Clive Gamble
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197264522
- eISBN:
- 9780191734724
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264522.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology
Archaeological accounts of cognitive evolution have traditionally favoured an internal model of the mind and a search for symbolic proxies. This chapter argues for an external model of cognition and ...
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Archaeological accounts of cognitive evolution have traditionally favoured an internal model of the mind and a search for symbolic proxies. This chapter argues for an external model of cognition and uses this perspective to develop the understanding of Palaeolithic material culture as based on sensory experience. It explores ways of investigating the evolution of cognition by using the social brain model combined with a theory of distributed cognition. The emphasis is on social extension, which was a necessary step to a global distribution and which was achieved by mechanisms such as focused gaze that amplified the emotional content of bonds. The discussion examines the importance of these mechanisms through three aspects of social extension — ontological security, psychological continuity and extension of self.Less
Archaeological accounts of cognitive evolution have traditionally favoured an internal model of the mind and a search for symbolic proxies. This chapter argues for an external model of cognition and uses this perspective to develop the understanding of Palaeolithic material culture as based on sensory experience. It explores ways of investigating the evolution of cognition by using the social brain model combined with a theory of distributed cognition. The emphasis is on social extension, which was a necessary step to a global distribution and which was achieved by mechanisms such as focused gaze that amplified the emotional content of bonds. The discussion examines the importance of these mechanisms through three aspects of social extension — ontological security, psychological continuity and extension of self.
Bryce Huebner
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199926275
- eISBN:
- 9780199347193
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199926275.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
We live in an age of scientific collaboration, popular uprisings, failing political parties, and increasing corporate power. Many of these kinds of collective action derive from the decisions of ...
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We live in an age of scientific collaboration, popular uprisings, failing political parties, and increasing corporate power. Many of these kinds of collective action derive from the decisions of intelligent and powerful leaders, and many others emerge as a result of the aggregation of individual interests. But genuinely collective mentality remains a seductive possibility. This book develops a novel approach to distributed cognition and collective intentionality. It is argued that genuine cognition requires the capacity to engage in flexible goal-directed behavior, and that this requires specialized representational systems that are integrated in a way that yields fluid and skillful coping with environmental contingencies. In line with this argument, it is claimed that collective mentality should be posited where and only where specialized subroutines are integrated to yields goal-directed behavior that is sensitive to the concerns that are relevant to a group as such. Unlike traditional claims about collective intentionality, this approach reveals that there are many kinds of collective minds: some groups have cognitive capacities that are more like those that we find in honeybees or cats than they are like those that we find in people. Indeed, groups are unlikely to be ‘believers’ in the fullest sense of the term, and understanding why this is the case sheds new light on questions about collective intentionality and collective responsibility.Less
We live in an age of scientific collaboration, popular uprisings, failing political parties, and increasing corporate power. Many of these kinds of collective action derive from the decisions of intelligent and powerful leaders, and many others emerge as a result of the aggregation of individual interests. But genuinely collective mentality remains a seductive possibility. This book develops a novel approach to distributed cognition and collective intentionality. It is argued that genuine cognition requires the capacity to engage in flexible goal-directed behavior, and that this requires specialized representational systems that are integrated in a way that yields fluid and skillful coping with environmental contingencies. In line with this argument, it is claimed that collective mentality should be posited where and only where specialized subroutines are integrated to yields goal-directed behavior that is sensitive to the concerns that are relevant to a group as such. Unlike traditional claims about collective intentionality, this approach reveals that there are many kinds of collective minds: some groups have cognitive capacities that are more like those that we find in honeybees or cats than they are like those that we find in people. Indeed, groups are unlikely to be ‘believers’ in the fullest sense of the term, and understanding why this is the case sheds new light on questions about collective intentionality and collective responsibility.
Georg Theiner
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262019552
- eISBN:
- 9780262314787
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019552.003.0009
- Subject:
- Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
My goal in this chapter is to show that Kirsh and Maglio’s (1994) distinction between pragmatic and epistemic action can be generalized from the level of individuals to that of groups. The concept of ...
