John Bishop
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205547
- eISBN:
- 9780191709432
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205547.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Can it be justifiable to commit oneself ‘by faith’ to a religious claim when its truth lacks adequate support from one's total available evidence? After critiquing both Wittgensteinian and Reformed ...
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Can it be justifiable to commit oneself ‘by faith’ to a religious claim when its truth lacks adequate support from one's total available evidence? After critiquing both Wittgensteinian and Reformed epistemologies of religious belief, this book defends a modest fideism that understands theistic commitment as involving ‘doxastic venture’ in the face of evidential ambiguity: practical commitment to propositions held to be true through ‘passional’ causes (causes other than the recognition of evidence of or for their truth). It is argued that the justifiability of religious faith-ventures is ultimately a moral issue — although such ventures can be morally justifiable only if they accord with the proper exercise of our rational epistemic capacities. The book canvasses issues concerning the ethics of belief and doxastic voluntarism. William James's ‘justification of faith’ in The Will to Believe is extended by requiring that justifiable faith-ventures should be morally acceptable both in motivation and content. The book conducts an extended debate between fideists and ‘hard line’ evidentialists, who maintain that religious faith-ventures are never justifiable. It concludes that, although neither fideists nor evidentialists can succeed in establishing their opponents' irrationality, fideism may nevertheless be morally preferable, as a less dogmatic, more self-accepting, even a more loving, position than its evidentialist rival.Less
Can it be justifiable to commit oneself ‘by faith’ to a religious claim when its truth lacks adequate support from one's total available evidence? After critiquing both Wittgensteinian and Reformed epistemologies of religious belief, this book defends a modest fideism that understands theistic commitment as involving ‘doxastic venture’ in the face of evidential ambiguity: practical commitment to propositions held to be true through ‘passional’ causes (causes other than the recognition of evidence of or for their truth). It is argued that the justifiability of religious faith-ventures is ultimately a moral issue — although such ventures can be morally justifiable only if they accord with the proper exercise of our rational epistemic capacities. The book canvasses issues concerning the ethics of belief and doxastic voluntarism. William James's ‘justification of faith’ in The Will to Believe is extended by requiring that justifiable faith-ventures should be morally acceptable both in motivation and content. The book conducts an extended debate between fideists and ‘hard line’ evidentialists, who maintain that religious faith-ventures are never justifiable. It concludes that, although neither fideists nor evidentialists can succeed in establishing their opponents' irrationality, fideism may nevertheless be morally preferable, as a less dogmatic, more self-accepting, even a more loving, position than its evidentialist rival.
Matthias Steup (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195128925
- eISBN:
- 9780199833764
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195128923.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Gathers 11 new and 3 previously published essays, all of which bear on questions having to do with epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. In the Introduction, Steup provides a summary ...
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Gathers 11 new and 3 previously published essays, all of which bear on questions having to do with epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. In the Introduction, Steup provides a summary of each of the essays as well as a brief account of his defense of doxastic involuntarism. In the first part of the volume – Epistemic Duty and the Normativity of Justification – Susan Haack discusses the ethics of belief, Bruce Russell explores the distinction between subjective and objective justification and its relevance to the analysis of knowledge, and Richard Fumerton questions the normativity of justification. In the second part – Epistemic Deontology and Doxastic Voluntarism – Robert Audi, Richard Feldman, and Carl Ginet discuss whether belief is, as is commonly supposed, involuntary, and whether its involuntariness is an obstacle to conceiving of epistemic justification in terms of duty fulfillment. In the third part – Epistemic Deontology and the Internality of Justification – Alvin Goldman subjects internalism, the view that justifiers must be internal to the mind, to a penetrating critique, and Matthias Steup defends internalism against Goldman's criticism. The papers in part four – Justification and Truth – address the question of how justification is related to truth as the epistemic goal. Marian David examines various strategies of linking epistemic justification to the truth goal and highlights the way in which they fail, and Michael DePaul argues that since we value knowledge more than mere true belief, truth cannot be our sole epistemic goal. The papers in the fifth section – Epistemic Virtue and Criteria of Justified Belief – explore the question of whether we can derive criteria of knowledge and justified belief without falling into circularity or succumbing to skepticism. Ernest Sosa proposes virtue perspectivism as a response to skepticism, and Noah Lemos defends the commonsense approach of G. E. Moore. The concluding papers in part six – Beyond Deontology – make a case for orienting epistemological inquiry in a new direction. Vrinda Dalmiya argues that focus on the knowing self motivates a care‐based version of virtue epistemology, and Linda Zagzebski proposes that virtue epistemology is particularly well suited for analyzing the neglected concept of understanding.Less
