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An analysis of the factors and the processes that led to the adoption of a mixed‐member electoral system in Israel. The first section analyzes the characteristics of the Israeli pre‐reform extreme electoral (hyper‐representative) system according to the two dimensions (intraparty and interparty) suggested by Shugart in Ch. 2; it also presents a brief discussion of reform initiatives, intended to provide solutions to some of the electoral system pathologies, and explains their failure. The second section discusses the developments in the intraparty dimension—the parties’ tendencies from the 1970s on to adopt more and more inclusive selectorates for candidate selection (this was reform outside the constitutional and legislative framework). The final section discusses the developments in the interparty dimension—patching a majoritarian feature onto a proportional system; this is an analysis of the politics of reform—the factors and the processes that led to the adoption of direct election of the prime minister, and includes five elements: long‐term developments that served as background factors; events that served as catalysts during the struggle for and against reform; a description of the political actors who took part in this struggle; the characteristics of the mixed system that make it more fit for promotion and its use by the reformers to overcome the primary advantage of the institutional status quo; and, lastly, the four stages of the reform process. An appendix lists major events and dates.

In no parliamentary democracy has the presidentialization of politics achieved such magnitude as in Israel. In 1992, the Israeli parliament adopted a law that altered not only the electoral system but also Israel’s political framework. According to this law, Israel became the first parliamentary democracy in which the Prime Minister was directly and popularly elected. This development produced a unique political system in which a ‘presidentialized’ Prime Minister was grafted onto an essentially parliamentary democracy. This chapter addresses the following questions: First, did the political reform in the 1990s reflect a de facto change that had already taken place? In other words, is it appropriate to speak of a phenomenon of presidentialization occurring within Israel’s parliamentary democracy prior to the 1990s? Second, what were the causes and consequences of presidentialization? How did this unique system affect the political parties, electoral competition, political representation, legislative behaviour, legislative-executive relations, and other associated factors? Third, how does Israel’s experience of the presidentialization of politics compare with other modern democracies? Were the political and electoral attributes of leadership powers amplified by factors flowing from the formal change? Finally, how does Israel’s rather extreme experience of the presidentialization of parliamentary democracy contribute to the assessment of this phenomenon?

This analyzes the consequences of the Israeli version of a mixed electoral system, in which a majoritarian method of electing the head of the executive branch was grafted onto an extremely proportional system of electing the legislature. Focuses on the first two elections in which this mixed system was implemented, 1996 and 1999, and in doing so, concentrates on two aspects of the elections: the election results, i.e., the decimation of the two main parties and the rise of sectarian parties (fragmentation of the parliamentary system); and the electoral dynamics, i.e., the convergence toward the center in both the executive and the legislative elections. The most significant ramifications of the implementation of the direct popular election of the prime minister have been a significant shift in the electoral strength of the parties and a dramatic change in the competitive electoral orientation of the Israeli party system. Neither result was expected by those who initiated and propelled the electoral reform, while many of the actual expectations of the reform were not met. Arranged in the following sections: The Israeli Version of a Mixed Electoral System and Resulting Hybrid Political System; and The Consequences of the Mixed Electoral System for (1) Electoral Competition, (2) Political Representation, and (3) Electoral Efficiency.

Israel had a closed list PR system that was so proportional that it resulted in a large multi-party system with a very fragmented parliament. One result is that for decades, Israel experienced difficulties in building and maintaining large coalition governments, often containing several small and more extreme parties, which can and do yield blackmail powers. The failure to reform the actual electoral system led to misguided attempts at institutional engineering. Reformers attempted to alleviate some of the effects of the electoral system by adopting party primaries and directly electing the prime minister. However, the unintended consequences of these reforms were immediate. Primaries undermined party discipline, while the direct election of the Prime Minister made the problem of sustaining coalition governments worse than before the reform. Israel has since returned to a ‘single-ballot’ system.

This chapter continues to evaluate the effect of selection methods on presidential activism with a thorough investigation of countries employing indirect (Estonia, Hungary, Germany) or direct (Austria, Ireland, Poland) presidential elections. Case study analysis allows for the consideration of other aspects of activism in addition to the president's role in cabinet formation, including the use of veto, appointment, and legislative powers; initiation of public debates; and intervention in international affairs. The study of presidential behavior in all six countries reveals significant amount of variance in how actively presidents use these powers among countries with similar election method. The latter, therefore, cannot account for the observed variance. Presidents selected through different processes can either be active or passive depending on whether other institutions provide incentives and opportunities conducive to their activism.

