Trenton Merricks
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205233
- eISBN:
- 9780191709302
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205233.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book explores how truth depends on the world or on things or on being, and examines philosophical debates concerning modality, time, and dispositions. For accounts of truth's dependence on being ...
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This book explores how truth depends on the world or on things or on being, and examines philosophical debates concerning modality, time, and dispositions. For accounts of truth's dependence on being have implications for these debates. Moreover, these debates have implications for how truth depends on being. Along the way, the book makes a number of new points about each of these debates, points that are of interest quite apart from the question of truth's dependence on being. The book concludes that some truths do not depend on being in any non-trivial way at all. One result of this conclusion is that it is a mistake to oppose a philosophical theory merely because it violates truth's alleged substantive dependence on being. Another result is that the correspondence theory of truth is false and, more fundamentally, that truth itself is not a relation of any sort between truth-bearers and that which makes them true.Less
This book explores how truth depends on the world or on things or on being, and examines philosophical debates concerning modality, time, and dispositions. For accounts of truth's dependence on being have implications for these debates. Moreover, these debates have implications for how truth depends on being. Along the way, the book makes a number of new points about each of these debates, points that are of interest quite apart from the question of truth's dependence on being. The book concludes that some truths do not depend on being in any non-trivial way at all. One result of this conclusion is that it is a mistake to oppose a philosophical theory merely because it violates truth's alleged substantive dependence on being. Another result is that the correspondence theory of truth is false and, more fundamentally, that truth itself is not a relation of any sort between truth-bearers and that which makes them true.
Alexander Bird
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199227013
- eISBN:
- 9780191711121
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What are the laws of nature, and what explains their existence? This book develops the proposal that the laws of nature are grounded in the essences of properties. It is argued that fundamental ...
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What are the laws of nature, and what explains their existence? This book develops the proposal that the laws of nature are grounded in the essences of properties. It is argued that fundamental natural properties have dispositional essences — they are potencies (pure powers). After explaining this proposal, the book goes on to show how this accounts for the existence of the laws of nature. A distinctive feature of this account is that it ensures that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. This account has advantages over the regularity and nomic necessitation accounts associated with Lewis and Armstrong, while the dispositional essentialist view of properties has corresponding advantages over the categoricalist view of properties, according to which properties are quidditistic and do not have qualitative essences, merely primitive identity and difference. The relationship between potencies and modality, and also intentionality is explored. Other potential criticisms are raised and the view defended against them. For example it is claimed that if all properties are potencies, then a vicious regress ensues; it is shown that this does not follow. Geometrical and other ‘structural’ properties are raised as counterexamples, being properties that seem categorical; it is argued that this is the case only if one takes a particular view of the role of spacetime in physical theories. It is held that laws are metaphysically contingent whereas dispositional essentialism makes them necessary; it is argued that the contingency of laws is an illusion. An account of laws is developed in the face of Mumford's claim that neither dispositional essentialism nor science has need of laws.Less
What are the laws of nature, and what explains their existence? This book develops the proposal that the laws of nature are grounded in the essences of properties. It is argued that fundamental natural properties have dispositional essences — they are potencies (pure powers). After explaining this proposal, the book goes on to show how this accounts for the existence of the laws of nature. A distinctive feature of this account is that it ensures that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. This account has advantages over the regularity and nomic necessitation accounts associated with Lewis and Armstrong, while the dispositional essentialist view of properties has corresponding advantages over the categoricalist view of properties, according to which properties are quidditistic and do not have qualitative essences, merely primitive identity and difference. The relationship between potencies and modality, and also intentionality is explored. Other potential criticisms are raised and the view defended against them. For example it is claimed that if all properties are potencies, then a vicious regress ensues; it is shown that this does not follow. Geometrical and other ‘structural’ properties are raised as counterexamples, being properties that seem categorical; it is argued that this is the case only if one takes a particular view of the role of spacetime in physical theories. It is held that laws are metaphysically contingent whereas dispositional essentialism makes them necessary; it is argued that the contingency of laws is an illusion. An account of laws is developed in the face of Mumford's claim that neither dispositional essentialism nor science has need of laws.