Gathers 11 new and 3 previously published essays, all of which bear on questions having to do with epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. In the Introduction, Steup provides a summary of each of the essays as well as a brief account of his defense of doxastic involuntarism. In the first part of the volume – Epistemic Duty and the Normativity of Justification – Susan Haack discusses the ethics of belief, Bruce Russell explores the distinction between subjective and objective justification and its relevance to the analysis of knowledge, and Richard Fumerton questions the normativity of justification. In the second part – Epistemic Deontology and Doxastic Voluntarism – Robert Audi, Richard Feldman, and Carl Ginet discuss whether belief is, as is commonly supposed, involuntary, and whether its involuntariness is an obstacle to conceiving of epistemic justification in terms of duty fulfillment. In the third part – Epistemic Deontology and the Internality of Justification – Alvin Goldman subjects internalism, the view that justifiers must be internal to the mind, to a penetrating critique, and Matthias Steup defends internalism against Goldman's criticism. The papers in part four – Justification and Truth – address the question of how justification is related to truth as the epistemic goal. Marian David examines various strategies of linking epistemic justification to the truth goal and highlights the way in which they fail, and Michael DePaul argues that since we value knowledge more than mere true belief, truth cannot be our sole epistemic goal. The papers in the fifth section – Epistemic Virtue and Criteria of Justified Belief – explore the question of whether we can derive criteria of knowledge and justified belief without falling into circularity or succumbing to skepticism. Ernest Sosa proposes virtue perspectivism as a response to skepticism, and Noah Lemos defends the commonsense approach of G. E. Moore. The concluding papers in part six – Beyond Deontology – make a case for orienting epistemological inquiry in a new direction. Vrinda Dalmiya argues that focus on the knowing self motivates a care‐based version of virtue epistemology, and Linda Zagzebski proposes that virtue epistemology is particularly well suited for analyzing the neglected concept of understanding.
John Bishop
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205547
- eISBN:
- 9780191709432
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205547.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter argues that reflective believers' concern is ultimately not just for the epistemic, but for the moral justifiability of their taking faith-beliefs to be true. In response to the doxastic ...
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This chapter argues that reflective believers' concern is ultimately not just for the epistemic, but for the moral justifiability of their taking faith-beliefs to be true. In response to the doxastic voluntarism this seems to imply, it is argued that control in relation to beliefs is exercised at two ‘loci’: indirect control over what we hold to be true, and direct control over what we take to be true in our practical reasoning. This latter is open to moral evaluation whenever the actions to which such reasoning can lead are morally significant. This condition is met in the case of theistic faith-beliefs, which pervasively influence how people live. We therefore need an ethics of belief, or better, of faith-commitment that specifies the conditions under which it is morally permissible to commit oneself practically to the truth of a theistic (or any other) faith-belief.Less
This chapter argues that reflective believers' concern is ultimately not just for the epistemic, but for the moral justifiability of their taking faith-beliefs to be true. In response to the doxastic voluntarism this seems to imply, it is argued that control in relation to beliefs is exercised at two ‘loci’: indirect control over what we hold to be true, and direct control over what we take to be true in our practical reasoning. This latter is open to moral evaluation whenever the actions to which such reasoning can lead are morally significant. This condition is met in the case of theistic faith-beliefs, which pervasively influence how people live. We therefore need an ethics of belief, or better, of faith-commitment that specifies the conditions under which it is morally permissible to commit oneself practically to the truth of a theistic (or any other) faith-belief.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195128925
- eISBN:
- 9780199833764
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195128923.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Attempts to find a place for an ethics of belief given that belief is not under voluntary control. Distinguishes between a behavioral and a genetic version of doxastic voluntarism and rejects both. ...
