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Traces the establishment of international presence in Kosovo following the signing of the Military‐Technical Agreement (MTA) between NATO and Yugoslavia and the implementation of the UN Security Resolution 1244. The chapter points to the success of the Kosovo International Security Force (KFOR) deployed by NATO to ensure security on ground, and to the mixed record of the civilian United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo in establishing effective presence. While the return of Albanian refugees was a success for UNMIK, the chapter argues that both KFOR and UNMIK failed to prevent revenge killings and that the poorly deployed UN police force was unprepared to stop inter‐ethnic violence, especially against Kosovo Serbs. Economic assistance and fight against organized crime are identified as some of the major challenges for UNMIK.

This lecture presents the text of the speech about economic development delivered by the author at the 2008 Keynes Lecture in Economics held at the British Academy. It examines macro and micro kinds of economic assistance and evaluates how assistance works. The lecture suggests that econometric methodology needs to be assessed, not only by methodologists but also by those who are concerned with the substance of the issue.

This chapter addresses the question of whether foreign economic assistance to states grossly disregarding human rights has an impact on the enjoyment of civil and political rights in those states, focusing on the case of Chile. It shows that in Chile, economic assistance to a very great extent permits the perpetuation of violations of human rights, and such violations, in turn, bring about the necessary conditions to obtain economic assistance.

This chapter examines the coordination and attribution problems of regional public goods in developing country regions. It explains that underfunding in these regions may be attributed to the lack of national and regional capacity to coordinate, the traditional country focus on current foreign aid systems, and the absence of both strong recipient-country demand and donor self-interest. It stresses the importance of addressing these issues in accelerating development and fostering global progress and development.

This chapter examines the role of pull instruments or challenge grants within the overall framework of foreign aid. It evaluates the Millennium Challenge Account and suggests that challenge programs could be a first step toward designing aid delivery approaches for different countries. It suggests that more differentiated strategies could allow donors to tailor aid delivery instruments more closely to the strengths and weaknesses of recipient countries, which would make aid more efficient and effective.

This chapter describes how a materialistic vision of society and the lack of a sense of common purpose in American life have made it extremely difficult for law and public policy to confront poverty in the United States in a way that takes seriously the full humanity of poor people. After explaining how current reforms of economic assistance for those who are impoverished fail to take key cultural problems into account, it argues that the creators of welfare reform had an impoverished sense of the fundamental needs of poor people.

This chapter details the reactions of Moscow and Beijing to the sudden opportunities presented by decolonization between 1958 and 1960. It also looks at the beginnings of Chinese suspicions of Soviet intentions and policies, especially in the wake of Moscow's decision to support India in its border conflict with China in 1959. Soviet foreign policy toward the newly emerging states focused on detaching them politically from their former colonial masters and opening them up to Soviet influence, which largely meant Soviet economic assistance and direction. This approach was in keeping with the broader policy of promoting peace to gain sympathy in Europe and reversing the perception of Moscow as a threat around the world while asserting the practical superiority of the socialist system. The Chinese however saw this as a failure of the Soviet Union to evaluate adequately the revolutionary significance of movements in the developing world.

This chapter examines the transfer of financial aid through the use of the instruments of grants and loans or their combination. It suggests that the provision of aid is hard to justify because loans have been made to countries with low income, weak governance and high risk of default, while grants have been distributed across the spectrum of per capita income rather than being narrowly focused on high-risk countries. It contends that creditworthiness should affect the composition rather than the amount of the total resource transfer, such that a country with high absorptive capacity for aid but with low creditworthiness should receive large resource transfers in the form of grants.

This chapter focuses on the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty of 1979. The first part examines whether societal or statist strategies and motivations inspired the treaty between these longstanding enemies. The second part examines why the agreement has endured but has not become a stable peace. It concludes that the treaty was motivated by a statist logic, principally the need of both parties to secure US military and economic assistance—as well as to respond to American coaxing and pressure—and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat's urgent need to alleviate domestic economic and political pressures that threatened to topple him from power. Unlike in the Western European case, however, the treaty was never socialized with the help of democratization, international institutions, the generation of extensive bilateral economic interaction, or the elimination of the state-to-nation imbalance. Consequently, while the treaty has endured for statist reasons, it remains fundamentally unstable.

This chapter outlines how Gorbachev encouraged the fraternal regimes of CEE to convene their respective conferences, so that these parties would align with CPSU perestroika and establish party unity as factionalism grew. By shedding new light on the role of the conference in Gorbachev's controlled liberalisation strategy, the chapter demonstrates that Gorbachev expected the fraternal parties to adopt this policy in the spirit of ‘socialist internationalism’. Archival documents suggest that Gorbachev intended to maintain the Soviet Union's ‘outer empire’ under proposed quasi-market conditions rather than democratisation and the severing of Soviet ties with these states. At the domestic level, the fraternal conferences were designed as a show of solidarity for Gorbachev's perestroika, and leadership renewal in these states was to cement perestroika in the fraternal parties. This process of modernisation was intended to make the one-party state more efficient and improve its image, both at home and abroad, which would in turn increase its appeal with the aim of preserving the socialist model.

This chapter examines internationalization, which is always seen as essential in fostering a country’s long-term economic growth. Based on the concept of comparative advantages, cross-border trade of goods and services is expected to generate positive welfare effects. However, not all countries have been conducive to internationalization. In particular, centrally planned economies failed to benefit. The system of central planning hindered participation in world markets. Due to the autarkic nature of ‘forced industrialization’, the countries had to rely on barter deals and bilateralism. This impeded internationalization, both within the Eastern bloc as well as between the communist ‘East’ and the market-oriented ‘West’. After the collapse of communism in 1989, the opening up of the economy became pivotal in the transition to a full-fledged market economy. Transition strategies have nonetheless been quite different and by no means implied a severely marginalized role for the state. On the contrary, state capitalism has emerged as a viable outward-looking alternative.

This chapter discusses how India and the United States are making efforts to develop a better relationship. The United States emphasizes developing better ties with India, as it realizes that the country is strategically placed in South Asia. The two countries have also realized that mutual benefits can be derived from such a partnership. The United States is set to benefit more as it can utilize India’s strategic location to monitor other emerging powers of the region and to minimize prevailing nuclear tensions. India can derive significant economic benefits from the partnership by alleviating poverty through economic assistance from the United States.

This chapter aims to provide a different approach to the development of regional IOs since World War II, by singling out non-democratic tendencies in regionalism from a historical perspective. It explores differences between the functioning of DROs and NDROs over the last 70 years—from coerced organizations such as COMECON to modern alliances of autocrats. The chapter argues that the twenty-first-century NDROs (e.g. SCO) are different from those of the last half of the twentieth century (e.g. COMECON) in terms of membership composition, governance structure, and the characteristics discussed in earlier chapters. While historical NDROs were driven by ideologies such as Communism, in the main modern NDROs lack an ideological foundation (with the exception of ALBA and the Islamic world). The ideological foundation of Islamic ROs has changed—from pan-Arabism in the 1940s and 1950s to the dominance of various forms of political Islam and a focus on specific political institutions (e.g. the conservative rule of Gulf monarchies in the GCC).