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My goal in this chapter is to show that Kirsh and Maglio’s (1994) distinction between pragmatic and epistemic action can be generalized from the level of individuals to that of groups. The concept of a collective epistemic action refers to ways in which groups actively change the structure of their social organization to improve their epistemic performance as collective agents. By emphasizing the interactions among people, rather than between people and their tools, I reconnect the “extended mind” thesis with complementary areas of social-scientific research in which groups are analyzed as the seats of action and cognition in their own right.Less
My goal in this chapter is to show that Kirsh and Maglio’s (1994) distinction between pragmatic and epistemic action can be generalized from the level of individuals to that of groups. The concept of a collective epistemic action refers to ways in which groups actively change the structure of their social organization to improve their epistemic performance as collective agents. By emphasizing the interactions among people, rather than between people and their tools, I reconnect the “extended mind” thesis with complementary areas of social-scientific research in which groups are analyzed as the seats of action and cognition in their own right.
Alexander Bird
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199665792
- eISBN:
- 9780191748615
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this chapter, three questions are posed: (i) When does a collection of individuals form an entity that is more than just the mereological sum of its constituent persons? (ii) Given that there is a ...
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In this chapter, three questions are posed: (i) When does a collection of individuals form an entity that is more than just the mereological sum of its constituent persons? (ii) Given that there is a group of this sort, under what conditions does it know (or believe etc.)? (iii) When we talk of, for example, ‘the growth of scientific knowledge’, can we regard this scientific knowledge as an epistemic state of some social entity? Drawing upon ideas from distribution cognition and Durkheimian sociology, responses are provided to the first and second questions and thereby a positive answer is given to the third.Less
In this chapter, three questions are posed: (i) When does a collection of individuals form an entity that is more than just the mereological sum of its constituent persons? (ii) Given that there is a group of this sort, under what conditions does it know (or believe etc.)? (iii) When we talk of, for example, ‘the growth of scientific knowledge’, can we regard this scientific knowledge as an epistemic state of some social entity? Drawing upon ideas from distribution cognition and Durkheimian sociology, responses are provided to the first and second questions and thereby a positive answer is given to the third.
John D. Dunne
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198827436
- eISBN:
- 9780191866289
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198827436.003.0005
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Organization Studies
Recent developments in the study of human cognition suggest that, in the context of interacting to accomplish a task together, humans engage in a form of ‘distributed’ or ‘cooperative’ cognition that ...
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Recent developments in the study of human cognition suggest that, in the context of interacting to accomplish a task together, humans engage in a form of ‘distributed’ or ‘cooperative’ cognition that facilitates their work. A key feature of this type of shared cognition is the capacity for humans to be aware of themselves as members of the cooperating group, and as the need arises, they can also become aware of the group itself when it must be regulated due to some dysfunction. In an attempt to bring new insights to this feature of cooperative cognition, this chapter engages with Buddhist epistemological theories of ‘reflexive awareness’ presented by the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti and his followers, and it points to crucial implications of the Dharmakīrtian notion of reflexivity that may be relevant to understanding the kind of reflexivity that sustains cooperative cognition.Less
Recent developments in the study of human cognition suggest that, in the context of interacting to accomplish a task together, humans engage in a form of ‘distributed’ or ‘cooperative’ cognition that facilitates their work. A key feature of this type of shared cognition is the capacity for humans to be aware of themselves as members of the cooperating group, and as the need arises, they can also become aware of the group itself when it must be regulated due to some dysfunction. In an attempt to bring new insights to this feature of cooperative cognition, this chapter engages with Buddhist epistemological theories of ‘reflexive awareness’ presented by the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti and his followers, and it points to crucial implications of the Dharmakīrtian notion of reflexivity that may be relevant to understanding the kind of reflexivity that sustains cooperative cognition.
