Simon Caney
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198293507
- eISBN:
- 9780191602337
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829350X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Having argued, in Ch. 2, that there are universal moral values, the next logical step is to ask what these universal moral values are; this question is pursued in Chs 3 and 4, which consider ...
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Having argued, in Ch. 2, that there are universal moral values, the next logical step is to ask what these universal moral values are; this question is pursued in Chs 3 and 4, which consider arguments for two different types of universal value and link together to provide an analysis of what universal principles of justice should apply at the global level. This chapter examines what universal principles of distributive justice (if any) should be adopted. It is arranged in 14 sections: Section I presents a conceptual analysis of the nature of distributive justice; Section II makes some preliminary points about the nature of cosmopolitan accounts of distributive justice and the general nature of the reasoning underlying these; Sections III–V then analyse three types of arguments for cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice, and Section VI reflects on these, and suggests and defends four principles of cosmopolitan distributive justice; Sections VII–VIII consider objections (counter-arguments) to cosmopolitan concepts of distributive justice, some of them outlined by John Rawls in his account of international justice and others by nationalist political thinkers such as David Miller; Sections IX–XI examine three nationalist claims about the nature of distributive justice, all of which emphasize the moral relevance of persons’ membership in nations, while Sections XII–XIII investigate two realist claims (XII–XIII). Section XIV sums up the findings of the chapter.Less
Having argued, in Ch. 2, that there are universal moral values, the next logical step is to ask what these universal moral values are; this question is pursued in Chs 3 and 4, which consider arguments for two different types of universal value and link together to provide an analysis of what universal principles of justice should apply at the global level. This chapter examines what universal principles of distributive justice (if any) should be adopted. It is arranged in 14 sections: Section I presents a conceptual analysis of the nature of distributive justice; Section II makes some preliminary points about the nature of cosmopolitan accounts of distributive justice and the general nature of the reasoning underlying these; Sections III–V then analyse three types of arguments for cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice, and Section VI reflects on these, and suggests and defends four principles of cosmopolitan distributive justice; Sections VII–VIII consider objections (counter-arguments) to cosmopolitan concepts of distributive justice, some of them outlined by John Rawls in his account of international justice and others by nationalist political thinkers such as David Miller; Sections IX–XI examine three nationalist claims about the nature of distributive justice, all of which emphasize the moral relevance of persons’ membership in nations, while Sections XII–XIII investigate two realist claims (XII–XIII). Section XIV sums up the findings of the chapter.
Allen Buchanan
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198295358
- eISBN:
- 9780191600982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295359.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter grapples with the most controversial topic in the discourse of human rights: distributive justice. The chief questions to be addressed are (1) whether a justice‐based international legal ...
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This chapter grapples with the most controversial topic in the discourse of human rights: distributive justice. The chief questions to be addressed are (1) whether a justice‐based international legal order should include rights of distributive justice (sometimes called social and economic rights) for individuals that exceed the right to the means of subsistence that is already widely recognized in international and regional human rights instruments, and (2) whether international law should recognize not only individuals but collectivities such as states or “peoples” or nations as having rights of distributive justice. To situate these questions, the chapter begins by considering alternative explanations for widespread skepticism about the possibility that distributive justice can have a significant place in the international legal order. The remaining sections of the chapter discuss: I. The Place of Distributive Justice in International Law; II. Reasons for Rejecting a Prominent Role for Distributive Justice in International Law Today; III. Deep Distributive Pluralism; IV. Societal Distributive Autonomy; and V. Institutional Capacity and Lack of Political Will.Less
This chapter grapples with the most controversial topic in the discourse of human rights: distributive justice. The chief questions to be addressed are (1) whether a justice‐based international legal order should include rights of distributive justice (sometimes called social and economic rights) for individuals that exceed the right to the means of subsistence that is already widely recognized in international and regional human rights instruments, and (2) whether international law should recognize not only individuals but collectivities such as states or “peoples” or nations as having rights of distributive justice. To situate these questions, the chapter begins by considering alternative explanations for widespread skepticism about the possibility that distributive justice can have a significant place in the international legal order. The remaining sections of the chapter discuss: I. The Place of Distributive Justice in International Law; II. Reasons for Rejecting a Prominent Role for Distributive Justice in International Law Today; III. Deep Distributive Pluralism; IV. Societal Distributive Autonomy; and V. Institutional Capacity and Lack of Political Will.