The final chapter reviews the major findings. It also discusses the practical implications of these findings reiterating that the focus of constitution designers on the election mechanism of the head of state is largely misplaced because for many important aspects of the functioning of the regime, this selection mechanism has little, if any, effect. This chapter then addresses the theoretical implications of the project underlining that treating indirectly elected presidents differently from directly elected ones is not justified: semi-presidential systems and those with indirectly elected presidents are very similar in many aspects. This chapter concludes with summarizing this book's contribution to the study of political institutions and democratic theory.

This chapter integrates findings on indirect elections with current scholarship on the impact of the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment and onset of direct elections. It constructs a comprehensive counterfactual analysis that helps demonstrate what the political outcomes would have been with direct elections in place since the founding, and in contrast, what Senate elections would look like after 1913 if indirect elections were still in place. It also addresses the question of whether U.S. senators represented states as units and responded to state governmental concerns more under the indirect system than they do under direct elections. It argues that indirect election had little impact on the Senate's overall partisan composition prior to 1913. Contrary to widespread belief, had direct election been in effect during the years immediately preceding the Seventeenth Amendment's passage, Republicans, not Democrats, would have benefited.

This introductory chapter sets out the book's purpose, which is to examine the dynamics of indirect elections and assess the consequences of the switch to direct elections with the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment. In the broadest terms, it aims to assess the extent to which the goals of the Seventeenth Amendment—empowering voters in the choice of U.S. senators, and reducing the corrosive effects of money and party machine power—have been met. In so doing, it provides a new opportunity to understand electoral design, legislatures, parties, and political ambition. In particular, the book examines the election of U.S. senators from 1871 to 1913 based on where those elections occurred: the state legislatures. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.

This chapter explores the links between the indirect electoral mechanism and patterns of representational behavior that appear to differ markedly from that exhibited by U.S. senators today. Specifically, it examines whether U.S. senators' institutional activities were connected to the dynamics underlying their election to office—for example, whether their election was resolved on the first ballot or required joint session balloting to resolve, and their margin of victory. The chapter proceeds in three parts. First, it presents a quantitative analysis of the patterns of separate or joint elections along with the number of ballots it took to resolve elections once they moved into joint session. Second, it assesses the relationship between how senators were elected and key indicators of legislative activity, such as bill sponsorship, committee assignments, and roll call voting. Third, it compares the behavior of senators elected under indirect elections to their directly elected modern-day counterparts.

This chapter summarizes the book's findings and reflects more broadly on the quality and context of Senate representation under two different electoral systems. In doing so, it addresses several key questions about institutional representation in the U.S. democracy. Are U.S. senators more responsive today to the needs and opinions of their constituents than under indirect elections? Did state legislators actually serve as good trustees in choosing their U.S. senators on behalf of their states' voters? Finally, if the Tea Party and other advocates for the repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment get their wish, will the U.S. Senate be a fundamentally different institution?

This chapter discusses progressive-era politics in five roughly chronological steps. The first and second sections recount how most states, in the absence of federal action, implemented the income tax and direct election of senators in the 1890s and 1910s, aiding the later passage of the matching Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments to the federal Constitution in 1913. The third section describes the long fight for female suffrage through state constitutional reform in the 1900s and 1910s, eventually yielding the accompanying federal Nineteenth Amendment. The fourth section concerns prohibition, a case of national deference to the states, failed dictation of national liquor law, and state convergence around repeal between the 1910s and 1930s. The chapter concludes with an explanation of how state constitution-making pre-empted federal amendments on parochial schooling, polygamy, child labor, and civil and voting rights in these years.

This chapter looks at two seemingly strange events which occurred before the presidential election in South Korea in 1987. This chapter attempts to analyze, from the rational choice framework, the seemingly irrational action of the candidate of the governing party agreeing to a direct presidential election, and the opposition candidates' failing to take this opportunity to win the presidency. The chapter also discusses the historical events that led up to the events of the 1987 presidential election.