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Attempts to find a place for an ethics of belief given that belief is not under voluntary control. Distinguishes between a behavioral and a genetic version of doxastic voluntarism and rejects both. According to the writer, belief formation is not causing oneself to believe something, but simply a belief's forming. How, then, can there be an ethics of belief? Suggests the following: We may say that it is morally objectionable to conduct one's intellectual life sloppily, and that we should accept an epistemic obligation to be attentive to one's evidence, from where we will be led to an ethics of inquiry.Less
Attempts to find a place for an ethics of belief given that belief is not under voluntary control. Distinguishes between a behavioral and a genetic version of doxastic voluntarism and rejects both. According to the writer, belief formation is not causing oneself to believe something, but simply a belief's forming. How, then, can there be an ethics of belief? Suggests the following: We may say that it is morally objectionable to conduct one's intellectual life sloppily, and that we should accept an epistemic obligation to be attentive to one's evidence, from where we will be led to an ethics of inquiry.
Richard Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199253722
- eISBN:
- 9780191601361
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253722.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Discusses the merits of versions of doxastic voluntarism, the thesis that we form beliefs voluntarily. It criticizes some forms of doxastic voluntarism, but concedes that we do have a kind of ...
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Discusses the merits of versions of doxastic voluntarism, the thesis that we form beliefs voluntarily. It criticizes some forms of doxastic voluntarism, but concedes that we do have a kind of indirect control over our beliefs. The chapter also examines various theses about the attitudes that we epistemically ought to have. An evidentialist thesis about the attitudes we epistemically ought to have is supported.Less
Discusses the merits of versions of doxastic voluntarism, the thesis that we form beliefs voluntarily. It criticizes some forms of doxastic voluntarism, but concedes that we do have a kind of indirect control over our beliefs. The chapter also examines various theses about the attitudes that we epistemically ought to have. An evidentialist thesis about the attitudes we epistemically ought to have is supported.
Richard Feldman and Earl Conee
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199253722
- eISBN:
- 9780191601361
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253722.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
An outline of the evidentialist view of justification, a defense of the view against recent objections, and a presentation of advantages of the view over various rival approaches, including ones that ...
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An outline of the evidentialist view of justification, a defense of the view against recent objections, and a presentation of advantages of the view over various rival approaches, including ones that emphasize deontological considerations and ones that emphasize reliability.Less
An outline of the evidentialist view of justification, a defense of the view against recent objections, and a presentation of advantages of the view over various rival approaches, including ones that emphasize deontological considerations and ones that emphasize reliability.
Andrew Reisner
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199672134
- eISBN:
- 9780191759079
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Direct doxastic voluntarism is commonly thought to be conceptually impossible owing to the way in which belief aims at truth. In this chapter, Reisner argues that the view that belief aims at truth ...
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Direct doxastic voluntarism is commonly thought to be conceptually impossible owing to the way in which belief aims at truth. In this chapter, Reisner argues that the view that belief aims at truth actually strongly suggests the conceptual possibility of direct doxastic voluntarism. Reisner considers some possible consequences to this argument, including the ramifications for our views about normative reasons for belief.Less
Direct doxastic voluntarism is commonly thought to be conceptually impossible owing to the way in which belief aims at truth. In this chapter, Reisner argues that the view that belief aims at truth actually strongly suggests the conceptual possibility of direct doxastic voluntarism. Reisner considers some possible consequences to this argument, including the ramifications for our views about normative reasons for belief.
Neil Levy and Eric Mandelbaum
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199686520
- eISBN:
- 9780191766343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686520.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter attempts to establish three theses. First, in response to recent work by Frankish, it argues that DDV is false-i.e., that people lack the power to form beliefs at will directly. Second, ...
