David M. Malone
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199278572
- eISBN:
- 9780191604119
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199278571.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter analyzes the disarmament of Iraq following the First Gulf War. Disarmament controlled by inspections and monitoring was the cornerstone of the vision set out for Iraq by SCR 687 in 1991. ...
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This chapter analyzes the disarmament of Iraq following the First Gulf War. Disarmament controlled by inspections and monitoring was the cornerstone of the vision set out for Iraq by SCR 687 in 1991. Weapons inspections were the administrative mechanism for the verification of Iraqi disarmament, with sanctions and the threat of force providing the incentive for Iraq to disarm. But for over a decade, Saddam Hussein successfully obscured the degree to which actual disarmament had been achieved, an uncertainty assessed very differently by Paris and Washington. The establishment of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) is discussed.Less
This chapter analyzes the disarmament of Iraq following the First Gulf War. Disarmament controlled by inspections and monitoring was the cornerstone of the vision set out for Iraq by SCR 687 in 1991. Weapons inspections were the administrative mechanism for the verification of Iraqi disarmament, with sanctions and the threat of force providing the incentive for Iraq to disarm. But for over a decade, Saddam Hussein successfully obscured the degree to which actual disarmament had been achieved, an uncertainty assessed very differently by Paris and Washington. The establishment of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) is discussed.
Philip Towle
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206361
- eISBN:
- 9780191677090
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206361.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History, Military History
Enforced disarmament has often been ignored by historians, diplomats, and strategic analysts. Yet the democracies have imposed some measure of disarmament on their enemies after every major victory ...
More
Enforced disarmament has often been ignored by historians, diplomats, and strategic analysts. Yet the democracies have imposed some measure of disarmament on their enemies after every major victory since 1815. In many cases, forced disarmament was one of the most important, if not the most important, of their war aims. The demilitarization of Germany and Japan, for example, was one of the most significant post-war measures agreed by the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States in 1945, whilst the debate on the disarmament measures imposed on Iraq after the Gulf War continues to rage. The efficacy and durability of enforced disarmament measures, and the resistance they are likely to encounter, are thus issues of central strategic and political importance. This book examines the most important peace settlements from the time of Napoleon Bonaparte to Saddam Hussein.Less
Enforced disarmament has often been ignored by historians, diplomats, and strategic analysts. Yet the democracies have imposed some measure of disarmament on their enemies after every major victory since 1815. In many cases, forced disarmament was one of the most important, if not the most important, of their war aims. The demilitarization of Germany and Japan, for example, was one of the most significant post-war measures agreed by the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States in 1945, whilst the debate on the disarmament measures imposed on Iraq after the Gulf War continues to rage. The efficacy and durability of enforced disarmament measures, and the resistance they are likely to encounter, are thus issues of central strategic and political importance. This book examines the most important peace settlements from the time of Napoleon Bonaparte to Saddam Hussein.
Beth A. Fischer
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780813178172
- eISBN:
- 9780813178189
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813178172.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Virtually no one anticipated the ending of the Cold War. Understanding how this long-standing conflict was peacefully resolved can give us insight into how to conclude other seemingly intractable ...
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Virtually no one anticipated the ending of the Cold War. Understanding how this long-standing conflict was peacefully resolved can give us insight into how to conclude other seemingly intractable conflicts.
Triumphalists believe that President Ronald Reagan “won” the Cold War by building up US military power and threatening the USSR. His hard-line policies forced Moscow to reduce its arsenal, adopt democratic reforms, withdraw from its war in Afghanistan, and ultimately collapse. Triumphalists assert that contemporary leaders should follow Reagan’s example bycompelling adversaries into submission.
However, triumphalism is a myth, a series of falsehoods about Reagan’s intentions, his policies, and the impact his administration had on the USSR.Drawing upon American and Soviet sources,this book demonstrates that Reagan’s initial hard-line policies brought the superpowers to the brink of war and made it more difficult for Moscow to disarm and reform. Compellence failed miserably.
The Cold War was resolved through diplomacy, not threats. President Reagan eventually engaged in dialogue so as to ease Moscow’s security concerns, build trust, and focus on the superpowers’ mutual interest in eliminating nuclear arms. For his part, Mikhail Gorbachev sought to end the arms race so as to divert resources to democratization. He too sought dialogue and trust.
