Hazlett Allan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199674800
- eISBN:
- 9780191761164
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674800.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
“Kantian” approaches to epistemic normativity, on which truth is belief’s constitutive standard of correctness (regardless of the desires of the believer), are articulated and criticized. A ...
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“Kantian” approaches to epistemic normativity, on which truth is belief’s constitutive standard of correctness (regardless of the desires of the believer), are articulated and criticized. A “normative” conception of belief is considered. It is argued that Kantian approaches are in tension with philosophical naturalism. More importantly, it is argued, the main argument for the Kantian’s view is unsound: the reality of the phenomena suggestive of the Kantian’s view (e.g. doxastic involuntarism) is contingent, and not necessary. Other arguments for the Kantian’s view are also criticized.Less
“Kantian” approaches to epistemic normativity, on which truth is belief’s constitutive standard of correctness (regardless of the desires of the believer), are articulated and criticized. A “normative” conception of belief is considered. It is argued that Kantian approaches are in tension with philosophical naturalism. More importantly, it is argued, the main argument for the Kantian’s view is unsound: the reality of the phenomena suggestive of the Kantian’s view (e.g. doxastic involuntarism) is contingent, and not necessary. Other arguments for the Kantian’s view are also criticized.
Rik Peels
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- November 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190608118
- eISBN:
- 9780190608132
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190608118.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter gives a detailed version of the main problem that an account of responsible belief faces, namely that of doxastic involuntarism: it seems both that doxastic responsibility requires ...
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This chapter gives a detailed version of the main problem that an account of responsible belief faces, namely that of doxastic involuntarism: it seems both that doxastic responsibility requires doxastic control and that we lack such control. In order to assess various responses to this problem, the chapter first explores the relation between obligation and control. It is argued that one has an obligation to φ only if people normally have control over φ-ing, one normally has control over φ-ing, or one has control over φ-ing in the situation at hand. Subsequently, four attempts to solve the problem of doxastic involuntarism are discussed: that according to which we have direct doxastic control, that according to which we have indirect doxastic control, that according to which we have compatibilist doxastic control, and that according to which having a doxastic obligation requires no doxastic control or influence. All are shown to be untenable.Less
This chapter gives a detailed version of the main problem that an account of responsible belief faces, namely that of doxastic involuntarism: it seems both that doxastic responsibility requires doxastic control and that we lack such control. In order to assess various responses to this problem, the chapter first explores the relation between obligation and control. It is argued that one has an obligation to φ only if people normally have control over φ-ing, one normally has control over φ-ing, or one has control over φ-ing in the situation at hand. Subsequently, four attempts to solve the problem of doxastic involuntarism are discussed: that according to which we have direct doxastic control, that according to which we have indirect doxastic control, that according to which we have compatibilist doxastic control, and that according to which having a doxastic obligation requires no doxastic control or influence. All are shown to be untenable.
Richard Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195128925
- eISBN:
- 9780199833764
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195128923.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Feldman defends the view that epistemic justification is analyzable in terms of an epistemic ‘ought’ against the objection that, unlike action, belief is not under voluntary control, which it would ...
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Feldman defends the view that epistemic justification is analyzable in terms of an epistemic ‘ought’ against the objection that, unlike action, belief is not under voluntary control, which it would have to be if epistemic justification is indeed a function of what we ought to believe. In response to Steup's argument that we do enjoy voluntary control over our beliefs because we can deliberate, Feldman argues that for belief to be voluntary, it would have to be intentional, which typically it is not. So Feldman holds that belief is not, in any significant sense, under our voluntary control. However, he rejects the other premise on which the objection is based: that for belief to be under the scope of an epistemic ‘ought’, it must be under voluntary control. He suggests that the epistemic ‘ought’ is a role ‘ought’ – an ‘ought’ that simply tells us what we should do in our role as believers – and thus crucially differs from the moral ‘ought’ because it does not require voluntary control.Less
Feldman defends the view that epistemic justification is analyzable in terms of an epistemic ‘ought’ against the objection that, unlike action, belief is not under voluntary control, which it would have to be if epistemic justification is indeed a function of what we ought to believe. In response to Steup's argument that we do enjoy voluntary control over our beliefs because we can deliberate, Feldman argues that for belief to be voluntary, it would have to be intentional, which typically it is not. So Feldman holds that belief is not, in any significant sense, under our voluntary control. However, he rejects the other premise on which the objection is based: that for belief to be under the scope of an epistemic ‘ought’, it must be under voluntary control. He suggests that the epistemic ‘ought’ is a role ‘ought’ – an ‘ought’ that simply tells us what we should do in our role as believers – and thus crucially differs from the moral ‘ought’ because it does not require voluntary control.
