Frank Lovett
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199579419
- eISBN:
- 9780191722837
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579419.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
In all societies, past and present, many persons and groups have been subject to domination. Properly understood, domination is a great evil, the suffering of which ought to be minimized as far as ...
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In all societies, past and present, many persons and groups have been subject to domination. Properly understood, domination is a great evil, the suffering of which ought to be minimized as far as possible. Surprisingly, however, political and social theorists have failed to provide a detailed analysis of the concept of domination in general. This study aims to redress this lacuna. It argues first that domination should be understood as a condition experienced by persons or groups to the extent that they are dependent on a social relationship in which some other person or group wields arbitrary power over them; this is termed the “arbitrary power conception” of domination. Second, it argues that we should regard it as wrong to perpetrate or permit unnecessary domination and, thus, that as a matter of justice the political and social institutions and practices of any society should be organized so as to minimize avoidable domination; this is termed “justice as minimizing domination (JMD),” a conception of social justice that connects with more familiar civic republican accounts of freedom as nondomination. In developing these arguments, this study employs a variety of methodological techniques — including conceptual analysis, formal modeling, social theory, and moral philosophy; existing accounts of dependency, power, social convention, and so on are clarified, expanded, or revised along the way. While of special interest to contemporary civic republicans, this study should appeal to a broad audience with diverse methodological and substantive interests.Less
In all societies, past and present, many persons and groups have been subject to domination. Properly understood, domination is a great evil, the suffering of which ought to be minimized as far as possible. Surprisingly, however, political and social theorists have failed to provide a detailed analysis of the concept of domination in general. This study aims to redress this lacuna. It argues first that domination should be understood as a condition experienced by persons or groups to the extent that they are dependent on a social relationship in which some other person or group wields arbitrary power over them; this is termed the “arbitrary power conception” of domination. Second, it argues that we should regard it as wrong to perpetrate or permit unnecessary domination and, thus, that as a matter of justice the political and social institutions and practices of any society should be organized so as to minimize avoidable domination; this is termed “justice as minimizing domination (JMD),” a conception of social justice that connects with more familiar civic republican accounts of freedom as nondomination. In developing these arguments, this study employs a variety of methodological techniques — including conceptual analysis, formal modeling, social theory, and moral philosophy; existing accounts of dependency, power, social convention, and so on are clarified, expanded, or revised along the way. While of special interest to contemporary civic republicans, this study should appeal to a broad audience with diverse methodological and substantive interests.
Rebekah L. Miles
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195144161
- eISBN:
- 9780199834495
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195144163.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Feminist theologians have commonly identified Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian realism as a prime example of a patriarchal theological ethic that promotes domination. In this study, the author claims ...
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Feminist theologians have commonly identified Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian realism as a prime example of a patriarchal theological ethic that promotes domination. In this study, the author claims that Niebuhr's thought can be usefully appropriated and revised in service of a new ethic – a feminist Christian realism. This new ethic is offered as an answer to the loss of moral grounding and critical judgment within some North American feminist theologies. She contends that an increasingly radical feminist emphasis on divine immanence and human boundedness has undercut key assumptions upon which feminism rests. Niebuhr's realism, she believes, can be the source of a necessary correction. Feminist theologians. Miles argues, would be better served by using the categories of Christian realism to retrieve critically, a more positive understanding of divine transcendence and human self‐transcendence while maintaining their emphasis on human boundedness and divine presence. This position is developed by drawing together the contributions of Niebuhr, Rosemary Radford Ruether, and Sharon Welch (two prominent feminist theologians). Ruether's turn to creation and Welch's turn to community together provide an important corrective to Niebuhr's Christian realism.Less
Feminist theologians have commonly identified Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian realism as a prime example of a patriarchal theological ethic that promotes domination. In this study, the author claims that Niebuhr's thought can be usefully appropriated and revised in service of a new ethic – a feminist Christian realism. This new ethic is offered as an answer to the loss of moral grounding and critical judgment within some North American feminist theologies. She contends that an increasingly radical feminist emphasis on divine immanence and human boundedness has undercut key assumptions upon which feminism rests. Niebuhr's realism, she believes, can be the source of a necessary correction. Feminist theologians. Miles argues, would be better served by using the categories of Christian realism to retrieve critically, a more positive understanding of divine transcendence and human self‐transcendence while maintaining their emphasis on human boundedness and divine presence. This position is developed by drawing together the contributions of Niebuhr, Rosemary Radford Ruether, and Sharon Welch (two prominent feminist theologians). Ruether's turn to creation and Welch's turn to community together provide an important corrective to Niebuhr's Christian realism.
