R. M. Hare
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250326
- eISBN:
- 9780191597602
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250320.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book is divided into three parts: in Part I, R. M. Hare offers a justification for the use of philosophy of language in the treatment of moral questions, together with an overview of his moral ...
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This book is divided into three parts: in Part I, R. M. Hare offers a justification for the use of philosophy of language in the treatment of moral questions, together with an overview of his moral philosophy of ‘universal prescriptivism’. The second part, and the core of the book, consists of five chapters originally presented as a lecture series under the title ‘A Taxonomy of Ethical Theories’. Hare identifies descriptivism and non‐descriptivism as the two main positions in modern moral philosophy. The former he divides into Naturalism and Intuitionism, and the latter into Emotivism and Rationalism. Hare argues that all forms of descriptivism tend to lead to Relativism because the truth conditions of moral statements are culturally variant. Of the positions discussed, only Hare's own position, a form of Rationalism, which he calls Universal Prescriptivism, meets all of the requirements that an adequate ethical theory should meet. Part III consists of Hare's previously published essay ‘Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?’ (Utilitas 5, 1993). Here, Hare puts forward the controversial thesis that Kant's moral philosophy is, in its basic principles, compatible with utilitarianism.Less
This book is divided into three parts: in Part I, R. M. Hare offers a justification for the use of philosophy of language in the treatment of moral questions, together with an overview of his moral philosophy of ‘universal prescriptivism’. The second part, and the core of the book, consists of five chapters originally presented as a lecture series under the title ‘A Taxonomy of Ethical Theories’. Hare identifies descriptivism and non‐descriptivism as the two main positions in modern moral philosophy. The former he divides into Naturalism and Intuitionism, and the latter into Emotivism and Rationalism. Hare argues that all forms of descriptivism tend to lead to Relativism because the truth conditions of moral statements are culturally variant. Of the positions discussed, only Hare's own position, a form of Rationalism, which he calls Universal Prescriptivism, meets all of the requirements that an adequate ethical theory should meet. Part III consists of Hare's previously published essay ‘Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?’ (Utilitas 5, 1993). Here, Hare puts forward the controversial thesis that Kant's moral philosophy is, in its basic principles, compatible with utilitarianism.
R. M. Hare
- Published in print:
- 1965
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198810926
- eISBN:
- 9780191597589
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019881092X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Concerns the apparent antinomy between freedom and reason. Rationality appears to be a restraint on freedom, whereas freedom seems to be incompatible with rationality. Rejecting rationality to ...
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Concerns the apparent antinomy between freedom and reason. Rationality appears to be a restraint on freedom, whereas freedom seems to be incompatible with rationality. Rejecting rationality to preserve freedom is the mark of subjectivist/emotivist theories of ethics. Rejecting freedom to emphasize rationality belongs to the naturalist/descriptivist theories. This book aims to reconcile these positions and do away with the alleged antinomy. The argument makes three main assumptions: (1) moral judgements are prescriptive; (2) they are universalizable; (3) there are genuine logical relations between prescriptive judgements. Insofar as moral judgements are universalizable, rationality gets a foothold, and their prescriptivity is intimately related to freedom to form one's own moral judgements. The first part of the book elaborates the thesis of universalizability and the connection between this feature and the fact that moral judgements have a descriptive element in addition to being prescriptive. The second and third parts expound the beginnings of a theory of moral reasoning grounded in the logic of prescriptivity and universalizability.It is argued that moral judgements are universalizable and prescriptive, and have an element of descriptive meaning. Moral judgements seriously intended must be taken as committing the speaker to some universal judgement applying to anyone in relevantly similar situations (universalizability). The thesis maintained here (universal prescriptivism) retains what is sound in descriptivism (natural and non‐natural), improving upon it by revealing the additional, prescriptive element of moral judgement. It is argued that the connection between universalizability and descriptive meaning is logically tight: it is impossible to maintain with consistency that moral judgements are descriptive yet not universalizable (descriptivism entails universalizability). However, descriptivism is not a complete account of evaluative language, and prescriptivism is additionally required to reach the mark. The ethical theory