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This chapter attempts to establish three theses. First, in response to recent work by Frankish, it argues that DDV is false-i.e., that people lack the power to form beliefs at will directly. Second, drawing on recent studies in social psychology, it contends that people have a propensity to form beliefs for non-epistemic reasons. Third, it argues that although DDV is false, once people become aware of their propensities to form beliefs for non-epistemic reasons, they have obligations to avoid triggering them-which are similar in kind to the sorts of obligations people would have if DDV were true.Less
This chapter attempts to establish three theses. First, in response to recent work by Frankish, it argues that DDV is false-i.e., that people lack the power to form beliefs at will directly. Second, drawing on recent studies in social psychology, it contends that people have a propensity to form beliefs for non-epistemic reasons. Third, it argues that although DDV is false, once people become aware of their propensities to form beliefs for non-epistemic reasons, they have obligations to avoid triggering them-which are similar in kind to the sorts of obligations people would have if DDV were true.
Andrei A. Buckareff
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199686520
- eISBN:
- 9780191766343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686520.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter develops and defends an argument against direct doxastic voluntarism. It argues that it is impossible for a person to succeed in exercising direct voluntary control over coming to ...
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This chapter develops and defends an argument against direct doxastic voluntarism. It argues that it is impossible for a person to succeed in exercising direct voluntary control over coming to believe that a proposition is true, on the basis of practical reasons alone. The case for this thesis proceeds in three steps. It begins by reviewing Bernard Williams’s seminal argument for a similar thesis, and it elucidates the reasons that Williams’s argument is regarded as a failure. The chapter continues by identifying a few constraints on belief formation. In the final section before the conclusion, it presents the case for a novel view and notes the ways in which it avoids the kind of objections levied against the position taken by Williams.Less
This chapter develops and defends an argument against direct doxastic voluntarism. It argues that it is impossible for a person to succeed in exercising direct voluntary control over coming to believe that a proposition is true, on the basis of practical reasons alone. The case for this thesis proceeds in three steps. It begins by reviewing Bernard Williams’s seminal argument for a similar thesis, and it elucidates the reasons that Williams’s argument is regarded as a failure. The chapter continues by identifying a few constraints on belief formation. In the final section before the conclusion, it presents the case for a novel view and notes the ways in which it avoids the kind of objections levied against the position taken by Williams.
Neil Levy
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199601387
- eISBN:
- 9780191729256
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199601387.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter turns to the epistemic dimensions of control. It is argued that these conditions are very demanding: moral responsibility for an action requires that the agent understands that, and how, ...
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This chapter turns to the epistemic dimensions of control. It is argued that these conditions are very demanding: moral responsibility for an action requires that the agent understands that, and how, the action is sensitive to her behaviour, as well as appreciation of the significance of that action or culpable ignorance of these facts. Precisely the same condition applies to culpable ignorance itself: holding agents to be responsible for their ignorance requires the identification of some act regarding which they possessed the relevant beliefs. It follows that culpable ignorance is much rarer than most philosophers think.Less
This chapter turns to the epistemic dimensions of control. It is argued that these conditions are very demanding: moral responsibility for an action requires that the agent understands that, and how, the action is sensitive to her behaviour, as well as appreciation of the significance of that action or culpable ignorance of these facts. Precisely the same condition applies to culpable ignorance itself: holding agents to be responsible for their ignorance requires the identification of some act regarding which they possessed the relevant beliefs. It follows that culpable ignorance is much rarer than most philosophers think.
Swami Medhananda
- Published in print:
- 2022
- Published Online:
- February 2022
- ISBN:
- 9780197624463
- eISBN:
- 9780197624494
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780197624463.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Chapter 8 reconstructs Vivekananda’s nuanced cosmopolitan account of the dynamics of religious faith. Vivekananda made a unique intervention in late nineteenth-century debates about faith and reason ...
