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This chapter presents an empirical analysis of the level, development, and structure of political effectiveness in twenty-one OECD countries between 1974 and 1995. There are three main results. First, regarding the level of effectiveness, the USA is, with the exception of economic policy, always among those countries with the worst performance record. Second, in terms of the development of political effectiveness, the general hypothesis that western democracies have been converging at a lower level of performance can not be confirmed. Third, the thesis of increasing incompatibility or increased tension between different policy goals finds no empirical confirmation.

This chapter deals with the Europeanization of public policy, with emphasis on the problems that researchers encounter when they try to get to grips with the concept of Europeanization, the issue of explanation, the measurement of effects and the control of alternative rival hypotheses. It covers the domestic impact of the public policy of the European Union (EU), for which the term ‘EU-ization’ could be used. Featherstone has shown in the introductory chapter that the scope of Europeanization can go beyond EU-ization, for example, it can include the transfer of policy from one European country to several other countries, but this chapter if primarily concerned with how the EU impacts on the domestic policy systems of member states. The first section of the chapter, ‘The Concept’, looks at the implications of the conceptual analysis of Europeanization and suggests ideas in the direction of conceptual precision; the next section ‘What is Europeanized and to What Extent?’ ‘unpacks’ the concept of Europeanization by using a simple taxonomy; the section ‘Vertical and Horizontal Mechanisms' illustrates the main mechanisms involved in Europeanization of public policy, before the key explanatory variables are discussed in the section ‘Towards Explanation?’. The concluding section presents suggestions for future research, the key argument throughout the chapter having been that research on Europeanization presents an opportunity to bring EU scholars closer to ‘normal’ political science.

This chapter takes a ‘top-down’ perspective on how European integration and Europeanization more generally affect domestic policies, politics and polities of the member states and beyond. The emerging literature on the topic is used to develop some preliminary hypotheses on the conditions under which domestic change would be expected in response to Europeanization. Various propositions made in the literature are simplified, and topics needing further research are pointed out. The chapter proceeds in the following steps: first, what is meant by the ‘domestic impact’ of Europeanization is specified; second, the concept of ‘misfit’ is developed, and differential empowerment and socialization are distinguished as the two theoretical logics of domestic adaptation to Europe; third, the degree and direction of domestic changes to be expected by the two logics and causal mechanisms are discussed, focusing on the question of whether convergence or divergence is likely. The conclusion offers propositions on how differential empowerment and socialization relate to each other.

The EU structural funds are characterized by an elaborate policy model, which member states are asked to follow exactly corresponding to its regulations and intentions. Chapter 8 argues that whether this policy model can be implemented effectively or not is, nevertheless, at the discretion of national actors and that their responses do not just depend on the current ‘goodness of fit’ but on compatibility with domestic policy paths. An empirical reconstruction of implementation processes in Germany, Ireland and Sweden shows that, if the structural funds’ policy model is incompatible with the established domestic policy instruments, the member state actors can successfully isolate the implementation of the European policy model. On a medium- or long-term basis, the effective implementation of the European structural funds will be made possible by an endogenous paradigmatic change of domestic policy. If, however, domestic policy remains stable, the isolation of the European policy model will be consolidated and become symbolic change.

This concluding chapter addresses the main issues raised in the Introduction and presents the general findings that emerge from the country studies. It has three main aims. First, it puts forward three arguments on the basis of the national investigations of policy co-ordination at the European level, and comparisons of permanent representations: the first argument is that that all the member states have responded to the co-ordination need that arises from EU policy-making and most aspire to a careful crafting of policy, but that the nature of their response varies according to the prevailing national attitude to European integration, features of the national political and administrative opportunity structures, policy style, and available resources; the second argument is that, although there are some similarities between national arrangements with respect to some aspects of organization and core functions, there are also several very substantial differences—neither the ‘convergence hypothesis’ nor the ‘continuing divergence hypothesis’ outlined in the Introduction is confirmed by the case studies, but there is evidence that many of the factors identified by each are at work; the third argument is related to effectiveness—each set of national arrangements has its own particular strengths and weaknesses, but one common factor affecting performance is the efficiency of domestic co-ordination procedures. The second aim of the Conclusion is to consider the wider implications of the findings both for the functioning of the European Union as a system and for theorizing about the EU; with respect to the former, national arrangements in Brussels do little to overcome the problem of segmentation that characterizes the EU, but concerning the latter, the case studies suggest that the intergovernmentalist image is at odds with how national policy preferences are actually formed and the nature of the role played by the permanent representations; the alternative image approach outlined above, and described in the Introduction, offers a better guide on both counts. The third and final aim of the chapter is to compare national co-ordination practices at the domestic level with those found at the European level; the contention put forward is that the domestic co-ordination of EU policy is more effective than processes at the European level.