Ann E. Cudd
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187434
- eISBN:
- 9780199786213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187431.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter discusses the direct and indirect psychological harms of oppression. Direct psychological harms are intentionally inflicted by dominant on subordinate groups. These include terror and ...
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This chapter discusses the direct and indirect psychological harms of oppression. Direct psychological harms are intentionally inflicted by dominant on subordinate groups. These include terror and psychological trauma, humiliation and degradation, objectification, religion, ideology, and cultural domination. Indirect psychological harms occur when the beliefs and values of the privileged or oppressor groups are subconsciously accepted by the subordinate and assimilated into their self-concept or value/belief scheme. Indirect forces thus work through the psychology of the oppressed to mold them and co-opt them to result in choices and decisions that harm the oppressed while benefiting the privileged. These include shame and low self-esteem, false consciousness, and deformed desire.Less
This chapter discusses the direct and indirect psychological harms of oppression. Direct psychological harms are intentionally inflicted by dominant on subordinate groups. These include terror and psychological trauma, humiliation and degradation, objectification, religion, ideology, and cultural domination. Indirect psychological harms occur when the beliefs and values of the privileged or oppressor groups are subconsciously accepted by the subordinate and assimilated into their self-concept or value/belief scheme. Indirect forces thus work through the psychology of the oppressed to mold them and co-opt them to result in choices and decisions that harm the oppressed while benefiting the privileged. These include shame and low self-esteem, false consciousness, and deformed desire.
Cécile Laborde
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199550210
- eISBN:
- 9780191720857
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550210.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, Political Theory
This book conducts the first comprehensive philosophical analysis of the hijab controversy in France, this book also conducts a dialogue between contemporary Anglo-American and French political ...
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This book conducts the first comprehensive philosophical analysis of the hijab controversy in France, this book also conducts a dialogue between contemporary Anglo-American and French political theory and defends a progressive republican solution to so-called multicultural conflicts in contemporary societies. It critically assesses the official republican philosophy of laïcité which purported to justify the 2004 ban on religious signs in schools. Laïcité is shown to encompass a comprehensive theory of republican citizenship, centered on three ideals: equality (secular neutrality of the public sphere), liberty (individual autonomy and emancipation), and fraternity (civic loyalty to the community of citizens). Challenging official interpretations of laïcité, the book then puts forward a critical republicanism which does not support the hijab ban, yet upholds a revised interpretation of three central republican commitments: secularism, non-domination and civic solidarity. Thus, it articulates a version of secularism which squarely addresses the problem of status quo bias—the fact that Western societies are historically not neutral towards all religions. It also defends a vision of female emancipation which rejects the coercive paternalism inherent in the regulation of religious dress, yet does not leave individuals unaided in the face of religious and secular, patriarchal and ethnocentric domination. Finally, the book outlines a theory of immigrant integration which places the burden of civic integration on basic socio-economic and political institutions, rather than on citizens themselves. This book examines the management of religious and cultural pluralism, centred on the pursuit of the progressive ideal of non-domination in existing, non-ideal societies.Less
This book conducts the first comprehensive philosophical analysis of the hijab controversy in France, this book also conducts a dialogue between contemporary Anglo-American and French political theory and defends a progressive republican solution to so-called multicultural conflicts in contemporary societies. It critically assesses the official republican philosophy of laïcité which purported to justify the 2004 ban on religious signs in schools. Laïcité is shown to encompass a comprehensive theory of republican citizenship, centered on three ideals: equality (secular neutrality of the public sphere), liberty (individual autonomy and emancipation), and fraternity (civic loyalty to the community of citizens). Challenging official interpretations of laïcité, the book then puts forward a critical republicanism which does not support the hijab ban, yet upholds a revised interpretation of three central republican commitments: secularism, non-domination and civic solidarity. Thus, it articulates a version of secularism which squarely addresses the problem of status quo bias—the fact that Western societies are historically not neutral towards all religions. It also defends a vision of female emancipation which rejects the coercive paternalism inherent in the regulation of religious dress, yet does not leave individuals unaided in the face of religious and secular, patriarchal and ethnocentric domination. Finally, the book outlines a theory of immigrant integration which places the burden of civic integration on basic socio-economic and political institutions, rather than on citizens themselves. This book examines the management of religious and cultural pluralism, centred on the pursuit of the progressive ideal of non-domination in existing, non-ideal societies.