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Chapter 8 reconstructs Vivekananda’s nuanced cosmopolitan account of the dynamics of religious faith. Vivekananda made a unique intervention in late nineteenth-century debates about faith and reason by steering a middle course between the stringent evidentialism of W. K. Clifford and T. H. Huxley and the anti-evidentialist fideism of William James. Vivekananda justifies religious faith on the basis of an “expanded evidentialism,” arguing that supersensuous perception and mystical testimony are valid sources of evidence that support the rationality of religious belief. Vivekananda’s various remarks about faith hint at a dynamic conception of religious faith, according to which one’s faith evolves in the following three stages: (1) faith as sub-doxastic intellectual assent, (2) faith as belief, and (3) faith as self-authenticating realization. The chapter concludes by bringing Vivekananda into critical dialogue with William Alston, who was one of the first Western philosophers to distinguish doxastic and non-doxastic forms of religious faith.Less
Chapter 8 reconstructs Vivekananda’s nuanced cosmopolitan account of the dynamics of religious faith. Vivekananda made a unique intervention in late nineteenth-century debates about faith and reason by steering a middle course between the stringent evidentialism of W. K. Clifford and T. H. Huxley and the anti-evidentialist fideism of William James. Vivekananda justifies religious faith on the basis of an “expanded evidentialism,” arguing that supersensuous perception and mystical testimony are valid sources of evidence that support the rationality of religious belief. Vivekananda’s various remarks about faith hint at a dynamic conception of religious faith, according to which one’s faith evolves in the following three stages: (1) faith as sub-doxastic intellectual assent, (2) faith as belief, and (3) faith as self-authenticating realization. The chapter concludes by bringing Vivekananda into critical dialogue with William Alston, who was one of the first Western philosophers to distinguish doxastic and non-doxastic forms of religious faith.
Anjan Chakravartty
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- July 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190651459
- eISBN:
- 9780190651480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190651459.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
The second of two forms of ontological uncertainty, previously introduced, is explored in detail. This form of uncertainty concerns the contention that not only is ontological commitment something ...
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The second of two forms of ontological uncertainty, previously introduced, is explored in detail. This form of uncertainty concerns the contention that not only is ontological commitment something that varies between individuals with different, prior, philosophical commitments in the form of different epistemic stances, but some such differences are irresolvable in principle. The deflationary stance and the two stances most relevant to disputes about this form of uncertainty—the empiricist and metaphysical stances—are considered. The view that the stance one adopts is subject to a kind of choice, thus constituting a form of epistemic voluntarism, is elaborated. Crucial to this view is a description and defense of “permissive” norms of rationality for ontological belief, according to which more than one but not all possible stances are rationally acceptable.Less
The second of two forms of ontological uncertainty, previously introduced, is explored in detail. This form of uncertainty concerns the contention that not only is ontological commitment something that varies between individuals with different, prior, philosophical commitments in the form of different epistemic stances, but some such differences are irresolvable in principle. The deflationary stance and the two stances most relevant to disputes about this form of uncertainty—the empiricist and metaphysical stances—are considered. The view that the stance one adopts is subject to a kind of choice, thus constituting a form of epistemic voluntarism, is elaborated. Crucial to this view is a description and defense of “permissive” norms of rationality for ontological belief, according to which more than one but not all possible stances are rationally acceptable.
Boudewijn de Bruin
- Published in print:
- 2022
- Published Online:
- March 2022
- ISBN:
- 9780198839675
- eISBN:
- 9780191875502
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198839675.003.0003
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Corporate Governance and Accountability
This chapter explores the link between freedom and knowledge or information. I start by considering a number of cases that scholars such as Ian Carter and Matthew Kramer have developed to argue that ...
