Fred Dretske
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195386196
- eISBN:
- 9780199866748
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195386196.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
If we think of the objects (as opposed to the facts and properties) we see as the objects we are visually conscious of, the texture of conscious visual experience is given by the number of objects we ...
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If we think of the objects (as opposed to the facts and properties) we see as the objects we are visually conscious of, the texture of conscious visual experience is given by the number of objects we see. By using an epistemic test for the objects we see (viz, the objects one sees are the objects one has direct perceptual knowledge of) it is argued that the texture of conscious experience is very rich indeed — much richer, in fact, than studies of change blindness and inattention would suggest. We know, by direct visual perception, more than we know we know. We are therefore — often enough anyway — aware of more than we realize. A subjective, first-person, test for consciousness is the wrong test.Less
If we think of the objects (as opposed to the facts and properties) we see as the objects we are visually conscious of, the texture of conscious visual experience is given by the number of objects we see. By using an epistemic test for the objects we see (viz, the objects one sees are the objects one has direct perceptual knowledge of) it is argued that the texture of conscious experience is very rich indeed — much richer, in fact, than studies of change blindness and inattention would suggest. We know, by direct visual perception, more than we know we know. We are therefore — often enough anyway — aware of more than we realize. A subjective, first-person, test for consciousness is the wrong test.
Bryan Magee
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237228
- eISBN:
- 9780191706233
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237227.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Investigates the contents of Schopenhauer's first book On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This is devoted to the nature of explanation. It concludes that all events in the ...
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Investigates the contents of Schopenhauer's first book On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This is devoted to the nature of explanation. It concludes that all events in the empirical world fall under one or more of four forms of explanation: scientific, mathematical, logical, and motivational. Since all meaningful empirical concepts are derived from experience, and no valid deductive argument can add to the content of its own premises, the only fully satisfactory empirical knowledge is provided by direct perception.Less
Investigates the contents of Schopenhauer's first book On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This is devoted to the nature of explanation. It concludes that all events in the empirical world fall under one or more of four forms of explanation: scientific, mathematical, logical, and motivational. Since all meaningful empirical concepts are derived from experience, and no valid deductive argument can add to the content of its own premises, the only fully satisfactory empirical knowledge is provided by direct perception.
Chris Thompson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780816653546
- eISBN:
- 9781452946184
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Minnesota Press
- DOI:
- 10.5749/minnesota/9780816653546.003.0006
- Subject:
- Art, Art History
This chapter narrates the interview between the author and Louwrien Wijers, on her life and experiences within the Fluxus movement. Wijers, as a contemporary of Joseph Beuys, had grown up surrounded ...
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This chapter narrates the interview between the author and Louwrien Wijers, on her life and experiences within the Fluxus movement. Wijers, as a contemporary of Joseph Beuys, had grown up surrounded by beauty and had learned Beuys’ “soft touch” approach to art, which would later be supplemented by her study of Gelugpa Buddhism and its concepts of nondual thinking and direct perception. During her foray into the contemporary art world, she met the likes of Ben d’Armagnac, who in his final performance introduced his concept of the overgave—a methodical push toward a state of emotional, physical, and intellectual exposure. His death also becomes a sort of avant-garde exhibition, and raises questions of death and silence—which is in itself a death of all other sounds—if there is a perfect ending, or if the ending is yet another beginning.Less
This chapter narrates the interview between the author and Louwrien Wijers, on her life and experiences within the Fluxus movement. Wijers, as a contemporary of Joseph Beuys, had grown up surrounded by beauty and had learned Beuys’ “soft touch” approach to art, which would later be supplemented by her study of Gelugpa Buddhism and its concepts of nondual thinking and direct perception. During her foray into the contemporary art world, she met the likes of Ben d’Armagnac, who in his final performance introduced his concept of the overgave—a methodical push toward a state of emotional, physical, and intellectual exposure. His death also becomes a sort of avant-garde exhibition, and raises questions of death and silence—which is in itself a death of all other sounds—if there is a perfect ending, or if the ending is yet another beginning.
Tim Button
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199672172
- eISBN:
- 9780191758393
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672172.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter explores Putnam’s more recent natural realism. Natural realism has many points of contact with McDowell’s line of thought in Mind and World. In particular, it utterly rejects the ...