Christopher Lake
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199241743
- eISBN:
- 9780191599743
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241740.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
These days, arguments about distributive justice—i.e. arguments about who should get what—often centre around two ideas. One is that goods should be distributed equally. The other is that how people ...
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These days, arguments about distributive justice—i.e. arguments about who should get what—often centre around two ideas. One is that goods should be distributed equally. The other is that how people fare in life should depend on what they are responsible for. In a wide‐ranging discussion, the author asks what it is that draws us to these two ideas and whether they lend themselves to being combined, in the way contemporary egalitarian thinkers seek to combine them, or whether they necessarily pull in different directions. Along the way, he examines how arguments about responsibility and natural talents bear upon the standing of market rewards and he looks at recent theoretical attempts to show that the recipients of social benefits should be willing to engage in contributive activity in return. The conclusion is clear—there is no natural tendency for a commitment to equality to support an attachment to responsibility nor for an attachment to responsibility to support a commitment to equality.Less
These days, arguments about distributive justice—i.e. arguments about who should get what—often centre around two ideas. One is that goods should be distributed equally. The other is that how people fare in life should depend on what they are responsible for. In a wide‐ranging discussion, the author asks what it is that draws us to these two ideas and whether they lend themselves to being combined, in the way contemporary egalitarian thinkers seek to combine them, or whether they necessarily pull in different directions. Along the way, he examines how arguments about responsibility and natural talents bear upon the standing of market rewards and he looks at recent theoretical attempts to show that the recipients of social benefits should be willing to engage in contributive activity in return. The conclusion is clear—there is no natural tendency for a commitment to equality to support an attachment to responsibility nor for an attachment to responsibility to support a commitment to equality.
Matt Matravers
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295730
- eISBN:
- 9780191599828
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295731.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book attempts to answer the challenge of showing that morality is not a confidence trick or a fetish. It does so by arguing that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested people could ...
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This book attempts to answer the challenge of showing that morality is not a confidence trick or a fetish. It does so by arguing that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested people could accept. The problem is approached by asking by what right some people punish others, and by comparing recent developments in theories of distributive and retributive justice. The first part of the book considers retributive, utilitarian, and mixed theories of punishment. In the second part, recent theories of distributive justice, especially those of Rawls and Gauthier, are examined. It is argued that these theories cannot give an adequate account of punishment. In the final part, an argument is offered for a genuinely constructivist account of morality—constructivist in that it rejects any idea of objective, mind‐independent moral values and seeks instead to construct morality from non‐moral human concerns; genuinely constructivist in that, in contrast to Rawls, it does not take as a premise the equal moral worth of persons. The conclusion is that a genuine constructivism will show the need for, and justification of, punishment as intrinsic to morality itself.Less
This book attempts to answer the challenge of showing that morality is not a confidence trick or a fetish. It does so by arguing that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested people could accept. The problem is approached by asking by what right some people punish others, and by comparing recent developments in theories of distributive and retributive justice. The first part of the book considers retributive, utilitarian, and mixed theories of punishment. In the second part, recent theories of distributive justice, especially those of Rawls and Gauthier, are examined. It is argued that these theories cannot give an adequate account of punishment. In the final part, an argument is offered for a genuinely constructivist account of morality—constructivist in that it rejects any idea of objective, mind‐independent moral values and seeks instead to construct morality from non‐moral human concerns; genuinely constructivist in that, in contrast to Rawls, it does not take as a premise the equal moral worth of persons. The conclusion is that a genuine constructivism will show the need for, and justification of, punishment as intrinsic to morality itself.
David Schlosberg
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199286294
- eISBN:
- 9780191713323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199286294.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
This chapter presents an overview and critique of many existing distributional theories of ecological justice. After a discussion of some of the key difficulties identified by liberal theorists in ...
