Ben Bradley
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557967
- eISBN:
- 9780191721205
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557967.001.1
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book addresses philosophical questions about death and well‐being. It defends two main theses. The first is hedonism, or the view that pleasure is what has intrinsic value for us. The second is ...
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This book addresses philosophical questions about death and well‐being. It defends two main theses. The first is hedonism, or the view that pleasure is what has intrinsic value for us. The second is a difference‐making principle about value, according to which (i) the value of an event for a person is determined by the difference it makes to the intrinsic value of that person's life, and (ii) the value of an event for someone at a time is determined by the difference it makes to how well‐off the person is at that time. These views have the following implications: things that happen after someone has died cannot harm that person; death itself, however, is bad for people after they die (contrary to what Epicurus thought), by making its victim worse off at those later times; death is worse the earlier it occurs, so it is worse to die as an infant than as a young adult; death is bad for fetuses and animals in essentially the same way as it is for adult humans; the only sensible way to make death less bad is to live so long that no more of a good life is possible.Less
This book addresses philosophical questions about death and well‐being. It defends two main theses. The first is hedonism, or the view that pleasure is what has intrinsic value for us. The second is a difference‐making principle about value, according to which (i) the value of an event for a person is determined by the difference it makes to the intrinsic value of that person's life, and (ii) the value of an event for someone at a time is determined by the difference it makes to how well‐off the person is at that time. These views have the following implications: things that happen after someone has died cannot harm that person; death itself, however, is bad for people after they die (contrary to what Epicurus thought), by making its victim worse off at those later times; death is worse the earlier it occurs, so it is worse to die as an infant than as a young adult; death is bad for fetuses and animals in essentially the same way as it is for adult humans; the only sensible way to make death less bad is to live so long that no more of a good life is possible.
Peter Menzies and Christian List
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199583621
- eISBN:
- 9780191723483
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
The systems studied in the special sciences are often said to be causally autonomous, in the sense that their higher‐level properties have causal powers that are independent of those of their more ...
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The systems studied in the special sciences are often said to be causally autonomous, in the sense that their higher‐level properties have causal powers that are independent of those of their more basic physical properties. This chapter aims to clarify what is implied by the doctrine of the causal autonomy of special‐science properties and to defend the doctrine using an interventionist theory of causation. In terms of this theory, it shows that a special‐science property can make a difference to some effect while the physical property that realizes it does not. Moreover, the theory permits identification of necessary and sufficient conditions for the causal autonomy of a higher‐level property, and to show that these are satisfied when causal claims about higher‐level properties have a special feature we call realization‐insensitivity. This feature consists in the fact that the relevant claims are true regardless of the way the higher‐level properties they describe are physically realized. The findings here are consistent with those of other philosophers, for example Alan Garfinkel, who have noted the realization‐insensitivity of higher‐level causal relations as a distinctive feature of the special sciences and have suggested that this feature ensures their independence from lower‐level causal relations.Less
The systems studied in the special sciences are often said to be causally autonomous, in the sense that their higher‐level properties have causal powers that are independent of those of their more basic physical properties. This chapter aims to clarify what is implied by the doctrine of the causal autonomy of special‐science properties and to defend the doctrine using an interventionist theory of causation. In terms of this theory, it shows that a special‐science property can make a difference to some effect while the physical property that realizes it does not. Moreover, the theory permits identification of necessary and sufficient conditions for the causal autonomy of a higher‐level property, and to show that these are satisfied when causal claims about higher‐level properties have a special feature we call realization‐insensitivity. This feature consists in the fact that the relevant claims are true regardless of the way the higher‐level properties they describe are physically realized. The findings here are consistent with those of other philosophers, for example Alan Garfinkel, who have noted the realization‐insensitivity of higher‐level causal relations as a distinctive feature of the special sciences and have suggested that this feature ensures their independence from lower‐level causal relations.
Ben Bradley
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557967
- eISBN:
- 9780191721205
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557967.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter defends a difference‐making principle about the total value of an event for a person, similar to one defended by Fred Feldman. According to this principle, the value of an event for a ...