Cécile Laborde
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199550210
- eISBN:
- 9780191720857
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550210.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, Political Theory
Chapter 10 argues that both official republicans and multiculturalists, in different ways, have tolerated or aggravated the damaging ethnicisation of social relations, and that only a radical ...
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Chapter 10 argues that both official republicans and multiculturalists, in different ways, have tolerated or aggravated the damaging ethnicisation of social relations, and that only a radical strategy of de-ethnicisation of the republic can fairly integrate members of minorities as equal citizens. It defends a revised model of republican integration, which advocates social and territorial de-segregation, rather than ethnically-based affirmative action and, instead of the recognition of the ‘Other’, advocates the profound and inclusive transformation of the ‘We’ that underpins the imagined community of the nation. Generally, critical republicanism pursues strategies of non-domination, which involve the removal of cultural and socio-economic obstacles to minority incorporation, instead of policies of recognition, which involve the positive validation of ethno-cultural difference.Less
Chapter 10 argues that both official republicans and multiculturalists, in different ways, have tolerated or aggravated the damaging ethnicisation of social relations, and that only a radical strategy of de-ethnicisation of the republic can fairly integrate members of minorities as equal citizens. It defends a revised model of republican integration, which advocates social and territorial de-segregation, rather than ethnically-based affirmative action and, instead of the recognition of the ‘Other’, advocates the profound and inclusive transformation of the ‘We’ that underpins the imagined community of the nation. Generally, critical republicanism pursues strategies of non-domination, which involve the removal of cultural and socio-economic obstacles to minority incorporation, instead of policies of recognition, which involve the positive validation of ethno-cultural difference.
Daniel Garber and Donald Rutherford (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199659593
- eISBN:
- 9780191745218
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659593.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy is an annual series, presenting a selection of the best current work in the history of early modern philosophy. It focuses on the seventeenth and eighteenth ...
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Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy is an annual series, presenting a selection of the best current work in the history of early modern philosophy. It focuses on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries — the extraordinary period of intellectual flourishing that begins, very roughly, with Descartes and his contemporaries and ends with Kant. It also publishes papers on thinkers or movements outside of that framework, provided they are important in illuminating early modern thought. Topics covered include Spinoza's political philosophy, Leibniz, monadic domination, Newton's ontology of omnipresence and infinate space, Hume, and Descarte.Less
Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy is an annual series, presenting a selection of the best current work in the history of early modern philosophy. It focuses on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries — the extraordinary period of intellectual flourishing that begins, very roughly, with Descartes and his contemporaries and ends with Kant. It also publishes papers on thinkers or movements outside of that framework, provided they are important in illuminating early modern thought. Topics covered include Spinoza's political philosophy, Leibniz, monadic domination, Newton's ontology of omnipresence and infinate space, Hume, and Descarte.
Cécile Laborde
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199550210
- eISBN:
- 9780191720857
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550210.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, Political Theory
Chapter 7 puts forward a normative defence of liberty as non-domination, which does not support a ban on hijab, but seeks to equip all individuals with culturally-neutral, autonomy-related skills, ...
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Chapter 7 puts forward a normative defence of liberty as non-domination, which does not support a ban on hijab, but seeks to equip all individuals with culturally-neutral, autonomy-related skills, and give them opportunities for effective political voice, so that they can resist domination, oppression, manipulation and indoctrination in their private and social life. Contra laïcistes, individuals should be allowed to live non-autonomous lives, but they should be empowered to resist the multiple forms that domination can take: public and private, secular and religious, ethnocentric, and patriarchal. To this end, critical republicans advocate both universal autonomy-promoting education and wide opportunities for democratic voice and participation.Less
Chapter 7 puts forward a normative defence of liberty as non-domination, which does not support a ban on hijab, but seeks to equip all individuals with culturally-neutral, autonomy-related skills, and give them opportunities for effective political voice, so that they can resist domination, oppression, manipulation and indoctrination in their private and social life. Contra laïcistes, individuals should be allowed to live non-autonomous lives, but they should be empowered to resist the multiple forms that domination can take: public and private, secular and religious, ethnocentric, and patriarchal. To this end, critical republicans advocate both universal autonomy-promoting education and wide opportunities for democratic voice and participation.
