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I: The Meaning of the First Person Term

Maximilian de Gaynesford

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199287826
eISBN:
9780191603570
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199287821.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

The central claim of this book is that I is a deictic term, like the other singular personal pronouns You and He/She. This is true of the logical character, inferential role, referential function, ... More


Expressive Use

Maximilian de Gaynesford

in I: The Meaning of the First Person Term

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199287826
eISBN:
9780191603570
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199287821.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

I satisfies its expressive use in the deictic mode. It is the expressive use of any singular term to express thoughts. This requires that the speaker know the positive answer to ... More


Communicative Role

Maximilian de Gaynesford

in I: The Meaning of the First Person Term

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199287826
eISBN:
9780191603570
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199287821.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

I fulfils its communicative role in the deictic mode. It is the communicative role of any singular term to communicate thoughts. This requires that the audience know the ... More


Two-Choice Reaction Times: Basic Ideas and Data

R. Duncan Luce

in Response Times: Their Role in Inferring Elementary Mental Organization

Published in print:
1991
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780195070019
eISBN:
9780199869879
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195070019.003.0006
Subject:
Psychology, Cognitive Models and Architectures

This chapter begins with a discussion of choice-reaction times and simple-reaction times. It then discusses a conceptual scheme for tradeoffs, discriminability and accuracy, speed-accuracy tradeoff, ... More


Discrimination and Self-Knowledge

Patrick Greenough

in Introspection and Consciousness

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199744794
eISBN:
9780199933396
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The chapter shows that a variety of Cartesian Conceptions of the mental are unworkable. In particular, the chapter offers a much weaker conception of limited discrimination than the one advanced by ... More


Some Problems with Infinity

Isaac Levi

in Mild Contraction: Evaluating Loss of Information Due to Loss of Belief

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780199270705
eISBN:
9780191601774
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199270708.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Problems with infinity where inductive expansion or contraction are concerned are discussed. Three special cases when thinking about infinity is required, are considered: problems where the task is ... More


Experience

Casey O'Callaghan

in A Multisensory Philosophy of Perception

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
December 2019
ISBN:
9780198833703
eISBN:
9780191872129
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198833703.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter argues that perceptual experience is richly multisensory. In particular, phenomenal consciousness is constitutively and irreducibly multisensory. The reason is that the phenomenal ... More


Phenomenal Identity and Indiscriminability

Jeff Speaks

in The Phenomenal and the Representational

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
August 2015
ISBN:
9780198732556
eISBN:
9780191796784
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732556.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Chapter 28 at last turns to the question of whether phenomenal and representational properties can be identified. It is suggested that there is strong reason to believe that they can be, and two ... More


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