Kourken Michaelian and Santiago Arango-Muñoz
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198737865
- eISBN:
- 9780191820366
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198737865.003.0013
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Developmental Psychology
Collaborative remembering, in which two or more individuals cooperate to remember together, is an ordinary occurrence. Ordinary though it may be, it challenges traditional understandings of memory ...
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Collaborative remembering, in which two or more individuals cooperate to remember together, is an ordinary occurrence. Ordinary though it may be, it challenges traditional understandings of memory knowledge in terms of justified memory beliefs held within the minds of single subjects. Collaborative memory has come to be a major area of research in psychology, but it has so far not been investigated in epistemology. This chapter conducts an initial exploration of the epistemological implications of collaborative memory research, arguing that the findings of this research support a novel theory of knowledge: distributed reliabilism. The chapter also argues for broadening the concept of collaborative memory to include not only direct interactions among subjects but also more indirect, technology-supported, and -mediated interactions.Less
Collaborative remembering, in which two or more individuals cooperate to remember together, is an ordinary occurrence. Ordinary though it may be, it challenges traditional understandings of memory knowledge in terms of justified memory beliefs held within the minds of single subjects. Collaborative memory has come to be a major area of research in psychology, but it has so far not been investigated in epistemology. This chapter conducts an initial exploration of the epistemological implications of collaborative memory research, arguing that the findings of this research support a novel theory of knowledge: distributed reliabilism. The chapter also argues for broadening the concept of collaborative memory to include not only direct interactions among subjects but also more indirect, technology-supported, and -mediated interactions.
Phaedra Daipha
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780226298542
- eISBN:
- 9780226298719
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226298719.003.0003
- Subject:
- Sociology, Science, Technology and Environment
This chapter takes the reader on a tour of a NWS forecasting office’s ecology, operations, and culture to ultimately settle into a discussion of the basic routine of a forecast shift—from the moment ...
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This chapter takes the reader on a tour of a NWS forecasting office’s ecology, operations, and culture to ultimately settle into a discussion of the basic routine of a forecast shift—from the moment the incoming forecaster gets briefed by the outgoing forecaster to the moment she releases the NWS forecast to the world. While thoroughly intertwined in practice, the three main components of the forecasting task, to be considered in turn, are data analysis, deliberation, and forecast production. This step-by-step breakdown of the forecasting process sets the stage for the sustained examination of particular aspects of meteorological decision-making in the chapters to come. But it also fleshes out and elaborates pragmatist theory of action with the day-to-day realities of diagnosis and prognosis at the NWS.Less
This chapter takes the reader on a tour of a NWS forecasting office’s ecology, operations, and culture to ultimately settle into a discussion of the basic routine of a forecast shift—from the moment the incoming forecaster gets briefed by the outgoing forecaster to the moment she releases the NWS forecast to the world. While thoroughly intertwined in practice, the three main components of the forecasting task, to be considered in turn, are data analysis, deliberation, and forecast production. This step-by-step breakdown of the forecasting process sets the stage for the sustained examination of particular aspects of meteorological decision-making in the chapters to come. But it also fleshes out and elaborates pragmatist theory of action with the day-to-day realities of diagnosis and prognosis at the NWS.
Eser Kandogan, Paul Maglio, Eben Haber, and John Bailey
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780195374124
- eISBN:
- 9780199979134
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195374124.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Human-Technology Interaction
Information technology is the foundation of modern life. When talking on the phone, using the Web, or getting money from an ATM, we rely on computers, networks, and databases – systems of information ...
