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In the general introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals where Kant discusses the concept of obligation and its law, he remarks that “the simplicity of this law in comparison with the great and various consequences that can be drawn from it must seem astonishing at first…” (MS 6: 225). In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant sets forth a system of duties to oneself and to others in which he appears to derive them from the humanity formulation of the CI, thus illustrating the “great and various consequences” that follow from the moral law. Smit and Timmons understand Kant’s derivations in the Doctrine of Virtue as purporting not only to justify in the sense of proving or showing true various claims about the deontic status of various types of actions and associated attitudes, but they view the derivations as also purporting explain why the various actions and attitudes have the deontic status Kant claims they have. The aim of their contribution is to (1) provide an interpretation of the humanity formulation which, they argue, is rich in content, and then (2) examine the various derivations featured in the Doctrine of Virtue in order to evaluate their success in providing plausible explanations of the various duties to self and duties to others Kant discusses.

This chapter argues that a person can owe second-personal duties to herself by virtue of the fact that she occupies multiple temporal perspectives. An individual’s wellbeing at one time can conflict with her wellbeing at another time, and her ends at one moment can conflict with her ends at another moment. Because of this, a person can make demands on herself from one temporal perspective to another, pertaining to the protection of her wellbeing and ends, just as she might make demands on another person. Such demands can generate second-personal duties across time, as they can when they are issued interpersonally, and so a person can owe duties to her past and future selves, just as she owes them to others. Since duties owed to the self at a time other than the present cannot be waived, the waivability objection is answered.

This chapter argues that a person can owe second-personal duties to herself at a moment, rather than merely across time. At a single moment, a person occupies multiple perspectives, associated with different practical identities. The good associated with one of her practical identities can conflict with the good associated with another practical identity, and her ends adopted from the standpoint of one identity can conflict with her ends adopted by another. Because of this, a person can make demands on herself from the perspective of one practical identity to another, pertaining to the protection of her wellbeing and ends, just as she might make demands on another person. Such demands can generate second-personal duties, which require that a person treat herself a particular way in the present. Since some duties owed to the self cannot be waived due to their relationship to the individual’s identity, the waivability objection is answered.

This chapter distinguishes between mere self-regarding reasons to treat oneself in particular ways, and more robust moral duties owed to oneself. While the former are a philosophical commonplace, the latter are absent from most contemporary accounts and their addition to our practical philosophy would be significant. Duties owed to the self are second-personal, in the sense of being directed at a specific person. When a person has a duty to herself, her reasons are particularly strict, they pre-empt other reasons, they require a special sort of acknowledgment of their moral quality, and they engage special moral emotions. As such, if a person accepts that she owes duties to herself, it will impact the way in which she treats herself, and the way she relates to herself, beyond the mere acknowledgment that she has self-regarding reasons.

This chapter introduces the concept of duties to the self, situating it within our everyday thought and talk, as well as within the history of moral philosophy. Contemporary dismissals of self-duty are discussed, as are contemporary Kantian attempts to appeal to the notion without vindicating it, and it is concluded that there exists a need for a comprehensive defense of duties to the self. The chapter concludes by noting the lack of discussion of self-duty within political philosophy, and by raising the possibility of paternalistic law justified through appeal to state-enforced duties to the self.

This chapter lays out and then develops the “waivability objection,” which has throughout philosophy’s history been the most serious objection to duties to the self. The objection holds that a person who has a duty to herself will always be in a position to waive it, and a duty that a person can simply escape by waiving it is no duty at all. Some attempts to answer this objection, including Kant’s, are considered and rejected. The chapter concludes that this objection is formidable and that any account of duties to the self should be constructed in response to it.

This opening chapter spells out the key concepts deployed throughout the book. It also contends, against integrity skeptics of various types, that personal integrity, understood as fidelity to one’s fundamental commitments, can actually have independent moral significance. The focus is on two arguments, both revolving around unconditional commitments. The first, the unfairness argument, holds that since morality itself pushes agents to incorporate certain unconditional commitments into their self-conception, it is unfair to criticize agents who go on to treat these commitments as an independent factor in their moral deliberation. The second argument links agents’ unconditional moral commitments to their self-respect. Both arguments allow us to see why one’s integrity is not simply parasitic upon one “doing the right thing.” Rather, integrity can inform the analysis of what one morally ought to do.

This chapter considers lines of inquiry that emerge from the argument pursued throughout the book. It considers the possibility, raised by Kant, that self-duty is a necessary ground for all duty. It considers a debate between Kant and Fichte about the nature of self-consciousness, discussing ways in which the account in the book might illuminate that debate. Finally, it considers the implication of holding, as this book does, that parts of a unified whole can relate to one another second-personally, and applies this thought to debates in political philosophy about communitarianism and liberalism.

This chapter defends Kant’s claim that we cannot have duties to animals and asks why he seems to think that if we did not recognize some moral constraint in the treatment of animals (an indirect duty with regard to them) the fact that some of us acted cruelly would “uproot” a natural predisposition in all of us that is “serviceable to morality.” It’s a puzzle, since many of us, even without a duty, would be kind. Because animals inform our understanding of our own embodied life, we mistake who we are if we don’t extend the reach of our duties to them.

This chapter argues for the existence of political duties owed to the self, which justify state coercion for the sake of the individual coerced. A person can pose a threat to her own freedom, and to her own ability to acquire what she is owed. Thus, a person’s relationship to herself raises concerns about both right and justice, thereby licensing the state to subject her to paternalistic policy, justified on liberal grounds. Paternalistic laws discussed include those outlawing tobacco, those limiting the amount of debt a person can take on, forced savings programs, and prohibitions on slavery contracts.

Although Kant was generally opposed to suicide, many contemporary ethicists invoke recognizably Kantian notions, including dignity and autonomy, in their defense of assisted dying or “death with dignity.” This chapter sorts out what Kant’s understanding of dignity implies about assisted dying. Kant’s understanding of dignity as rooted in practically rational agency distinguishes his account of dignity as a trait that is universal, unified, equal, and inalienable and that entails a duty of self-preservation as fundamental to respecting rational agency. Nevertheless, Kant’s arguments do not establish an obligation to forego suicide (and hence, an obligation on the part of others not to assist in suicide) in each and every case. Although Kant’s notion of dignity cannot be deployed to defend a broad permission for suicide akin to that favored by the “death with dignity” movement, it also does not entail as restrictive a stance on morally permissible suicide or on assisted dying.

This chapter discusses difficulties with the idea that there exist duties to the self that the state may paternalistically force a person to discharge. The liberal tradition typically prizes freedom, and so views with suspicion any suggestion that a person ought to be coerced for her own sake. State coercion is permissible only to realize right and justice, which are usually thought to regulate relationships between distinct persons. Since a person’s relationship to herself is typically not thought to be one regulated by right or justice, coercion of a person for her own sake has been consistently rejected within the liberal tradition.

This chapter examines the claim that there are certain beliefs, attitudes, and fantasies that are impermissible simply in virtue of their content. Although this claim has a recognizably deontological flavor, it has not received much sustained attention from deontologists. However, interesting arguments for it can be extracted from Thomas Scanlon’s contractualism and from Kant’s own theory, and the chapter examines these in some detail. Where Kant’s theory is concerned, the doctrines discussed include the universalizability test, the idea that each rational agent is an end in himself, the idea that all rational agency commands our respect, and the idea that we all have duties of self-perfection. Although there is obviously room for further discussion, the chapter’s conclusion is that no convincing deontological argument for putting any thoughts off limits is yet in sight.