Iris Marion Young
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297550
- eISBN:
- 9780191716751
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297556.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The scope of issues of justice extends globally on many issues. Governance of global society therefore needs transformed institutions. A vision of global democracy assumes a relational model of ...
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The scope of issues of justice extends globally on many issues. Governance of global society therefore needs transformed institutions. A vision of global democracy assumes a relational model of self‐determination as non‐domination in the context of inclusive and stronger global institutions.Less
The scope of issues of justice extends globally on many issues. Governance of global society therefore needs transformed institutions. A vision of global democracy assumes a relational model of self‐determination as non‐domination in the context of inclusive and stronger global institutions.
Peter Fleming
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199547159
- eISBN:
- 9780191720024
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199547159.001.0001
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Organization Studies, HRM / IR
Personal authenticity was once a reference point from which critics and labour activists sought to challenge the domination of the corporation. Now it has entered into the parlance of managerial ...
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Personal authenticity was once a reference point from which critics and labour activists sought to challenge the domination of the corporation. Now it has entered into the parlance of managerial discourse. This book critically investigates the increasing popularity of personal authenticity in corporate ideology and practice. Rather than have workers adhere to depersonalising bureaucratic rules or homogenous cultural norms, many large corporations now invite employees to simply be themselves. Alternative lifestyles, consumption, ethic identity, sexuality, fun, and even dissent are now celebrated since employees are presumed to be more motivated if they can just be themselves. Does this freedom to express ones authenticity in the workplace finally herald the end of corporate control? To answer this question, this book places this concern with authenticity within a political framework and demonstrates how it might represent an even more insidious form of cultural domination. The book especially focuses on the way in which private and non-work selves are prospected and put to work in the firm. The ideas of Hardt and Negri and the Italian autonomist movement are used to show how common forms of association and co-operation outside of commodified work is the inspiration for personal authenticity. It is the vibrancy, energy, and creativity of this non-commodified stratum of social life that managerialism now aims to exploit. Each chapter explores how this is achieved and highlights the worker resistance that is provoked as a result. The book concludes by demonstrating how the discourse of freedom underlying the managerial version of authenticity harbours potential for a radical transformation of the contemporary corporate form.Less
Personal authenticity was once a reference point from which critics and labour activists sought to challenge the domination of the corporation. Now it has entered into the parlance of managerial discourse. This book critically investigates the increasing popularity of personal authenticity in corporate ideology and practice. Rather than have workers adhere to depersonalising bureaucratic rules or homogenous cultural norms, many large corporations now invite employees to simply be themselves. Alternative lifestyles, consumption, ethic identity, sexuality, fun, and even dissent are now celebrated since employees are presumed to be more motivated if they can just be themselves. Does this freedom to express ones authenticity in the workplace finally herald the end of corporate control? To answer this question, this book places this concern with authenticity within a political framework and demonstrates how it might represent an even more insidious form of cultural domination. The book especially focuses on the way in which private and non-work selves are prospected and put to work in the firm. The ideas of Hardt and Negri and the Italian autonomist movement are used to show how common forms of association and co-operation outside of commodified work is the inspiration for personal authenticity. It is the vibrancy, energy, and creativity of this non-commodified stratum of social life that managerialism now aims to exploit. Each chapter explores how this is achieved and highlights the worker resistance that is provoked as a result. The book concludes by demonstrating how the discourse of freedom underlying the managerial version of authenticity harbours potential for a radical transformation of the contemporary corporate form.
Philip Pettit
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296423
- eISBN:
- 9780191600081
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296428.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The negative conception of freedom as non‐interference and the positive conception of freedom as self‐mastery are not the only available ideals of liberty; a third alternative is the conception of ...
