate expectations, equality of opportunity, fair-risk imposition, and “cosmopolitan” conceptions of fairness.
John Tomasi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691144467
- eISBN:
- 9781400842391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691144467.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This book has discussed market democracy as a liberal research program and free market fairness as a morally superior account of liberal justice. It has explained the market democratic regime's ...
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This book has discussed market democracy as a liberal research program and free market fairness as a morally superior account of liberal justice. It has explained the market democratic regime's deliberative approach to the questions of political life and its support for a thick conception of economic liberty that is on par with the other basic liberal rights and freedoms. It has shown how free market fairness advances capitalistic policies under the banner of social justice and how market democracy highlights the moral attractions of the market-based approach to social order. The book has also explored market democracy's differences from classical liberalism, high liberalism, and libertarianism with respect to interpretations of issues such as economic liberty and social or distributive justice. In this conclusion, the book reflects on free market fairness and its relation to traditional American values.Less
This book has discussed market democracy as a liberal research program and free market fairness as a morally superior account of liberal justice. It has explained the market democratic regime's deliberative approach to the questions of political life and its support for a thick conception of economic liberty that is on par with the other basic liberal rights and freedoms. It has shown how free market fairness advances capitalistic policies under the banner of social justice and how market democracy highlights the moral attractions of the market-based approach to social order. The book has also explored market democracy's differences from classical liberalism, high liberalism, and libertarianism with respect to interpretations of issues such as economic liberty and social or distributive justice. In this conclusion, the book reflects on free market fairness and its relation to traditional American values.
John Tomasi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691144467
- eISBN:
- 9781400842391
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691144467.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Can libertarians care about social justice? This book argues that they can and should. Drawing simultaneously on moral insights from defenders of economic liberty such as F. A. Hayek and advocates of ...
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Can libertarians care about social justice? This book argues that they can and should. Drawing simultaneously on moral insights from defenders of economic liberty such as F. A. Hayek and advocates of social justice such as John Rawls, the book presents a new theory of liberal justice. This theory, free market fairness, is committed to both limited government and the material betterment of the poor. Unlike traditional libertarians, the book argues that property rights are best defended not in terms of self-ownership or economic efficiency but as requirements of democratic legitimacy. At the same time, it encourages egalitarians concerned about social justice to listen more sympathetically to the claims ordinary citizens make about the importance of private economic liberty in their daily lives. In place of the familiar social democratic interpretations of social justice, the book offers a “market democratic” conception of social justice: free market fairness. It argues that free market fairness, with its twin commitment to economic liberties and a fair distribution of goods and opportunities, is a morally superior account of liberal justice. Free market fairness is also a distinctively American ideal. It extends the notion, prominent in America's founding period, that protection of property and promotion of real opportunity are indivisible goals. Indeed, according to this book, free market fairness is social justice, American style. The book offers a bold new way of thinking about politics, economics, and justice—one that will challenge readers on both the left and right.Less
Can libertarians care about social justice? This book argues that they can and should. Drawing simultaneously on moral insights from defenders of economic liberty such as F. A. Hayek and advocates of social justice such as John Rawls, the book presents a new theory of liberal justice. This theory, free market fairness, is committed to both limited government and the material betterment of the poor. Unlike traditional libertarians, the book argues that property rights are best defended not in terms of self-ownership or economic efficiency but as requirements of democratic legitimacy. At the same time, it encourages egalitarians concerned about social justice to listen more sympathetically to the claims ordinary citizens make about the importance of private economic liberty in their daily lives. In place of the familiar social democratic interpretations of social justice, the book offers a “market democratic” conception of social justice: free market fairness. It argues that free market fairness, with its twin commitment to economic liberties and a fair distribution of goods and opportunities, is a morally superior account of liberal justice. Free market fairness is also a distinctively American ideal. It extends the notion, prominent in America's founding period, that protection of property and promotion of real opportunity are indivisible goals. Indeed, according to this book, free market fairness is social justice, American style. The book offers a bold new way of thinking about politics, economics, and justice—one that will challenge readers on both the left and right.
John Tomasi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691144467
- eISBN:
- 9781400842391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691144467.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter considers John Rawls' conception of ideal theory, with particular emphasis on the implications of problems of feasibility for normative political philosophy and market democracy's ...