Anita M. Superson
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195376623
- eISBN:
- 9780199871551
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376623.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This book challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, “Why be moral?” and demands a demonstration that acting in morally required ways is rationally required. It argues that we defeat ...
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This book challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, “Why be moral?” and demands a demonstration that acting in morally required ways is rationally required. It argues that we defeat the action skeptic, as well as the disposition skeptic, who denies that being morally disposed is rationally required, and the motive skeptic, who believes that merely going through the motions in acting morally is rationally permissible. It argues, against internalism, that we address the amoralist, who is not moved by moral reasons he recognizes. It argues for expanding the skeptic's position from self-interest to privilege, to include morally unjustified behavior typically directed against disenfranchised social groups. It argues for revising the traditional expected utility model of rationality to exclude desires deformed by patriarchy as ones it is not irrational to have. It defends the Interdependency Thesis, which assesses the rationality of moral dispositions and of actions interdependently, and allows us to fine tune the demands of the skeptic by not focusing on acts and dispositions in themselves, but on their interconnection. It defends the view that our rational assessments of agents should reflect the complex connection between the agent's reasons for adopting a moral disposition, and for having and acting from it, whether these cohere with her reasons for acting and for wanting to be a morally good person, and the justification for the moral theory or principles she endorses. Acts come in degrees of rationality, as measured by how they contribute to the agent's consistent life plan.Less
This book challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, “Why be moral?” and demands a demonstration that acting in morally required ways is rationally required. It argues that we defeat the action skeptic, as well as the disposition skeptic, who denies that being morally disposed is rationally required, and the motive skeptic, who believes that merely going through the motions in acting morally is rationally permissible. It argues, against internalism, that we address the amoralist, who is not moved by moral reasons he recognizes. It argues for expanding the skeptic's position from self-interest to privilege, to include morally unjustified behavior typically directed against disenfranchised social groups. It argues for revising the traditional expected utility model of rationality to exclude desires deformed by patriarchy as ones it is not irrational to have. It defends the Interdependency Thesis, which assesses the rationality of moral dispositions and of actions interdependently, and allows us to fine tune the demands of the skeptic by not focusing on acts and dispositions in themselves, but on their interconnection. It defends the view that our rational assessments of agents should reflect the complex connection between the agent's reasons for adopting a moral disposition, and for having and acting from it, whether these cohere with her reasons for acting and for wanting to be a morally good person, and the justification for the moral theory or principles she endorses. Acts come in degrees of rationality, as measured by how they contribute to the agent's consistent life plan.
David M. Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199590612
- eISBN:
- 9780191723391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A view that is currently popular is to identify properties as being nothing but powers, a position that can be called ‘Dispositionalism’. Causation becomes manifestations of dispositions, and ...
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A view that is currently popular is to identify properties as being nothing but powers, a position that can be called ‘Dispositionalism’. Causation becomes manifestations of dispositions, and non‐probable manifestations in suitable circumstances are necessitated. Such views are defended by Sydney Shoemaker, Stephen Mumford, and Alexander Bird. Robert Black calls the sort of position held by those who reject powers as ‘Quidditism’, giving universals (or tropes) a categorial nature that plays no executive role. It is argued against this that a purely dispositional account of properties leads to a regress that may not be self‐contradictory but is unbelievable. It seems particularly difficult to give an account of relations as powers. Some theorists, George Molnar and Brian Ellis in particular, give a mixed account, making spatial relations in particular categorical, and so not powers. Perhaps this gets the worst of both worlds.Less
A view that is currently popular is to identify properties as being nothing but powers, a position that can be called ‘Dispositionalism’. Causation becomes manifestations of dispositions, and non‐probable manifestations in suitable circumstances are necessitated. Such views are defended by Sydney Shoemaker, Stephen Mumford, and Alexander Bird. Robert Black calls the sort of position held by those who reject powers as ‘Quidditism’, giving universals (or tropes) a categorial nature that plays no executive role. It is argued against this that a purely dispositional account of properties leads to a regress that may not be self‐contradictory but is unbelievable. It seems particularly difficult to give an account of relations as powers. Some theorists, George Molnar and Brian Ellis in particular, give a mixed account, making spatial relations in particular categorical, and so not powers. Perhaps this gets the worst of both worlds.