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This chapter presents an overview and critique of many existing distributional theories of ecological justice. After a discussion of some of the key difficulties identified by liberal theorists in applying the concept of justice to the natural world, the chapter examines a number of theories that attempt to expand liberal and distributional notions of justice to future generations of humans and to non-human nature.Less
This chapter presents an overview and critique of many existing distributional theories of ecological justice. After a discussion of some of the key difficulties identified by liberal theorists in applying the concept of justice to the natural world, the chapter examines a number of theories that attempt to expand liberal and distributional notions of justice to future generations of humans and to non-human nature.
Daniel Butt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218240
- eISBN:
- 9780191711589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218240.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter outlines a number of critical responses to the project of seeking to rectify historic injustice, and explains why they largely do not apply to international libertarian accounts of ...
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This chapter outlines a number of critical responses to the project of seeking to rectify historic injustice, and explains why they largely do not apply to international libertarian accounts of international justice. It distinguishes between backward-looking and forward-looking accounts of distributive justice in both ideal and non-ideal theory, and looks at how both accounts relate to ideas of rectificatory justice. If one advocates a forward-looking account of distributive justice, and so advocates a redistribution of resources with each new generation, then the rectificatory project will seem to be of little importance. However, this nonchalance in the face of historic injustice is unsustainable if one advocates backward-looking principles. Since international libertarians resist cosmopolitan calls for a generational redistribution of resources across political boundaries, they must carefully scrutinize the provenance of modern day distributions.Less
This chapter outlines a number of critical responses to the project of seeking to rectify historic injustice, and explains why they largely do not apply to international libertarian accounts of international justice. It distinguishes between backward-looking and forward-looking accounts of distributive justice in both ideal and non-ideal theory, and looks at how both accounts relate to ideas of rectificatory justice. If one advocates a forward-looking account of distributive justice, and so advocates a redistribution of resources with each new generation, then the rectificatory project will seem to be of little importance. However, this nonchalance in the face of historic injustice is unsustainable if one advocates backward-looking principles. Since international libertarians resist cosmopolitan calls for a generational redistribution of resources across political boundaries, they must carefully scrutinize the provenance of modern day distributions.
Samuel Scheffler
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257676
- eISBN:
- 9780191600197
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257671.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Scheffler identifies and interprets the core ideas in John Rawls's discussion of desert in A Theory of Justice. The conjunction of these ideas, which Scheffler terms the ‘Liberal Theory’ of desert, ...
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Scheffler identifies and interprets the core ideas in John Rawls's discussion of desert in A Theory of Justice. The conjunction of these ideas, which Scheffler terms the ‘Liberal Theory’ of desert, denies that the principles of distributive justice make reference to a ‘prejusticial’ notion of desert but allows a place for prejusticial desert in our thinking about retributive justice and the criminal law. Scheffler investigates this asymmetry between distributive and retributive justice, noting that desert is an individualistic notion that may not fit into a holistic theory of distributive justice. But retributive justice, concerned with the imposition of punishment on particular human beings, can perhaps accommodate such an individualistic notion.Less
Scheffler identifies and interprets the core ideas in John Rawls's discussion of desert in A Theory of Justice. The conjunction of these ideas, which Scheffler terms the ‘Liberal Theory’ of desert, denies that the principles of distributive justice make reference to a ‘prejusticial’ notion of desert but allows a place for prejusticial desert in our thinking about retributive justice and the criminal law. Scheffler investigates this asymmetry between distributive and retributive justice, noting that desert is an individualistic notion that may not fit into a holistic theory of distributive justice. But retributive justice, concerned with the imposition of punishment on particular human beings, can perhaps accommodate such an individualistic notion.
Randy E. Barnett
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297291
- eISBN:
- 9780191598777
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297297.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
What is liberty, as opposed to licence, and why is it so important? When people pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity whilst living in society, they confront pervasive problems of knowledge, ...