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This chapter explores the link between freedom and knowledge or information. I start by considering a number of cases that scholars such as Ian Carter and Matthew Kramer have developed to argue that a lack of knowledge can constitute a decrease of one’s freedom. I offer an alternative analysis of these cases in which epistemic elements and freedom elements are distinguished. I develop a conception of ‘epistemic freedom’ according to which an agent is epistemically free to the extent that they can (i) adopt the appropriate doxastic attitude (belief, disbelief), on the basis of (ii) performing investigative actions, which (iii) justify the adopted doxastic attitude. I show that this alternative analysis is better positioned to deal with such diverse notions as science denial, brainwashing, oxytocin (the love hormone, or liquid trust), doxastic voluntarism, contextual framing in news shows, the Kuleshov effect, and neuromarketing.Less
This chapter explores the link between freedom and knowledge or information. I start by considering a number of cases that scholars such as Ian Carter and Matthew Kramer have developed to argue that a lack of knowledge can constitute a decrease of one’s freedom. I offer an alternative analysis of these cases in which epistemic elements and freedom elements are distinguished. I develop a conception of ‘epistemic freedom’ according to which an agent is epistemically free to the extent that they can (i) adopt the appropriate doxastic attitude (belief, disbelief), on the basis of (ii) performing investigative actions, which (iii) justify the adopted doxastic attitude. I show that this alternative analysis is better positioned to deal with such diverse notions as science denial, brainwashing, oxytocin (the love hormone, or liquid trust), doxastic voluntarism, contextual framing in news shows, the Kuleshov effect, and neuromarketing.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780190221843
- eISBN:
- 9780190221867
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190221843.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This book provides conceptions of belief and knowledge, offers a theory of how they are grounded, and connects them with the will and thereby with action, moral responsibility, and intellectual ...
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This book provides conceptions of belief and knowledge, offers a theory of how they are grounded, and connects them with the will and thereby with action, moral responsibility, and intellectual virtue. A unifying element is a commitment to representing epistemology—which is centrally concerned with belief—as integrated with a plausible philosophy of mind that does justice both to the nature of belief and to the conditions for its formation and regulation. Part I centers on belief and its relation to the will. It explores our control of our beliefs, and it describes several forms belief may take and shows how beliefs are connected with the world outside the mind. Part II concerns normative aspects of epistemology, explores the nature of intellectual virtue, and presents a theory of moral perception. Parts II and III together offer a theory of the grounds of both justification and knowledge and show how these grounds bear on the self-evident. Rationality is distinguished from justification; each is clarified in relation to the other; and the epistemological importance of the phenomenal—for instance, of intuitional experience and other "private" aspects of mental life—is explored. Part IV addresses social epistemology. It offers a theory of testimony as essential in human knowledge and a related account of the rational resolution of disagreements.Less
This book provides conceptions of belief and knowledge, offers a theory of how they are grounded, and connects them with the will and thereby with action, moral responsibility, and intellectual virtue. A unifying element is a commitment to representing epistemology—which is centrally concerned with belief—as integrated with a plausible philosophy of mind that does justice both to the nature of belief and to the conditions for its formation and regulation. Part I centers on belief and its relation to the will. It explores our control of our beliefs, and it describes several forms belief may take and shows how beliefs are connected with the world outside the mind. Part II concerns normative aspects of epistemology, explores the nature of intellectual virtue, and presents a theory of moral perception. Parts II and III together offer a theory of the grounds of both justification and knowledge and show how these grounds bear on the self-evident. Rationality is distinguished from justification; each is clarified in relation to the other; and the epistemological importance of the phenomenal—for instance, of intuitional experience and other "private" aspects of mental life—is explored. Part IV addresses social epistemology. It offers a theory of testimony as essential in human knowledge and a related account of the rational resolution of disagreements.
Jill Vance Buroker
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- July 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198724957
- eISBN:
- 9780191792434
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198724957.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Kant’s Critical philosophy depends on the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, which he borrowed from Aristotle. But unlike Aristotle Kant claims that theoretical reason is ...
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Kant’s Critical philosophy depends on the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, which he borrowed from Aristotle. But unlike Aristotle Kant claims that theoretical reason is subordinate to practical reason. This raises the possibility that theoretical judging could be a voluntary activity. This chapter investigates Kant’s view of the relation between theoretical judgments and the will. Based on Andrew Chignell’s recent work, it is argued that Kant recognizes the legitimate direct use of the will only in judgments he labels Belief (Glaube). With respect to Knowledge, his position is identical to Descartes’s position on clear and distinct perception. An analysis of Kant’s voluntarism regarding the activities of theoretical reason provides a model for subordinating theoretical reason to practical reason.Less
Kant’s Critical philosophy depends on the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, which he borrowed from Aristotle. But unlike Aristotle Kant claims that theoretical reason is subordinate to practical reason. This raises the possibility that theoretical judging could be a voluntary activity. This chapter investigates Kant’s view of the relation between theoretical judgments and the will. Based on Andrew Chignell’s recent work, it is argued that Kant recognizes the legitimate direct use of the will only in judgments he labels Belief (Glaube). With respect to Knowledge, his position is identical to Descartes’s position on clear and distinct perception. An analysis of Kant’s voluntarism regarding the activities of theoretical reason provides a model for subordinating theoretical reason to practical reason.