Stephen Mumford
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199259823
- eISBN:
- 9780191698637
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199259823.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This book puts forward a new theory of dispositions, showing how central their role in metaphysics and philosophy of science is. Much of our understanding of the physical and psychological world is ...
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This book puts forward a new theory of dispositions, showing how central their role in metaphysics and philosophy of science is. Much of our understanding of the physical and psychological world is expressed in terms of dispositional properties — from the spin of a subatomic particle and the solubility of sugar to a person's belief that zebras have stripes. The book discusses what it means to say that something has a property of this kind, and how dispositions can possibly be real things in the world. They have seemed too many to reside on the fringes of actuality, waiting to manifest themselves; the book's realist account reveals them to be far less enigmatic, and shows that an understanding of dispositions is essential to an understanding of properties, causation, and scientific laws.Less
This book puts forward a new theory of dispositions, showing how central their role in metaphysics and philosophy of science is. Much of our understanding of the physical and psychological world is expressed in terms of dispositional properties — from the spin of a subatomic particle and the solubility of sugar to a person's belief that zebras have stripes. The book discusses what it means to say that something has a property of this kind, and how dispositions can possibly be real things in the world. They have seemed too many to reside on the fringes of actuality, waiting to manifest themselves; the book's realist account reveals them to be far less enigmatic, and shows that an understanding of dispositions is essential to an understanding of properties, causation, and scientific laws.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The four-category ontology is a metaphysical system recognizing two fundamental categorial distinctions — these being between the particular and the universal, and between the substantial and the ...
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The four-category ontology is a metaphysical system recognizing two fundamental categorial distinctions — these being between the particular and the universal, and between the substantial and the non-substantial — which cut across each other to generate four fundamental ontological categories. The four categories thus generated are substantial particulars (‘objects’), non-substantial particulars (‘modes’), substantial universals (‘kinds’), and non-substantial universals (‘attributes’). This ontology has a lengthy pedigree, with many commentators attributing a version of it to Aristotle on the basis of certain passages in one of his early works, the Categories. Although it has been revived or rediscovered at various times during the history of western philosophy, it has never found widespread favour, perhaps due to its apparent lack of parsimony and its commitment to universals. In pursuit of ontological economy, metaphysicians have generally preferred to recognize fewer than four fundamental ontological categories. This book contends that the four-category ontology has an explanatory power which is unrivalled by more parsimonious systems, and that this counts decisively in its favour. It provides a uniquely powerful explanatory framework for a unified account of causation, dispositions, natural laws, natural necessity, and many other related matters, such as the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. The book is divided into four parts: the first setting out the framework of the four-category ontology, the second focusing on its central distinction between object and property, the third exploring its applications in the philosophy of natural science, and the fourth dealing with fundamental issues of truth and realism.Less
The four-category ontology is a metaphysical system recognizing two fundamental categorial distinctions — these being between the particular and the universal, and between the substantial and the non-substantial — which cut across each other to generate four fundamental ontological categories. The four categories thus generated are substantial particulars (‘objects’), non-substantial particulars (‘modes’), substantial universals (‘kinds’), and non-substantial universals (‘attributes’). This ontology has a lengthy pedigree, with many commentators attributing a version of it to Aristotle on the basis of certain passages in one of his early works, the Categories. Although it has been revived or rediscovered at various times during the history of western philosophy, it has never found widespread favour, perhaps due to its apparent lack of parsimony and its commitment to universals. In pursuit of ontological economy, metaphysicians have generally preferred to recognize fewer than four fundamental ontological categories. This book contends that the four-category ontology has an explanatory power which is unrivalled by more parsimonious systems, and that this counts decisively in its favour. It provides a uniquely powerful explanatory framework for a unified account of causation, dispositions, natural laws, natural necessity, and many other related matters, such as the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. The book is divided into four parts: the first setting out the framework of the four-category ontology, the second focusing on its central distinction between object and property, the third exploring its applications in the philosophy of natural science, and the fourth dealing with fundamental issues of truth and realism.