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What is liberty, as opposed to licence, and why is it so important? When people pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity whilst living in society, they confront pervasive problems of knowledge, interest, and power. These problems are dealt with by ensuring the liberty of the people to pursue their own ends, but addressing these problems also requires that liberty be structured by certain rights and procedures associated with the classical liberal conception of justice and the rule of law. This book identifies the content of natural rights—several property, freedom of contract, first possession, restitution, and self defence—and explains how natural rights are distinct from natural law and why these abstract rights require a conventional rule of law to implement. Barnett discusses the practicality of restitution as an alternative to punishment in criminal justice and the constitutional principles that are needed to protect fundamental rights from enforcement error and abuse. After describing how a polycentric legal system would function, he concludes by considering communitarian objections and those based on retributive and distributive justice.Less
What is liberty, as opposed to licence, and why is it so important? When people pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity whilst living in society, they confront pervasive problems of knowledge, interest, and power. These problems are dealt with by ensuring the liberty of the people to pursue their own ends, but addressing these problems also requires that liberty be structured by certain rights and procedures associated with the classical liberal conception of justice and the rule of law. This book identifies the content of natural rights—several property, freedom of contract, first possession, restitution, and self defence—and explains how natural rights are distinct from natural law and why these abstract rights require a conventional rule of law to implement. Barnett discusses the practicality of restitution as an alternative to punishment in criminal justice and the constitutional principles that are needed to protect fundamental rights from enforcement error and abuse. After describing how a polycentric legal system would function, he concludes by considering communitarian objections and those based on retributive and distributive justice.
David Schlosberg
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199286294
- eISBN:
- 9780191713323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199286294.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
This chapter explores recent theories of justice, focusing on those that move beyond a sole emphasis on the traditional distributive paradigm. Particular attention is paid to various theories of ...
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This chapter explores recent theories of justice, focusing on those that move beyond a sole emphasis on the traditional distributive paradigm. Particular attention is paid to various theories of recognition, the capabilities approach, and participatory justice. Ultimately, the argument is that a thorough understanding and approach to justice requires us to see the linkages between distribution, recognition, capabilities, and participation.Less
This chapter explores recent theories of justice, focusing on those that move beyond a sole emphasis on the traditional distributive paradigm. Particular attention is paid to various theories of recognition, the capabilities approach, and participatory justice. Ultimately, the argument is that a thorough understanding and approach to justice requires us to see the linkages between distribution, recognition, capabilities, and participation.
Simon Caney
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198293507
- eISBN:
- 9780191602337
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829350X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Examines which political principles should govern global politics. It explores ethical issues in justice that arise at the global level and addresses questions such as: are there universal values, ...
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Examines which political principles should govern global politics. It explores ethical issues in justice that arise at the global level and addresses questions such as: are there universal values, and if so, what are they; what human rights, if any, are there; are there global principles of distributive justice; should there be a system of supra-state institutions; is national self-determination defensible; when, if ever, may political regimes wage war; and is humanitarian intervention justified?The book outlines and defends an egalitarian liberal brand of cosmopolitanism to address these questions, maintaining that there are universal principles, arguing that these include universal civil and political human rights, and defending the application of global principles of distributive justice. On this basis, it makes a case for a system of supra-state political institutions to promote these universal principles of justice further. Having set out principles of ideal theory, the book then examines what principles should apply when injustices are committed. To do this it examines when political regimes may wage war and when they may engage in intervention, and thereby draws on cosmopolitan principles to derive and defend a cosmopolitan conception of just war and humanitarian intervention. In arriving at these conclusions, the book engages in a sustained analysis of the competing arguments on all the above issues, examining the arguments of nationalists, realists, and those who affirm the ideal of a society of states. To do this, the book explores and integrates the work of philosophers, political theorists, and international relations scholars, and illustrates its ethical argument and theoretical analysis with empirical examples. Furthermore, it argues that the issues examined in the book cannot be adequately treated in isolation from each other but must be treated as an interlinked whole.Less
Examines which political principles should govern global politics. It explores ethical issues in justice that arise at the global level and addresses questions such as: are there universal values, and if so, what are they; what human rights, if any, are there; are there global principles of distributive justice; should there be a system of supra-state institutions; is national self-determination defensible; when, if ever, may political regimes wage war; and is humanitarian intervention justified?