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The negative conception of freedom as non‐interference and the positive conception of freedom as self‐mastery are not the only available ideals of liberty; a third alternative is the conception of freedom as non‐domination, which requires that no one is able to interfere on an arbitrary basis— at their pleasure—in the choices of the free person. This is the conception espoused in the long republican tradition. Thus republicans regarded all of those who are subject to another's arbitrary will as unfree, even if the other does not actually interfere with them; there is no interference in such a case but there is a loss of liberty. And, in cases where a regime of law did not subject people to an arbitrary will, they thought that legal coercion was not a compromise of people's liberty; there is interference in such a case but no loss of liberty. As the conception of freedom as non‐interference was introduced by Hobbes to defend Leviathan against republicans, it was used to defend British rule in the North American colonies against the republican criticism that Parliament had arbitrary power over the colonists. This new conception became respectable through the work of people like Bentham and Paley, who saw in it a way of conceiving of freedom that would allow even dominated agents like women and servants—so far as they did not suffer actual interference —to count as free. Unlike traditional republicans, Bentham and Paley did not feel able to limit the constituency of citizens to the mainstream, propertied males, and their inclusivism in this respect, which neo‐republicans must also share, may explain why they regarded the republican ideal of freedom too demanding.Less
The negative conception of freedom as non‐interference and the positive conception of freedom as self‐mastery are not the only available ideals of liberty; a third alternative is the conception of freedom as non‐domination, which requires that no one is able to interfere on an arbitrary basis— at their pleasure—in the choices of the free person. This is the conception espoused in the long republican tradition. Thus republicans regarded all of those who are subject to another's arbitrary will as unfree, even if the other does not actually interfere with them; there is no interference in such a case but there is a loss of liberty. And, in cases where a regime of law did not subject people to an arbitrary will, they thought that legal coercion was not a compromise of people's liberty; there is interference in such a case but no loss of liberty. As the conception of freedom as non‐interference was introduced by Hobbes to defend Leviathan against republicans, it was used to defend British rule in the North American colonies against the republican criticism that Parliament had arbitrary power over the colonists. This new conception became respectable through the work of people like Bentham and Paley, who saw in it a way of conceiving of freedom that would allow even dominated agents like women and servants—so far as they did not suffer actual interference —to count as free. Unlike traditional republicans, Bentham and Paley did not feel able to limit the constituency of citizens to the mainstream, propertied males, and their inclusivism in this respect, which neo‐republicans must also share, may explain why they regarded the republican ideal of freedom too demanding.
Philip Pettit
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296423
- eISBN:
- 9780191600081
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296428.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Interference involves an intentional or quasi‐intentional worsening of someone's choice situation and occurs on an arbitrary basis to the extent that it is not forced to track the interests and ideas ...
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Interference involves an intentional or quasi‐intentional worsening of someone's choice situation and occurs on an arbitrary basis to the extent that it is not forced to track the interests and ideas of those who suffer the interference. One party dominates another just so far as they have the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis in some of the other's choices; where such domination occurs, it will tend to be a matter of common knowledge among relevant parties but that is not part of the definition. Domination in the sense defined may occur without actual interference: it requires only the capacity for interference; and interference may occur without any domination: if the interference is not arbitrary then it will not dominate. Non‐domination may be advanced in a society either through people coming to have equal powers, or through a legal regime stopping people from dominating one another without itself dominating anyone in turn. When someone enjoys non‐domination, it will usually be a matter of common knowledge among relevant parties, so that non‐domination has a subjective and inter‐subjective aspect: it is associated with tranquillity, in Montesquieu's phrase, and with the ability to look others in the eye. Notwithstanding the allegations of Paley and early liberals, freedom as non‐domination is not a confused ideal, it comes in degrees both of intensity and extent, and it is not an impossibly radical ideal; the rich demands that it would make on the state look capable of being satisfied in our world, even if they were not capable of satisfaction in Paley's.Less
Interference involves an intentional or quasi‐intentional worsening of someone's choice situation and occurs on an arbitrary basis to the extent that it is not forced to track the interests and ideas of those who suffer the interference. One party dominates another just so far as they have the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis in some of the other's choices; where such domination occurs, it will tend to be a matter of common knowledge among relevant parties but that is not part of the definition. Domination in the sense defined may occur without actual interference: it requires only the capacity for interference; and interference may occur without any domination: if the interference is not arbitrary then it will not dominate. Non‐domination may be advanced in a society either through people coming to have equal powers, or through a legal regime stopping people from dominating one another without itself dominating anyone in turn. When someone enjoys non‐domination, it will usually be a matter of common knowledge among relevant parties, so that non‐domination has a subjective and inter‐subjective aspect: it is associated with tranquillity, in Montesquieu's phrase, and with the ability to look others in the eye. Notwithstanding the allegations of Paley and early liberals, freedom as non‐domination is not a confused ideal, it comes in degrees both of intensity and extent, and it is not an impossibly radical ideal; the rich demands that it would make on the state look capable of being satisfied in our world, even if they were not capable of satisfaction in Paley's.
Philip Pettit
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296423
- eISBN:
- 9780191600081
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296428.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Freedom as non‐domination is a significantly egalitarian good. Maximizing the intensity of the non‐domination that people enjoy will require that people enjoy non‐domination with equal intensity, ...