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Information technology is the foundation of modern life. When talking on the phone, using the Web, or getting money from an ATM, we rely on computers, networks, and databases – systems of information technologies. What keeps these systems running? The answer is people: computer system administrators. Most of the time, the people are invisible. They work out of sight, down in the data-center, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. We only notice them when there is a problem – when we cannot get our email or access our money. Most of the time, the systems are remarkably robust. How do system administrators keep systems running as well as they do? And how can we help them be better at their jobs? This book answers these and other questions. Through real-life stories, it documents how dynamic arrangements of people and machines work together to tame complex information technology by developing and adapting tools and practices to create effective work environments and keep systems running.Less
Information technology is the foundation of modern life. When talking on the phone, using the Web, or getting money from an ATM, we rely on computers, networks, and databases – systems of information technologies. What keeps these systems running? The answer is people: computer system administrators. Most of the time, the people are invisible. They work out of sight, down in the data-center, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. We only notice them when there is a problem – when we cannot get our email or access our money. Most of the time, the systems are remarkably robust. How do system administrators keep systems running as well as they do? And how can we help them be better at their jobs? This book answers these and other questions. Through real-life stories, it documents how dynamic arrangements of people and machines work together to tame complex information technology by developing and adapting tools and practices to create effective work environments and keep systems running.
Lawrence M. Zbikowski
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- July 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198804352
- eISBN:
- 9780191842672
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198804352.003.0003
- Subject:
- Psychology, Music Psychology, Developmental Psychology
This chapter explores how the notion of cognitive extension, which is the idea that cognitive processes can be extended through material resources, reshapes the way we think about musical ...
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This chapter explores how the notion of cognitive extension, which is the idea that cognitive processes can be extended through material resources, reshapes the way we think about musical consciousness. A brief review of recent work on cognitive extension by Andy Clark is provided and linked with Edwin Hutchins’s idea of distributed cognition. Examples of cognitive extension from musical practices are discussed, including mnemonic devices employed during the middle ages, musical scores, and the use of musical instruments. It is proposed that musical sound itself can be thought of as a means through which musical thought is extended out into the world, especially where a distributed cognitive system is manifested as a musical ensemble.Less
This chapter explores how the notion of cognitive extension, which is the idea that cognitive processes can be extended through material resources, reshapes the way we think about musical consciousness. A brief review of recent work on cognitive extension by Andy Clark is provided and linked with Edwin Hutchins’s idea of distributed cognition. Examples of cognitive extension from musical practices are discussed, including mnemonic devices employed during the middle ages, musical scores, and the use of musical instruments. It is proposed that musical sound itself can be thought of as a means through which musical thought is extended out into the world, especially where a distributed cognitive system is manifested as a musical ensemble.
Edwin Hutchins
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262014601
- eISBN:
- 9780262289795
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014601.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter discusses distributed cognition as a framework for exploring the cognitive implications of the commonsense observation that different properties may emerge at different levels of ...
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This chapter discusses distributed cognition as a framework for exploring the cognitive implications of the commonsense observation that different properties may emerge at different levels of organization in systems characterized by multiple levels of interacting elements. Distributed cognition as applied to sociocultural systems suggested an answer to the question of how low-level processes create high-level cognition. The idea here is that high-level cognition is produced by the culturally orchestrated application of low-level cognitive processes to cultural materials, i.e. elements of language, sign systems, and inscriptions of all sorts. A central claim of distributed cognition is presented and discussed, which posits that the proper unit of analysis for cognition should not be set a priori, but should be responsive to the nature of the phenomena under study here.Less
This chapter discusses distributed cognition as a framework for exploring the cognitive implications of the commonsense observation that different properties may emerge at different levels of organization in systems characterized by multiple levels of interacting elements. Distributed cognition as applied to sociocultural systems suggested an answer to the question of how low-level processes create high-level cognition. The idea here is that high-level cognition is produced by the culturally orchestrated application of low-level cognitive processes to cultural materials, i.e. elements of language, sign systems, and inscriptions of all sorts. A central claim of distributed cognition is presented and discussed, which posits that the proper unit of analysis for cognition should not be set a priori, but should be responsive to the nature of the phenomena under study here.
Ellen Spolsky
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- April 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780190232146
- eISBN:
- 9780190232177
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190232146.003.0004
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory, World Literature
This chapter explores the similarities between natural and humanly constructed affordances in search of evidence that imaginative representations can work, not only for individual understanding, but ...