The ending of the Cold War demonstrates the importance of moral leadership. Reagan and Gorbachev both rose above their differences and introduced radical new ideas about nuclear disarmament. Consequently, both encountered domestic opposition. Each persevered, however, leading their nations toward a safer, more humane future.Less
Virtually no one anticipated the ending of the Cold War. Understanding how this long-standing conflict was peacefully resolved can give us insight into how to conclude other seemingly intractable conflicts.
Triumphalists believe that President Ronald Reagan “won” the Cold War by building up US military power and threatening the USSR. His hard-line policies forced Moscow to reduce its arsenal, adopt democratic reforms, withdraw from its war in Afghanistan, and ultimately collapse. Triumphalists assert that contemporary leaders should follow Reagan’s example bycompelling adversaries into submission.
However, triumphalism is a myth, a series of falsehoods about Reagan’s intentions, his policies, and the impact his administration had on the USSR.Drawing upon American and Soviet sources,this book demonstrates that Reagan’s initial hard-line policies brought the superpowers to the brink of war and made it more difficult for Moscow to disarm and reform. Compellence failed miserably.
The Cold War was resolved through diplomacy, not threats. President Reagan eventually engaged in dialogue so as to ease Moscow’s security concerns, build trust, and focus on the superpowers’ mutual interest in eliminating nuclear arms. For his part, Mikhail Gorbachev sought to end the arms race so as to divert resources to democratization. He too sought dialogue and trust.
The ending of the Cold War demonstrates the importance of moral leadership. Reagan and Gorbachev both rose above their differences and introduced radical new ideas about nuclear disarmament. Consequently, both encountered domestic opposition. Each persevered, however, leading their nations toward a safer, more humane future.
Daniel H. Joyner
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199227358
- eISBN:
- 9780191728488
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227358.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
The 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has proven the most complicated and controversial of all arms control treaties, both in principle and in practice. Statements of nuclear-weapon States from ...
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The 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has proven the most complicated and controversial of all arms control treaties, both in principle and in practice. Statements of nuclear-weapon States from the Cold War to the present, led by the United States, show a disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty, and an unwarranted underprioritization of the civilian energy development and disarmament pillars of the treaty. This book argues that the way in which nuclear-weapon States have interpreted the Treaty has laid the legal foundation for a number of policies related to trade in civilian nuclear energy technologies and nuclear weapons disarmament. These policies circumscribe the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States under Article IV of the Treaty by imposing conditions on the supply of civilian nuclear technologies. They also provide for the renewal and maintenance, and in some cases further development, of the nuclear weapons arsenals of nuclear-weapon States. The book provides a legal analysis of this trend in treaty interpretation by nuclear-weapon States and the policies for which it has provided legal justification. It argues, through a close and systematic examination of the Treaty by reference to the rules of treaty interpretation found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that this disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty leads to erroneous legal interpretations in light of the original balance of principles underlying the Treaty, prejudicing the legitimate legal interests of non-nuclear-weapon States.Less
The 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has proven the most complicated and controversial of all arms control treaties, both in principle and in practice. Statements of nuclear-weapon States from the Cold War to the present, led by the United States, show a disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty, and an unwarranted underprioritization of the civilian energy development and disarmament pillars of the treaty. This book argues that the way in which nuclear-weapon States have interpreted the Treaty has laid the legal foundation for a number of policies related to trade in civilian nuclear energy technologies and nuclear weapons disarmament. These policies circumscribe the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States under Article IV of the Treaty by imposing conditions on the supply of civilian nuclear technologies. They also provide for the renewal and maintenance, and in some cases further development, of the nuclear weapons arsenals of nuclear-weapon States. The book provides a legal analysis of this trend in treaty interpretation by nuclear-weapon States and the policies for which it has provided legal justification. It argues, through a close and systematic examination of the Treaty by reference to the rules of treaty interpretation found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that this disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty leads to erroneous legal interpretations in light of the original balance of principles underlying the Treaty, prejudicing the legitimate legal interests of non-nuclear-weapon States.
Michael Quinlan
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199563944
- eISBN:
- 9780191721274
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563944.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This final chapter considers what action might be taken, short of the at-best-distant abolitionist goal, to constrain the risks and costs and to optimize the peace-maintaining contribution of nuclear ...