This chapter considers another set of justifications about the electoral college—this time based on maintaining the harmony and cohesion of the Republic. Instead of emphasizing what the electoral college does for the country, advocates call attention to alleged harm that alternative methods of presidential selection, especially direct election, would cause the nation. To begin, defenders of the electoral college charge that direct election of the president would encourage electoral fraud and vote recounts, sow national disharmony, and deny the president a mandate for governing. Most supporters of the electoral college also maintain that it is an essential bulwark of federalism and that electing the president directly would undermine the entire federal system. The chapter thus examines these charges and explores whether the electoral college actually has the benefits its advocates claim for it.

This chapter summarizes the findings of the previous chapters and concludes that electoral colleges violate political equality. It argues that the electoral college system is obsolete. The United States is now the only country that elects a politically powerful president via an electoral college and the only one in which a candidate can become president without having obtained the highest number of votes in the sole or final round of popular voting. The chapter indicates that recent reforms in democratic countries have replaced indirect procedures with direct popular voting. In this light, the chapter offers alternatives to the electoral college and considers some prospects for change.

This chapter concerns the preservation of the party system as another argument in favor of electoral colleges. This argument asserts that the direct election of the president would fragment and polarize the party system and lead to corrupt deals among political leaders. At the core of the argument is the assumption by most critics of direct election that it would require a runoff between the two candidates receiving the most votes if no candidate receives, say, 40 percent of the vote in the first round of voting. Based on this assumption, advocates of the electoral college allege a number of ills that would befall the party system under direct election of the president. Given this argument, the chapter asks if a runoff would fragment the party system and, more importantly, if a runoff is needed to elect the president directly. Furthermore, the chapter considers how direct election could adversely affect the party system should there be no runoff and what role, if any, the electoral college plays in maintaining it.

This chapter investigates justifications for the electoral college. It focuses in particular on the protection of significant interests which would be overlooked or harmed under a system of direct election of the president. Advocates argue that allocation of electoral votes by states that then cast their votes as units ensures that presidential candidates will be attentive to and protective of state-based interests, especially the interests of states with small populations. As such, the chapter considers the question from several angles. It asks how much additional protection states—especially small states—require. The chapter also considers whether or not presidential candidates appeal directly to state interests and give disproportionate attention to small states in their campaigns and if the electoral college gives minorities special influence in the selection of the president.

This chapter explores the political power of the English elected mayor, how mayors have carved out a role for themselves locally and how they have operated within a framework set out in both legalisation and a written local constitution. It also theorises on direct election to executive political office. Liberal democracy has traditionally portrayed liberalism as a counterpoint to democracy. Certain political concerns are alleviated by indirect democracy. Indirect election of the executive acts as a safeguard against the voters doing the wrong thing. The constitution of Hartlepool council has granted the mayor an interesting ceremonial role to play. The direct election of an individual to local political executive office is the distinctive and defining feature of elected mayors. The direct election by the local voters of the political head of the council and the political leader of the community provides that politician with a clear mandate.

Chapter 4 focuses on the 1847 Illinois state constitutional convention and the constitution approved by voters in 1848. Democrats comprised a majority of delegates, but Whigs built many successful coalitions. The new constitution sought greater balance of governmental powers, reducing the legislature’s appointive power, bestowing on the governor a weak veto power, and calling for direct election of judges. Age and residency requirements were specified for government service; citizenship was required of voters. Two contentious provisions put separately to voters were ultimately approved: one prohibiting free blacks from immigrating to the state and one calling for a property tax to relieve the state’s debt. With the 1848 constitution, Illinois transitioned from a frontier to a modern state.

This chapter discusses the role of the councillor serving alongside an elected mayor, and the reactions and experiences of councillors to working with an elected mayor. It specifically explores how the London Borough of Newham redefines the role of the councillor. The arrival of the English version of the directly elected mayor eases the tension between governing and representation as it is experienced by the councillor. Mayoral government has the potential to strengthen the links the councillor has with the ward he or she represents. Labour councillors saw a greater importance for the mayor in representing his or her party than Conservative, Liberal Democrat and (not surprisingly) independent councillors. Councillors on mayoral authorities have recognised their role in relation to mayoral accountability, but perceive that their role has been diminished as a result of the direct election, by the public, of the political head of the council.