Thomas Nagel
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195149838
- eISBN:
- 9780199872206
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195149831.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In this discussion of where justification and understanding come to an end, Nagel undertakes to refute various forms of subjectivism. Defending rationalism, he argues that there are some thoughts ...
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In this discussion of where justification and understanding come to an end, Nagel undertakes to refute various forms of subjectivism. Defending rationalism, he argues that there are some thoughts that we simply cannot get outside of; thoughts that we cannot regard as mere psychological dispositions. The last word on philosophical disputes about the objectivity of any form of thought must lie in some unqualified thoughts about how things are. In the domains of logic and mathematics, certain basic propositions are immune to doubt being central to the framework of everything we can think. In the domains of ethics, science, or history, resistance to the external or subjective viewpoint comes from within these domains themselves. First‐order thoughts about ethics, science, and history are the decisive factor in response to any second‐order thoughts about their psychological character. Any criticism of the reasoning within these domains necessarily involves reasoning carried out at the same level of inquiry. Questions about how the capacity for rational thought is possible for a species like ours generate a pernicious fear of religion that Nagel seeks to dispel.Less
In this discussion of where justification and understanding come to an end, Nagel undertakes to refute various forms of subjectivism. Defending rationalism, he argues that there are some thoughts that we simply cannot get outside of; thoughts that we cannot regard as mere psychological dispositions. The last word on philosophical disputes about the objectivity of any form of thought must lie in some unqualified thoughts about how things are. In the domains of logic and mathematics, certain basic propositions are immune to doubt being central to the framework of everything we can think. In the domains of ethics, science, or history, resistance to the external or subjective viewpoint comes from within these domains themselves. First‐order thoughts about ethics, science, and history are the decisive factor in response to any second‐order thoughts about their psychological character. Any criticism of the reasoning within these domains necessarily involves reasoning carried out at the same level of inquiry. Questions about how the capacity for rational thought is possible for a species like ours generate a pernicious fear of religion that Nagel seeks to dispel.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The central principles of the four-category ontology are explained, especially its distinction between properties conceived as particulars (modes) and properties conceived as universals (attributes), ...
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The central principles of the four-category ontology are explained, especially its distinction between properties conceived as particulars (modes) and properties conceived as universals (attributes), and its distinction between substantial universals (kinds) and substantial particulars (objects). Its appeal to universals is defended and its account of the dispositional/occurrent distinction is explained. Some advantages of the four-category ontology over various of its more parsimonious rivals are sketched: its account of the individuation of tropes or modes, its analysis of laws, its analysis of dispositionality, and its account of property-perception.Less
The central principles of the four-category ontology are explained, especially its distinction between properties conceived as particulars (modes) and properties conceived as universals (attributes), and its distinction between substantial universals (kinds) and substantial particulars (objects). Its appeal to universals is defended and its account of the dispositional/occurrent distinction is explained. Some advantages of the four-category ontology over various of its more parsimonious rivals are sketched: its account of the individuation of tropes or modes, its analysis of laws, its analysis of dispositionality, and its account of property-perception.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The customary distinction between dispositional and categorical properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the ...
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The customary distinction between dispositional and categorical properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the latter distinction is explained using the framework of the four-category ontology. An account is sketched of the ontological status of laws of nature, and its similarities to and differences from D. M. Armstrong’s account are discussed, particularly the key role in the new account of the categorial distinction between substantial and non-substantial universals. A theory of natural powers is advanced and contrasted with the recent theories of C. B. Martin and George Molnar.Less
The customary distinction between dispositional and categorical properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the latter distinction is explained using the framework of the four-category ontology. An account is sketched of the ontological status of laws of nature, and its similarities to and differences from D. M. Armstrong’s account are discussed, particularly the key role in the new account of the categorial distinction between substantial and non-substantial universals. A theory of natural powers is advanced and contrasted with the recent theories of C. B. Martin and George Molnar.
Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199659081
- eISBN:
- 9780191745201
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659081.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. They ...
