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Non‐Teleological Explanations of Actions

G. F. Schueler

in Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199250370
eISBN:
9780191598364
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199250375.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, General

There are well‐known arguments in favour of the idea that explanations of actions are at bottom non‐teleological. Michael Smith's ‘direction‐of‐fit’ argument entails this, and both Davidson and ... More


AN OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENT?

Ingmar Persson

in The Retreat of Reason: A dilemma in the philosophy of life

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199276905
eISBN:
9780191603198
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199276900.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, General

In this chapter the fact that desires have a direction of fit which is opposite to that of beliefs is employed to suggest that objectivism with respect to reasons for desire is implausible. Because ... More


The Authenticity of Memory

Sven Bernecker

in Memory: A Philosophical Study

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199577569
eISBN:
9780191722820
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577569.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

For a present propositional attitude token to stand in a memory‐relation to a past propositional attitude token, the contents of both tokens need not be type‐identical but only sufficiently similar. ... More


Motivation and Desires

Maria Alvarez

in Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199550005
eISBN:
9780191720239
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550005.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Chapter 3 focuses on motivation in action with a view to answering the question what our reasons for action –what are called ‘motivating reasons’—are. After a discussion of motives, the focus moves ... More


Feminism in Epistemology: Exclusion and Objectification

Rae Langton

in Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199247066
eISBN:
9780191594823
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247066.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy

Feminism's questioning of prejudice is continuous with philosophical method (Descartes, Astell, le Doeuff). Feminism contributes to epistemology by identifying sins of omission: women get left out, ... More


Intentional Action

Roger Teichmann

in The Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199299331
eISBN:
9780191715068
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299331.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The account, in Intention, of intentional action and of expressions of intention makes use of three important notions: non-observational knowledge, the question ‘Why?’ in its reason-demanding sense, ... More


Speaker's Freedom and Maker's Knowledge

Rae Langton

in Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199247066
eISBN:
9780191594823
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247066.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy

Mill thinks knowledge is good, and free speech promotes knowledge. Pornography apparently promotes false belief, not knowledge, so seems, in Mill's terms, indefensible. A closer look reveals the ... More


A Puzzle about Internal Reasons

Michael Smith

in Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199599325
eISBN:
9780191741500
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

According to Bernard Williams, all reasons for action are what he calls ‘internal reasons’, where an agent has an internal reason to act in some way just in case she would be motivated to act in that ... More


Tracking over the Rivals

Sherrilyn Roush

in Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199274734
eISBN:
9780191603228
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199274738.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues that the new tracking view is superior to externalist rivals: process reliabilism, the safety view, and the relevant alternatives view. This is because of the generality problem, ... More


Motivation and Desire

Alfred R. Mele

in Motivation and Agency

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195156171
eISBN:
9780199833467
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515617X.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Introduces some terminology and important distinctions. Terms defined include “action–desire,” “motivational base,” and “motivation‐encompassing attitudes.” Among the distinctions drawn are: ... More


The Rational Roles of Intuition

Elijah Chudnoff

in Intuition

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199683000
eISBN:
9780191763113
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199683000.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Intuitions are inputs to theoretical reasoning. According to the view developed in this book they play this role because they are justifiers. Intuitions are sometimes thought of as evidence. It is ... More


Antirealist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism

Simon Blackburn

David Copp (ed.)

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780195147797
eISBN:
9780199785841
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195147790.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Expressivism is the view that the function of normative sentences is not to represent a kind of fact, but to avow attitudes, prescribe behavior, or the like. The idea can be found in David Hume. In ... More


The “Guise of the Ought-to-Be”: A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire

Federico Lauria

in The Nature of Desire

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
June 2017
ISBN:
9780199370962
eISBN:
9780199370986
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370962.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act. This essay examines these conceptions of ... More


Introduction: Reconsidering Some Dogmas about Desires

Federico Lauria and Julien A. Deonna

in The Nature of Desire

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
June 2017
ISBN:
9780199370962
eISBN:
9780199370986
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370962.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

Desire has not been at the center of recent preoccupations in the philosophy of mind. Consequently, the literature settled into several dogmas. The first part of this introduction presents these ... More


Belief: Some Complications

Elizabeth S. Radcliffe

in Hume, Passion, and Action

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780199573295
eISBN:
9780191862908
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199573295.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Hume’s characterization of belief is crucial in the debate over whether beliefs could be motives. Hume seemed to doubt his account of belief in the Treatise, made corrections to it in the Appendix, ... More


Belief in Action

Michael Slote

in A Sentimentalist Theory of the Mind

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199371754
eISBN:
9780199371778
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199371754.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Moral Philosophy

Belief by its very nature involves favoring a certain proposition not only for intellectual purposes but also for practical ones. Analytic philosophers (including Hume) who see belief as inert or as ... More


New Consequentialism and the New Doing-Allowing Distinction

Paul Hurley

in Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
December 2018
ISBN:
9780190270117
eISBN:
9780190270131
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190270117.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

Intuitively, we sometimes have decisive reasons not to do certain things even though such restraint allows something worse overall to happen. Traditional consequentialists challenge the legitimacy of ... More


Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire: Co-authored with David Copp

David Sobel

in From Valuing to Value: Towards a Defense of Subjectivism

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
December 2016
ISBN:
9780198712640
eISBN:
9780191780998
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712640.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

In this chapter David Copp and I argue that the direction of fit metaphor is limited in providing an account of beliefs and desires. The metaphor is given its most rigorous analysis by Michael Smith; ... More


Desiderative Inconsistency, Moore’s Paradox, and Norms of Desire

David Wall

in The Nature of Desire

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
June 2017
ISBN:
9780199370962
eISBN:
9780199370986
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370962.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

What is wrong with desiderative inconsistency, having essentially conflicting desires that cannot possibly be satisfied at the same time? It was recently argued that attempts to explain this in terms ... More


What is Desire-as-Belief?

Alex Gregory

in Desire as Belief: A Study of Desire, Motivation, and Rationality

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
June 2021
ISBN:
9780198848172
eISBN:
9780191882739
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198848172.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter explains some basic assumptions and terminology and then introduces desire-as-belief—the view that our desires are a subset of our beliefs. The view is explained in part by an analogy to ... More


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