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This final chapter considers what action might be taken, short of the at-best-distant abolitionist goal, to constrain the risks and costs and to optimize the peace-maintaining contribution of nuclear armouries while they continue to exist. Drawing largely upon earlier chapters, it summarizes what needs to be done in the non-proliferation field both over problem countries and in remedying wider systemic weaknesses. It reviews the potential for further steps, especially though not only by the United States and Russia, on nuclear disarmament and related issues such as transparency and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It notes the scope for improving doctrines and postures, for example, by clarifying the ‘no first use’ issue and by ending any remaining arrangements for holding nuclear forces at short notice to launch. Finally, it recalls that though this direct nuclear-weapon agenda is still important, the central path to dependable peace and security must still be primarily a matter of basic political advance in resolving disputes and improving structures for managing them.Less
This final chapter considers what action might be taken, short of the at-best-distant abolitionist goal, to constrain the risks and costs and to optimize the peace-maintaining contribution of nuclear armouries while they continue to exist. Drawing largely upon earlier chapters, it summarizes what needs to be done in the non-proliferation field both over problem countries and in remedying wider systemic weaknesses. It reviews the potential for further steps, especially though not only by the United States and Russia, on nuclear disarmament and related issues such as transparency and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It notes the scope for improving doctrines and postures, for example, by clarifying the ‘no first use’ issue and by ending any remaining arrangements for holding nuclear forces at short notice to launch. Finally, it recalls that though this direct nuclear-weapon agenda is still important, the central path to dependable peace and security must still be primarily a matter of basic political advance in resolving disputes and improving structures for managing them.
Michael Quinlan
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199563944
- eISBN:
- 9780191721274
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563944.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter considers why the spread of nuclear weapons to new possessors has been generally recognized as dangerous, and then notes the array of instruments, centred upon the 1968 Nuclear ...
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This chapter considers why the spread of nuclear weapons to new possessors has been generally recognized as dangerous, and then notes the array of instruments, centred upon the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), that has been built up to prevent this. It discusses problems about the asymmetrical character of the Treaty, and brings out that the Treaty embodies three main bargains of which disarmament by the tolerated nuclear-weapon possessors is only one. It acknowledges nevertheless that such disarmament needs to be taken further if whole-hearted support for the Treaty-centred regime, pressure upon problem states like North Korea and Iran, and acceptance of the burdens and constraints which the regime entails are to be maintained, and if the need is to be acted upon, preferably at the 2010 Treaty review conference, to remedy regime weaknesses concerning verification, the right of withdrawal, and reconciling the prevention of wider weapon-proliferation potential with the likely spread of nuclear energy.Less
This chapter considers why the spread of nuclear weapons to new possessors has been generally recognized as dangerous, and then notes the array of instruments, centred upon the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), that has been built up to prevent this. It discusses problems about the asymmetrical character of the Treaty, and brings out that the Treaty embodies three main bargains of which disarmament by the tolerated nuclear-weapon possessors is only one. It acknowledges nevertheless that such disarmament needs to be taken further if whole-hearted support for the Treaty-centred regime, pressure upon problem states like North Korea and Iran, and acceptance of the burdens and constraints which the regime entails are to be maintained, and if the need is to be acted upon, preferably at the 2010 Treaty review conference, to remedy regime weaknesses concerning verification, the right of withdrawal, and reconciling the prevention of wider weapon-proliferation potential with the likely spread of nuclear energy.
Daniel H. Joyner
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199227358
- eISBN:
- 9780191728488
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227358.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
This introductory chapter presents an overview of the book. This book is a thesis driven text which applies the rules of treaty interpretation in international law to produce a so-called ‘holistic ...
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This introductory chapter presents an overview of the book. This book is a thesis driven text which applies the rules of treaty interpretation in international law to produce a so-called ‘holistic interpretation’ of the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The unifying thesis of this book is that the original balance of principles underlying the NPT, which can be distilled through an application of the principles of treaty interpretation contained in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, has for over a decade been distorted particularly by nuclear-weapon-possessing governments, led by the United States, in favour of a disproportionate prioritization of non-proliferation principles, and an unwarranted under-prioritization of peaceful use and disarmament principles. It is argued that this distortion of principled balance by nuclear-weapon states has resulted in a number of erroneous legal interpretations of the NPT's provisions.Less
This introductory chapter presents an overview of the book. This book is a thesis driven text which applies the rules of treaty interpretation in international law to produce a so-called ‘holistic interpretation’ of the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The unifying thesis of this book is that the original balance of principles underlying the NPT, which can be distilled through an application of the principles of treaty interpretation contained in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, has for over a decade been distorted particularly by nuclear-weapon-possessing governments, led by the United States, in favour of a disproportionate prioritization of non-proliferation principles, and an unwarranted under-prioritization of peaceful use and disarmament principles. It is argued that this distortion of principled balance by nuclear-weapon states has resulted in a number of erroneous legal interpretations of the NPT's provisions.
