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Well-Being and Death

Ben Bradley

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780199557967
eISBN:
9780191721205
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557967.001.1
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This book addresses philosophical questions about death and well‐being. It defends two main theses. The first is hedonism, or the view that pleasure is what has intrinsic value for us. The second is ... More


The Causal Autonomy of the Special Sciences

Peter Menzies and Christian List

in Emergence in Mind

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199583621
eISBN:
9780191723483
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

The systems studied in the special sciences are often said to be causally autonomous, in the sense that their higher‐level properties have causal powers that are independent of those of their more ... More


THE EVIL OF DEATH

Ben Bradley

in Well-Being and Death

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780199557967
eISBN:
9780191721205
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557967.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter defends a difference‐making principle about the total value of an event for a person, similar to one defended by Fred Feldman. According to this principle, the value of an event for a ... More


The Exclusion Problem, the Determination Relation, and Contrastive Causation *

Peter Menzies

in Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199211531
eISBN:
9780191705977
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

This chapter critically examines the causal exclusion argument against non-reductive physicalism. It argues that a contrastive account of causation falsifies the exclusion principle when it is ... More


Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms *

James Woodward

in Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199211531
eISBN:
9780191705977
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

This chapter argues that many of the standard arguments for the causal inertness of the mental rest on mistaken assumptions about causality and causal explanation. An interventionist account ... More


Deliberative Libertarian Accounts

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Deliberative libertarian accounts allow that basic free actions may be causally determined by their immediate causal antecedents; indeterminism is required only at earlier points in the processes ... More


The Problem of Value

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Here I examine the charge that the indeterminism required by event-causal accounts is at best superfluous; if free will is incompatible with determinism, then, it is said, no event-causal libertarian ... More


A Philosopher Looks at Tool Use and Causal Understanding

James Woodward

in Tool Use and Causal Cognition

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199571154
eISBN:
9780191731259
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571154.003.0002
Subject:
Psychology, Developmental Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology

This chapter presents a kind of typology of different sorts of abilities that might be associated with the notion of causal understanding, the acquisition of causal beliefs, causally informed action ... More


Population Thinking about Mechanisms: An Integrative Relationship

James Tabery

in Beyond Versus: The Struggle to Understand the Interaction of Nature and Nurture

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
January 2015
ISBN:
9780262027373
eISBN:
9780262324144
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262027373.003.0005
Subject:
History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine

What is the relationship between scientists who study the causal mechanisms responsible for the development of traits and scientists who study the causes of variation responsible for differences in ... More


Counterfactuals and Difference-making

in Causation and its Basis in Fundamental Physics

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199936205
eISBN:
9780199367757
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936205.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

This chapter initiates discussion of the middle layer of causation by recalling Nelson Goodman’s account of counterfactuals. I construct an improved version called the nomic conditional that is ... More


Derivative Causation

in Causation and its Basis in Fundamental Physics

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199936205
eISBN:
9780199367757
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936205.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

This chapter introduces the notion of influence that is equated with prob-dependence, namely prob-influence. I demonstrate how this conception of influence is a good model for precisifying causal ... More


Making a Difference

Rani Lill Anjum and Stephen Mumford

in Causation in Science and the Methods of Scientific Discovery

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
November 2018
ISBN:
9780198733669
eISBN:
9780191798030
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198733669.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

One view of what links a cause to an effect is that causes make a difference to whether or not the effect is produced. This assumption is behind comparative studies, such as the method of randomized ... More


The Underlying Metaphysics: Completing the Picture

Carolina Sartorio

in Causation and Free Will

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
April 2016
ISBN:
9780198746799
eISBN:
9780191809071
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746799.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter covers a discussion of other metaphysical assumptions behind the view introduced in chapter 1. The difference-making aspect of causation and the intransitivity of causation are ... More


Fairness, Participation, and the Real Problem of Collective Harm

Julia Nefsky

in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 5

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
September 2015
ISBN:
9780198744665
eISBN:
9780191808838
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744665.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

In many cases people collectively cause a morally significant outcome but no individual act seems to make a difference, and so no reason can called upon to act. This chapter explores the possibility ... More


Unificationism, Explanatory Internalism, and Autonomy

James Woodward

in The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
June 2016
ISBN:
9780199381357
eISBN:
9780199381371
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199381357.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, General, Philosophy of Science

Jim Woodward focuses on Kitcher’s unificationist account of explanation and the relationship between unification and autonomy. He argues that Kitcher is right to focus on “internalist” relations and ... More


Causal Strength

Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann

in Bayesian Philosophy of Science

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
October 2019
ISBN:
9780199672110
eISBN:
9780191881671
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199672110.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

The question “When is C a cause of E?” is well-studied in philosophy—much more than the equally important issue of quantifying the causal strength between C and E. In this chapter, we transfer ... More


The Program Model, Difference-makers, and the Exclusion Problem

Philip Pettit

in Making a Difference: Essays on the Philosophy of Causation

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
July 2017
ISBN:
9780198746911
eISBN:
9780191809132
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198746911.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

How do the notions of programming and difference-making relate to one another? A higher-level property programs for an effect just in case, intuitively, the actual realizer of the property at any ... More


My Brain Made Me Do It: The Exclusion Argument Against Free Will, and What’s Wrong with It

Christian List and Peter Menzies

in Making a Difference: Essays on the Philosophy of Causation

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
July 2017
ISBN:
9780198746911
eISBN:
9780191809132
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198746911.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This chapter offers a critical assessment of the ‘exclusion argument’ against free will, which may be summarized by the slogan: ‘My brain made me do it, therefore I couldn’t have been free.’ While ... More


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