The book outlines and defends an egalitarian liberal brand of cosmopolitanism to address these questions, maintaining that there are universal principles, arguing that these include universal civil and political human rights, and defending the application of global principles of distributive justice. On this basis, it makes a case for a system of supra-state political institutions to promote these universal principles of justice further. Having set out principles of ideal theory, the book then examines what principles should apply when injustices are committed. To do this it examines when political regimes may wage war and when they may engage in intervention, and thereby draws on cosmopolitan principles to derive and defend a cosmopolitan conception of just war and humanitarian intervention. In arriving at these conclusions, the book engages in a sustained analysis of the competing arguments on all the above issues, examining the arguments of nationalists, realists, and those who affirm the ideal of a society of states. To do this, the book explores and integrates the work of philosophers, political theorists, and international relations scholars, and illustrates its ethical argument and theoretical analysis with empirical examples. Furthermore, it argues that the issues examined in the book cannot be adequately treated in isolation from each other but must be treated as an interlinked whole.
Randy E. Barnett
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297291
- eISBN:
- 9780191598777
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297297.003.0015
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter anticipates and responds to various objections to the thesis of the book, including those founded on communitarianism and on considerations of retributive and distributive justice. It ...
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This chapter anticipates and responds to various objections to the thesis of the book, including those founded on communitarianism and on considerations of retributive and distributive justice. It considers such issues as neutrality, and the difference between the right or just and the good. It concludes by considering the practicality of using ‘public policy’ analysis in place of the rights identified here and of adding additional rights to those defended as needed, to handle the problems of knowledge, interest, and power.Less
This chapter anticipates and responds to various objections to the thesis of the book, including those founded on communitarianism and on considerations of retributive and distributive justice. It considers such issues as neutrality, and the difference between the right or just and the good. It concludes by considering the practicality of using ‘public policy’ analysis in place of the rights identified here and of adding additional rights to those defended as needed, to handle the problems of knowledge, interest, and power.
Ian Carter
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294535
- eISBN:
- 9780191598951
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294530.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
When liberal political philosophers talk of equalizing, increasing or maximizing freedom (or liberty), they implicitly assume freedom to be a measurable attribute. Freedom is one of the currencies of ...
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When liberal political philosophers talk of equalizing, increasing or maximizing freedom (or liberty), they implicitly assume freedom to be a measurable attribute. Freedom is one of the currencies of a liberal theory of distributive justice, and is therefore assumed to be something that individuals can possess in varying degrees. Yet it is rarely clear what is meant by claims about degrees of freedom. To make sense of such claims, we need to clarify the concept of overall freedom and ask whether its measurement is theoretically possible. This concept is important because freedom has, for liberals, non-specific (or content-independent) value–i.e. value that is independent of the value of being free to do specific things. Liberals prescribe not only that individuals have certain specific freedom-types but also that they have a measure of (overall) freedom. Attempts to make sense of the concept of overall freedom by weighting particular options in terms of their values are erroneous, as these do not account for freedom’s non-specific value. On the other hand, a closer examination of the problems of the individuation of actions and of the various types of constraints on freedom shows overall freedom to be measurable in a way that reflects its non-specific value. To this end, actions need to be individuated in spatio-temporal terms and constraints on freedom need to be characterized in terms of the physical compossibility of actions. The comparative judgements about freedom implied by this analysis (with reference both to individuals and to groups) are more coherent with our intuitive judgements than might at first be expected.Less
When liberal political philosophers talk of equalizing, increasing or maximizing freedom (or liberty), they implicitly assume freedom to be a measurable attribute. Freedom is one of the currencies of a liberal theory of distributive justice, and is therefore assumed to be something that individuals can possess in varying degrees. Yet it is rarely clear what is meant by claims about degrees of freedom. To make sense of such claims, we need to clarify the concept of overall freedom and ask whether its measurement is theoretically possible. This concept is important because freedom has, for liberals, non-specific (or content-independent) value–i.e. value that is independent of the value of being free to do specific things. Liberals prescribe not only that individuals have certain specific freedom-types but also that they have a measure of (overall) freedom. Attempts to make sense of the concept of overall freedom by weighting particular options in terms of their values are erroneous, as these do not account for freedom’s non-specific value. On the other hand, a closer examination of the problems of the individuation of actions and of the various types of constraints on freedom shows overall freedom to be measurable in a way that reflects its non-specific value. To this end, actions need to be individuated in spatio-temporal terms and constraints on freedom need to be characterized in terms of the physical compossibility of actions. The comparative judgements about freedom implied by this analysis (with reference both to individuals and to groups) are more coherent with our intuitive judgements than might at first be expected.