Jason Baehr
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199604074
- eISBN:
- 9780191729300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter provides an account of intellectual courage is defended according to which intellectual courage is a disposition to persist in a doxastic state (e.g. belief) or course of action (e.g. ...
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This chapter provides an account of intellectual courage is defended according to which intellectual courage is a disposition to persist in a doxastic state (e.g. belief) or course of action (e.g. inquiry) aimed at an epistemic good despite the fact that doing so involves an apparent threat to one's well‐being. In the course of this defense, several additional questions and issues are addressed, including the significance of fear and danger relative to the essential “context” of intellectual courage, the sorts of states and activities in which intellectual courage can be manifested, and when or under what conditions an exercise of intellectual courage is virtuous. The upshot of this and the preceding three chapters is that some form of “autonomous” character‐based virtue epistemology is viable.Less
This chapter provides an account of intellectual courage is defended according to which intellectual courage is a disposition to persist in a doxastic state (e.g. belief) or course of action (e.g. inquiry) aimed at an epistemic good despite the fact that doing so involves an apparent threat to one's well‐being. In the course of this defense, several additional questions and issues are addressed, including the significance of fear and danger relative to the essential “context” of intellectual courage, the sorts of states and activities in which intellectual courage can be manifested, and when or under what conditions an exercise of intellectual courage is virtuous. The upshot of this and the preceding three chapters is that some form of “autonomous” character‐based virtue epistemology is viable.
Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- August 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190462758
- eISBN:
- 9780190462772
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190462758.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, General
Moderate scientism is the view that empirical science can help answer questions in nonscientific disciplines. This chapter evaluates moderate scientism in philosophy. It reviews several ways that ...
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Moderate scientism is the view that empirical science can help answer questions in nonscientific disciplines. This chapter evaluates moderate scientism in philosophy. It reviews several ways that science has contributed to research in epistemology, action theory, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. It also reviews several ways that science has contributed to our understanding of how philosophers make judgments and decisions. Based on this research, it concludes that the case for moderate philosophical scientism is strong: Scientific practice has promoted significant progress in philosophy, and its further development should be welcomed and encouraged.Less
Moderate scientism is the view that empirical science can help answer questions in nonscientific disciplines. This chapter evaluates moderate scientism in philosophy. It reviews several ways that science has contributed to research in epistemology, action theory, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. It also reviews several ways that science has contributed to our understanding of how philosophers make judgments and decisions. Based on this research, it concludes that the case for moderate philosophical scientism is strong: Scientific practice has promoted significant progress in philosophy, and its further development should be welcomed and encouraged.
Laura Papish
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190692100
- eISBN:
- 9780190692131
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190692100.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explores what exactly self-deception is from a Kantian point of view. It is shown that though Kant initially seems to explain self-deception by drawing on the concept of an internal or ...
