Katherin A. Rogers
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198743972
- eISBN:
- 9780191803963
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743972.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
Against the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) Frankfurt proposes counterexamples (FSCs): Manipulator (M) wants agent (S) to choose B. If M foresees that S chooses A, M makes him choose B. ...
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Against the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) Frankfurt proposes counterexamples (FSCs): Manipulator (M) wants agent (S) to choose B. If M foresees that S chooses A, M makes him choose B. If M foresees that S chooses B on his own, M does nothing. S lacks options, but isn’t he free? The “dilemma defense” raises problems concerning foresight, but “blockage” (Mele and Robb) and “buffered” (Hunt) FSCs attempt to circumvent this defense. This chapter introduces a timeline and four theses, including the grounding principle. Anselmian FSCs are impossible since no one foresees what an agent will choose absent the agent’s choice. But an agent who chooses A (logically) cannot be made to choose B instead. Blockage cases fail, too, and buffered cases deny the “torn condition.” One possibility in which a divine manipulator might control the outcome of an agent’s a se choice—Rewind—is considered, but rejected.Less
Against the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) Frankfurt proposes counterexamples (FSCs): Manipulator (M) wants agent (S) to choose B. If M foresees that S chooses A, M makes him choose B. If M foresees that S chooses B on his own, M does nothing. S lacks options, but isn’t he free? The “dilemma defense” raises problems concerning foresight, but “blockage” (Mele and Robb) and “buffered” (Hunt) FSCs attempt to circumvent this defense. This chapter introduces a timeline and four theses, including the grounding principle. Anselmian FSCs are impossible since no one foresees what an agent will choose absent the agent’s choice. But an agent who chooses A (logically) cannot be made to choose B instead. Blockage cases fail, too, and buffered cases deny the “torn condition.” One possibility in which a divine manipulator might control the outcome of an agent’s a se choice—Rewind—is considered, but rejected.
Derk Pereboom
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199685516
- eISBN:
- 9780191765674
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685516.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Source views claim that an agent’s moral responsibility for an action is not explained by the availability to her of alternative possibilities, but rather by her being the actual source of her action ...
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Source views claim that an agent’s moral responsibility for an action is not explained by the availability to her of alternative possibilities, but rather by her being the actual source of her action in a specific way. This chapter set’s out my Frankfurt-case argument for the source view, and defend it against David Widerker’s concern that the agent in the Frankfurt case is only derivatively morally responsible, and against Carl Ginet’s objection that relative to exactly what this agent is morally responsible for, he will have an alternative possibility. I also present a theory of the robustness of an alternative possibility, that is, what it would be for an alternative possibility to explain an agent’s moral responsibility for an action.Less
Source views claim that an agent’s moral responsibility for an action is not explained by the availability to her of alternative possibilities, but rather by her being the actual source of her action in a specific way. This chapter set’s out my Frankfurt-case argument for the source view, and defend it against David Widerker’s concern that the agent in the Frankfurt case is only derivatively morally responsible, and against Carl Ginet’s objection that relative to exactly what this agent is morally responsible for, he will have an alternative possibility. I also present a theory of the robustness of an alternative possibility, that is, what it would be for an alternative possibility to explain an agent’s moral responsibility for an action.