Colin M. Macleod
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198293972
- eISBN:
- 9780191599798
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198293976.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book presents a systemic and definitive critique of Ronald Dworkin's highly influential theory of liberal equality. Focusing on the connection Dworkin attempts to establish between economic ...
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This book presents a systemic and definitive critique of Ronald Dworkin's highly influential theory of liberal equality. Focusing on the connection Dworkin attempts to establish between economic markets and liberal equality, the book examines Dworkin's contention that markets have an indispensable role to play in the articulation of liberal ideals of distributive justice, individual liberty, and state neutrality. The book also examines the issues concerning individual responsibility and entitlement as well as the nature of justice with respect to persons with disabilities. The author argues that Dworkin's attempt to establish deep affinities between the market and equality is unsuccessful and his proposed solutions to some central controversies in political theory are seriously flawed. This powerful examination of the work of America's leading public philosopher reveals some timely lessons about the hazards and limitations of the market as a device for the articulation and realization of egalitarian justice.Less
This book presents a systemic and definitive critique of Ronald Dworkin's highly influential theory of liberal equality. Focusing on the connection Dworkin attempts to establish between economic markets and liberal equality, the book examines Dworkin's contention that markets have an indispensable role to play in the articulation of liberal ideals of distributive justice, individual liberty, and state neutrality. The book also examines the issues concerning individual responsibility and entitlement as well as the nature of justice with respect to persons with disabilities. The author argues that Dworkin's attempt to establish deep affinities between the market and equality is unsuccessful and his proposed solutions to some central controversies in political theory are seriously flawed. This powerful examination of the work of America's leading public philosopher reveals some timely lessons about the hazards and limitations of the market as a device for the articulation and realization of egalitarian justice.
Daniel Butt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218240
- eISBN:
- 9780191711589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218240.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter lays out the account of justice between nations — international libertarianism — which the book uses to assess present day obligations arising from historic injustice. The first section ...
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This chapter lays out the account of justice between nations — international libertarianism — which the book uses to assess present day obligations arising from historic injustice. The first section outlines international libertarianism as a backward-looking account of international distributive justice, in contrast with forward-looking redistributive cosmopolitanism. The second section differentiates international libertarianism from prescriptive realism, by giving details of the principles of just international interaction which international libertarians believe should govern relations between different communities. These combine a respect for national self-determination with a prohibition on self-interested aggression. The third section considers the propriety of using these principles to judge historic international interaction, in the light of historically different beliefs about morality and the relatively recent development of international law. It concludes by considering the claim that historic departures from the principles might be seen as having been justified by necessity, and considers the duties of compensation which would result from such actions.Less
This chapter lays out the account of justice between nations — international libertarianism — which the book uses to assess present day obligations arising from historic injustice. The first section outlines international libertarianism as a backward-looking account of international distributive justice, in contrast with forward-looking redistributive cosmopolitanism. The second section differentiates international libertarianism from prescriptive realism, by giving details of the principles of just international interaction which international libertarians believe should govern relations between different communities. These combine a respect for national self-determination with a prohibition on self-interested aggression. The third section considers the propriety of using these principles to judge historic international interaction, in the light of historically different beliefs about morality and the relatively recent development of international law. It concludes by considering the claim that historic departures from the principles might be seen as having been justified by necessity, and considers the duties of compensation which would result from such actions.
Cécile Fabre
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296751
- eISBN:
- 9780191599200
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296754.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The desirability, or lack thereof, of bills of rights has been the focus of some of the most enduring political debates over the last two centuries. Unlike civil and political rights, social rights ...