Emanuel Adler
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780197265529
- eISBN:
- 9780191760334
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197265529.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter focuses on the integrative force of resilient liberal practices. It acknowledges that liberal order is in crisis, but asserts that liberal internationalism's permanent crisis is a source ...
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This chapter focuses on the integrative force of resilient liberal practices. It acknowledges that liberal order is in crisis, but asserts that liberal internationalism's permanent crisis is a source of renewal and transformation in liberal order. A definition of liberal internationalism is put forward that carefully avoids constructing reified notions of liberal internationalism associated with American power. The chapter points to the need to focus on social practices to see the potential of liberal order's adaptation and renewal, and suggests that, although the decline of American power indeed may be seen from a narrow perspective to threaten liberal order, from a wider and deeper conceptual historical perspective, liberal practices may be why the order has not yet been replaced.Less
This chapter focuses on the integrative force of resilient liberal practices. It acknowledges that liberal order is in crisis, but asserts that liberal internationalism's permanent crisis is a source of renewal and transformation in liberal order. A definition of liberal internationalism is put forward that carefully avoids constructing reified notions of liberal internationalism associated with American power. The chapter points to the need to focus on social practices to see the potential of liberal order's adaptation and renewal, and suggests that, although the decline of American power indeed may be seen from a narrow perspective to threaten liberal order, from a wider and deeper conceptual historical perspective, liberal practices may be why the order has not yet been replaced.
Philip Towle
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206361
- eISBN:
- 9780191677090
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206361.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History, Military History
Disarmament and arms control are firmly associated in the public mind with efforts to maintain international peace through compromise and negotiation. However, there is a much older type of ...
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Disarmament and arms control are firmly associated in the public mind with efforts to maintain international peace through compromise and negotiation. However, there is a much older type of disarmament, which is not the product of give and take but is imposed upon a defeated enemy. Forced disarmament, the subject of this book, is the United Nations' policy today in Iraq because of its defeat in the Gulf War. Given that there is no way of insuring against revanchism, it is not surprising that Western democracies have insisted on disarming their enemies after every major victory since 1815. Germany and Japan accepted their disarmament in 1945 so it could go hand in hand with a policy of reconciliation. The effectiveness and durability of enforced disarmament measures, as well as the resistance they are likely to encounter, are issues with important strategic and political implications. This book looks at the most important peace settlements from the time of Napoleon Bonaparte to Saddam Hussein.Less
Disarmament and arms control are firmly associated in the public mind with efforts to maintain international peace through compromise and negotiation. However, there is a much older type of disarmament, which is not the product of give and take but is imposed upon a defeated enemy. Forced disarmament, the subject of this book, is the United Nations' policy today in Iraq because of its defeat in the Gulf War. Given that there is no way of insuring against revanchism, it is not surprising that Western democracies have insisted on disarming their enemies after every major victory since 1815. Germany and Japan accepted their disarmament in 1945 so it could go hand in hand with a policy of reconciliation. The effectiveness and durability of enforced disarmament measures, as well as the resistance they are likely to encounter, are issues with important strategic and political implications. This book looks at the most important peace settlements from the time of Napoleon Bonaparte to Saddam Hussein.
William H. Boothby
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199569946
- eISBN:
- 9780191705250
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199569946.003.0013
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
This chapter discusses the issues surrounding nuclear weapons. It starts by noting the statements made by the NATO states when they ratified AP1 and reference is made to the declared position of the ...
