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What's Wrong with Development Aid?

Clark C. Gibson

in The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid

This chapter argues that the incentives generated by development aid’s institutions are important in explaining its lackluster outcomes. Understanding the incentives that confront donors and ... More

This chapter argues that the incentives generated by development aid’s institutions are important in explaining its lackluster outcomes. Understanding the incentives that confront donors and recipients requires knowledge of the fundamental collective-action problems that these actors face. Such problems may lead individuals seeking to improve their lot to choose actions that actually undermine their well-being. Even before aid flows into a country, these basic, day-to-day problems need solutions if foreign assistance is to produce successful and sustainable results.Less

Aid to Fragile States: Do Donors Help or Hinder?

Stephen Browne

in Foreign Aid for Development: Issues, Challenges, and the New Agenda

The record of aid to fragile and poorly-performing states is the real test of aid effectiveness. Rich countries can justify aid to fragile states both through altruism and self-interest. But, with ... More

The record of aid to fragile and poorly-performing states is the real test of aid effectiveness. Rich countries can justify aid to fragile states both through altruism and self-interest. But, with some exceptions, donors have appeared at the wrong times and with the wrong attitudes, even sometimes undermining development progress. State failure has dimensions of both will and capacity. Failure demands constructive engagement by donors, in some cases to save people in weak states from their leaders, and in all cases to save the states from circumstances which they cannot control. This chapter examines the aid relationship with respect to three weak countries. Burma presents a case of comprehensive failure of political will and capacity, but isolating the regime, as some donors have chosen to do, will only perpetuate the plight of the population. Rwanda provides an alarming example of donor complicity in state collapse. The country has now rebounded from the terrible genocide of 1994, but some donors still cannot set aside their political and cultural biases. Zambia has lived through many years of bilaterally-assisted economic mismanagement, and also proved to be a highly unsuitable case for Bretton Woods treatment. It is doing better now that the country is more willing and able to take control of its development agenda. The paper concludes with eight principles for donors to observe in engaging more productively with fragile states.Less

Food Aid During Civil War: Conflicting Conclusions Derived from Alternative Approaches

Frances Stewart and Emma Samman

in War and Underdevelopment: Volume 1: The Economic and Social Consequences of Conflict

Food aid was initially intended as an instrument of development aid. In recent years, however, it has increasingly been used as part of emergency relief, with many of these emergencies originating ... More

Food aid was initially intended as an instrument of development aid. In recent years, however, it has increasingly been used as part of emergency relief, with many of these emergencies originating from violent conflicts. For convenience, this chapter terms conflict-related food aid, CONFAID; and development-related food aid, DEVFAID. CONFAID needs to be considered from three perspectives: its ‘humanitarian’, ‘economic’, and ‘political economy’ roles. The chapter approaches the issue first by a consideration of the role of CONFAID in three countries ravaged by civil war – Sudan, Mozambique, and Afghanistan – exploring in each case the impact of CONFAID in humanitarian, political economy, and economic dimensions. It then draws some general lessons, drawing on the three examples, and finally discusses some policy implications stemming from the analysis.Less

When the Self Becomes Other: Representations of Gender, Islam, and the Politics of Survival in the Sahrawi Refugee Camps

Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh

in Dispossession and Displacement: Forced Migration in the Middle East and North Africa

This chapter examines the ways in which the protracted Sahrawi refugee context has been represented by its political body, the Polisario Front, to its non-Sahrawi ‘audience’ in such a way as to ... More

This chapter examines the ways in which the protracted Sahrawi refugee context has been represented by its political body, the Polisario Front, to its non-Sahrawi ‘audience’ in such a way as to assure continued political and humanitarian support. This chapter builds upon the recognition that the delivery of development aid is generally dependent on the capacity of the recipients to fulfil a set of non-economic conditionalities such as the creation of democratic political structures, the protection of human rights, and the promotion of gender equality. Refugees are expected to conform to the values of their sponsors. Conformity to these imposed values assuages them continued arrival of humanitarian supplies. However, such conditionalities do not necessarily lead to the modification of recipients’ socio-political structures as sponsors may expect. Rather, multiple forms of dependence on external aid and the broader political context have directly impacted the manners with which the recipients market themselves to their sponsors. In this chapter, the efforts of the Polisario Front in developing a particular representation of the Sahrawi ‘Self’ based upon the observations of its own observers form the focus of this chapter. It examines the strategies employed by the Front such as placing the Sahrawi refugee woman and solidarity movements as forefront representations of the refugee camps in order to secure external aid.Less

The Limits of Bipolarity in the Golden Age of Modernization

Sara Lorenzini

in Global Development: A Cold War History

This chapter addresses the differentiated priorities in the West and East as they emerged during the institutionalization of development structures and procedures. In the 1950s, with the Soviet Union ... More