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This chapter defends a difference‐making principle about the total value of an event for a person, similar to one defended by Fred Feldman. According to this principle, the value of an event for a person is determined by a comparison between how well the person's life actually goes and how it would have gone had the event not occurred. Thus, given Lewis‐Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals, value is relative to a similarity relation between possible worlds. Some objections are raised and answered, including worries about overdetermination, Lucretius's “symmetry argument,” and apparently harmful events that do not make anyone worse off.Less
This chapter defends a difference‐making principle about the total value of an event for a person, similar to one defended by Fred Feldman. According to this principle, the value of an event for a person is determined by a comparison between how well the person's life actually goes and how it would have gone had the event not occurred. Thus, given Lewis‐Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals, value is relative to a similarity relation between possible worlds. Some objections are raised and answered, including worries about overdetermination, Lucretius's “symmetry argument,” and apparently harmful events that do not make anyone worse off.
Peter Menzies
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199211531
- eISBN:
- 9780191705977
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
This chapter critically examines the causal exclusion argument against non-reductive physicalism. It argues that a contrastive account of causation falsifies the exclusion principle when it is ...
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This chapter critically examines the causal exclusion argument against non-reductive physicalism. It argues that a contrastive account of causation falsifies the exclusion principle when it is formulated in terms of causal sufficiency, but not when it is formulated in terms of difference-making causation. Nonetheless, the causal exclusion argument poses no threat to non-reductive physicalism. For a non-reductive physicalist is still able to reject its conclusion by challenging the principle of the causal closure of the physical. The principle's formulation in terms of difference-making causation makes a much stronger and less plausible claim than its formulation in terms of sufficient causation. For example, when a mental property is the difference-maker of a behavioural property, there may be a physical property that is causally sufficient for the behavioural property, but it need not be a difference-making cause of that property.Less
This chapter critically examines the causal exclusion argument against non-reductive physicalism. It argues that a contrastive account of causation falsifies the exclusion principle when it is formulated in terms of causal sufficiency, but not when it is formulated in terms of difference-making causation. Nonetheless, the causal exclusion argument poses no threat to non-reductive physicalism. For a non-reductive physicalist is still able to reject its conclusion by challenging the principle of the causal closure of the physical. The principle's formulation in terms of difference-making causation makes a much stronger and less plausible claim than its formulation in terms of sufficient causation. For example, when a mental property is the difference-maker of a behavioural property, there may be a physical property that is causally sufficient for the behavioural property, but it need not be a difference-making cause of that property.
James Woodward
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199211531
- eISBN:
- 9780191705977
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
This chapter argues that many of the standard arguments for the causal inertness of the mental rest on mistaken assumptions about causality and causal explanation. An interventionist account ...
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This chapter argues that many of the standard arguments for the causal inertness of the mental rest on mistaken assumptions about causality and causal explanation. An interventionist account undercuts these assumptions. Interventionism allows for explanations involving macroscopic variables as well as microscopic variables. So, depending on the details of the case, it can explain the causal efficacy and explanatory power of multiple realisable mental states. When it comes to the causal exclusion argument, the chapter rejects the exclusion principle according to which if an event has a sufficient cause, then no distinct event can be a cause of it, unless this is a genuine case of causal overdetermination. An event being causally sufficient for some effect does not exclude some distinct event from causing or being causally relevant to that effect, even in the absence of overdetermination.Less
This chapter argues that many of the standard arguments for the causal inertness of the mental rest on mistaken assumptions about causality and causal explanation. An interventionist account undercuts these assumptions. Interventionism allows for explanations involving macroscopic variables as well as microscopic variables. So, depending on the details of the case, it can explain the causal efficacy and explanatory power of multiple realisable mental states. When it comes to the causal exclusion argument, the chapter rejects the exclusion principle according to which if an event has a sufficient cause, then no distinct event can be a cause of it, unless this is a genuine case of causal overdetermination. An event being causally sufficient for some effect does not exclude some distinct event from causing or being causally relevant to that effect, even in the absence of overdetermination.
Randolph Clarke
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195159875
- eISBN:
- 9780199835010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515987X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Deliberative libertarian accounts allow that basic free actions may be causally determined by their immediate causal antecedents; indeterminism is required only at earlier points in the processes ...
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Deliberative libertarian accounts allow that basic free actions may be causally determined by their immediate causal antecedents; indeterminism is required only at earlier points in the processes leading to free actions. Accounts of this type proposed by Daniel Dennett, Laura Ekstrom, and Alfred Mele are examined here. Given the assumption of incompatibilism, deliberative accounts fail to provide for the sort of difference-making that is distinctive of free action. Further, they fail to evade the problem of diminished control that they are meant to evade.Less
Deliberative libertarian accounts allow that basic free actions may be causally determined by their immediate causal antecedents; indeterminism is required only at earlier points in the processes leading to free actions. Accounts of this type proposed by Daniel Dennett, Laura Ekstrom, and Alfred Mele are examined here. Given the assumption of incompatibilism, deliberative accounts fail to provide for the sort of difference-making that is distinctive of free action. Further, they fail to evade the problem of diminished control that they are meant to evade.