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This chapter considers John Rawls' conception of ideal theory, with particular emphasis on the implications of problems of feasibility for normative political philosophy and market democracy's institutional guarantees. It defends Rawls' general view of ideal theory, first by explaining why the objection to market democracy—that even if market democratic institutional forms appear attractive in theory, they are unlikely to deliver the goods in practice and so are defective for that reason—has little force when applied against the idealism of left liberalism. It then examines why such arguments are equally ineffective when trained against the idealism of free market fairness. It also analyzes Rawls' idea of “realistic utopianism” before concluding by asking whether market democratic regimes that treat economic liberty as constitutionally basic can realize all the requirements of justice as fairness.Less
This chapter considers John Rawls' conception of ideal theory, with particular emphasis on the implications of problems of feasibility for normative political philosophy and market democracy's institutional guarantees. It defends Rawls' general view of ideal theory, first by explaining why the objection to market democracy—that even if market democratic institutional forms appear attractive in theory, they are unlikely to deliver the goods in practice and so are defective for that reason—has little force when applied against the idealism of left liberalism. It then examines why such arguments are equally ineffective when trained against the idealism of free market fairness. It also analyzes Rawls' idea of “realistic utopianism” before concluding by asking whether market democratic regimes that treat economic liberty as constitutionally basic can realize all the requirements of justice as fairness.
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226240664
- eISBN:
- 9780226240749
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226240749.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
Despite the changes that swept across the nation after the Civil War, the law and traditions of free expression remained largely the same. Of course, Northerners disagreed about the implications of ...
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Despite the changes that swept across the nation after the Civil War, the law and traditions of free expression remained largely the same. Of course, Northerners disagreed about the implications of the Reconstruction for free expression just as they disagreed about many other issues. This chapter discusses immorality, expression, and libertarian theory; the legal doctrine's support for suppression; the link between expressive and economic liberties; and the Supreme Court's doctrinal stance on free expression.Less
Despite the changes that swept across the nation after the Civil War, the law and traditions of free expression remained largely the same. Of course, Northerners disagreed about the implications of the Reconstruction for free expression just as they disagreed about many other issues. This chapter discusses immorality, expression, and libertarian theory; the legal doctrine's support for suppression; the link between expressive and economic liberties; and the Supreme Court's doctrinal stance on free expression.
Allen Buchanan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199325382
- eISBN:
- 9780199369300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199325382.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter undertakes the first two justificatory tasks: making a complex moral case for having a system of international legal human rights similar to the one that exists and making headway on the ...
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This chapter undertakes the first two justificatory tasks: making a complex moral case for having a system of international legal human rights similar to the one that exists and making headway on the question of which specific norms ought to be included in it. With respect to the former question of justification, the chapter sets out three distinct justificatory arguments. The first identifies seven important benefits a system of international legal human rights similar to the existing one can provide for a wide range of actors, including states. The second argument shows that having such a system is morally obligatory, given the risks that the existing international order imposes on individuals by conferring eminently abusable powers and privileges on states. The third argument shows that states and the governments that act in their name have a special obligation to support such a system, because they are the chief benefiaries of the flaws of the international order that the system helps ameliorate. The latter part of the chapter provides fairly detailed sketches of justifications for representative rights from each of the major categories of human rights: civil and political rights, economic rights and economic liberty rights, the right to democratic government, and rights of physical security.Less
This chapter undertakes the first two justificatory tasks: making a complex moral case for having a system of international legal human rights similar to the one that exists and making headway on the question of which specific norms ought to be included in it. With respect to the former question of justification, the chapter sets out three distinct justificatory arguments. The first identifies seven important benefits a system of international legal human rights similar to the existing one can provide for a wide range of actors, including states. The second argument shows that having such a system is morally obligatory, given the risks that the existing international order imposes on individuals by conferring eminently abusable powers and privileges on states. The third argument shows that states and the governments that act in their name have a special obligation to support such a system, because they are the chief benefiaries of the flaws of the international order that the system helps ameliorate. The latter part of the chapter provides fairly detailed sketches of justifications for representative rights from each of the major categories of human rights: civil and political rights, economic rights and economic liberty rights, the right to democratic government, and rights of physical security.
Nick Fischer
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780252040023
- eISBN:
- 9780252098222
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Illinois Press
- DOI:
- 10.5406/illinois/9780252040023.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter examines how wartime and Red Scare repression expanded into a general cultural war on “Bolshevik” causes, individuals, and organizations targeted by the Anticommunist Spider Web during ...