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This chapter explores the similarities between natural and humanly constructed affordances in search of evidence that imaginative representations can work, not only for individual understanding, but also for the benefit of larger social groups. The material objects examined—religious art and relics and portrait painting—were intended by their makers not only to display but explicitly to influence the cognitive circuits of a community, unifying it around a common narrative in several sensory modes and strengthening the shared inferences. Portrait painting shares with the tradition of icon painting the power to reinforce the hierarchy of values within a community, building on our confidence (usually overestimated) that we can read faces to tell us about the feelings, beliefs, thoughts, and intentions of others. This work depends upon theories of distributed cognition and J. J. Gibson’s theory of affordances and suggests the need for a notion of counter-affordances.Less
This chapter explores the similarities between natural and humanly constructed affordances in search of evidence that imaginative representations can work, not only for individual understanding, but also for the benefit of larger social groups. The material objects examined—religious art and relics and portrait painting—were intended by their makers not only to display but explicitly to influence the cognitive circuits of a community, unifying it around a common narrative in several sensory modes and strengthening the shared inferences. Portrait painting shares with the tradition of icon painting the power to reinforce the hierarchy of values within a community, building on our confidence (usually overestimated) that we can read faces to tell us about the feelings, beliefs, thoughts, and intentions of others. This work depends upon theories of distributed cognition and J. J. Gibson’s theory of affordances and suggests the need for a notion of counter-affordances.
S. Orestis Palermos and Deborah P. Tollefsen
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198801764
- eISBN:
- 9780191840357
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198801764.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
While mainstream epistemology has recently turned its focus on individual know-how (e.g., knowing-how to swim, ride a bike, play chess, etc.), there is very little, if any, work on group know-how ...
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While mainstream epistemology has recently turned its focus on individual know-how (e.g., knowing-how to swim, ride a bike, play chess, etc.), there is very little, if any, work on group know-how (e.g., sports-team performance, jazz improvisation, knowing-how to tango, etc.). This chapter attempts to fill the gap in the existing literature by exploring the relevant philosophical terrain. It starts by surveying recent debates on individual knowledge-how and argues that group know-how (G-KH) cannot always be reduced to individual knowledge-how. Rather, certain cases of G-KH call for a non-reductive analysis. A natural place to look for a theory of irreducible G-KH is the literature on joint intentionality and distributed cognition. First, the chapter explores what a joint intentionality approach to G-KH might look like. Then it considers an alternative approach that views G-KH as a form of distributed cognition. Finally, the chapter discusses a potential link between the two approaches.Less
While mainstream epistemology has recently turned its focus on individual know-how (e.g., knowing-how to swim, ride a bike, play chess, etc.), there is very little, if any, work on group know-how (e.g., sports-team performance, jazz improvisation, knowing-how to tango, etc.). This chapter attempts to fill the gap in the existing literature by exploring the relevant philosophical terrain. It starts by surveying recent debates on individual knowledge-how and argues that group know-how (G-KH) cannot always be reduced to individual knowledge-how. Rather, certain cases of G-KH call for a non-reductive analysis. A natural place to look for a theory of irreducible G-KH is the literature on joint intentionality and distributed cognition. First, the chapter explores what a joint intentionality approach to G-KH might look like. Then it considers an alternative approach that views G-KH as a form of distributed cognition. Finally, the chapter discusses a potential link between the two approaches.
Francis Heylighen and Shima Beigi
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198801764
- eISBN:
- 9780191840357
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198801764.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
We approach the problem of the extended mind from a radically non-dualist perspective. The separation between mind and matter is an artifact of the mechanistic worldview, which leaves no room for ...