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This chapter discusses the issues surrounding nuclear weapons. It starts by noting the statements made by the NATO states when they ratified AP1 and reference is made to the declared position of the US as to the inapplicability to nuclear weapons of the new rules introduced in AP1. It then discusses what those newly introduced rules consist of. The chapter considers the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion and the academic comment that has followed it. The UK position in relation to the legality of nuclear weapons is noted, and the distinction between this discussion and nuclear disarmament initiatives is made.Less
This chapter discusses the issues surrounding nuclear weapons. It starts by noting the statements made by the NATO states when they ratified AP1 and reference is made to the declared position of the US as to the inapplicability to nuclear weapons of the new rules introduced in AP1. It then discusses what those newly introduced rules consist of. The chapter considers the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion and the academic comment that has followed it. The UK position in relation to the legality of nuclear weapons is noted, and the distinction between this discussion and nuclear disarmament initiatives is made.
Daniel H. Joyner
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199204908
- eISBN:
- 9780191709470
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199204908.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
This chapter discusses the origins of the nuclear Nnon-proliferation regime. The NPT was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 at Washington, London, and Moscow. It was signed that first day by the ...
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This chapter discusses the origins of the nuclear Nnon-proliferation regime. The NPT was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 at Washington, London, and Moscow. It was signed that first day by the three depository governments and by more than fifty other states. The treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970. In 2007, the membership of the NPT stands at 187 states, and the treaty continues to serve as the cornerstone legal instrument of the nuclear non-proliferation system. Articles I, II, III, and VI of the NPT are discussed.Less
This chapter discusses the origins of the nuclear Nnon-proliferation regime. The NPT was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 at Washington, London, and Moscow. It was signed that first day by the three depository governments and by more than fifty other states. The treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970. In 2007, the membership of the NPT stands at 187 states, and the treaty continues to serve as the cornerstone legal instrument of the nuclear non-proliferation system. Articles I, II, III, and VI of the NPT are discussed.
Randall Caroline Watson Forsberg
Matthew Evangelista and Neta C. Crawford (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781501744358
- eISBN:
- 9781501744365
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501744358.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Military analyst, peace activist, teacher, and social theorist, the author of this book (1943–2007) founded the Nuclear Freeze campaign and the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. This ...
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Military analyst, peace activist, teacher, and social theorist, the author of this book (1943–2007) founded the Nuclear Freeze campaign and the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. This book, completed in 1997 and published for the first time here, delves into a vast literature in psychology, anthropology, archeology, sociology, and history to examine the ways in which changing moral beliefs came to stigmatize forms of socially sanctioned violence, such as human sacrifice, cannibalism, and slavery, eventually rendering them unacceptable. Could the same process work for war? The book begins by giving attention to the theory of peace—that is, the theory of the conditions under which war might end. A controversial topic because many people are convinced that war cannot end. It then considers how war could be abolished. In doing so, the book reviews some of the widely practiced forms of socially sanctioned group violence and concludes with a brief discussion of the prospects for the abolition of all forms of such violence. The book is edited, with an introduction by two political scientists, both of whom worked with Forsberg.Less
Military analyst, peace activist, teacher, and social theorist, the author of this book (1943–2007) founded the Nuclear Freeze campaign and the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. This book, completed in 1997 and published for the first time here, delves into a vast literature in psychology, anthropology, archeology, sociology, and history to examine the ways in which changing moral beliefs came to stigmatize forms of socially sanctioned violence, such as human sacrifice, cannibalism, and slavery, eventually rendering them unacceptable. Could the same process work for war? The book begins by giving attention to the theory of peace—that is, the theory of the conditions under which war might end. A controversial topic because many people are convinced that war cannot end. It then considers how war could be abolished. In doing so, the book reviews some of the widely practiced forms of socially sanctioned group violence and concludes with a brief discussion of the prospects for the abolition of all forms of such violence. The book is edited, with an introduction by two political scientists, both of whom worked with Forsberg.
István Hargittai
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195178456
- eISBN:
- 9780199787012
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178456.003.0005
- Subject:
- Physics, History of Physics
The period of Cold War started almost immediately after World War II, and by then, the Martians had become authorities in utilizing science for creating new weapons. In the United States, a feeling ...