Randolph Clarke
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195159875
- eISBN:
- 9780199835010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515987X.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Here I examine the charge that the indeterminism required by event-causal accounts is at best superfluous; if free will is incompatible with determinism, then, it is said, no event-causal libertarian ...
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Here I examine the charge that the indeterminism required by event-causal accounts is at best superfluous; if free will is incompatible with determinism, then, it is said, no event-causal libertarian account adequately characterizes free will. The distinction between broad incompatibilism and merely narrow incompatibilism is brought to bear. If the latter thesis is correct, then an event-causal account can secure all that is needed for free will. However, if broad incompatibilism is correct, then no event-causal account is adequate, though such views can still secure some things of value that cannot exist given determinism, such as distinctive types of difference-making and attributability, and the truth of the presumption of open alternatives that we commonly make while deliberating.Less
Here I examine the charge that the indeterminism required by event-causal accounts is at best superfluous; if free will is incompatible with determinism, then, it is said, no event-causal libertarian account adequately characterizes free will. The distinction between broad incompatibilism and merely narrow incompatibilism is brought to bear. If the latter thesis is correct, then an event-causal account can secure all that is needed for free will. However, if broad incompatibilism is correct, then no event-causal account is adequate, though such views can still secure some things of value that cannot exist given determinism, such as distinctive types of difference-making and attributability, and the truth of the presumption of open alternatives that we commonly make while deliberating.
James Woodward
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199571154
- eISBN:
- 9780191731259
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571154.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Developmental Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology
This chapter presents a kind of typology of different sorts of abilities that might be associated with the notion of causal understanding, the acquisition of causal beliefs, causally informed action ...
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This chapter presents a kind of typology of different sorts of abilities that might be associated with the notion of causal understanding, the acquisition of causal beliefs, causally informed action patterns, and so on. It asks how these various abilities relate to one another, whether some may play a role in the acquisition of others, and so on. Drawing on relevant philosophical literature, it shows that different philosophical accounts of causation track, at least to some degree, different and dissociable competences that go together to make up adult causal understanding. The chapter is organized as follows. It begins with a sketch of competing philosophical accounts of causation, emphasizing the difference between claims about causal relationships as these exist in the world and claims about the way in which we and other animals represent causal relationships. It then explores the contrast between two different families of approaches to (or ways of thinking about) causation, one of which is called ‘difference-making’ and the other ‘geometrical-mechanical’. The remainder of the chapter discusses elements that seem relevant to whether there is adult human-like causal cognition.Less
This chapter presents a kind of typology of different sorts of abilities that might be associated with the notion of causal understanding, the acquisition of causal beliefs, causally informed action patterns, and so on. It asks how these various abilities relate to one another, whether some may play a role in the acquisition of others, and so on. Drawing on relevant philosophical literature, it shows that different philosophical accounts of causation track, at least to some degree, different and dissociable competences that go together to make up adult causal understanding. The chapter is organized as follows. It begins with a sketch of competing philosophical accounts of causation, emphasizing the difference between claims about causal relationships as these exist in the world and claims about the way in which we and other animals represent causal relationships. It then explores the contrast between two different families of approaches to (or ways of thinking about) causation, one of which is called ‘difference-making’ and the other ‘geometrical-mechanical’. The remainder of the chapter discusses elements that seem relevant to whether there is adult human-like causal cognition.
James Tabery
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262027373
- eISBN:
- 9780262324144
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027373.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
What is the relationship between scientists who study the causal mechanisms responsible for the development of traits and scientists who study the causes of variation responsible for differences in ...
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What is the relationship between scientists who study the causal mechanisms responsible for the development of traits and scientists who study the causes of variation responsible for differences in those traits? A number of characterizations of this relationship have been proposed which treat the two scientific approaches to explanation as incommensurably distinct and isolated from one another. This chapter instead offers a formulation of the relationship that sees the two scientific approaches as integratively related—as capable of pluralistically co-informing one another. The chapter draws on scholarship from the new mechanical philosophy and research on the concept of causation to formulate the integrative relationship.Less
What is the relationship between scientists who study the causal mechanisms responsible for the development of traits and scientists who study the causes of variation responsible for differences in those traits? A number of characterizations of this relationship have been proposed which treat the two scientific approaches to explanation as incommensurably distinct and isolated from one another. This chapter instead offers a formulation of the relationship that sees the two scientific approaches as integratively related—as capable of pluralistically co-informing one another. The chapter draws on scholarship from the new mechanical philosophy and research on the concept of causation to formulate the integrative relationship.