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The desirability, or lack thereof, of bills of rights has been the focus of some of the most enduring political debates over the last two centuries. Unlike civil and political rights, social rights to the meeting of needs, standard rights to adequate minimum income, education, housing, and health care are usually not given constitutional protection. The book argues that individuals have social rights to adequate minimum income, housing, health care, and education, and that those rights must be entrenched in the constitution of a democratic state. That is, the democratic majority should not be able to repeal them, and certain institutions (for instance, the judiciary) should be given the power to strike down laws passed by the legislature that are in breach of those rights. Thus, the book is located at the crossroads of two major issues of contemporary political philosophy, to wit, the issue of democracy and the issue of distributive justice. It stems from the perception that there may be conflicts between the demands of democracy and the demands of distributive justice, both of which are crucially important, and from the resulting recognition that the question of the relationship between these two values cannot be ignored.Less
The desirability, or lack thereof, of bills of rights has been the focus of some of the most enduring political debates over the last two centuries. Unlike civil and political rights, social rights to the meeting of needs, standard rights to adequate minimum income, education, housing, and health care are usually not given constitutional protection. The book argues that individuals have social rights to adequate minimum income, housing, health care, and education, and that those rights must be entrenched in the constitution of a democratic state. That is, the democratic majority should not be able to repeal them, and certain institutions (for instance, the judiciary) should be given the power to strike down laws passed by the legislature that are in breach of those rights. Thus, the book is located at the crossroads of two major issues of contemporary political philosophy, to wit, the issue of democracy and the issue of distributive justice. It stems from the perception that there may be conflicts between the demands of democracy and the demands of distributive justice, both of which are crucially important, and from the resulting recognition that the question of the relationship between these two values cannot be ignored.
Kok-Chor Tan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199588855
- eISBN:
- 9780191738586
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588855.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book is a critical survey of the following three questions of egalitarian distributive justice. where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? These ...
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This book is a critical survey of the following three questions of egalitarian distributive justice. where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? These questions may be referred to, respectively, as the questions of the site, ground, and scope of distributive equality. The book defends an institutional site for egalitarian justice, a luck eglitarian ideal of why equality matters, and the idea that the scope of distributive justice is global. The account of equality proposed in this work may be described as “institutional luck egalitarianism” that is global in scope.Less
This book is a critical survey of the following three questions of egalitarian distributive justice. where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? These questions may be referred to, respectively, as the questions of the site, ground, and scope of distributive equality. The book defends an institutional site for egalitarian justice, a luck eglitarian ideal of why equality matters, and the idea that the scope of distributive justice is global. The account of equality proposed in this work may be described as “institutional luck egalitarianism” that is global in scope.
Amy Gutmann
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198280088
- eISBN:
- 9780191599927
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198280084.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Amy Gutmann argues that a just society could not, pace Michael Walzer, distribute social goods in accordance with the standards of complex equality. To support this view, Gutmann points to conflicts ...
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Amy Gutmann argues that a just society could not, pace Michael Walzer, distribute social goods in accordance with the standards of complex equality. To support this view, Gutmann points to conflicts between multiple meanings of goods, which require adjudication in accordance with moral considerations that cut across distributive spheres. Drawing on the several meanings of productive employment and medical care in contemporary USA, she concludes that justice is complex, but not specific to distinct spheres.Less
Amy Gutmann argues that a just society could not, pace Michael Walzer, distribute social goods in accordance with the standards of complex equality. To support this view, Gutmann points to conflicts between multiple meanings of goods, which require adjudication in accordance with moral considerations that cut across distributive spheres. Drawing on the several meanings of productive employment and medical care in contemporary USA, she concludes that justice is complex, but not specific to distinct spheres.
Allen Buchanan
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198295358
- eISBN:
- 9780191600982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295359.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Begins the task of applying the justice‐based conception of political legitimacy developed in Part Two of the book to the practically urgent and theoretically vexing issues of secession and ...
