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Dual-Content Theory: the Explanatory Advantages

Peter Carruthers

in Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199277360
eISBN:
9780191602597
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199277362.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Presents and develops what the author takes to be the main argument, both against the most plausible version of first-order representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness, and in support of ... More


Introduction

Peter Carruthers

in Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199277360
eISBN:
9780191602597
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199277362.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Elaborates some of the background assumptions made by the chapters that follow and situates the theory that the author espouses (dual-content theory) within a wider context and range of alternatives. ... More


Natural Theories of Consciousness

Peter Carruthers

in Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199277360
eISBN:
9780191602597
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199277362.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Works its way through a variety of different accounts of phenomenal consciousness, looking at the strengths and weaknesses of each. At the heart of the chapter is an extended critical examination of ... More


Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences

Peter Carruthers

in Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199277360
eISBN:
9780191602597
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199277362.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Argues for the need to recognise higher-order perceptual experiences and briefly argues for the superiority of the author’s own dispositional HOT version of higher-order perception (HOP) theory (here ... More


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