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Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. They offer a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. This book is the seventh volume in the series. Topics covered include counterpart theory, the idea of absolute generality, humean supervenience, coincident objects, open future, presentism, laws, and identity.Less
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. They offer a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. This book is the seventh volume in the series. Topics covered include counterpart theory, the idea of absolute generality, humean supervenience, coincident objects, open future, presentism, laws, and identity.
Robert Merrihew Adams
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199207510
- eISBN:
- 9780191708824
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207510.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Experiments and conclusions of ‘situationist’ social psychology have been seen by some as grounds for doubting that there are any virtues or vices, or more broadly any traits of character, at all. ...
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Experiments and conclusions of ‘situationist’ social psychology have been seen by some as grounds for doubting that there are any virtues or vices, or more broadly any traits of character, at all. This chapter explores the experimental and theoretical basis of doubts that human behaviour is consistent enough from one type of situation to another to manifest anything worth calling a virtue. It argues that behavioral dispositions are probably acquired as merely probabilistic tendencies or as situation-specific modules, but that even so some of them may be virtues or parts of virtue. Less situation-specific and arguably more important as traits of character are qualities that are not directly behavioral dispositions, but lie behind them, such as important desires, cognitive states, and political and religious affiliations.Less
Experiments and conclusions of ‘situationist’ social psychology have been seen by some as grounds for doubting that there are any virtues or vices, or more broadly any traits of character, at all. This chapter explores the experimental and theoretical basis of doubts that human behaviour is consistent enough from one type of situation to another to manifest anything worth calling a virtue. It argues that behavioral dispositions are probably acquired as merely probabilistic tendencies or as situation-specific modules, but that even so some of them may be virtues or parts of virtue. Less situation-specific and arguably more important as traits of character are qualities that are not directly behavioral dispositions, but lie behind them, such as important desires, cognitive states, and political and religious affiliations.
Derek Parfit
- Published in print:
- 1986
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198249085
- eISBN:
- 9780191598173
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019824908X.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Seeks to reduce the distance between Common‐Sense Morality and Consequentialism. Acts, dispositions, motives are also discussed.
Seeks to reduce the distance between Common‐Sense Morality and Consequentialism. Acts, dispositions, motives are also discussed.
Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199251247
- eISBN:
- 9780191603983
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925124X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
It is widely held, following Kripke, that no theory of ‘meaning as dispositions of use’ could accommodate the relationship between meaning and truth, e.g., that if a word means DOG then it is true of ...
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It is widely held, following Kripke, that no theory of ‘meaning as dispositions of use’ could accommodate the relationship between meaning and truth, e.g., that if a word means DOG then it is true of all dogs and only of dogs. This chapter makes explicit and criticizes the assumptions on which Kripke’s position is founded. First, that in order for the meaning of a given word (e.g., dog) to be constituted by its having a given use, we would have to be able to read off (and hence give an explanation of) the word’s extension on the basis of that use. Second, for this to be possible, there would have to be some way of weeding out those uses that are errors (i.e., cases in which the word is applied to things other than dogs). It is argued that these assumptions are incorrect, since they are affiliated with an anti-deflationary conception of truth.Less
It is widely held, following Kripke, that no theory of ‘meaning as dispositions of use’ could accommodate the relationship between meaning and truth, e.g., that if a word means DOG then it is true of all dogs and only of dogs. This chapter makes explicit and criticizes the assumptions on which Kripke’s position is founded. First, that in order for the meaning of a given word (e.g., dog) to be constituted by its having a given use, we would have to be able to read off (and hence give an explanation of) the word’s extension on the basis of that use. Second, for this to be possible, there would have to be some way of weeding out those uses that are errors (i.e., cases in which the word is applied to things other than dogs). It is argued that these assumptions are incorrect, since they are affiliated with an anti-deflationary conception of truth.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187427
- eISBN:
- 9780199786596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187423.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter examines the Humean thesis that agents can only be blamed for their bad acts insofar as those acts are manifestations of defects in their characters. Several versions of this thesis are ...