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Begins the task of applying the justice‐based conception of political legitimacy developed in Part Two of the book to the practically urgent and theoretically vexing issues of secession and self‐determination. Two main theses are advanced. The first is that international law should recognize a remedial right to secede but not a general right of self‐determination that includes the right to secede for all peoples or nations; from the standpoint of international law, the unilateral right to secede—the right to secede without consent or constitutional authorization—should be understood as a remedial right only, a last‐resort response to serious injustices (the Remedial Right Only Theory). The second thesis advanced is that international legal order should encourage alternatives to secession, in particular by working for greater compliance with existing international human rights norms prohibiting ethno‐national and religious discrimination and, in some cases, by supporting intrastate autonomy regimes, i.e. arrangements for self‐government short of full sovereignty. The six sections of the chapter are: I. Introduction; II. A Justice‐Based Theory of Secession; III. Theories of Secession; IV. Recognition and the Right to Secede; V. Secession and Distributive Justice; and VI. Conclusions.Less
Begins the task of applying the justice‐based conception of political legitimacy developed in Part Two of the book to the practically urgent and theoretically vexing issues of secession and self‐determination. Two main theses are advanced. The first is that international law should recognize a remedial right to secede but not a general right of self‐determination that includes the right to secede for all peoples or nations; from the standpoint of international law, the unilateral right to secede—the right to secede without consent or constitutional authorization—should be understood as a remedial right only, a last‐resort response to serious injustices (the Remedial Right Only Theory). The second thesis advanced is that international legal order should encourage alternatives to secession, in particular by working for greater compliance with existing international human rights norms prohibiting ethno‐national and religious discrimination and, in some cases, by supporting intrastate autonomy regimes, i.e. arrangements for self‐government short of full sovereignty. The six sections of the chapter are: I. Introduction; II. A Justice‐Based Theory of Secession; III. Theories of Secession; IV. Recognition and the Right to Secede; V. Secession and Distributive Justice; and VI. Conclusions.
Daniel Butt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218240
- eISBN:
- 9780191711589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218240.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter focuses on the claim that present day parties have inherited entitlements to property which, owing to historic injustice, is currently in the possession of others. Those who advocate ...
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This chapter focuses on the claim that present day parties have inherited entitlements to property which, owing to historic injustice, is currently in the possession of others. Those who advocate restitution as a response to wrongdoing argue that such property should be returned to the heirs of the historical victims. This inheritance-based model has often been rejected at a domestic level by theorists who reject the justifiability of inheritance. This response, however, is not available to international libertarians, who endorse backward-looking accounts of distributive justice. The chapter examines Jeremy Waldron's claim that property rights lapse in the absence of sustained possession, and holds that this need not be accepted if one sees international libertarianism as based on historical entitlement. It proceeds to challenge Janna Thompson's claim that the inheritance model is flawed as a result of its indeterminacy, maintaining that it need not rest upon counterfactual reasoning.Less
This chapter focuses on the claim that present day parties have inherited entitlements to property which, owing to historic injustice, is currently in the possession of others. Those who advocate restitution as a response to wrongdoing argue that such property should be returned to the heirs of the historical victims. This inheritance-based model has often been rejected at a domestic level by theorists who reject the justifiability of inheritance. This response, however, is not available to international libertarians, who endorse backward-looking accounts of distributive justice. The chapter examines Jeremy Waldron's claim that property rights lapse in the absence of sustained possession, and holds that this need not be accepted if one sees international libertarianism as based on historical entitlement. It proceeds to challenge Janna Thompson's claim that the inheritance model is flawed as a result of its indeterminacy, maintaining that it need not rest upon counterfactual reasoning.
Ian Carter
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294535
- eISBN:
- 9780191598951
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294530.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
If freedom’s non-specific value is sufficiently strong, then freedom should be considered one of the currencies of distributive justice. A theorist who affirms that freedom is one of the currencies ...
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If freedom’s non-specific value is sufficiently strong, then freedom should be considered one of the currencies of distributive justice. A theorist who affirms that freedom is one of the currencies of distributive justice can be said to affirm a freedom-based theory of justice. Given such a theory, the definition of freedom should itself be independent of that of justice, and thus a non-moralized definition. A freedom-based theory of justice can contain various alternative principles for the distribution of freedom, such as maximal freedom, equal freedom, maximal equal freedom and maximin freedom. These principles in turn make varying demands on our powers of measuring freedom in terms of the possibility of interpersonal comparisons, cardinality and unidimensionality.Less
If freedom’s non-specific value is sufficiently strong, then freedom should be considered one of the currencies of distributive justice. A theorist who affirms that freedom is one of the currencies of distributive justice can be said to affirm a freedom-based theory of justice. Given such a theory, the definition of freedom should itself be independent of that of justice, and thus a non-moralized definition. A freedom-based theory of justice can contain various alternative principles for the distribution of freedom, such as maximal freedom, equal freedom, maximal equal freedom and maximin freedom. These principles in turn make varying demands on our powers of measuring freedom in terms of the possibility of interpersonal comparisons, cardinality and unidimensionality.