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We approach the problem of the extended mind from a radically non-dualist perspective. The separation between mind and matter is an artifact of the mechanistic worldview, which leaves no room for mental phenomena such as agency, intentionality, or experience. We propose to replace it by an action ontology, which conceives mind and matter as aspects of the same network of processes. By adopting the intentional stance, we interpret the catalysts of elementary reactions as agents exhibiting desires, intentions, and sensations. Autopoietic networks of reactions constitute more complex super-agents, which exhibit memory, deliberation and sense-making. In the case of social networks, individual agents coordinate their actions via the propagation of challenges. The distributed cognition that emerges cannot be situated in any individual brain. This non-dualist, holistic view extends and operationalizes process metaphysics and Eastern philosophies. It is supported by both mindfulness experiences and mathematical models of action, self-organization, and cognition.Less
We approach the problem of the extended mind from a radically non-dualist perspective. The separation between mind and matter is an artifact of the mechanistic worldview, which leaves no room for mental phenomena such as agency, intentionality, or experience. We propose to replace it by an action ontology, which conceives mind and matter as aspects of the same network of processes. By adopting the intentional stance, we interpret the catalysts of elementary reactions as agents exhibiting desires, intentions, and sensations. Autopoietic networks of reactions constitute more complex super-agents, which exhibit memory, deliberation and sense-making. In the case of social networks, individual agents coordinate their actions via the propagation of challenges. The distributed cognition that emerges cannot be situated in any individual brain. This non-dualist, holistic view extends and operationalizes process metaphysics and Eastern philosophies. It is supported by both mindfulness experiences and mathematical models of action, self-organization, and cognition.
Amit Prasad
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262026956
- eISBN:
- 9780262322065
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026956.003.0001
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Technology and Society
The history of MRI, if we were to rely on published accounts, appears to be a classic exemplification of the diffusion model of science. Not only do the invention and development of MRI appear to ...
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The history of MRI, if we were to rely on published accounts, appears to be a classic exemplification of the diffusion model of science. Not only do the invention and development of MRI appear to have taken place in the Western countries, but there also seems to be a “lag” in diffusion of knowledge about MRI to India. This chapter, which presents the analytical and methodological framework of the book, argues that a deconstructive-empirical approach is necessary in order to move beyond dualist and Euro/West-centric constructions of transnational technoscience. Instead of a comparative study across nations and societies, the book presents entangled histories of MRI research, development, and diffusion. It utilizes the concepts of connected (and disconnected) trails and distributed cognition to explore complex and shifting hierarchical entanglements of technoscientific practice, cultures, institutions, and imaginaries in the United States, Britain, and India.Less
The history of MRI, if we were to rely on published accounts, appears to be a classic exemplification of the diffusion model of science. Not only do the invention and development of MRI appear to have taken place in the Western countries, but there also seems to be a “lag” in diffusion of knowledge about MRI to India. This chapter, which presents the analytical and methodological framework of the book, argues that a deconstructive-empirical approach is necessary in order to move beyond dualist and Euro/West-centric constructions of transnational technoscience. Instead of a comparative study across nations and societies, the book presents entangled histories of MRI research, development, and diffusion. It utilizes the concepts of connected (and disconnected) trails and distributed cognition to explore complex and shifting hierarchical entanglements of technoscientific practice, cultures, institutions, and imaginaries in the United States, Britain, and India.
Adam Linson and Eric F. Clarke
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780199355914
- eISBN:
- 9780199355945
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199355914.003.0004
- Subject:
- Music, Psychology of Music
This chapter proposes a way to understand the social, distributed and ecological underpinnings of improvised musical activity. It argues that significant aspects of collaborative performance may ...