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Freedom as non‐domination is a significantly egalitarian good. Maximizing the intensity of the non‐domination that people enjoy will require that people enjoy non‐domination with equal intensity, even though maximizing the extent of undominated choice—maximizing the resources and opportunities that people enjoy—need not require its equal distribution; the project supports structural equality but not material equality. Freedom as non‐domination is also a communitarian good. It can be realized only under an arrangement involving people in communal interaction. And it can be realized for one person only so far as it is realized for others in the vulnerability classes to which that person belongs: thus, a woman can be fully free in this sense only so far as womanhood is not a badge of vulnerability, only so far as all women are free. The communitarian character of freedom as non‐domination means that the freedom of a community is as basic a notion as the freedom of individuals, and that there is every reason, as communitarians require, why people should be able to identify with a state that promotes such freedom.Less
Freedom as non‐domination is a significantly egalitarian good. Maximizing the intensity of the non‐domination that people enjoy will require that people enjoy non‐domination with equal intensity, even though maximizing the extent of undominated choice—maximizing the resources and opportunities that people enjoy—need not require its equal distribution; the project supports structural equality but not material equality. Freedom as non‐domination is also a communitarian good. It can be realized only under an arrangement involving people in communal interaction. And it can be realized for one person only so far as it is realized for others in the vulnerability classes to which that person belongs: thus, a woman can be fully free in this sense only so far as womanhood is not a badge of vulnerability, only so far as all women are free. The communitarian character of freedom as non‐domination means that the freedom of a community is as basic a notion as the freedom of individuals, and that there is every reason, as communitarians require, why people should be able to identify with a state that promotes such freedom.
Philip Pettit
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296423
- eISBN:
- 9780191600081
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296428.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The republican state must not only seek to combat the effects of dominium in giving rise to domination, it must also guard against the domination that can be associated with the imperium of ...
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The republican state must not only seek to combat the effects of dominium in giving rise to domination, it must also guard against the domination that can be associated with the imperium of government. If the way in which government operates is not to be subject to manipulation on an arbitrary basis, then there are a number of constitutionalist conditions, which it must plausibly fulfil and these have also been identified as important in the republican tradition. They include the rule of law, the separation of power, and counter‐majoritarian safeguards. Not all discretion can be profitably removed, however, and the only way for a republican regime to guarantee that this exercise of discretion is not hostile to the interests and ideas of people at large, or of some section of the community, is to introduce systematic possibilities for ordinary people to contest the doings of government. This points us towards the ideal of a democracy, based not on the alleged consent of the people, but rather on the contestability by the people of everything that government does. A contestatory democracy will have to be deliberative, requiring that decisions be based on considerations of allegedly common concern, if there is to be a systematically available basis for people to challenge what the government does. It will have to be inclusive, making room for people from every quarter to be able to press challenges against legislative, executive, or judicial decisions. And it will have to be responsive to the contestations that are brought against government decisions.Less
The republican state must not only seek to combat the effects of dominium in giving rise to domination, it must also guard against the domination that can be associated with the imperium of government. If the way in which government operates is not to be subject to manipulation on an arbitrary basis, then there are a number of constitutionalist conditions, which it must plausibly fulfil and these have also been identified as important in the republican tradition. They include the rule of law, the separation of power, and counter‐majoritarian safeguards. Not all discretion can be profitably removed, however, and the only way for a republican regime to guarantee that this exercise of discretion is not hostile to the interests and ideas of people at large, or of some section of the community, is to introduce systematic possibilities for ordinary people to contest the doings of government. This points us towards the ideal of a democracy, based not on the alleged consent of the people, but rather on the contestability by the people of everything that government does. A contestatory democracy will have to be deliberative, requiring that decisions be based on considerations of allegedly common concern, if there is to be a systematically available basis for people to challenge what the government does. It will have to be inclusive, making room for people from every quarter to be able to press challenges against legislative, executive, or judicial decisions. And it will have to be responsive to the contestations that are brought against government decisions.
Laura Valentini
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199593859
- eISBN:
- 9780191731457
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593859.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter discusses how to move from a general concern with the justification of coercion to particular substantive principles of justice. It argues that a social system is just only so long as it ...
