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Organizations representing economic interests within individual nation states peaked in both social importance and academic interest during the 1970s and 1980s. It is often argued that since then they have declined in significance. There are four reasons for this: increasing economic globalization, the dominance of neo–liberal economic ideology, the rise of the individual enterprise, and the challenge of various non–functional (non–producer) interests. This chapter assesses the significance of each of these, paying attention to both general or convergent trends and to those that suggest differences of national experience among European countries. The range of organizations included in the discussion are first established, and the four types of interest relationships (contestation, pluralism, bargained corporatism and authoritarian corporatism) between the organizations and their members and those with whom they deal are identified.

Questions the assumptions underlying US democracy promotion policies, namely, that democracy is a self‐evident and uncontentious concept and that the US‐style democracy is applicable across different cultures and societies. It argues that the US promotes a formal electoral model of democracy that dissociates politics from its socio–economic setting and is designed to advance American economic interests in the global system.

This is the second of three chapters on the role of economic interests, and of systems for representing those interests, in the politics of welfare state reform. They explore the linkages between national welfare states and national economies, and examine the processes through which economic actors press their interests on policy makers. Section 1 of Manow's chapter offers a critical account of contributions that predict the formation of new political coalitions along the cleavage line between those firms and workers that are forced to adjust to international market pressures and those that enjoy domestic shelter from globalized markets; a brief discussion is included of the relative importance of the electorate in current welfare reforms as compared with the role played by organized interests of capital and labour. Section 2 presents a transaction cost argument that seeks to identify one central logic linking production and protection in continental welfare states and coordinated market economies, respectively; the central argument is that generous welfare state programmes may enhance and not diminish international competitiveness and can be part of the comparative institutional advantage of an economy rather than solely contributing to its comparative cost disadvantage. Section 3 concludes by briefly discussing the implications of the argument presented in Sect. 2 for the present debate on the compensatory role of the welfare state in a globalized economy.

This is the first of three chapters on the role of economic interests, and of systems for representing those interests, in the politics of welfare state reform. They explore the linkages between national welfare states and national economies, and examine the processes through which economic actors press their interests on policy makers. Huber and Stephens explore at length the linkages between different types of welfare states and different production regimes, and demonstrate that there are in fact quite different configurations within the universe of affluent democracies, with particular types of welfare states strongly associated with distinct systems of economic organization. Their analysis proceeds in three steps: first, a conceptualization is provided of welfare state and production regimes, with an analysis of their performance up to the 1980s; second, an analysis is made of pressures on these regimes and the resulting welfare state retrenchments since the 1980s; and third, an assessment is made of possible future paths to adaptation, recovery, and consolidation.

Starts by discussing the new era of austerity in the contemporary welfare state, the reasons for it, and the political problems that it creates. Describes the project that gave rise to the book as bringing together leading researchers from Europe and North America, who seek to increase knowledge about the politics of the contemporary welfare state. The focus is on four overlapping themes, which are covered in the four main parts of the book: (1) the sources and scope of pressures on national welfare states; (2) the role of economic interests, and of systems for representing those interests, in the politics of reform; (3) the implications of electoral politics and the design of political institutions for welfare state adjustment; and (4) the distinctive policy dynamics of particular areas of social provision. These themes are intimately linked, and the linkages between them are made explicit both within and across the chapters of the book. This introduction outlines the four themes and introduces the contributions of the chapters to follow.

This is the third of three chapters on the role of economic interests, and of systems for representing those interests, in the politics of welfare state reform; they explore the linkages between national welfare states and national economies, and examine the processes through which economic actors press their interests on policy makers. Here Rhodes explores the implications for welfare states of nationally negotiated social pacts in bridging and making innovative linkages between social security systems and employment rules and wage bargaining. The essential argument of Sect. 1 is that the emergence of social pacts is linked to common domestic and external pressures for welfare state reform in the European Union, and that contrary to the expectations of many commentators, these pressures are neither ‘disorganizing’ European capitalism nor neutralizing the power of the state; furthermore, rather than fragmenting political‐economic structures, pressures for reform have in many instances modified or even bolstered efforts at coordination via bargaining. Section 2 introduces the notion of ‘competitive corporatism’, and shows that underpinning these social pacts are varying degrees of associational cohesion, and two types of coalition — seeking distributional deals and productivity gains — which have complex linkages and overlaps. In ideal typical terms, it can be suggested that competitive corporatism is successfully achieved if underpinned by a close but flexible interlocking of these two types of coalition, although in practice it is not always possible, as has been demonstrated in various continental European countries.

Issues of social group autarky are addressed, with particular reference to their economic costs. The different sections of the chapter address the social interests of such groups, give some American examples (the Lubavitch Jewish community of Brooklyn, and American farmers—the need for which has declined as agricultural productivity has risen dramatically), individual versus group economic benefits, special status for social groups, conflict between special‐status social groups (exemplified by professional, religious, status, linguistic, and ethnic groups), and conflict within special‐status groups.