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This chapter proposes a way to understand the social, distributed and ecological underpinnings of improvised musical activity. It argues that significant aspects of collaborative performance may arise from perceptual, cognitive and action-orientated factors, in relation to prior experience and the broader historical and cultural context. The chapter illustrates ways in which each improviser in a collaboration may attune to different aspects of the circumstances, with idiosyncratic perceptions of the available affordances guided by attentional processes, physical aspects of the human body and musical instrument, and associations with prior experience. The experience of each musician in a collaborative improvisation thus both overlaps with and diverges from those of other musicians in the ensemble. These divergences are as important as the common ground, and are thus essential to any plausible and comprehensive account of collaborative improvisation.Less
This chapter proposes a way to understand the social, distributed and ecological underpinnings of improvised musical activity. It argues that significant aspects of collaborative performance may arise from perceptual, cognitive and action-orientated factors, in relation to prior experience and the broader historical and cultural context. The chapter illustrates ways in which each improviser in a collaboration may attune to different aspects of the circumstances, with idiosyncratic perceptions of the available affordances guided by attentional processes, physical aspects of the human body and musical instrument, and associations with prior experience. The experience of each musician in a collaborative improvisation thus both overlaps with and diverges from those of other musicians in the ensemble. These divergences are as important as the common ground, and are thus essential to any plausible and comprehensive account of collaborative improvisation.
Eser Kandogan, Paul P. Maglio, Eben M. Haber, and John Bailey
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780195374124
- eISBN:
- 9780199979134
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195374124.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Human-Technology Interaction
This chapter describes the social complexity of IT system administration through the story of George, a Web administrator who worked closely with many others in the course of debugging a new Web ...
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This chapter describes the social complexity of IT system administration through the story of George, a Web administrator who worked closely with many others in the course of debugging a new Web server. This story demonstrates the importance of collaboration, communication, coordination, and situational awareness as different people brought together their expertise in an attempt to solve a difficult problem. It also highlights the need for trust and understanding; the chapter shows how it was not sufficient to find a solution to the problem. In the end, George had to trust his collaborators to develop an understanding of the problem and of its solution.Less
This chapter describes the social complexity of IT system administration through the story of George, a Web administrator who worked closely with many others in the course of debugging a new Web server. This story demonstrates the importance of collaboration, communication, coordination, and situational awareness as different people brought together their expertise in an attempt to solve a difficult problem. It also highlights the need for trust and understanding; the chapter shows how it was not sufficient to find a solution to the problem. In the end, George had to trust his collaborators to develop an understanding of the problem and of its solution.
Bryce Huebner
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199926275
- eISBN:
- 9780199347193
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199926275.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
This chapter briefly summarizes the main conclusions of the book. It lays out the core elements of the macrocognitive approach to collective mentality, and serves as a reminder that collective ...
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This chapter briefly summarizes the main conclusions of the book. It lays out the core elements of the macrocognitive approach to collective mentality, and serves as a reminder that collective mentality is likely to be rare, and where it arises, quite minimal. These arguments are then briefly situated within a broader set of claims about social ontology and social epistemology.Less
This chapter briefly summarizes the main conclusions of the book. It lays out the core elements of the macrocognitive approach to collective mentality, and serves as a reminder that collective mentality is likely to be rare, and where it arises, quite minimal. These arguments are then briefly situated within a broader set of claims about social ontology and social epistemology.
Georg Theiner and Nikolaus Fogle
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198801764
- eISBN:
- 9780191840357
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198801764.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter approaches the work of the French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, from the point of view of embodied, extended, and distributed cognition. The concepts that form Bourdieu’s central dyad, ...
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This chapter approaches the work of the French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, from the point of view of embodied, extended, and distributed cognition. The concepts that form Bourdieu’s central dyad, habitus and field, are remarkably consonant with externalist views. Habitus is a form of knowledge that is not only embodied but fundamentally environment-dependent, and field is a distributed network of cognitively active positions that serves not only as a repository of social knowledge, but also as an external template for individual schemes of perception and action. The aim of this chapter’s comparative analysis is not to merely show that Bourdieu’s concepts are compatible with cognitive and epistemological externalism. They further demonstrate that the resources of Bourdieu’s theoretical framework can prove particularly useful for developing externalist accounts of culture and society—two areas that are significantly underexplored within mainstream debates in analytic philosophy.Less
This chapter approaches the work of the French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, from the point of view of embodied, extended, and distributed cognition. The concepts that form Bourdieu’s central dyad, habitus and field, are remarkably consonant with externalist views. Habitus is a form of knowledge that is not only embodied but fundamentally environment-dependent, and field is a distributed network of cognitively active positions that serves not only as a repository of social knowledge, but also as an external template for individual schemes of perception and action. The aim of this chapter’s comparative analysis is not to merely show that Bourdieu’s concepts are compatible with cognitive and epistemological externalism. They further demonstrate that the resources of Bourdieu’s theoretical framework can prove particularly useful for developing externalist accounts of culture and society—two areas that are significantly underexplored within mainstream debates in analytic philosophy.
