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Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief

John Bishop

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780199205547
eISBN:
9780191709432
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205547.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion

Can it be justifiable to commit oneself ‘by faith’ to a religious claim when its truth lacks adequate support from one's total available evidence? After critiquing both Wittgensteinian and Reformed ... More


Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue

Matthias Steup (ed.)

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195128925
eISBN:
9780199833764
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195128923.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Gathers 11 new and 3 previously published essays, all of which bear on questions having to do with epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. In the Introduction, Steup provides a summary ... More


The ‘Justifiability’ of Faith‐beliefs: An Ultimately Moral Issue

John Bishop

in Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780199205547
eISBN:
9780191709432
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205547.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion

This chapter argues that reflective believers' concern is ultimately not just for the epistemic, but for the moral justifiability of their taking faith-beliefs to be true. In response to the doxastic ... More


Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of Belief

Robert Audi

in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195128925
eISBN:
9780199833764
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195128923.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Attempts to find a place for an ethics of belief given that belief is not under voluntary control. Distinguishes between a behavioral and a genetic version of doxastic voluntarism and rejects both. ... More


The Ethics of Belief

Richard Feldman

in Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
August 2004
ISBN:
9780199253722
eISBN:
9780191601361
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199253722.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Discusses the merits of versions of doxastic voluntarism, the thesis that we form beliefs voluntarily. It criticizes some forms of doxastic voluntarism, but concedes that we do have a kind of ... More


Evidentialism

Richard Feldman and Earl Conee

in Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
August 2004
ISBN:
9780199253722
eISBN:
9780191601361
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199253722.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

An outline of the evidentialist view of justification, a defense of the view against recent objections, and a presentation of advantages of the view over various rival approaches, including ones that ... More


Leaps of Knowledge

Andrew Reisner

in The Aim of Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199672134
eISBN:
9780191759079
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Direct doxastic voluntarism is commonly thought to be conceptually impossible owing to the way in which belief aims at truth. In this chapter, Reisner argues that the view that belief aims at truth ... More


The Powers that Bind:: Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Obligation

Neil Levy and Eric Mandelbaum

in The Ethics of Belief

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
September 2014
ISBN:
9780199686520
eISBN:
9780191766343
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686520.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter attempts to establish three theses. First, in response to recent work by Frankish, it argues that DDV is false-i.e., that people lack the power to form beliefs at will directly. Second, ... More


Deciding to Believe Redux

Andrei A. Buckareff

in The Ethics of Belief

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
September 2014
ISBN:
9780199686520
eISBN:
9780191766343
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686520.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter develops and defends an argument against direct doxastic voluntarism. It argues that it is impossible for a person to succeed in exercising direct voluntary control over coming to ... More


The Epistemic Dimensions of Control

Neil Levy

in Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199601387
eISBN:
9780191729256
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199601387.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter turns to the epistemic dimensions of control. It is argued that these conditions are very demanding: moral responsibility for an action requires that the agent understands that, and how, ... More


The Nature and Provenance of Epistemic Stances

Anjan Chakravartty

in Scientific Ontology: Integrating Naturalized Metaphysics and Voluntarist Epistemology

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
July 2017
ISBN:
9780190651459
eISBN:
9780190651480
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190651459.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

The second of two forms of ontological uncertainty, previously introduced, is explored in detail. This form of uncertainty concerns the contention that not only is ontological commitment something ... More


Rational Belief: Structure, Grounds, and Intellectual Virtue

Robert Audi

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
August 2015
ISBN:
9780190221843
eISBN:
9780190221867
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190221843.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General

This book provides conceptions of belief and knowledge, offers a theory of how they are grounded, and connects them with the will and thereby with action, moral responsibility, and intellectual ... More


Kant on Judging and the Will

Jill Vance Buroker

in Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
July 2017
ISBN:
9780198724957
eISBN:
9780191792434
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198724957.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Kant’s Critical philosophy depends on the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, which he borrowed from Aristotle. But unlike Aristotle Kant claims that theoretical reason is ... More


Intellectual Courage

Jason Baehr

in The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199604074
eISBN:
9780191729300
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter provides an account of intellectual courage is defended according to which intellectual courage is a disposition to persist in a doxastic state (e.g. belief) or course of action (e.g. ... More


Moderate Scientism in Philosophy

Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri

in Scientism: Prospects and Problems

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
August 2018
ISBN:
9780190462758
eISBN:
9780190462772
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190462758.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, General

Moderate scientism is the view that empirical science can help answer questions in nonscientific disciplines. This chapter evaluates moderate scientism in philosophy. It reviews several ways that ... More


Kantian Self-Deception

Laura Papish

in Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
May 2018
ISBN:
9780190692100
eISBN:
9780190692131
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190692100.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter explores what exactly self-deception is from a Kantian point of view. It is shown that though Kant initially seems to explain self-deception by drawing on the concept of an internal or ... More


What’s the Relevant Sort of Control?

Douglas W. Portmore

in Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
July 2019
ISBN:
9780190945350
eISBN:
9780190945381
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190945350.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Our options include all and only those events over which we exert the relevant sort of control. This chapter argues that the relevant sort of control must be complete as opposed to partial and ... More


‘Rationally Ought’ Implies ‘Can’

Ralph Wedgwood

in The Value of Rationality

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
September 2017
ISBN:
9780198802693
eISBN:
9780191841972
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198802693.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ is defended: it follows from the classical semantics for ‘ought’, and the objections to it can be answered. If the ‘ought’ is a non-trivial agential ‘ought’, ... More


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