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199936205
- eISBN:
- 9780199367757
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936205.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter initiates discussion of the middle layer of causation by recalling Nelson Goodman’s account of counterfactuals. I construct an improved version called the nomic conditional that is ...
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This chapter initiates discussion of the middle layer of causation by recalling Nelson Goodman’s account of counterfactuals. I construct an improved version called the nomic conditional that is adapted for understanding causal generalities and effective strategies. I then present the corresponding notion of difference-making or counterfactual dependence, called prob-dependence.Less
This chapter initiates discussion of the middle layer of causation by recalling Nelson Goodman’s account of counterfactuals. I construct an improved version called the nomic conditional that is adapted for understanding causal generalities and effective strategies. I then present the corresponding notion of difference-making or counterfactual dependence, called prob-dependence.
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199936205
- eISBN:
- 9780199367757
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936205.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter introduces the notion of influence that is equated with prob-dependence, namely prob-influence. I demonstrate how this conception of influence is a good model for precisifying causal ...
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This chapter introduces the notion of influence that is equated with prob-dependence, namely prob-influence. I demonstrate how this conception of influence is a good model for precisifying causal generalities like, “Smoking causes cancer.” I then show how my model of causation bears on standard topics like aspect causation, causation by omission, contrastivity, and transitivity. Finally, I describe another conception of influence called partial influence, which is an extremely liberal construal of difference-making. This conception is useful for examining the non-local causation thought to be an essential feature of quantum mechanics as well as the causation involved when a Newcomb predictor reliably foretells an agent’s future decision.Less
This chapter introduces the notion of influence that is equated with prob-dependence, namely prob-influence. I demonstrate how this conception of influence is a good model for precisifying causal generalities like, “Smoking causes cancer.” I then show how my model of causation bears on standard topics like aspect causation, causation by omission, contrastivity, and transitivity. Finally, I describe another conception of influence called partial influence, which is an extremely liberal construal of difference-making. This conception is useful for examining the non-local causation thought to be an essential feature of quantum mechanics as well as the causation involved when a Newcomb predictor reliably foretells an agent’s future decision.
Rani Lill Anjum and Stephen Mumford
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- November 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198733669
- eISBN:
- 9780191798030
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198733669.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
One view of what links a cause to an effect is that causes make a difference to whether or not the effect is produced. This assumption is behind comparative studies, such as the method of randomized ...
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One view of what links a cause to an effect is that causes make a difference to whether or not the effect is produced. This assumption is behind comparative studies, such as the method of randomized controlled trials, aimed at showing whether a trial intervention makes a positive difference to outcomes. Comparative studies are regarded as the gold standard in some areas of research but they are also problematic. There can be causes that make no difference and some difference-makers that are not causes. This indicates that difference-making should be taken as a symptom of causation: a feature that accompanies it in some, though not all, cases. Symptoms can be useful in the discovery of causes but they cannot be definitive of causation.Less
One view of what links a cause to an effect is that causes make a difference to whether or not the effect is produced. This assumption is behind comparative studies, such as the method of randomized controlled trials, aimed at showing whether a trial intervention makes a positive difference to outcomes. Comparative studies are regarded as the gold standard in some areas of research but they are also problematic. There can be causes that make no difference and some difference-makers that are not causes. This indicates that difference-making should be taken as a symptom of causation: a feature that accompanies it in some, though not all, cases. Symptoms can be useful in the discovery of causes but they cannot be definitive of causation.
Carolina Sartorio
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- April 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198746799
- eISBN:
- 9780191809071
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746799.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter covers a discussion of other metaphysical assumptions behind the view introduced in chapter 1. The difference-making aspect of causation and the intransitivity of causation are ...