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This chapter examines how wartime and Red Scare repression expanded into a general cultural war on “Bolshevik” causes, individuals, and organizations targeted by the Anticommunist Spider Web during the 1920s. It considers a combination of federal, state, and local ordinances that effected political repression, suppressed free speech and economic liberty, and promoted Americanization in formal education settings led by the Ku Klux Klan and the American Legion. The chapter demonstrates how this climate of repression also led to the collapse of progressivism and impeded social welfare initiatives, gave rise to an amendment designed to make constitutional change virtually impossible, and resulted in the demise of the Roosevelt administration's Federal Theatre Project (FTP). It shows that the Spider Web members and their supporters created a repressive infrastructure of blacklists, witch hunts, loyalty oaths, and compulsory patriotism. In the process, the Spider Web strengthened its influence not only on the doctrine of anticommunism but also on the nation's political culture.Less
This chapter examines how wartime and Red Scare repression expanded into a general cultural war on “Bolshevik” causes, individuals, and organizations targeted by the Anticommunist Spider Web during the 1920s. It considers a combination of federal, state, and local ordinances that effected political repression, suppressed free speech and economic liberty, and promoted Americanization in formal education settings led by the Ku Klux Klan and the American Legion. The chapter demonstrates how this climate of repression also led to the collapse of progressivism and impeded social welfare initiatives, gave rise to an amendment designed to make constitutional change virtually impossible, and resulted in the demise of the Roosevelt administration's Federal Theatre Project (FTP). It shows that the Spider Web members and their supporters created a repressive infrastructure of blacklists, witch hunts, loyalty oaths, and compulsory patriotism. In the process, the Spider Web strengthened its influence not only on the doctrine of anticommunism but also on the nation's political culture.
Daniel Layman
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- July 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190939076
- eISBN:
- 9780190939106
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190939076.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
According to Locke, all people are free and equal. Consequently, the natural world belongs to all people in common. But each person, along with his labor, belongs only to himself. Thus, although all ...
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According to Locke, all people are free and equal. Consequently, the natural world belongs to all people in common. But each person, along with his labor, belongs only to himself. Thus, although all people share a common right to use the world, each person acquires a private right to resources he “mixes” with his labor. Before large-scale economic development, there was no problem with each person appropriating as much as he could use, because this left “enough, and as good” for others. But once money spurred development, people could efficiently use far more. Under these new conditions, there was no longer enough and as good lying in common. Consequently, although everyone got richer through economic development, the world divided into resource owners and employees working on others’ resources. All of this posed a dilemma for Locke. On the one hand, people could be required to leave the world lying in common, preserving equal standing but sacrificing well-being for all. On the other, people could be permitted to develop the world into a network of private plots, greatly increasing well-being for all but sacrificing equal standing. Locke notices the tension, but he lacks an adequate solution. He implausibly appeals to our purported consent to money and its consequences before ending the chapter, thus leaving his property problem for others to solve.Less
According to Locke, all people are free and equal. Consequently, the natural world belongs to all people in common. But each person, along with his labor, belongs only to himself. Thus, although all people share a common right to use the world, each person acquires a private right to resources he “mixes” with his labor. Before large-scale economic development, there was no problem with each person appropriating as much as he could use, because this left “enough, and as good” for others. But once money spurred development, people could efficiently use far more. Under these new conditions, there was no longer enough and as good lying in common. Consequently, although everyone got richer through economic development, the world divided into resource owners and employees working on others’ resources. All of this posed a dilemma for Locke. On the one hand, people could be required to leave the world lying in common, preserving equal standing but sacrificing well-being for all. On the other, people could be permitted to develop the world into a network of private plots, greatly increasing well-being for all but sacrificing equal standing. Locke notices the tension, but he lacks an adequate solution. He implausibly appeals to our purported consent to money and its consequences before ending the chapter, thus leaving his property problem for others to solve.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- July 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190859213
- eISBN:
- 9780190859220
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190859213.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Classical liberals argue Rawls fails to give sufficient weight to economic liberty. This paper argues that these classical liberals are mistaken. We know that Rawls took seriously Marx’s critique ...
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Classical liberals argue Rawls fails to give sufficient weight to economic liberty. This paper argues that these classical liberals are mistaken. We know that Rawls took seriously Marx’s critique that the merely formal equality guaranteed by the basic liberties principle was de facto undermined by the material inequality permitted by the difference principle. As a response to Marx, Rawls believed that his principles could be fully specified in only one of two forms: liberal market socialism or property-owning democracy. Each fully specified system disperses capital so as to bring it under democratic control. Furthermore, within each system, economic liberties are robustly protected in a stable way. The classical liberal critique misfires as it takes only a part of his view to be the whole and neglects the full specification of these principles in one or another of Rawls’s preferred social systems.Less
Classical liberals argue Rawls fails to give sufficient weight to economic liberty. This paper argues that these classical liberals are mistaken. We know that Rawls took seriously Marx’s critique that the merely formal equality guaranteed by the basic liberties principle was de facto undermined by the material inequality permitted by the difference principle. As a response to Marx, Rawls believed that his principles could be fully specified in only one of two forms: liberal market socialism or property-owning democracy. Each fully specified system disperses capital so as to bring it under democratic control. Furthermore, within each system, economic liberties are robustly protected in a stable way. The classical liberal critique misfires as it takes only a part of his view to be the whole and neglects the full specification of these principles in one or another of Rawls’s preferred social systems.