This chapter addresses the differentiated priorities in the West and East as they emerged during the institutionalization of development structures and procedures. In the 1950s, with the Soviet Union and its allies entering the development business, aid became a full-fledged weapon in the Cold War arsenal. Development plans extolled the virtues of modernity and modernity was conceived in the singular: there were several ways to solve the same problem, and experts had differentiated approaches, but they did not diverge drastically. With the entry of the Soviet Union as a potential donor rather than a distant model, development turned competitive. Models were now pitted against one another in a competition about effectiveness and symbolic strength. Technology was not neutral anymore. Machinery and dams were products of a culture, and the choice of technology implied a choice of social organization, labor relations, and structures of production: it was a political choice. Countries had to take sides in the Cold War, because the decision was a final and irreversible one between irreconcilable proposals. The chapter then focuses on the organs charged with coordinating aid: the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Permanent Commission for Technical Assistance of Comecon.Less

Why Foreign Aid? Setting the Stage

in Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics

This chapter begins by addressing the question of why states provide aid to people in other countries. It then sets out the purpose of the book, which is to offer an analysis of aid's evolving ... More

This chapter begins by addressing the question of why states provide aid to people in other countries. It then sets out the purpose of the book, which is to offer an analysis of aid's evolving purposes and provide five case studies of aid-giving in major donor countries: the United States, Japan, France, Germany, and Denmark. Each of these case studies addresses two basic questions. First, what was the profile of aid's purposes in each country and how did it evolve over time? Second, why did governments choose the particular mix of purposes they did? This is followed by discussions of the argument and findings of the book; the theoretical model used for the analysis; and four categories of domestic political forces shaping foreign aid.Less

Conclusions

Sara Lorenzini

in Global Development: A Cold War History

This concluding chapter argues that, during the Cold War, countries in the Global South had played the superpowers off each other, achieving almost unchecked aid during decolonization—but this ... More

This concluding chapter argues that, during the Cold War, countries in the Global South had played the superpowers off each other, achieving almost unchecked aid during decolonization—but this approach no longer worked. Economists and social scientists attacked the Cold War, claiming that the aid distributed then, while abundant, had been distorted by politics, with negative consequences for national economies. Cold War aid, they said, fostered inefficient distribution, thwarted institutional development in newly independent countries, propped up failed states, and nourished civil wars with weapons and ideology. The book reveals development's many expectations other than humanitarian motives: political loyalty, broader markets, and personal or group legitimacy. It also recounts a plural history, seeing the global history of development as made up of projects with worldwide aspirations but clearly framed for national purposes and within regional dimensions. The image of development as a single design, the concretization of a hegemonic view, a global faith, a center around which global polity is organized, is a simplified representation.Less

Governments and Supranational Agencies: A New Consensus?

Gordon Brown

in Making Globalization Good: The Moral Challenges of Global Capitalism

In this chapter, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, makes a strong plea for a greater sense of economic and moral responsibility on the part of the wealthier nations towards their ... More

In this chapter, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, makes a strong plea for a greater sense of economic and moral responsibility on the part of the wealthier nations towards their poorer counterparts. It is also his conviction that for global prosperity to be sustained, it has to be fairly shared, and, as a success story, cites the institutional innovations of the early post‐war era to create an international architecture to advance this goal. However, the contemporary global economic and political scenario is very different, and Brown advocates a reconfiguration of the role of supra‐national institutions, both to meet the specific needs of global capitalism, and to drastically reduce poverty. More particularly, he proposes a new global consensus that will: (1) better enable the poorer countries to participate fully in the global economy and benefit from it; (2) encourage the international business community to adopt high corporate standards for their participation as reliable and consistent partners in the development process; (3) enable the adoption of improved trade regimes designed to improve the participation of developing countries in decision making; and (4) allow a substantial increase in development aid to nations most in need and willing to focus on the fight against poverty. The chapter concludes by stressing the responsibilities of each of the various institutions of global capitalism and, most notably, those of the business community, civil society, governments of both the richer and poorer countries, and individuals throughout the world.Less

Japan: The Rise and Decline of an “Aid Superpower”

in Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics

This chapter discusses the history and evolution of Japanese foreign aid, which has long been viewed as driven by commercial motives: expanding exports and ensuring access to needed raw materials ... More