This concluding chapter has three main aims: to identify the main findings that emerge from the ten country case studies presented in the book; to present an argument about the factors that shape the strategies and structures of national co-ordination; and to draw attention to a number of wider issues on the basis of what the findings suggest. The first finding is that European integration exerts a powerful need for co-ordination on the part of governments and that European Union (EU) policy-making has become an important locus of domestic co-ordination for governments; however, membership of the Union confronts the member states with very specific challenges, and meeting its complex demands is extremely problematic. Second, national responses to the demands of EU membership have led to a redefinition of the functions traditionally performed by some actors and a recasting or recalibration of interinstitutional relationships. Third, there are important similarities between the way in which the member states co-ordinate their European policies, although diversity persists and institutional convergence is limited in scope and extent. The main part of the conclusion presents a cross-national view of the co-ordination of EU policy, looking at similarities and differences and explaining them; the last part presents concluding remarks on the effectiveness of national co-ordination systems, co-ordination as a process, the systemic implications (impact) of the findings, and theoretical issues.

The candidate countries of central and eastern Europe (CEE) have been taking on all the obligations of European Union (EU) membership for some ten years now, so the domestic effects of transferring policies and institutions to them are likely to be comparable to the effects of the EU on its current member states, although the political relationship between the applicants and the EU is very different, which affects how Europeanization occurs. This chapter examines just one domain of Europeanization in relation to CEE candidates. Public policy. The first section sets out a prima facie case for extending the study of Europeanization to include the EU effects in CEE, arguing that the effects are likely to be similar in nature, but broader and deeper in scope. The second section discusses how theoretical and empirical work on Europeanization in the fifteen EU countries can usefully be applied to the applicants for membership, particularly the CEE countries that have sought to join since 1989; it sets out a typology of routes of influence through which the EU can affect domestic changes in CEE. The third section presents an analysis of two major reasons why Europeanization is different in the case of central and eastern European countries: the first reason is that they are candidates rather than members of the Union, in an asymmetrical relationship which gives the EU more coercive routes of influence in domestic policy-making processes, and the applicants a stronger incentive than existing member states to implement EU policies because they are trying to gain admission yet cannot influence EU policy making; the second reason is the uncertainty built into the accession processes, which has at least five dimensions.

This introduction starts by pointing out that entry into the European Union (EU) appears to pose even greater demands for co-ordination on its member states than that already required for the domestic public sector. With entry into the EU, the domain of government and action and responsibility has been extended, the complexity of decision-making has been increased and the policy stakes in many policy areas have been raised. In addition to co-ordinating their internal policy-making activities, governments must also be prepared to defend more coherent programmes at the EU level and ensure that their proposals in Brussels and their actions in their national capital are compatible. The different sections of the introduction discuss EU membership and the sources of co-ordination need, the challenge of EU policy co-ordination, and convergence and distinctiveness (divergence).

Domestic and international policy‐making on protection of the ozone layer are examined from 1980 to 1987. Tracks the 1982 resumption of international negotiations to protect the ozone layer after two further unsuccessful attempts. Follows the progression of these negotiations, and their interactions with domestic policy and corporate strategy, over five years: three years of stagnation leading to the 1985 Vienna Convention, followed by two years of rapid progress culminating in the 1987 Montreal Protocol — the first international agreement on concrete measures to reduce human contribution to ozone depletion.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the national co-ordination of European Union (EU) policy in Spain. It concentrates on the processes that take place in Madrid, and using a threefold categorization, examines the mechanisms used by central government in its dealings with the other main actors involved in the process. The first set of relationships are horizontal, and relate to non-governmental actors, including the Parliament, political parties, and interest groups; the second set are vertical, or more precisely intergovernmental, and concern relations between the centre and the periphery under the surveillance of the Constitutional Court; the third set are internal, and relate to intragovernmental co-ordination within the central administration and the core executive. These three sets of relationships are examined in the three main sections of the chapter. It is argued that Spain’s politico-constitutional uniqueness has been retained, and even reinforced within the EU, and that the Spanish case appears to challenge the assumption that Europeanization is hollowing out the state, since the Spanish state, here identified with its central government, has been strengthened since accession.

This chapter on the national co-ordination of European Union (EU) policy in the United Kingdom has four sections. The first considers the UK’s interpretation of the co-ordination need generated by EC/EU membership; the co-ordination ambition is outlined in relation to the UK political system and explanatory factors are discussed. The organization, structure, and procedural operation of the co-ordination system are discussed in the second section of the chapter, which examines in detail the relationship between central actors and the line ministries, the division of labour and responsibility, and the formal and informal channels of communication. The third section assesses the effectiveness of UK co-ordination within the wider context of the relationship between administrative efficiency and policy success. The final part concludes that the UK’s system for co-ordinating EU policy has been shaped more profoundly by pre-existing institutional structures and values that characterize the domestic polity than by the demands generated by membership of the EU, but that the influence of both imperatives is apparent.

