David M. Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199590612
- eISBN:
- 9780191723391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Once one has ‘sparse’ universals it is natural to think that an account of laws of nature can be given in terms of relations between these universals. Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and myself all ...
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Once one has ‘sparse’ universals it is natural to think that an account of laws of nature can be given in terms of relations between these universals. Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and myself all proposed this view at much the same time. My own first version was subjected to trenchant criticism by David Lewis and Bas van Fraassen. My second attempt, which is to see laws as causal (or nomic) connections between states of affairs types, is here argued to meet these difficulties. Although the connection remains contingent, it sets up a direct connection between states of affairs. Hence it is stronger than Hume‐type theories, constituting a ‘middle way’. This leads to a singularist theory of causal connection, with the laws of nature (themselves universals) instantiated in these causal/nomic connections. Progress can then be made with the problem of induction (inference to the best explanation). Typical laws of nature are functional, expressed in equations, and involving determinable properties only. The complication this leads to is addressed. It is suggested further that we have direct perceptual awareness of causal action on our own bodies.Less
Once one has ‘sparse’ universals it is natural to think that an account of laws of nature can be given in terms of relations between these universals. Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and myself all proposed this view at much the same time. My own first version was subjected to trenchant criticism by David Lewis and Bas van Fraassen. My second attempt, which is to see laws as causal (or nomic) connections between states of affairs types, is here argued to meet these difficulties. Although the connection remains contingent, it sets up a direct connection between states of affairs. Hence it is stronger than Hume‐type theories, constituting a ‘middle way’. This leads to a singularist theory of causal connection, with the laws of nature (themselves universals) instantiated in these causal/nomic connections. Progress can then be made with the problem of induction (inference to the best explanation). Typical laws of nature are functional, expressed in equations, and involving determinable properties only. The complication this leads to is addressed. It is suggested further that we have direct perceptual awareness of causal action on our own bodies.
Craig French
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780199666416
- eISBN:
- 9780191858284
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers the Spatiality Claim: if one sees an object then one sees some of that object’s spatial properties. The author considers an argument for this given by Cassam (2007), and ...
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This chapter considers the Spatiality Claim: if one sees an object then one sees some of that object’s spatial properties. The author considers an argument for this given by Cassam (2007), and challenges Cassam’s argument. His argument involves the idea, inspired by Dretske (1969), that seeing an object requires visual differentiation. But, it is argued here, there are prima facie counter-examples to the visual differentiation condition. Next, the author discusses the Spatiality Claim directly, and defends it against potential counter-examples which come from reflection on empirical cases where subjects can see objects yet have some sort of spatial perception deficit. One theme that emerges is that insofar as versions of the Spatiality Claim are defensible, we should focus on the relatively determinable spatial properties of objects and our perception of such properties.Less
This chapter considers the Spatiality Claim: if one sees an object then one sees some of that object’s spatial properties. The author considers an argument for this given by Cassam (2007), and challenges Cassam’s argument. His argument involves the idea, inspired by Dretske (1969), that seeing an object requires visual differentiation. But, it is argued here, there are prima facie counter-examples to the visual differentiation condition. Next, the author discusses the Spatiality Claim directly, and defends it against potential counter-examples which come from reflection on empirical cases where subjects can see objects yet have some sort of spatial perception deficit. One theme that emerges is that insofar as versions of the Spatiality Claim are defensible, we should focus on the relatively determinable spatial properties of objects and our perception of such properties.