Bas van der Vossen and Jason Brennan
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- August 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190462956
- eISBN:
- 9780190462970
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190462956.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The chapter makes a prima facie case for free trade. It argues that the case for international free trade is just as strong as the case for free domestic trade. This case is strong because trade ...
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The chapter makes a prima facie case for free trade. It argues that the case for international free trade is just as strong as the case for free domestic trade. This case is strong because trade restrictions involve coercively interfering with people’s freedom to interact on mutually acceptable grounds; such restrictions generally stand in need of justification. Second, there also exists a strong economic case for free trade. Standard economic models and history suggest that freeing up trade strongly benefits both buyers and sellers, irrespective of where they live. The chapter concludes that even though it does not offer a conclusive case for free trade by itself, the burden of proof squarely lies with those who would defend trade restrictions.Less
The chapter makes a prima facie case for free trade. It argues that the case for international free trade is just as strong as the case for free domestic trade. This case is strong because trade restrictions involve coercively interfering with people’s freedom to interact on mutually acceptable grounds; such restrictions generally stand in need of justification. Second, there also exists a strong economic case for free trade. Standard economic models and history suggest that freeing up trade strongly benefits both buyers and sellers, irrespective of where they live. The chapter concludes that even though it does not offer a conclusive case for free trade by itself, the burden of proof squarely lies with those who would defend trade restrictions.
Daniel Layman
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- July 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190939076
- eISBN:
- 9780190939106
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190939076.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
During the nineteenth century, the Lockean radicals—Thomas Hodgskin, Lysander Spooner, John Bray, and Henry George—picked up the loose ends of Locke’s property theory and wove them into two competing ...
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During the nineteenth century, the Lockean radicals—Thomas Hodgskin, Lysander Spooner, John Bray, and Henry George—picked up the loose ends of Locke’s property theory and wove them into two competing strands. Each strand addressed problems of liberty and equality that were emerging with industrial capitalism, but each did so in a different way. In one camp, Hodgskin and Spooner—the libertarian radicals—argued that the world of resources is common to all people only in the negative sense of being originally unowned by anyone. According to them, there are no just grounds for state redistribution except to correct past injustices, and governments are typically little more than thieving and oppressive gangs. In the other camp, Bray and George—the egalitarian radicals—held that all people have a positive claim to share equally in the world’s resources. According to them, states should ensure, through redistributive taxation and other progressive policies, that our institutions respect this common right. Locke Among the Radicals tells the forgotten story of the Lockean radicals and the role they played in addressing problems latent in Locke’s theory. In addition, it argues that some of the radicals’ insights can provide a blueprint for a form of liberal distributive justice that is applicable today.Less
During the nineteenth century, the Lockean radicals—Thomas Hodgskin, Lysander Spooner, John Bray, and Henry George—picked up the loose ends of Locke’s property theory and wove them into two competing strands. Each strand addressed problems of liberty and equality that were emerging with industrial capitalism, but each did so in a different way. In one camp, Hodgskin and Spooner—the libertarian radicals—argued that the world of resources is common to all people only in the negative sense of being originally unowned by anyone. According to them, there are no just grounds for state redistribution except to correct past injustices, and governments are typically little more than thieving and oppressive gangs. In the other camp, Bray and George—the egalitarian radicals—held that all people have a positive claim to share equally in the world’s resources. According to them, states should ensure, through redistributive taxation and other progressive policies, that our institutions respect this common right. Locke Among the Radicals tells the forgotten story of the Lockean radicals and the role they played in addressing problems latent in Locke’s theory. In addition, it argues that some of the radicals’ insights can provide a blueprint for a form of liberal distributive justice that is applicable today.
Thomas O. McGarity
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300141245
- eISBN:
- 9780300195217
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300141245.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
This chapter explores how the emergence of the corporate form blended nicely with the laissez faire ideology of an expanding class of economic elites in the growing American industrial economy. For ...