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The period of Cold War started almost immediately after World War II, and by then, the Martians had become authorities in utilizing science for creating new weapons. In the United States, a feeling of threat from the Soviet Union increased and this resulted in a period of paranoiac fear. Teller argued forcefully for the American hydrogen bomb and for the opening of a second weapons laboratory to counter similar efforts in the Soviet Union. In this, the Martians differed from most of the scientific community. Eventually, Szilard became a champion of disarmament and the coexistence with the Soviet Union. With the Martians disappearing and Wigner becoming marginalized, Teller remained on the scene well into the 1980s and became an advocate for the controversial “Star Wars”.Less
The period of Cold War started almost immediately after World War II, and by then, the Martians had become authorities in utilizing science for creating new weapons. In the United States, a feeling of threat from the Soviet Union increased and this resulted in a period of paranoiac fear. Teller argued forcefully for the American hydrogen bomb and for the opening of a second weapons laboratory to counter similar efforts in the Soviet Union. In this, the Martians differed from most of the scientific community. Eventually, Szilard became a champion of disarmament and the coexistence with the Soviet Union. With the Martians disappearing and Wigner becoming marginalized, Teller remained on the scene well into the 1980s and became an advocate for the controversial “Star Wars”.
Peter J. Yearwood
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199226733
- eISBN:
- 9780191710308
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226733.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
The success of the League was widely seen as depending on its formulating a scheme for international disarmament. Lloyd George had this in the back of his mind when offering a security treaty to ...
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The success of the League was widely seen as depending on its formulating a scheme for international disarmament. Lloyd George had this in the back of his mind when offering a security treaty to Paris. Lord Esher, his man on the League's Temporary Mixed Commission, was pushed aside by Cecil, whose appointment had been arranged by H. A. L. Fisher, the British representative on the Council. Cecil hoped to repair Anglo‐French relations, which had rapidly deteriorated after Poincaré came to power, by agreeing with the French representatives a plan which would formally link security and disarmament. Once this had been adopted at Geneva, Cecil hoped to impose it on the British government, which he had himself joined when Stanley Baldwin became Prime Minister in May 1923. However, he was on bad terms with Curzon, who remained Foreign Secretary. The league did not endorse the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and the consensus in the Conservative Cabinet was strongly against it.Less
The success of the League was widely seen as depending on its formulating a scheme for international disarmament. Lloyd George had this in the back of his mind when offering a security treaty to Paris. Lord Esher, his man on the League's Temporary Mixed Commission, was pushed aside by Cecil, whose appointment had been arranged by H. A. L. Fisher, the British representative on the Council. Cecil hoped to repair Anglo‐French relations, which had rapidly deteriorated after Poincaré came to power, by agreeing with the French representatives a plan which would formally link security and disarmament. Once this had been adopted at Geneva, Cecil hoped to impose it on the British government, which he had himself joined when Stanley Baldwin became Prime Minister in May 1923. However, he was on bad terms with Curzon, who remained Foreign Secretary. The league did not endorse the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and the consensus in the Conservative Cabinet was strongly against it.
Philip Towle
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206361
- eISBN:
- 9780191677090
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206361.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History, Military History
Dunkirk and the fortresses on the Russo–Ottoman border were demilitarized in eighteenth-century peace treaties because of the dominating part played by such fortifications in the warfare of the ...
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Dunkirk and the fortresses on the Russo–Ottoman border were demilitarized in eighteenth-century peace treaties because of the dominating part played by such fortifications in the warfare of the period. With the outbreak of the French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte's subsequent seizure of power as emperor of France, the international scene and the nature of warfare were transformed. French expansion was based on mass armies raised by conscription. Because the size of armies was now crucial, it was not surprising that Napoleon tried to limit the number of men under arms maintained by his defeated enemies. Napoleon's armies conquered Italy, the Low Countries, and the smaller German states. They overwhelmed Austria and threatened Russia and Turkey. They defeated Prussia in 1806 and Austria for the second time in 1809. This chapter focuses on Napoleon's implementation of forced disarmament measures in Prussia and Austria.Less
Dunkirk and the fortresses on the Russo–Ottoman border were demilitarized in eighteenth-century peace treaties because of the dominating part played by such fortifications in the warfare of the period. With the outbreak of the French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte's subsequent seizure of power as emperor of France, the international scene and the nature of warfare were transformed. French expansion was based on mass armies raised by conscription. Because the size of armies was now crucial, it was not surprising that Napoleon tried to limit the number of men under arms maintained by his defeated enemies. Napoleon's armies conquered Italy, the Low Countries, and the smaller German states. They overwhelmed Austria and threatened Russia and Turkey. They defeated Prussia in 1806 and Austria for the second time in 1809. This chapter focuses on Napoleon's implementation of forced disarmament measures in Prussia and Austria.
