Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary, and Finn Spicer (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199551118
- eISBN:
- 9780191594960
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199551118.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
What is the relationship between perception and action, between an organism and its environment, in explaining consciousness? These are issues at the heart of philosophy of mind and the cognitive ...
More
What is the relationship between perception and action, between an organism and its environment, in explaining consciousness? These are issues at the heart of philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. This book explores the relationship between perception and action from a variety of interdisciplinary perspectives, ranging from theoretical discussion of concepts to findings from recent scientific studies. It incorporates contributions from leading philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, and an artificial intelligence theorist. The contributions take a range of positions with respect to the view that perception is an achievement by an agent acting in a complex environment in which sensorimotor dynamics constitute an essential ingredient to perceptual experience. A key focus of the book is on the debate about action-oriented theories of visual perception versus the dual-visual systems hypothesis: the former champions the role of sensorimotor dynamics in perceptual awareness while the latter favours a functional dichotomy between perception and action. At least on the surface, these two approaches are in conflict. Where one emphasizes the interdependence of action and perception, the other suggests that action and perception are functionally distinct. The dialogue between these two approaches brings out wider theoretical issues underlying the research paradigm of cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind.Less
What is the relationship between perception and action, between an organism and its environment, in explaining consciousness? These are issues at the heart of philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. This book explores the relationship between perception and action from a variety of interdisciplinary perspectives, ranging from theoretical discussion of concepts to findings from recent scientific studies. It incorporates contributions from leading philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, and an artificial intelligence theorist. The contributions take a range of positions with respect to the view that perception is an achievement by an agent acting in a complex environment in which sensorimotor dynamics constitute an essential ingredient to perceptual experience. A key focus of the book is on the debate about action-oriented theories of visual perception versus the dual-visual systems hypothesis: the former champions the role of sensorimotor dynamics in perceptual awareness while the latter favours a functional dichotomy between perception and action. At least on the surface, these two approaches are in conflict. Where one emphasizes the interdependence of action and perception, the other suggests that action and perception are functionally distinct. The dialogue between these two approaches brings out wider theoretical issues underlying the research paradigm of cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind.
Yves Rossetti, Hisaaki Ota, Annabelle Blangero, Alain Vighetto, and Laure Pisella
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199551118
- eISBN:
- 9780191594960
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199551118.003.0010
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
A main issue in the debate centring on the relation between perception and action is the following: how much of our actions can be performed independently from perception? An answer to this question ...
More
A main issue in the debate centring on the relation between perception and action is the following: how much of our actions can be performed independently from perception? An answer to this question seems to be provided in the field of motor neuroscience. Accordingly, the main paradigms in the field have tried to investigate residual visuo-motor abilities in patients with visual deficits (e.g., visually guided reach-to-grasp in cortical blindness (blindsight) or visual form agnosia, or to delineate specific visual deficits that would be specific to the action system and not affect perceptual responses (e.g., optic ataxia)). This chapter examines the conclusions which can be drawn from the investigation of optic ataxia through a review of the recent developments made in relation to this neurological condition. It argues that a general oversimplification of the dual-visual systems hypothesis (Milner and Goodale 1995) has led to the popular interpretation that ‘dorsal = action’. It challenges the claims of a neat double dissociation between the conditions observed in optic ataxia and visual agnosia, and in turn between perception and action.Less
A main issue in the debate centring on the relation between perception and action is the following: how much of our actions can be performed independently from perception? An answer to this question seems to be provided in the field of motor neuroscience. Accordingly, the main paradigms in the field have tried to investigate residual visuo-motor abilities in patients with visual deficits (e.g., visually guided reach-to-grasp in cortical blindness (blindsight) or visual form agnosia, or to delineate specific visual deficits that would be specific to the action system and not affect perceptual responses (e.g., optic ataxia)). This chapter examines the conclusions which can be drawn from the investigation of optic ataxia through a review of the recent developments made in relation to this neurological condition. It argues that a general oversimplification of the dual-visual systems hypothesis (Milner and Goodale 1995) has led to the popular interpretation that ‘dorsal = action’. It challenges the claims of a neat double dissociation between the conditions observed in optic ataxia and visual agnosia, and in turn between perception and action.