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This chapter discusses how to move from a general concern with the justification of coercion to particular substantive principles of justice. It argues that a social system is just only so long as it respects the right to freedom of those subject to it, namely their right to the social conditions necessary to lead autonomous lives. For this to be the case, the distribution of freedom engendered by the system has to be justifiable in the eyes of all those who are subject to it. Focusing on domestic societies in particular, the chapter concludes that a multiplicity of principles of economic justice might instantiate mutually justifiable distributions of freedom, not all of which are egalitarian in form. In other words, contrary to most contemporary liberal theorists’ arguments on the view defended in this chapter, economic equality is not a fundamental, non-negotiable demand of justice.Less
This chapter discusses how to move from a general concern with the justification of coercion to particular substantive principles of justice. It argues that a social system is just only so long as it respects the right to freedom of those subject to it, namely their right to the social conditions necessary to lead autonomous lives. For this to be the case, the distribution of freedom engendered by the system has to be justifiable in the eyes of all those who are subject to it. Focusing on domestic societies in particular, the chapter concludes that a multiplicity of principles of economic justice might instantiate mutually justifiable distributions of freedom, not all of which are egalitarian in form. In other words, contrary to most contemporary liberal theorists’ arguments on the view defended in this chapter, economic equality is not a fundamental, non-negotiable demand of justice.
Erik O. Eriksen
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199572519
- eISBN:
- 9780191722400
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572519.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, Democratization
This chapter first briefly addresses the legitimation problems of the Union and the concept of legitimacy. What does it mean and what are the implications for the political theory of the Union? On ...
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This chapter first briefly addresses the legitimation problems of the Union and the concept of legitimacy. What does it mean and what are the implications for the political theory of the Union? On the basis of the contention that citizens must be offered justification for the exercise of political power that has convincing force in light of standards that are accessible to them, a distinction is made between democracy as a legitimation principle and as an organizational principle. The first gives rise to a deliberative concept of democracy, while the latter points us to some institutional prerequisites that constitute the yardstick for addressing the actual democratic deficits of the Union.Less
This chapter first briefly addresses the legitimation problems of the Union and the concept of legitimacy. What does it mean and what are the implications for the political theory of the Union? On the basis of the contention that citizens must be offered justification for the exercise of political power that has convincing force in light of standards that are accessible to them, a distinction is made between democracy as a legitimation principle and as an organizational principle. The first gives rise to a deliberative concept of democracy, while the latter points us to some institutional prerequisites that constitute the yardstick for addressing the actual democratic deficits of the Union.
Robert Eric Frykenberg
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198263777
- eISBN:
- 9780191714191
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198263777.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
This chapter explores European Christians' attempts to control and exercise dominion over Indian Christians from the 19th century and onwards. It argues that at each and every stage of development in ...
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This chapter explores European Christians' attempts to control and exercise dominion over Indian Christians from the 19th century and onwards. It argues that at each and every stage of development in missionary expansions during the 19th century, whether imperial or national, from the time of Christian Friedrich Schwartz down to such missionaries as Allen Hume, Verrier Elwin, Charles F. Andrews, Edward Thompson, and Amy Carmichael, there were prominent anti-imperial, pro-nationalist missionaries, many of whom also remained isolated as marginalized mavericks. All missionaries had to confront conflicts between universalistic ideals of their faith and more immediate political realities, whether these were imperial or national in character.Less
This chapter explores European Christians' attempts to control and exercise dominion over Indian Christians from the 19th century and onwards. It argues that at each and every stage of development in missionary expansions during the 19th century, whether imperial or national, from the time of Christian Friedrich Schwartz down to such missionaries as Allen Hume, Verrier Elwin, Charles F. Andrews, Edward Thompson, and Amy Carmichael, there were prominent anti-imperial, pro-nationalist missionaries, many of whom also remained isolated as marginalized mavericks. All missionaries had to confront conflicts between universalistic ideals of their faith and more immediate political realities, whether these were imperial or national in character.
Sophie Lunn-Rockliffe
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199230204
- eISBN:
- 9780191710681
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230204.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
This chapter explores Ambrosiaster's attitudes toward natural social hierarchies in creation. These attitudes provide the necessary starting point for any investigation of his ideas about political, ...