Philip Towle
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206361
- eISBN:
- 9780191677090
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206361.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History, Military History
The Crimean War of 1854–1856 was prolonged for almost a year by Britain's determination to banish Russian naval power from the Black Sea. Like most forced disarmament measures after limited wars, ...
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The Crimean War of 1854–1856 was prolonged for almost a year by Britain's determination to banish Russian naval power from the Black Sea. Like most forced disarmament measures after limited wars, this was tactically offensive and strategically defensive, since it was designed to separate the expansionist Russians from the decaying Ottoman Empire. Russia accepted the banishment of its fleet only after its naval forces in the Black Sea had been destroyed and had been isolated diplomatically. Like the demilitarization of Dunkirk in the eighteenth century, neutralization of the Black Sea was a limited measure, which did not reduce the totality of Russian power, but was still deeply resented as a national humiliation. Consequently, as soon as his enemies were weakened in 1870, the tsar denounced the neutralization of the Black Sea, provoking an international crisis which might easily have led to a second war. Thus, despite its limited scope, forced disarmament occupied a central role in diplomacy during the period, a position which it was not to occupy again until the 1920s.Less
The Crimean War of 1854–1856 was prolonged for almost a year by Britain's determination to banish Russian naval power from the Black Sea. Like most forced disarmament measures after limited wars, this was tactically offensive and strategically defensive, since it was designed to separate the expansionist Russians from the decaying Ottoman Empire. Russia accepted the banishment of its fleet only after its naval forces in the Black Sea had been destroyed and had been isolated diplomatically. Like the demilitarization of Dunkirk in the eighteenth century, neutralization of the Black Sea was a limited measure, which did not reduce the totality of Russian power, but was still deeply resented as a national humiliation. Consequently, as soon as his enemies were weakened in 1870, the tsar denounced the neutralization of the Black Sea, provoking an international crisis which might easily have led to a second war. Thus, despite its limited scope, forced disarmament occupied a central role in diplomacy during the period, a position which it was not to occupy again until the 1920s.
Philip Towle
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206361
- eISBN:
- 9780191677090
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206361.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History, Military History
After the First World War, the democratic nations tried for the first time in the modern period to impose far-reaching disarmament measures on their enemies. These were not the limited defensive ...
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After the First World War, the democratic nations tried for the first time in the modern period to impose far-reaching disarmament measures on their enemies. These were not the limited defensive measures imposed on France in 1815 or Russia in 1856 but the continuation of the allied offensive to break the power of Germany and its former allies, Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Turkey escaped the same fate only because it stood up to allied forces. The disarmament provisions of the Armistice in November 1918 and of the Treaty of Versailles fourteen months later were as far-reaching as the allies could make them. The German army was to be reduced to 100,000 and, to prevent the buildup of reserves, officers were to serve for twenty-five years and men for twelve. Only armaments sufficient for such a small army were to be retained and the rest of the German arsenal was to be destroyed under allied supervision. This chapter offers a genesis of the forced disarmament of Germany after its defeat in the First World War.Less
After the First World War, the democratic nations tried for the first time in the modern period to impose far-reaching disarmament measures on their enemies. These were not the limited defensive measures imposed on France in 1815 or Russia in 1856 but the continuation of the allied offensive to break the power of Germany and its former allies, Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Turkey escaped the same fate only because it stood up to allied forces. The disarmament provisions of the Armistice in November 1918 and of the Treaty of Versailles fourteen months later were as far-reaching as the allies could make them. The German army was to be reduced to 100,000 and, to prevent the buildup of reserves, officers were to serve for twenty-five years and men for twelve. Only armaments sufficient for such a small army were to be retained and the rest of the German arsenal was to be destroyed under allied supervision. This chapter offers a genesis of the forced disarmament of Germany after its defeat in the First World War.
Philip Towle
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206361
- eISBN:
- 9780191677090
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206361.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History, Military History
At the end of the First World War, the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated, leaving a power vacuum in Central Europe. For the first time, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Hungary became ...
