Search Results

This chapter argues that reflective believers' concern is ultimately not just for the epistemic, but for the moral justifiability of their taking faith-beliefs to be true. In response to the doxastic voluntarism this seems to imply, it is argued that control in relation to beliefs is exercised at two ‘loci’: indirect control over what we hold to be true, and direct control over what we take to be true in our practical reasoning. This latter is open to moral evaluation whenever the actions to which such reasoning can lead are morally significant. This condition is met in the case of theistic faith-beliefs, which pervasively influence how people live. We therefore need an ethics of belief, or better, of faith-commitment that specifies the conditions under which it is morally permissible to commit oneself practically to the truth of a theistic (or any other) faith-belief.

Discusses the merits of versions of doxastic voluntarism, the thesis that we form beliefs voluntarily. It criticizes some forms of doxastic voluntarism, but concedes that we do have a kind of indirect control over our beliefs. The chapter also examines various theses about the attitudes that we epistemically ought to have. An evidentialist thesis about the attitudes we epistemically ought to have is supported.

An outline of the evidentialist view of justification, a defense of the view against recent objections, and a presentation of advantages of the view over various rival approaches, including ones that emphasize deontological considerations and ones that emphasize reliability.

Direct doxastic voluntarism is commonly thought to be conceptually impossible owing to the way in which belief aims at truth. In this chapter, Reisner argues that the view that belief aims at truth actually strongly suggests the conceptual possibility of direct doxastic voluntarism. Reisner considers some possible consequences to this argument, including the ramifications for our views about normative reasons for belief.

This chapter attempts to establish three theses. First, in response to recent work by Frankish, it argues that DDV is false-i.e., that people lack the power to form beliefs at will directly. Second, drawing on recent studies in social psychology, it contends that people have a propensity to form beliefs for non-epistemic reasons. Third, it argues that although DDV is false, once people become aware of their propensities to form beliefs for non-epistemic reasons, they have obligations to avoid triggering them-which are similar in kind to the sorts of obligations people would have if DDV were true.

This chapter develops and defends an argument against direct doxastic voluntarism. It argues that it is impossible for a person to succeed in exercising direct voluntary control over coming to believe that a proposition is true, on the basis of practical reasons alone. The case for this thesis proceeds in three steps. It begins by reviewing Bernard Williams’s seminal argument for a similar thesis, and it elucidates the reasons that Williams’s argument is regarded as a failure. The chapter continues by identifying a few constraints on belief formation. In the final section before the conclusion, it presents the case for a novel view and notes the ways in which it avoids the kind of objections levied against the position taken by Williams.

This chapter turns to the epistemic dimensions of control. It is argued that these conditions are very demanding: moral responsibility for an action requires that the agent understands that, and how, the action is sensitive to her behaviour, as well as appreciation of the significance of that action or culpable ignorance of these facts. Precisely the same condition applies to culpable ignorance itself: holding agents to be responsible for their ignorance requires the identification of some act regarding which they possessed the relevant beliefs. It follows that culpable ignorance is much rarer than most philosophers think.

The second of two forms of ontological uncertainty, previously introduced, is explored in detail. This form of uncertainty concerns the contention that not only is ontological commitment something that varies between individuals with different, prior, philosophical commitments in the form of different epistemic stances, but some such differences are irresolvable in principle. The deflationary stance and the two stances most relevant to disputes about this form of uncertainty—the empiricist and metaphysical stances—are considered. The view that the stance one adopts is subject to a kind of choice, thus constituting a form of epistemic voluntarism, is elaborated. Crucial to this view is a description and defense of “permissive” norms of rationality for ontological belief, according to which more than one but not all possible stances are rationally acceptable.

Kant’s Critical philosophy depends on the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, which he borrowed from Aristotle. But unlike Aristotle Kant claims that theoretical reason is subordinate to practical reason. This raises the possibility that theoretical judging could be a voluntary activity. This chapter investigates Kant’s view of the relation between theoretical judgments and the will. Based on Andrew Chignell’s recent work, it is argued that Kant recognizes the legitimate direct use of the will only in judgments he labels Belief (Glaube). With respect to Knowledge, his position is identical to Descartes’s position on clear and distinct perception. An analysis of Kant’s voluntarism regarding the activities of theoretical reason provides a model for subordinating theoretical reason to practical reason.

This chapter provides an account of intellectual courage is defended according to which intellectual courage is a disposition to persist in a doxastic state (e.g. belief) or course of action (e.g. inquiry) aimed at an epistemic good despite the fact that doing so involves an apparent threat to one's well‐being. In the course of this defense, several additional questions and issues are addressed, including the significance of fear and danger relative to the essential “context” of intellectual courage, the sorts of states and activities in which intellectual courage can be manifested, and when or under what conditions an exercise of intellectual courage is virtuous. The upshot of this and the preceding three chapters is that some form of “autonomous” character‐based virtue epistemology is viable.

Moderate scientism is the view that empirical science can help answer questions in nonscientific disciplines. This chapter evaluates moderate scientism in philosophy. It reviews several ways that science has contributed to research in epistemology, action theory, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. It also reviews several ways that science has contributed to our understanding of how philosophers make judgments and decisions. Based on this research, it concludes that the case for moderate philosophical scientism is strong: Scientific practice has promoted significant progress in philosophy, and its further development should be welcomed and encouraged.

This chapter explores what exactly self-deception is from a Kantian point of view. It is shown that though Kant initially seems to explain self-deception by drawing on the concept of an internal or inner lie, this does not provide a fruitful path forward. However, with the aid of certain source materials—in particular, Kant’s lectures on logic—a much more promising account of self-deception can be developed. On this account, self-deception is a rationally sophisticated and rationally minded form of irrationality, one that involves a process Kant refers to as rationalization (Vernünfteln). This chapter both explores rationalization and offers several illustrations of its use. The chapter also demonstrates that since the boundary between impermissible self-deceit and justified doxastic voluntarism depends on the laudability of motives and goals, self-deceptive rationalization must ultimately be understood more as a normative concept than a descriptive one.

Our options include all and only those events over which we exert the relevant sort of control. This chapter argues that the relevant sort of control must be complete as opposed to partial and synchronic as opposed to diachronic (i.e., the sort of control that we exercise at a moment in time rather than over a span of time). And it’s argued that the relevant sort of control is personal as opposed to subpersonal (i.e., the sort of control that makes our actions intelligible in terms of reasons and not just in terms of cause and effect). Last, it’s argued that the relevant sort of control is not the sort that we exert directly over our intentional acts by forming certain volitions, but the sort that we exert directly over our reasons-responsive attitudes (e.g., our beliefs, desires, and intentions) by being both receptive and reactive to reasons.

The principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ is defended: it follows from the classical semantics for ‘ought’, and the objections to it can be answered. If the ‘ought’ is a non-trivial agential ‘ought’, the agent must be also able to act or think otherwise than as she ought. Such a non-trivial ‘ought’ implies a ‘two-way power’ (the agent can act or think as she ought, and also act or think otherwise). This kind of two-way power is explained. It need not involve acting or thinking voluntarily or ‘at will’; but it must involve the agent’s having appropriate opportunities for exercising her capacities. It is suggested that opportunities can be reduced to chances, and capacities to dispositions, of appropriate kinds. Prima facie, this account is compatible with the idea that we are subject to non-trivial rational requirements, each of which entails a corresponding non-trivial agential ‘ought’.