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This chapter explores how the emergence of the corporate form blended nicely with the laissez faire ideology of an expanding class of economic elites in the growing American industrial economy. For the laissez faire gurus of the Gilded Age, the ultimate repository of virtue was the marketplace. For Gilded Age elites who believed that economic liberty and individual liberty were inextricably linked, the logical next step was to afford corporations the status of personhood. Laissez faire minimalism yielded undeniable benefits for society. By almost every conceivable measure, the United States economy grew during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The American Mining Congress came up with its own standards for mine safety, and persuaded Congress to establish a mine safety program in the Bureau of Mines to adopt those standards and pre-empt more stringent state standards.Less
This chapter explores how the emergence of the corporate form blended nicely with the laissez faire ideology of an expanding class of economic elites in the growing American industrial economy. For the laissez faire gurus of the Gilded Age, the ultimate repository of virtue was the marketplace. For Gilded Age elites who believed that economic liberty and individual liberty were inextricably linked, the logical next step was to afford corporations the status of personhood. Laissez faire minimalism yielded undeniable benefits for society. By almost every conceivable measure, the United States economy grew during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The American Mining Congress came up with its own standards for mine safety, and persuaded Congress to establish a mine safety program in the Bureau of Mines to adopt those standards and pre-empt more stringent state standards.
Bas van der Vossen and Jason Brennan
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- August 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190462956
- eISBN:
- 9780190462970
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190462956.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The chapter defends economic liberties such as the right to private property and freedom of contract as basic human rights, which the authors refer to as productive human rights. Despite being ...
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The chapter defends economic liberties such as the right to private property and freedom of contract as basic human rights, which the authors refer to as productive human rights. Despite being largely ignored or criticized in the theory and practice of human rights, they serve all the key functions that human rights generally serve. Using a basic interest framework, the chapter show that productive rights qualify as human rights because they both directly serve the interests of individual rights-holders, as well as the interests of people across the societies in which they are upheld. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the theoretical implications of a theory of justice that omits productive rights, and focuses only on things like meeting people’s needs. Such a theory will end up distorting important truths about human life and agency.Less
The chapter defends economic liberties such as the right to private property and freedom of contract as basic human rights, which the authors refer to as productive human rights. Despite being largely ignored or criticized in the theory and practice of human rights, they serve all the key functions that human rights generally serve. Using a basic interest framework, the chapter show that productive rights qualify as human rights because they both directly serve the interests of individual rights-holders, as well as the interests of people across the societies in which they are upheld. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the theoretical implications of a theory of justice that omits productive rights, and focuses only on things like meeting people’s needs. Such a theory will end up distorting important truths about human life and agency.
Bas van der Vossen and Jason Brennan
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- August 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190462956
- eISBN:
- 9780190462970
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190462956.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The humane and workable solution to global poverty is freedom. We can help the poor—and help ourselves at the same time—by tearing down our walls and trade barriers. Both justice and good economic ...
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The humane and workable solution to global poverty is freedom. We can help the poor—and help ourselves at the same time—by tearing down our walls and trade barriers. Both justice and good economic sense require that we open borders, free up international trade, and respect the economic liberties of people around the world. What global justice requires is an open world. Most books on global justice see the world’s poor as little more than mouths to be fed. Their authors see justice as a zero-sum game: some must lose so that others may win. They rely on controversial moral intuitions and outdated or mistaken economic beliefs about economic growth. Van der Vossen and Brennan present global justice as a positive-sum game: the methods that can best help the world’s poor also help everyone else. Using mainstream development economics and common-sense moral intuitions, they argue that instead of treating the world’s poor as helpless victims who must be rescued by the rich, we should remove the coercive limits that keep people poor in the first place. We should offer people the freedom to work, produce, trade, and migrate, in ways that help better themselves and others who are willing to cooperate with them. In Defense of Openness offers a new approach to global justice: we don’t need to “save” the poor. The poor will save themselves, if only we would get out of their way and let them.Less
The humane and workable solution to global poverty is freedom. We can help the poor—and help ourselves at the same time—by tearing down our walls and trade barriers. Both justice and good economic sense require that we open borders, free up international trade, and respect the economic liberties of people around the world. What global justice requires is an open world. Most books on global justice see the world’s poor as little more than mouths to be fed. Their authors see justice as a zero-sum game: some must lose so that others may win. They rely on controversial moral intuitions and outdated or mistaken economic beliefs about economic growth. Van der Vossen and Brennan present global justice as a positive-sum game: the methods that can best help the world’s poor also help everyone else. Using mainstream development economics and common-sense moral intuitions, they argue that instead of treating the world’s poor as helpless victims who must be rescued by the rich, we should remove the coercive limits that keep people poor in the first place. We should offer people the freedom to work, produce, trade, and migrate, in ways that help better themselves and others who are willing to cooperate with them. In Defense of Openness offers a new approach to global justice: we don’t need to “save” the poor. The poor will save themselves, if only we would get out of their way and let them.