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This chapter covers a discussion of other metaphysical assumptions behind the view introduced in chapter 1. The difference-making aspect of causation and the intransitivity of causation are discussed. The role of luck, in a specific sense, in the view is also discussed and luck is defined in this sense. There is also an attempt to shed light on some interesting asymmetries concerning responsibility for actions and responsibility for omissions. Several of the scenarios introduced in chapter 2 are examined again, to look further into the question of alternative possibilities and responsibility. The chapter concludes with an assertion that a solid foundation is now in place, on which basis to continue the enquiry in chapter 4.Less
This chapter covers a discussion of other metaphysical assumptions behind the view introduced in chapter 1. The difference-making aspect of causation and the intransitivity of causation are discussed. The role of luck, in a specific sense, in the view is also discussed and luck is defined in this sense. There is also an attempt to shed light on some interesting asymmetries concerning responsibility for actions and responsibility for omissions. Several of the scenarios introduced in chapter 2 are examined again, to look further into the question of alternative possibilities and responsibility. The chapter concludes with an assertion that a solid foundation is now in place, on which basis to continue the enquiry in chapter 4.
Julia Nefsky
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198744665
- eISBN:
- 9780191808838
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744665.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
In many cases people collectively cause a morally significant outcome but no individual act seems to make a difference, and so no reason can called upon to act. This chapter explores the possibility ...
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In many cases people collectively cause a morally significant outcome but no individual act seems to make a difference, and so no reason can called upon to act. This chapter explores the possibility of solving this problem by appealing to reasons for action that are not concerned with the difference one makes in outcome. It focuses on three such proposals: ‘Weak Participation’, ‘Strong Participation’, and ‘the Fairness Approach’, arguing that they face a shared problem: while they do identify considerations other than the difference one makes, these considerations do not seem to work as reasons for action as long as one’s act won’t make a difference. The problem, then, extends beyond these three proposals, and is a challenge for non-consequentialists, as well as consequentialists. The upshot is a sharper understanding of what the core challenge in these cases really is, and thus what needs to be done to address it.Less
In many cases people collectively cause a morally significant outcome but no individual act seems to make a difference, and so no reason can called upon to act. This chapter explores the possibility of solving this problem by appealing to reasons for action that are not concerned with the difference one makes in outcome. It focuses on three such proposals: ‘Weak Participation’, ‘Strong Participation’, and ‘the Fairness Approach’, arguing that they face a shared problem: while they do identify considerations other than the difference one makes, these considerations do not seem to work as reasons for action as long as one’s act won’t make a difference. The problem, then, extends beyond these three proposals, and is a challenge for non-consequentialists, as well as consequentialists. The upshot is a sharper understanding of what the core challenge in these cases really is, and thus what needs to be done to address it.
James Woodward
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- June 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199381357
- eISBN:
- 9780199381371
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199381357.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Philosophy of Science
Jim Woodward focuses on Kitcher’s unificationist account of explanation and the relationship between unification and autonomy. He argues that Kitcher is right to focus on “internalist” relations and ...
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Jim Woodward focuses on Kitcher’s unificationist account of explanation and the relationship between unification and autonomy. He argues that Kitcher is right to focus on “internalist” relations and that unification plays an important role in at least some explanations but that explanations must also capture the “external” relation of difference-making. Woodward also distinguishes two types of unificationist projects: EU1 involves explaining a large number of phenomena in terms of a few factors and is often tied to successful reduction; EU2 involves showing that certain factors are irrelevant to some phenomena and is often tied to establishing that some “upper-level” phenomena are autonomous from “lower-level” microdetails. Moreover Woodward argues that the autonomy of the special sciences does not depend on whether special science explanations are more unifying than those at a lower level, but instead depends on whether they successfully describe stable difference-making relations for their intended explananda.Less
Jim Woodward focuses on Kitcher’s unificationist account of explanation and the relationship between unification and autonomy. He argues that Kitcher is right to focus on “internalist” relations and that unification plays an important role in at least some explanations but that explanations must also capture the “external” relation of difference-making. Woodward also distinguishes two types of unificationist projects: EU1 involves explaining a large number of phenomena in terms of a few factors and is often tied to successful reduction; EU2 involves showing that certain factors are irrelevant to some phenomena and is often tied to establishing that some “upper-level” phenomena are autonomous from “lower-level” microdetails. Moreover Woodward argues that the autonomy of the special sciences does not depend on whether special science explanations are more unifying than those at a lower level, but instead depends on whether they successfully describe stable difference-making relations for their intended explananda.
Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- October 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780199672110
- eISBN:
- 9780191881671
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199672110.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
The question “When is C a cause of E?” is well-studied in philosophy—much more than the equally important issue of quantifying the causal strength between C and E. In this chapter, we transfer ...
