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This chapter introduces perfect deterrence theory and contrasts it with classical deterrence theory, which is the prevailing realist theory of interstate war prevention. How and under what conditions war might be prevented is the principal question addressed by both theories. The assumptions, empirical implications, and policy prescriptions of the two approaches to deterrence are discussed. Classical deterrence theory is shown to have both logical and empirical problems. Perfect deterrence theory, which is composed of a number of interrelated game models that are analyzed under a common set of preference assumptions, is not only logically consistent but empirically robust as well.

Renewed interest in deterrence today has been stimulated by the way recent efforts to sustain security and stability in international politics have often been unevenly successful or not successful at all. Efforts to deter, contain, and end conflict—whether terrorism, intrastate ethnic, religious and political fighting, and interstate fighting—have frequently run into difficulty. There is serious disarray in the East-West deterrence relationship once again, after a brief Cold War hiatus, with disturbing possibilities of outright conflict now being openly discussed among analysts and observers. Part of the reason that deterrence is so challenged today is that the very concept of deterrence—including cross-domain deterrence—has become seriously overstretched to apply to far more than it reasonably can, or should.

This chapter examines the extent to which the employment of criminal sanctions for cartel activity can be justified on the basis of deterrence. It outlines the deficiencies of the current approach to deterrence in EU antitrust enforcement and then uses the current literature to present a robust deterrence-based argument in favour of antitrust criminalization, an argument that attempts to address the identified deficiencies of the current approach to deterrence. In addition, it analyses the limitations of this deterrence-based argument and, hence, the theoretical challenge of deterrence in the context of antitrust criminalization.

In this chapter, the general theory of crime depicted in self-control theory is taken as valid, and the implications for criminal justice are explored. The historical connections between classical theory and criminal sanctions are described, and the relations between classical deterrence theories and control theory are examined. The classical theory assumption that deterrence places limits of effectiveness on state sanctions is used in conjunction with the modern notion of self control. The result is that modern control theory, supported by contemporary research on the effectiveness of criminal sanctions, explains why criminal sanctions have limited effectiveness for crime and sets limits on the appropriate use of criminal sanctions. Modern control theory, using classical school assumptions of human nature and choice, shows why public policy should focus on early socialization and prevention.

This chapter develops a new theory of nuclear deterrence, the superiority-brinkmanship synthesis theory. The theory brings together traditional arguments in the nuclear strategy literature about the advantages of nuclear superiority and combines them with nuclear brinkmanship theory to provide the first coherent theoretical explanation for why nuclear superiority provides states with geopolitical advantages. It argues that military nuclear advantages reduce a state’s expected cost of nuclear war, increasing its effective resolve, and enhancing its bargaining position. On the other hand, states in an inferior strategic position face a relatively higher cost of nuclear war, are less willing to run risks in a crisis, and are more likely to back down early in a dispute. This chapter serves, therefore, as the theoretical and conceptual core for the first half of the book

The use of aggressive interrogation techniques on terrorism suspects is typically justified on utilitarian grounds. This chapter presents evidence that those who support such techniques are actually fuelled more by retributive motives. One experimental study conducted with a broad national sample of US residents found that interrogation recommendations are more sensitive to manipulation of the target’s history of bad acts than to manipulation of his likelihood of useful knowledge. Moreover, the desire for harsh interrogation is largely isomorphic with the desire to punish, and both effects are mediated by the perceived moral status of the target. A second study demonstrated conditions under which nationality and geographical proximity of the detainee make a difference to interrogation and morality judgments. The implications of our results are discussed with regard to national policy on torture-interrogation.

This chapter concludes the book. It reviews the book’s central argument and findings. It explains that the book found considerable support for the superiority-brinkmanship synthesis theory and that other theories found less support. It then discusses the implications of the book’s findings for international relations scholarship and for US nuclear policy. The primary theoretical contribution of this book was to resolve one of the most important and long-standing puzzles in the field of security studies: if nuclear superiority does not matter, then why do policymakers often act as if it does? For those interested in bridging the gap between international relations scholarship and US foreign policymaking, it sought to demonstrate that rigorous social science research can be policy-relevant. Finally, it examined the future of US nuclear posture and strategy and the nature of an ideal nuclear balance of power between the United States and its adversaries.

This chapter considers the relevance of the Francovich liability to enforcement. Francovich liability can be regarded as an element of enforcement of EU law, but this is limited in scope in an objective and subjective sense, which might confound critical observers of EU law. To overcome the somewhat haphazard approach of citing national—the German and to some extent English—cases pointing in one or other direction regarding the relevance of the liability, this chapter turns to two contrasting approaches. The first is the thorough study by Takis Tridimas analysing all subsequent ECJ case law relating to Francovich. The second is the study based on an economic theory of deterrence advanced by Hans-Bernd Schäfer. The chapter also briefly refers to a comparative empirical study of the case law in German and UK courts.