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This chapter explores Ambrosiaster's attitudes toward natural social hierarchies in creation. These attitudes provide the necessary starting point for any investigation of his ideas about political, institutionalized forms of domination (such as that of the emperor over his subjects) because he used the same language for both sorts of hierarchy, which allowed him to narrow the gap between social and political forms of domination. Ambrosiaster presented man and woman's domination over the animals and man's domination over woman as inherently natural, ordained at the very moment of creation by God. Slavery, however — considered both metaphysically as slavery to sin and literally as institutional slavery — was identified as a postlapsarian system of subjection and therefore unnatural.Less
This chapter explores Ambrosiaster's attitudes toward natural social hierarchies in creation. These attitudes provide the necessary starting point for any investigation of his ideas about political, institutionalized forms of domination (such as that of the emperor over his subjects) because he used the same language for both sorts of hierarchy, which allowed him to narrow the gap between social and political forms of domination. Ambrosiaster presented man and woman's domination over the animals and man's domination over woman as inherently natural, ordained at the very moment of creation by God. Slavery, however — considered both metaphysically as slavery to sin and literally as institutional slavery — was identified as a postlapsarian system of subjection and therefore unnatural.
Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199283675
- eISBN:
- 9780191712661
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283675.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Humility as an intellectual virtue is the absence of intellectual vanity, arrogance, and domination (among other vices of the same family). As such, intellectual humility is a low level of concern to ...
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Humility as an intellectual virtue is the absence of intellectual vanity, arrogance, and domination (among other vices of the same family). As such, intellectual humility is a low level of concern to be well regarded by other people for one's intellectual accomplishments or prowess, where the concern for others' good opinion is swamped in a higher concern for intellectual goods. Humility is a disposition not to ‘infer’ some illicit entitlement from one's (perhaps genuine) intellectual superiority. It is a low level of concern to have the personal importance that derives from power or influence over others' minds. The concerns of which humility is the relative absence are extraneous to the pursuit of intellectual goods, and so may erect various stumbling blocks to intellectual success.Less
Humility as an intellectual virtue is the absence of intellectual vanity, arrogance, and domination (among other vices of the same family). As such, intellectual humility is a low level of concern to be well regarded by other people for one's intellectual accomplishments or prowess, where the concern for others' good opinion is swamped in a higher concern for intellectual goods. Humility is a disposition not to ‘infer’ some illicit entitlement from one's (perhaps genuine) intellectual superiority. It is a low level of concern to have the personal importance that derives from power or influence over others' minds. The concerns of which humility is the relative absence are extraneous to the pursuit of intellectual goods, and so may erect various stumbling blocks to intellectual success.
Nils Jansen
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199588763
- eISBN:
- 9780191723315
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588763.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter formulates — as a systematic summary of the previous two chapters and as a conceptual basis for the following final chapter — a more adequate, ideal-typical classification of different ...
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This chapter formulates — as a systematic summary of the previous two chapters and as a conceptual basis for the following final chapter — a more adequate, ideal-typical classification of different forms of textual legal authorities. This classification rests on an abstract conceptual distinction of political domination, or legislative authority, on the one hand and non-legislative, or professional, authority on the other hand.Less
This chapter formulates — as a systematic summary of the previous two chapters and as a conceptual basis for the following final chapter — a more adequate, ideal-typical classification of different forms of textual legal authorities. This classification rests on an abstract conceptual distinction of political domination, or legislative authority, on the one hand and non-legislative, or professional, authority on the other hand.
Andrew N. Rubin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691154152
- eISBN:
- 9781400842179
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691154152.003.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
This introductory chapter discusses several iterations of militarized Orientalism and the function that it has continued to serve in military zones of rapid cultural translation. Such instances not ...
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This introductory chapter discusses several iterations of militarized Orientalism and the function that it has continued to serve in military zones of rapid cultural translation. Such instances not only show how brazen the connection between power and knowledge has become in our culture, but also evince how profoundly the modalities for understanding have become instruments of power. The chapter briefly traces the genealogy of this view in the early years of the Cold War and describes the formidable structures and conjunctures of cultural domination, as well as the cultural mechanisms by which the United States rearticulated the discourse of British colonialism through the institutions and discourses of anticommunism.Less
This introductory chapter discusses several iterations of militarized Orientalism and the function that it has continued to serve in military zones of rapid cultural translation. Such instances not only show how brazen the connection between power and knowledge has become in our culture, but also evince how profoundly the modalities for understanding have become instruments of power. The chapter briefly traces the genealogy of this view in the early years of the Cold War and describes the formidable structures and conjunctures of cultural domination, as well as the cultural mechanisms by which the United States rearticulated the discourse of British colonialism through the institutions and discourses of anticommunism.