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At the end of the First World War, the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated, leaving a power vacuum in Central Europe. For the first time, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Hungary became independent states, politically weak but fiercely nationalistic. The period began with the forced disarmament of Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria and the attempt to disarm Turkey; it finished with Anglo-French resistance that the Czechoslovak government appease Germany by abandoning its line of fortifications in the Sudetenland. Both of these processes were far-reaching. Czechoslovakia in 1938 was as vulnerable without its defensive line as Athens had been without its walls. Germany's former allies were only allowed to maintain armed forces which were a fraction of the size of those mobilized by their neighbours in the 1920s, making it impossible for them to use force to regain their lost territories but also increasing their bitterness.Less
At the end of the First World War, the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated, leaving a power vacuum in Central Europe. For the first time, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Hungary became independent states, politically weak but fiercely nationalistic. The period began with the forced disarmament of Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria and the attempt to disarm Turkey; it finished with Anglo-French resistance that the Czechoslovak government appease Germany by abandoning its line of fortifications in the Sudetenland. Both of these processes were far-reaching. Czechoslovakia in 1938 was as vulnerable without its defensive line as Athens had been without its walls. Germany's former allies were only allowed to maintain armed forces which were a fraction of the size of those mobilized by their neighbours in the 1920s, making it impossible for them to use force to regain their lost territories but also increasing their bitterness.
Philip Towle
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206361
- eISBN:
- 9780191677090
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206361.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History, Military History
Forced disarmament has often been a preliminary to the destruction or subjugation of a defeated nation. Had Napoleon Bonaparte not been defeated, the disarmament of Prussia and Austria would have led ...
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Forced disarmament has often been a preliminary to the destruction or subjugation of a defeated nation. Had Napoleon Bonaparte not been defeated, the disarmament of Prussia and Austria would have led to the loss of their independence and their incorporation within the French Empire. In the case of Vichy France, the whole process of national destruction and imperial expansion gradually unfolded. After the stunning defeat of the French armies in 1940, most of France was occupied by Germany. The rump of the French state, with its capital at Vichy, maintained a vulnerable and uneasy independence. The new government under Marshal Pétain was allowed to keep only 100,000 men under arms. French officers were relieved that they could keep an army at all, but it suited Adolf Hitler to show leniency because this made it less likely that the French colonies would align themselves with Britain. When the allies overran French North Africa and consequently Hitler decided to strike in November 1942, the Vichy experiment ended.Less
Forced disarmament has often been a preliminary to the destruction or subjugation of a defeated nation. Had Napoleon Bonaparte not been defeated, the disarmament of Prussia and Austria would have led to the loss of their independence and their incorporation within the French Empire. In the case of Vichy France, the whole process of national destruction and imperial expansion gradually unfolded. After the stunning defeat of the French armies in 1940, most of France was occupied by Germany. The rump of the French state, with its capital at Vichy, maintained a vulnerable and uneasy independence. The new government under Marshal Pétain was allowed to keep only 100,000 men under arms. French officers were relieved that they could keep an army at all, but it suited Adolf Hitler to show leniency because this made it less likely that the French colonies would align themselves with Britain. When the allies overran French North Africa and consequently Hitler decided to strike in November 1942, the Vichy experiment ended.
Philip Towle
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206361
- eISBN:
- 9780191677090
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206361.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History, Military History
The heterogeneous alliance that defeated the Axis states in the Second World War was united by its determination to demand the unconditional surrender of the enemy powers and to prevent their ...
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The heterogeneous alliance that defeated the Axis states in the Second World War was united by its determination to demand the unconditional surrender of the enemy powers and to prevent their resurgence. For Russia, the war was a struggle for survival in which many of its great cities were destroyed and some 20 million people died. The Western democracies saw it as a crusade against the forces of evil. The allied leaders, Josef Stalin of Russia, Winston Churchill of Britain, and Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States, agreed that enemy governments should be removed and Nazism and Facism should be eradicated. While the fighting was continuing, they could also agree that the defeated nations should be totally disarmed and demilitarized. This chapter discusses the allies' war aims and the forced disarmament of defeated nations both during the Second World War and after.Less
The heterogeneous alliance that defeated the Axis states in the Second World War was united by its determination to demand the unconditional surrender of the enemy powers and to prevent their resurgence. For Russia, the war was a struggle for survival in which many of its great cities were destroyed and some 20 million people died. The Western democracies saw it as a crusade against the forces of evil. The allied leaders, Josef Stalin of Russia, Winston Churchill of Britain, and Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States, agreed that enemy governments should be removed and Nazism and Facism should be eradicated. While the fighting was continuing, they could also agree that the defeated nations should be totally disarmed and demilitarized. This chapter discusses the allies' war aims and the forced disarmament of defeated nations both during the Second World War and after.