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This chapter explores what exactly self-deception is from a Kantian point of view. It is shown that though Kant initially seems to explain self-deception by drawing on the concept of an internal or inner lie, this does not provide a fruitful path forward. However, with the aid of certain source materials—in particular, Kant’s lectures on logic—a much more promising account of self-deception can be developed. On this account, self-deception is a rationally sophisticated and rationally minded form of irrationality, one that involves a process Kant refers to as rationalization (Vernünfteln). This chapter both explores rationalization and offers several illustrations of its use. The chapter also demonstrates that since the boundary between impermissible self-deceit and justified doxastic voluntarism depends on the laudability of motives and goals, self-deceptive rationalization must ultimately be understood more as a normative concept than a descriptive one.Less
This chapter explores what exactly self-deception is from a Kantian point of view. It is shown that though Kant initially seems to explain self-deception by drawing on the concept of an internal or inner lie, this does not provide a fruitful path forward. However, with the aid of certain source materials—in particular, Kant’s lectures on logic—a much more promising account of self-deception can be developed. On this account, self-deception is a rationally sophisticated and rationally minded form of irrationality, one that involves a process Kant refers to as rationalization (Vernünfteln). This chapter both explores rationalization and offers several illustrations of its use. The chapter also demonstrates that since the boundary between impermissible self-deceit and justified doxastic voluntarism depends on the laudability of motives and goals, self-deceptive rationalization must ultimately be understood more as a normative concept than a descriptive one.
Douglas W. Portmore
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- July 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190945350
- eISBN:
- 9780190945381
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190945350.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Our options include all and only those events over which we exert the relevant sort of control. This chapter argues that the relevant sort of control must be complete as opposed to partial and ...
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Our options include all and only those events over which we exert the relevant sort of control. This chapter argues that the relevant sort of control must be complete as opposed to partial and synchronic as opposed to diachronic (i.e., the sort of control that we exercise at a moment in time rather than over a span of time). And it’s argued that the relevant sort of control is personal as opposed to subpersonal (i.e., the sort of control that makes our actions intelligible in terms of reasons and not just in terms of cause and effect). Last, it’s argued that the relevant sort of control is not the sort that we exert directly over our intentional acts by forming certain volitions, but the sort that we exert directly over our reasons-responsive attitudes (e.g., our beliefs, desires, and intentions) by being both receptive and reactive to reasons.Less
Our options include all and only those events over which we exert the relevant sort of control. This chapter argues that the relevant sort of control must be complete as opposed to partial and synchronic as opposed to diachronic (i.e., the sort of control that we exercise at a moment in time rather than over a span of time). And it’s argued that the relevant sort of control is personal as opposed to subpersonal (i.e., the sort of control that makes our actions intelligible in terms of reasons and not just in terms of cause and effect). Last, it’s argued that the relevant sort of control is not the sort that we exert directly over our intentional acts by forming certain volitions, but the sort that we exert directly over our reasons-responsive attitudes (e.g., our beliefs, desires, and intentions) by being both receptive and reactive to reasons.
Ralph Wedgwood
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198802693
- eISBN:
- 9780191841972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198802693.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ is defended: it follows from the classical semantics for ‘ought’, and the objections to it can be answered. If the ‘ought’ is a non-trivial agential ‘ought’, ...
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The principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ is defended: it follows from the classical semantics for ‘ought’, and the objections to it can be answered. If the ‘ought’ is a non-trivial agential ‘ought’, the agent must be also able to act or think otherwise than as she ought. Such a non-trivial ‘ought’ implies a ‘two-way power’ (the agent can act or think as she ought, and also act or think otherwise). This kind of two-way power is explained. It need not involve acting or thinking voluntarily or ‘at will’; but it must involve the agent’s having appropriate opportunities for exercising her capacities. It is suggested that opportunities can be reduced to chances, and capacities to dispositions, of appropriate kinds. Prima facie, this account is compatible with the idea that we are subject to non-trivial rational requirements, each of which entails a corresponding non-trivial agential ‘ought’.Less
The principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ is defended: it follows from the classical semantics for ‘ought’, and the objections to it can be answered. If the ‘ought’ is a non-trivial agential ‘ought’, the agent must be also able to act or think otherwise than as she ought. Such a non-trivial ‘ought’ implies a ‘two-way power’ (the agent can act or think as she ought, and also act or think otherwise). This kind of two-way power is explained. It need not involve acting or thinking voluntarily or ‘at will’; but it must involve the agent’s having appropriate opportunities for exercising her capacities. It is suggested that opportunities can be reduced to chances, and capacities to dispositions, of appropriate kinds. Prima facie, this account is compatible with the idea that we are subject to non-trivial rational requirements, each of which entails a corresponding non-trivial agential ‘ought’.