Matthew C. Hunter
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780226017297
- eISBN:
- 9780226017327
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226017327.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
This chapter focuses on the Royal Society’s early museum at Gresham College in London where objects from the institution’s far-flung contacts were put on public display. Examining the ways in which ...
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This chapter focuses on the Royal Society’s early museum at Gresham College in London where objects from the institution’s far-flung contacts were put on public display. Examining the ways in which these valuable artifacts were physically disassembled, reconfigured and recoded with meaning (often many times over) in the Royal Society’s meetings, the chapter demonstrates how the museum collection came to serve as a powerful model for the faculties of cognition particularly for Robert Hooke, Keeper of the museum itself. Hooke’s writings on cognition from the early 1680s, I argue, articulate this epistemological geography. Distributed networks of informants became the senses of the experimental body which would deliver ontologically-fragile, unreliable objects to the centralized laboratory of the mind. There, the countervailing agency of what Hooke would call (through engagement with Elizabethan philosopher John Dee) “Archietonical Power” brings them to stable, rational order and feeds intelligence back out to the periphery. By shifting between the Royal Society’s constant bricolage of museum artifacts and Hooke’s conception of reason, the chapter sheds raking light on the darker textures of experimental intelligence.Less
This chapter focuses on the Royal Society’s early museum at Gresham College in London where objects from the institution’s far-flung contacts were put on public display. Examining the ways in which these valuable artifacts were physically disassembled, reconfigured and recoded with meaning (often many times over) in the Royal Society’s meetings, the chapter demonstrates how the museum collection came to serve as a powerful model for the faculties of cognition particularly for Robert Hooke, Keeper of the museum itself. Hooke’s writings on cognition from the early 1680s, I argue, articulate this epistemological geography. Distributed networks of informants became the senses of the experimental body which would deliver ontologically-fragile, unreliable objects to the centralized laboratory of the mind. There, the countervailing agency of what Hooke would call (through engagement with Elizabethan philosopher John Dee) “Archietonical Power” brings them to stable, rational order and feeds intelligence back out to the periphery. By shifting between the Royal Society’s constant bricolage of museum artifacts and Hooke’s conception of reason, the chapter sheds raking light on the darker textures of experimental intelligence.
Joel Krueger
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199659180
- eISBN:
- 9780191772238
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659180.003.0011
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology, Developmental Psychology
This chapter argues that emotions might be productively thought of as distributed processes of social niche construction: forms of engagement whereby agents manipulate their social context to ...
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This chapter argues that emotions might be productively thought of as distributed processes of social niche construction: forms of engagement whereby agents manipulate their social context to establish, modify, and negotiate relationships, communicate intentions, and attune themselves to the mental life of others. It considers how material and ideational factors of our social niches support the emergence of emotions on both short-term and long-term time scales. In doing so, it draws upon theoretical resources of distributed approaches to cognition as well as several different strands of empirical work, including research in developmental psychology.Less
This chapter argues that emotions might be productively thought of as distributed processes of social niche construction: forms of engagement whereby agents manipulate their social context to establish, modify, and negotiate relationships, communicate intentions, and attune themselves to the mental life of others. It considers how material and ideational factors of our social niches support the emergence of emotions on both short-term and long-term time scales. In doing so, it draws upon theoretical resources of distributed approaches to cognition as well as several different strands of empirical work, including research in developmental psychology.