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This chapter examines the Humean thesis that agents can only be blamed for their bad acts insofar as those acts are manifestations of defects in their characters. Several versions of this thesis are distinguished and criticized. The criticisms include both the familiar charge that the Humean can’t explain how someone can deserve blame for an act whose badness is “out of character” and the less familiar charge that on the Humean account, the badness of the act itself drops out as irrelevant. It is argued, however, that although Hume was wrong to say that every blameworthy act reflects a flaw in the agent’s character, it may be right to say that every blameworthy act is rooted in the agent’s character.Less
This chapter examines the Humean thesis that agents can only be blamed for their bad acts insofar as those acts are manifestations of defects in their characters. Several versions of this thesis are distinguished and criticized. The criticisms include both the familiar charge that the Humean can’t explain how someone can deserve blame for an act whose badness is “out of character” and the less familiar charge that on the Humean account, the badness of the act itself drops out as irrelevant. It is argued, however, that although Hume was wrong to say that every blameworthy act reflects a flaw in the agent’s character, it may be right to say that every blameworthy act is rooted in the agent’s character.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187427
- eISBN:
- 9780199786596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187423.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter exploits the insight that emerged in the previous chapter — that a bad act may be rooted in an agent’s character without manifesting a defect in that character — to explain how an act’s ...
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This chapter exploits the insight that emerged in the previous chapter — that a bad act may be rooted in an agent’s character without manifesting a defect in that character — to explain how an act’s badness can render an agent blameworthy. According to this explanation, the crucial fact is that the act’s bad-making features can be traced to the interplay of the very same desires, beliefs, and dispositions that also make the agent the person he is. By assigning character this reduced but still substantial role, we can preserve what is important about Hume’s account while avoiding his errors.Less
This chapter exploits the insight that emerged in the previous chapter — that a bad act may be rooted in an agent’s character without manifesting a defect in that character — to explain how an act’s badness can render an agent blameworthy. According to this explanation, the crucial fact is that the act’s bad-making features can be traced to the interplay of the very same desires, beliefs, and dispositions that also make the agent the person he is. By assigning character this reduced but still substantial role, we can preserve what is important about Hume’s account while avoiding his errors.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187427
- eISBN:
- 9780199786596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187423.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter develops a new account of what blame adds to the belief that someone has acted badly. According to the proposed account, the additional element consists of a set of dispositions (to ...
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This chapter develops a new account of what blame adds to the belief that someone has acted badly. According to the proposed account, the additional element consists of a set of dispositions (to become angry, express one’s disapproval, and the like) which are explained by the combination of the belief that the agent has acted badly and a desire that he not have done so. Unlike most desires, this one is oriented to the past rather than the future. Nevertheless, it remains a source of motivation that is capable of accounting for the blame-constituting dispositions.Less
This chapter develops a new account of what blame adds to the belief that someone has acted badly. According to the proposed account, the additional element consists of a set of dispositions (to become angry, express one’s disapproval, and the like) which are explained by the combination of the belief that the agent has acted badly and a desire that he not have done so. Unlike most desires, this one is oriented to the past rather than the future. Nevertheless, it remains a source of motivation that is capable of accounting for the blame-constituting dispositions.
Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695614
- eISBN:
- 9780191731952
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695614.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This book develops the theory of causal dispositionalism. Others have already suggested that a theory of causation would follow from an ontology of real dispositions or powers. This book attempts to ...
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This book develops the theory of causal dispositionalism. Others have already suggested that a theory of causation would follow from an ontology of real dispositions or powers. This book attempts to show how. The book argues that powers come together in complex partnerships producing something together that they could not have produced alone. They will do so in a distinctly dispositional way that is not reducible to necessity. The mode of composition of causes can vary and is sometimes non-linear. The book calls this view compositional pluralism. The book argues for the simultaneity of cause and effect as causation is the process that occurs when partnered powers produce their effect. It begins once those partners are together and ends either when the process is complete or is interrupted. The theory explains how causal claims are distinguished from others and why there is no causation by absence. The book distinguishes the distinct, sui generis dispositional modality of causation and show how it can be known directly through experience. The book applies the theory to the science of biology, where it is corroborated.Less
This book develops the theory of causal dispositionalism. Others have already suggested that a theory of causation would follow from an ontology of real dispositions or powers. This book attempts to show how. The book argues that powers come together in complex partnerships producing something together that they could not have produced alone. They will do so in a distinctly dispositional way that is not reducible to necessity. The mode of composition of causes can vary and is sometimes non-linear. The book calls this view compositional pluralism. The book argues for the simultaneity of cause and effect as causation is the process that occurs when partnered powers produce their effect. It begins once those partners are together and ends either when the process is complete or is interrupted. The theory explains how causal claims are distinguished from others and why there is no causation by absence. The book distinguishes the distinct, sui generis dispositional modality of causation and show how it can be known directly through experience. The book applies the theory to the science of biology, where it is corroborated.
