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Vice and Knowledge

Quassim Cassam

in Vices of the Mind: From the Intellectual to the Political

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
January 2019
ISBN:
9780198826903
eISBN:
9780191865824
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198826903.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter discusses the view, associated with David Hume and Saul Kripke, that the supposed epistemic vice of dogmatism can play a positive role in protecting our knowledge. It discusses Kripke’s ... More


Usage Challenges to Fallibilism

Jody Azzouni

in Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A definition of fallibility shows that agents are fallible about necessary truths. It is shown that fallibility of agents implies a denial of parity reasoning. Moorean paradoxes appear to undercut ... More


Knowledge, Time, and Negligence

Ernest Sosa

in Epistemology

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
January 2019
ISBN:
9780691183268
eISBN:
9781400883059
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691183268.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter analyses Saul Kripke's dogmatism paradox. It argues that, in order to address properly that puzzle, one needs a notion of epistemic negligence that fits naturally within a ... More


Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Jody Azzouni

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The word “know” is revealed as vague, applicable to fallible agents, factive, and criterion-transcendent. It is invariant in its meaning across contexts and invariant relative to different agents. ... More


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