This chapter discusses the history and evolution of Japanese foreign aid, which has long been viewed as driven by commercial motives: expanding exports and ensuring access to needed raw materials imports. Commerce certainly played a major role in the country allocation and use of Japan's economic assistance, but this purpose was always embedded in the government's fundamental goals of prosperity, autonomy, and international respect. By the late 1970s, once Japan made significant progress on its economic goals, the orientation of its aid began to shift. Diplomatic concerns (especially managing relations with the United States) became more prominent, playing a direct role in both the amount and country allocation of Japanese aid. By 1989, after doubling its aid several times over during the 1980s, Japan became the “aid superpower”—the largest single donor in the world—and remained so during much of the 1990s. But it proved unable to hold to its position as the largest aid donor in the face of domestic economic crises and several major scandals involving its assistance. Japanese aid was cut sharply at the end of the 1990s, and the government was never able fully to align its development aid policies with those of other governments. Japanese bilateral aid remained heavily focused on funding infrastructure, especially in East Asia, leaving Japan more of a niche player in development aid than a world leader.Less

Western Alternatives for Development in the Global Cold War

Sara Lorenzini

in Global Development: A Cold War History

This chapter assesses how modernization worked its way into Cold War politics and how it influenced public discourse and foreign policy in the United States during the second half of the 1950s. ... More

This chapter assesses how modernization worked its way into Cold War politics and how it influenced public discourse and foreign policy in the United States during the second half of the 1950s. Between 1957 and 1958, several events prompted the United States to shift toward a more active foreign aid policy. These events brought a consensus that a more vigorous approach to promoting economic growth and development as a way to contain communist influence was needed. The question of improved coordination of development assistance among the Atlantic nations was also a factor. Most of Western Europe shared America's concern about Soviet penetration, and several members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) insisted on activating economic collaboration according to article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, using it to provide aid cooperatively. The chapter then considers how, with the presidency of John F. Kennedy, modernization became the representative Western ideology for waging the Cold War, even as other coexisting traditions of imperial origin offered rival methods of using development aid as a tool of foreign policy to face radicalization in the decolonizing world.Less

Introduction

Nancy H. Kwak

in A World of Homeowners: American Power and the Politics of Housing Aid

This chapter explains the nature of American interest in international housing conditions after World War II, as well as the mechanisms by which Americans funnelled aid abroad. American aid flowed ... More

This chapter explains the nature of American interest in international housing conditions after World War II, as well as the mechanisms by which Americans funnelled aid abroad. American aid flowed primarily through the international division of federal housing agencies, or the various agencies tasked with bilateral aid outside the Department of Defense. Americans also contributed to a wide array of international, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental bodies, exerting varying degrees of influence within each. This chapter details the various modes of American leadership and participation and then offers a short summary of the overarching organization of the book.Less

Emigration, Development, and (In)security

Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia

in Frontiers of Fear: Immigration and Insecurity in the United States and Europe

This chapter examines the West’s inadequate attention to a key push factor, overseas development aid, despite its securitization with the goal of supporting “allies” in the war on terror. Western ... More

This chapter examines the West’s inadequate attention to a key push factor, overseas development aid, despite its securitization with the goal of supporting “allies” in the war on terror. Western countries have increased their development aid in trying to respond to growing inequities between the North and South. Both the U.S. and European governments have been very active in their efforts to promote development—and therefore to address the issues related to poverty such as illegal immigration and global instability. This chapter considers how Europe and the United States have increasingly associated foreign aid with the fight against terrorism. However, it argues that neither the United States nor the European Union has effectively addressed the North–South gap with their limited and targeted approach based on security concerns. Such an emphasis on security concerns increases insecurity instead of alleviating poverty.Less

From American relief to international development cooperation (1961–68)

Heike Wieters

in The NGO Care and Food Aid from America 1945-80: Showered With Kindness'?

Chapter 6 focuses on CARE’s ongoing professionalization and its ties to government agencies, international diplomats, corporate players and marketing firms. It sheds light on CARE’s first attempts at ... More

Chapter 6 focuses on CARE’s ongoing professionalization and its ties to government agencies, international diplomats, corporate players and marketing firms. It sheds light on CARE’s first attempts at a further internationalization of the enterprise and its investment in external development and nutrition expertise. CARE merged with the NGO Medico Inc. fostered community organising activities and pushed for a more development-oriented approach in its hunger relief programming.Less

Does Aid Break Down Cooperation?

in Breakdown in Pakistan: How Aid Is Eroding Institutions for Collective Action

This chapter provides the survey results of Pakistan's forty largest civil society organizations, half of which use development aid and half of which don't. The survey focused on the motivation of ... More

This chapter provides the survey results of Pakistan's forty largest civil society organizations, half of which use development aid and half of which don't. The survey focused on the motivation of the group leaders, the groups' membership, and the organizational performance of these forty groups. This survey was conducted as a way to test the hypothesis that was expressed in the previous chapter: that the main reason why aid breaks down cooperation within civil society groups is because it changes group performance and the behavior of group leaders. This chapter argues that aid actually has a negative impact on collective action, which then results in a negative impact on the ability of an organization to achieve its development goals.Less