The author of this chapter on the national co-ordination of European Union (EU) policy in Germany contends that, in order to arrive at a more balanced picture of the efficiency of German EU policy co-ordination, the various aspects of the term ‘Europa-Politik’ need to be distinguished more carefully than experts on the EU usually do; accordingly, the chapter draws on the polity–policy–politics distinction and other policy classifications customary in the field of policy analysis in the pursuit of four objectives. First an analysis is made of the already well documented structural arrangements in Bonn, the Länder and Brussels for co-ordinating various policy types in the multilevel decision-making system; the German co-ordination machinery is described as basically a two-track system consisting of a diplomatic track built and a sectorized expert track. Second, substantive policy interdependencies reflected and articulated within the departmental division of labour (as well as on the other two layers of the European decision-making system) are explored as to their issue salience and their bearing on the politics dimension of Europa-Politik. Third, the place of politics (and politicians) in the apparently diplomat- and bureaucrat-dominated, expert-driven German subsystem of the European political system is considered more systematically, and it is contended that the German pattern of ex post co-ordination is ultimately superior to a practice of ex ante co-ordination of all policy matters regardless of their salience. Fourth, the French and the British co-ordination systems, which emphasise ex ante central co-ordination, are considered and pronounced as less thorough than their image suggests; their emphasis on ex ante central co-ordination is explained by the more defensive nature of the two governments towards European integration in the past and, in the case of Britain, by features of the Westminster system that allow more hierarchical interministerial relations than does a coalition government, or a federal system.

This concluding chapter summarizes the most important results of this investigation into the development of political effectiveness in western democracies since 1974, and the impact of political institutions. The findings are discussed with respect to their theoretical and practical implications. The study stresses that the effect of institutions is more complicated than most of the neo-institutionalist approaches assume. No clear predictions can be made on the basis of institutional factors. Consequently, the analyses do not support the widely-held assumption that fundamental political problems can simply be resolved through institutional reforms of liberal democracies.

This chapter analyses the national co-ordination of European Union (EU) policy in Greece, seeking to show that in terms of formal arrangements the country is more or less in tune with other EU members, although co-ordination deficiencies are often apparent and pronounced. The chapter highlights the ‘inanimate’ character of the arrangements in place and their neutralization by the absence of clear priorities set at the political level and diffused throughout the political–administrative system. The co-ordination scheme is described as looking like a truncated pyramid, where everything is in place apart from the unifying element at the top. It is further argued that although the existing arrangements are apparently well entrenched, they are not unalterable, and that what is essentially required is leadership from the centre and for government to lay down general orientations in the European policy domain; the core executive needs to take daring decisions and mark clear priorities so that ultimately it becomes possible to give a sense of direction. The three main sections of the chapter discuss the prerequisites of co-ordination, the ‘truncated pyramid structure’ of the Greek administrative system, and the missing link of governmental steering.

This chapter on the national co-ordination of European Union (EU) policy in Denmark starts by pointing out that the Danish position within the EU is somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, Denmark has acquired the image of a ‘Eurosceptic’ having obtained several opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty; on the other hand, its day-to-day performance in the EU is widely regarded as positive, since its rate and speed of implementation of EU legislative acts is one of the highest. This performance is partly due to Denmark’s EU co-ordination system, combined with its internal emphasis upon consensus. The Danish EU co-ordination system is centralized but also displays some decentralized features; in addition, compared with the normal domestic procedures for co-ordination, EU co-ordination in the country is very formalized, although it is also achieved informally through consensus. The four main sections of the chapter discuss: the centralization issue; the structure and procedures for EU policy co-ordination; sectorization (a decision-making process in which the decisive influence is located in an alliance between a sectoral ministry and important interest groups in an area); and the role of parliament and the European Committee.

Looks at the different levels of change in the countries of South Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) since the end of the cold war, and attempts to determine how, and to what extent, the end of the cold war has been a long‐term determinant in defining the region's foreign and domestic policies. The different sections of the chapter address: the security dimension (including consideration of the effect of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan); democratization; and economic liberalization and regional cooperation.

This chapter on the national co-ordination of European Union (EU) policy in Austria starts by discussing the challenge of co-ordination, and outlining the policy changes and reforms in the lead-up to membership of the EU. The strategy employed has resulted in high ambitions concerning EU co-ordination, and this co-ordination ambition is supported by a policy-making culture that values co-ordination and integration, and is based on the country’s long tradition of wide consultation, grand coalition government, parliamentary consensus seeking, and corporatism. The remainder of the chapter looks at the various actors involved individually, briefly pointing out in which way membership of the EU constitutes a challenge, mapping out the respective actor’s formal role in the co-ordination process, and evaluating the actor’s impact on Austria’s position- taking in the EU. The five sets of actors examined are: the central players ( the cabinet and the central administration); Parliament; the President; the Länder; and interest groups (corporatism). The conclusion aims at an overall evaluation of the EU co-ordination process from a political power perspective.