Wolfgang Spohn
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697502
- eISBN:
- 9780191739323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697502.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This account of laws is naturally extended to an account of ceteris paribus laws or conditions. In the main, “ceteris paribus” is here interpreted as “other things being normal”. A brief review ...
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This account of laws is naturally extended to an account of ceteris paribus laws or conditions. In the main, “ceteris paribus” is here interpreted as “other things being normal”. A brief review displays how unsatisfactory current accounts of ceteris paribus conditions are. Relative to a ranking function, however, normal and exceptional conditions can be precisely explicated in a way that avoids the inadequacies of other accounts. In particular, this explication makes sense of double and higher degrees of exceptionality. Starting from the old observation that reduction sentences for dispositions hold only ceteris paribus, the chapter then proceeds to an analysis of dispositions. It is argued that those reduction sentences are defeasibly a priori and, if qualified by normal conditions, even unrevisably a priori; this is what we a priori know about dispositions. The chapter concludes with a comparative discussion of the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of dispositions, confirming the account given in this chapter.Less
This account of laws is naturally extended to an account of ceteris paribus laws or conditions. In the main, “ceteris paribus” is here interpreted as “other things being normal”. A brief review displays how unsatisfactory current accounts of ceteris paribus conditions are. Relative to a ranking function, however, normal and exceptional conditions can be precisely explicated in a way that avoids the inadequacies of other accounts. In particular, this explication makes sense of double and higher degrees of exceptionality. Starting from the old observation that reduction sentences for dispositions hold only ceteris paribus, the chapter then proceeds to an analysis of dispositions. It is argued that those reduction sentences are defeasibly a priori and, if qualified by normal conditions, even unrevisably a priori; this is what we a priori know about dispositions. The chapter concludes with a comparative discussion of the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of dispositions, confirming the account given in this chapter.
Marcus Giaquinto
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199285945
- eISBN:
- 9780191713811
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285945.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter shows how we might come by a simple geometrical belief without inferring it from other beliefs, in a way that is consonant with the apparent obviousness and cogency of the acquired ...
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This chapter shows how we might come by a simple geometrical belief without inferring it from other beliefs, in a way that is consonant with the apparent obviousness and cogency of the acquired belief. This is intended to be a model for an explanation of beliefs that, cognitively speaking, constitute ultimate premisses. It also shows that a belief so acquired can be knowledge, and a response is given to objections on that score.Less
This chapter shows how we might come by a simple geometrical belief without inferring it from other beliefs, in a way that is consonant with the apparent obviousness and cogency of the acquired belief. This is intended to be a model for an explanation of beliefs that, cognitively speaking, constitute ultimate premisses. It also shows that a belief so acquired can be knowledge, and a response is given to objections on that score.
C. B. Martin
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199234103
- eISBN:
- 9780191715570
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234103.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter begins with a discussion of dispositionality as ubiquitous. It then discusses dispositionality as depth and breadth, non-existent and prohibitive dispositions, nonmental dispositions, ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of dispositionality as ubiquitous. It then discusses dispositionality as depth and breadth, non-existent and prohibitive dispositions, nonmental dispositions, properties as purely dispositional, and Pythagoreanism.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of dispositionality as ubiquitous. It then discusses dispositionality as depth and breadth, non-existent and prohibitive dispositions, nonmental dispositions, properties as purely dispositional, and Pythagoreanism.