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This chapter explores Putnam’s more recent natural realism. Natural realism has many points of contact with McDowell’s line of thought in Mind and World. In particular, it utterly rejects the bracketed empiricist approach to ’understanding’ that is characteristic of nonrealism. Moreover, it attempts to avoid the problems raised by the model-theoretic arguments by tackling Cartesian angst head-on. This is an excellent strategy. Unfortunately, natural realism attempts to tackle Cartesian angst by embracing naïve realism about perception. It is therefore unable to deal adequately with Cartesian scepticism. This is a crucial failing, since Cartesian angst is all that is needed to feed the machine of the model-theoretic arguments and the just-more-theory manoeuvre. The discussion of philosophy of perception turns out to be a red herring in the present context.Less
This chapter explores Putnam’s more recent natural realism. Natural realism has many points of contact with McDowell’s line of thought in Mind and World. In particular, it utterly rejects the bracketed empiricist approach to ’understanding’ that is characteristic of nonrealism. Moreover, it attempts to avoid the problems raised by the model-theoretic arguments by tackling Cartesian angst head-on. This is an excellent strategy. Unfortunately, natural realism attempts to tackle Cartesian angst by embracing naïve realism about perception. It is therefore unable to deal adequately with Cartesian scepticism. This is a crucial failing, since Cartesian angst is all that is needed to feed the machine of the model-theoretic arguments and the just-more-theory manoeuvre. The discussion of philosophy of perception turns out to be a red herring in the present context.
Tom Stoneham
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- February 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198755685
- eISBN:
- 9780191816833
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198755685.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This paper engages with the debate of how Berkeley reconciles restricting the objects of sense perception to what is immediately perceived with allowing that ordinary physical objects are amongst the ...
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This paper engages with the debate of how Berkeley reconciles restricting the objects of sense perception to what is immediately perceived with allowing that ordinary physical objects are amongst the objects of perception. Pitcher’s (1986) argument that Berkeley did not take the claim that we perceive ordinary physical objects to be ‘strictly true’ is rejected before we move to the debate between Pappas (2000) and Dicker (2006) about whether Berkeley equivocates about the definition of ‘immediate perception’ in a way which undermines his position. They agree that Hylas must accept indirect realism, but disagree about how this affects the cogency of his argument. However, Stoneham (2002) gave a different account of the dialectic in the First Dialogue that shows both Pappas and Dicker to be mistaken. This allows us to resolve Berkeley’s problem by appeal to the ordinary idea that we can perceive an object by perceiving part of it.Less
This paper engages with the debate of how Berkeley reconciles restricting the objects of sense perception to what is immediately perceived with allowing that ordinary physical objects are amongst the objects of perception. Pitcher’s (1986) argument that Berkeley did not take the claim that we perceive ordinary physical objects to be ‘strictly true’ is rejected before we move to the debate between Pappas (2000) and Dicker (2006) about whether Berkeley equivocates about the definition of ‘immediate perception’ in a way which undermines his position. They agree that Hylas must accept indirect realism, but disagree about how this affects the cogency of his argument. However, Stoneham (2002) gave a different account of the dialectic in the First Dialogue that shows both Pappas and Dicker to be mistaken. This allows us to resolve Berkeley’s problem by appeal to the ordinary idea that we can perceive an object by perceiving part of it.
Mark Rowlands
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190846039
- eISBN:
- 9780190846060
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190846039.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
According to the problem of other animal minds, claims to know anything about the minds of animals suffer from serious problems of justification. These problems parallel the problem of other human ...
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According to the problem of other animal minds, claims to know anything about the minds of animals suffer from serious problems of justification. These problems parallel the problem of other human minds. Inferentialist approaches argue that the justification lies in the appropriate form of inference. These approaches are inadequate for a variety of reasons. Direct perception approaches claim our access to the minds of animals is, in some cases, perceptual. A novel form of the direct perception account is defended. This is based on three ideas: (a) a distinction between seeing and seeing that, (b) a distinction between formal and functional descriptions of behavior, and (c) the idea that functional descriptions of behavior are (often) disguised psychological descriptions. If we wish to have any useful descriptions of animal behavior, we must accept that we can often see their mental states.Less
According to the problem of other animal minds, claims to know anything about the minds of animals suffer from serious problems of justification. These problems parallel the problem of other human minds. Inferentialist approaches argue that the justification lies in the appropriate form of inference. These approaches are inadequate for a variety of reasons. Direct perception approaches claim our access to the minds of animals is, in some cases, perceptual. A novel form of the direct perception account is defended. This is based on three ideas: (a) a distinction between seeing and seeing that, (b) a distinction between formal and functional descriptions of behavior, and (c) the idea that functional descriptions of behavior are (often) disguised psychological descriptions. If we wish to have any useful descriptions of animal behavior, we must accept that we can often see their mental states.