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The question “When is C a cause of E?” is well-studied in philosophy—much more than the equally important issue of quantifying the causal strength between C and E. In this chapter, we transfer methods from Bayesian Confirmation Theory to the problem of explicating causal strength. We develop axiomatic foundations for a probabilistic theory of causal strength as difference-making and proceed in three steps: First, we motivate causal Bayesian networks as an adequate framework for defining and comparing measures of causal strength. Second, we demonstrate how specific causal strength measures can be derived from a set of plausible adequacy conditions (method of representation theorems). Third, we use these results to argue for a specific measure of causal strength: the difference that interventions on the cause make for the probability of the effect. An application to outcome measures in medicine and discussion of possible objections concludes the chapter.Less
The question “When is C a cause of E?” is well-studied in philosophy—much more than the equally important issue of quantifying the causal strength between C and E. In this chapter, we transfer methods from Bayesian Confirmation Theory to the problem of explicating causal strength. We develop axiomatic foundations for a probabilistic theory of causal strength as difference-making and proceed in three steps: First, we motivate causal Bayesian networks as an adequate framework for defining and comparing measures of causal strength. Second, we demonstrate how specific causal strength measures can be derived from a set of plausible adequacy conditions (method of representation theorems). Third, we use these results to argue for a specific measure of causal strength: the difference that interventions on the cause make for the probability of the effect. An application to outcome measures in medicine and discussion of possible objections concludes the chapter.
Philip Pettit
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- July 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198746911
- eISBN:
- 9780191809132
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198746911.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
How do the notions of programming and difference-making relate to one another? A higher-level property programs for an effect just in case, intuitively, the actual realizer of the property at any ...
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How do the notions of programming and difference-making relate to one another? A higher-level property programs for an effect just in case, intuitively, the actual realizer of the property at any lower level gives rise to a realizer of the effect and any possible realizer at that level would also have done this. A higher-level property makes a difference to the effect just in case its presence programs for the effect and, in addition, its absence programs for the absence of the effect. Christian List and Peter Menzies argue for the capacity of the difference-making model to explain away the exclusion problem raised for physicalists by Jaegwon Kim. But the program model, developed in earlier work by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, offers a simpler and more straightforward way of handling the challenge.Less
How do the notions of programming and difference-making relate to one another? A higher-level property programs for an effect just in case, intuitively, the actual realizer of the property at any lower level gives rise to a realizer of the effect and any possible realizer at that level would also have done this. A higher-level property makes a difference to the effect just in case its presence programs for the effect and, in addition, its absence programs for the absence of the effect. Christian List and Peter Menzies argue for the capacity of the difference-making model to explain away the exclusion problem raised for physicalists by Jaegwon Kim. But the program model, developed in earlier work by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, offers a simpler and more straightforward way of handling the challenge.
Christian List and Peter Menzies
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- July 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198746911
- eISBN:
- 9780191809132
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198746911.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter offers a critical assessment of the ‘exclusion argument’ against free will, which may be summarized by the slogan: ‘My brain made me do it, therefore I couldn’t have been free.’ While ...
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This chapter offers a critical assessment of the ‘exclusion argument’ against free will, which may be summarized by the slogan: ‘My brain made me do it, therefore I couldn’t have been free.’ While the exclusion argument has received much attention in debates about mental causation (‘could my mental states ever cause my actions?’), it is seldom discussed in relation to free will. However, the argument informally underlies many neuroscientific discussions of free will, especially the claim that advances in neuroscience seriously challenge our belief in free will. The chapter introduces two distinct versions of the argument, discusses several unsuccessful responses to it, and then presents the authors’ preferred response. This involves showing that a key premise—the ‘exclusion principle’—is false under what the authors take to be the most natural account of causation in the context of agency: the difference-making account. The chapter finally revisits the debate about neuroscience and free will.Less
This chapter offers a critical assessment of the ‘exclusion argument’ against free will, which may be summarized by the slogan: ‘My brain made me do it, therefore I couldn’t have been free.’ While the exclusion argument has received much attention in debates about mental causation (‘could my mental states ever cause my actions?’), it is seldom discussed in relation to free will. However, the argument informally underlies many neuroscientific discussions of free will, especially the claim that advances in neuroscience seriously challenge our belief in free will. The chapter introduces two distinct versions of the argument, discusses several unsuccessful responses to it, and then presents the authors’ preferred response. This involves showing that a key premise—the ‘exclusion principle’—is false under what the authors take to be the most natural account of causation in the context of agency: the difference-making account. The chapter finally revisits the debate about neuroscience and free will.