Rik Peels
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- November 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190608118
- eISBN:
- 9780190608132
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190608118.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion
What we believe and fail to believe has a great impact on what we do. This is true for extreme beliefs, such as fundamentalist beliefs, but also more mundane beliefs. Hence, if we want to act ...
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What we believe and fail to believe has a great impact on what we do. This is true for extreme beliefs, such as fundamentalist beliefs, but also more mundane beliefs. Hence, if we want to act responsibly, we should believe responsibly; however, it seems we lack the kind of control over our beliefs that such responsibility requires: we cannot choose our beliefs. The book evaluates several responses to this so-called problem of doxastic involuntarism, and finds that each of them fails, including the currently popular response that we are responsible for our beliefs to the extent that they are reason-responsive. There is an alternative solution. We lack control over our beliefs, but we can influence them: we can choose to perform certain actions that, as a matter of fact, make a difference to what we believe. We have influence on our beliefs in virtue of our control over our belief-forming mechanisms, our evidence base, and our intellectual virtues and vices. We have a wide variety of moral, prudential, and epistemic obligations to perform such belief-influencing actions. The book also considers in detail when we are excused for a belief: we can still believe responsibly if we are excused for our belief by force, ignorance, or luck. A careful consideration of these excuses teaches us, respectively, that responsible belief entails that we could have believed otherwise, that responsible belief is radically subjective, and that responsible belief is compatible with its being a matter of luck that we hold that belief.Less
What we believe and fail to believe has a great impact on what we do. This is true for extreme beliefs, such as fundamentalist beliefs, but also more mundane beliefs. Hence, if we want to act responsibly, we should believe responsibly; however, it seems we lack the kind of control over our beliefs that such responsibility requires: we cannot choose our beliefs. The book evaluates several responses to this so-called problem of doxastic involuntarism, and finds that each of them fails, including the currently popular response that we are responsible for our beliefs to the extent that they are reason-responsive. There is an alternative solution. We lack control over our beliefs, but we can influence them: we can choose to perform certain actions that, as a matter of fact, make a difference to what we believe. We have influence on our beliefs in virtue of our control over our belief-forming mechanisms, our evidence base, and our intellectual virtues and vices. We have a wide variety of moral, prudential, and epistemic obligations to perform such belief-influencing actions. The book also considers in detail when we are excused for a belief: we can still believe responsibly if we are excused for our belief by force, ignorance, or luck. A careful consideration of these excuses teaches us, respectively, that responsible belief entails that we could have believed otherwise, that responsible belief is radically subjective, and that responsible belief is compatible with its being a matter of luck that we hold that belief.
Jussi Suikkanen
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199678044
- eISBN:
- 9780191757457
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678044.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Moral error theories claim that (i) moral utterances express moral beliefs, that (ii) moral beliefs ascribe moral properties, and that (iii) moral properties are not instantiated. Thus, according to ...
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Moral error theories claim that (i) moral utterances express moral beliefs, that (ii) moral beliefs ascribe moral properties, and that (iii) moral properties are not instantiated. Thus, according to these views, there seems to be conclusive evidence against the truth of our ordinary moral beliefs. Furthermore, many error theorists claim that, even if we accepted moral error theory, we could still in principle keep our first-order moral beliefs. This chapter argues that this last claim makes many popular versions of the moral error theory incompatible with the standard philosophical accounts of beliefs. Functionalism, normative theories of beliefs, representationalism, and interpretationalism all entail that being sensitive to thoughts about evidence is a constitutive feature of beliefs. Given that many moral error theorists deny that moral beliefs have this quality, their views are in a direct conflict with the most popular views about the nature of beliefs.Less
Moral error theories claim that (i) moral utterances express moral beliefs, that (ii) moral beliefs ascribe moral properties, and that (iii) moral properties are not instantiated. Thus, according to these views, there seems to be conclusive evidence against the truth of our ordinary moral beliefs. Furthermore, many error theorists claim that, even if we accepted moral error theory, we could still in principle keep our first-order moral beliefs. This chapter argues that this last claim makes many popular versions of the moral error theory incompatible with the standard philosophical accounts of beliefs. Functionalism, normative theories of beliefs, representationalism, and interpretationalism all entail that being sensitive to thoughts about evidence is a constitutive feature of beliefs. Given that many moral error theorists deny that moral beliefs have this quality, their views are in a direct conflict with the most popular views about the nature of beliefs.