presented in this book is prescriptivist: it is argued that it is an essential characteristic of moral terms that judgements containing them are, as typically used, intended as guides for conduct. The view shares with naturalism the emphasis on the possession of non‐moral properties by the object of moral judgement, which qualifies it for evaluation of its kind. However, it differs from the naturalist view of moral discourse in rejecting its understanding of moral argument. The prescriptivist thrust of the argument is brought to bear upon the question of the freedom of will.The book defends Hume's doctrine that one cannot deduce moral judgements from non‐moral statements of fact, and the application of this theory, which says that one cannot deduce morally substantial conclusions from non‐moral statements about the use of the moral terms. The explorations of various chapters produce theses about moral reasoning that are logical, not substantial: the robustly moral is derived from the particular predicament of the moral arguers. This comes out clearly in the discussion of universalizability and utilitarianism. The Humean thesis does not as supposed lead to the conclusion that the only kind of cogent moral argument is one which is premised on moral assumptions shared between the parties to the argument; on the contrary, it is maintained that once the logical character of the moral concepts is understood, there can be useful and compelling moral arguments between people who do not share a substantive moral outlook. The discussion brings together issues of moral conflict, interests, and ideals and the ability of the theory to handle conflict in practical scenarios.Less
Concerns the apparent antinomy between freedom and reason. Rationality appears to be a restraint on freedom, whereas freedom seems to be incompatible with rationality. Rejecting rationality to preserve freedom is the mark of subjectivist/emotivist theories of ethics. Rejecting freedom to emphasize rationality belongs to the naturalist/descriptivist theories. This book aims to reconcile these positions and do away with the alleged antinomy. The argument makes three main assumptions: (1) moral judgements are prescriptive; (2) they are universalizable; (3) there are genuine logical relations between prescriptive judgements. Insofar as moral judgements are universalizable, rationality gets a foothold, and their prescriptivity is intimately related to freedom to form one's own moral judgements. The first part of the book elaborates the thesis of universalizability and the connection between this feature and the fact that moral judgements have a descriptive element in addition to being prescriptive. The second and third parts expound the beginnings of a theory of moral reasoning grounded in the logic of prescriptivity and universalizability.
It is argued that moral judgements are universalizable and prescriptive, and have an element of descriptive meaning. Moral judgements seriously intended must be taken as committing the speaker to some universal judgement applying to anyone in relevantly similar situations (universalizability). The thesis maintained here (universal prescriptivism) retains what is sound in descriptivism (natural and non‐natural), improving upon it by revealing the additional, prescriptive element of moral judgement. It is argued that the connection between universalizability and descriptive meaning is logically tight: it is impossible to maintain with consistency that moral judgements are descriptive yet not universalizable (descriptivism entails universalizability). However, descriptivism is not a complete account of evaluative language, and prescriptivism is additionally required to reach the mark. The ethical theory presented in this book is prescriptivist: it is argued that it is an essential characteristic of moral terms that judgements containing them are, as typically used, intended as guides for conduct. The view shares with naturalism the emphasis on the possession of non‐moral properties by the object of moral judgement, which qualifies it for evaluation of its kind. However, it differs from the naturalist view of moral discourse in rejecting its understanding of moral argument. The prescriptivist thrust of the argument is brought to bear upon the question of the freedom of will.
The book defends Hume's doctrine that one cannot deduce moral judgements from non‐moral statements of fact, and the application of this theory, which says that one cannot deduce morally substantial conclusions from non‐moral statements about the use of the moral terms. The explorations of various chapters produce theses about moral reasoning that are logical, not substantial: the robustly moral is derived from the particular predicament of the moral arguers. This comes out clearly in the discussion of universalizability and utilitarianism. The Humean thesis does not as supposed lead to the conclusion that the only kind of cogent moral argument is one which is premised on moral assumptions shared between the parties to the argument; on the contrary, it is maintained that once the logical character of the moral concepts is understood, there can be useful and compelling moral arguments between people who do not share a substantive moral outlook. The discussion brings together issues of moral conflict, interests, and ideals and the ability of the theory to handle conflict in practical scenarios.
Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter challenges the so-called semantic assumption — according to which beliefs are necessarily descriptive in that they purport to represent or describe some state of affairs — by arguing ...
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This chapter challenges the so-called semantic assumption — according to which beliefs are necessarily descriptive in that they purport to represent or describe some state of affairs — by arguing that moral judgments share enough of the phenomenological and functional features that are central to the notion of belief, to count as genuine beliefs; a notion that does not require beliefs to be primarily descriptive. This opens the door to a cognitivist version of expressivism. The chapter sketches a version of cognitivist expressivism, including an account of logical embedding (meant to deal with the Frege–Geach problem), which it argued as prima facie more plausible than non-cognitivist and descriptivist alternatives in metaethics.Less
This chapter challenges the so-called semantic assumption — according to which beliefs are necessarily descriptive in that they purport to represent or describe some state of affairs — by arguing that moral judgments share enough of the phenomenological and functional features that are central to the notion of belief, to count as genuine beliefs; a notion that does not require beliefs to be primarily descriptive. This opens the door to a cognitivist version of expressivism. The chapter sketches a version of cognitivist expressivism, including an account of logical embedding (meant to deal with the Frege–Geach problem), which it argued as prima facie more plausible than non-cognitivist and descriptivist alternatives in metaethics.
Stephen Barker
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter proposes a new framework for metaethical expressivism that involves a combination of several elements. First, it claims that evaluative sentences are used to make genuine assertions, and ...
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This chapter proposes a new framework for metaethical expressivism that involves a combination of several elements. First, it claims that evaluative sentences are used to make genuine assertions, and so there are at least two types of assertion: reportive and expressive. Second, and following from the first, assertions of both sorts are truth-apt. Third, it is argued that all assertions are representational in that they purport to represent or describe some state of affairs. So, how do merely reportive assertions differ from expressive assertions? In response, the chapter proposes a pragmatic conception of truth according to which truth-bearers are sentences with representational content that are also used with an assertoric purpose. The idea is that the essential difference between reportive and expressive assertions is the purposes or intentions for which they are asserted: ‘in reportive assertions, speakers defend commitments to representational intentions; in expressive assertions speakers defend commitments to states [cognitive or conative] whose possession they have in fact represented’. In uttering a value sentence, for instance, one is expressing a desire (or related motivational state) that one is prepared to defend. The chapter explains how his form of expressivism can make sense of the various objectivist trappings of moral discourse, including its truth-aptness, logical embedding, and being subject to rational debate.Less
This chapter proposes a new framework for metaethical expressivism that involves a combination of several elements. First, it claims that evaluative sentences are used to make genuine assertions, and so there are at least two types of assertion: reportive and expressive. Second, and following from the first, assertions of both sorts are truth-apt. Third, it is argued that all assertions are representational in that they purport to represent or describe some state of affairs. So, how do merely reportive assertions differ from expressive assertions? In response, the chapter proposes a pragmatic conception of truth according to which truth-bearers are sentences with representational content that are also used with an assertoric purpose. The idea is that the essential difference between reportive and expressive assertions is the purposes or intentions for which they are asserted: ‘in reportive assertions, speakers defend commitments to representational intentions; in expressive assertions speakers defend commitments to states [cognitive or conative] whose possession they have in fact represented’. In uttering a value sentence, for instance, one is expressing a desire (or related motivational state) that one is prepared to defend. The chapter explains how his form of expressivism can make sense of the various objectivist trappings of moral discourse, including its truth-aptness, logical embedding, and being subject to rational debate.
Edwin L. Battistella
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195172485
- eISBN:
- 9780199788187
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195172485.003.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, English Language
This chapter raises some broad issues of tradition versus innovation in culture to place the discussion of realism in language into perspective. Topics covered include the meaning of the phrase, “bad ...
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This chapter raises some broad issues of tradition versus innovation in culture to place the discussion of realism in language into perspective. Topics covered include the meaning of the phrase, “bad language”; descriptive and prescriptive viewpoints of standard language, and ideas that underlie notions of good and bad language.Less
This chapter raises some broad issues of tradition versus innovation in culture to place the discussion of realism in language into perspective. Topics covered include the meaning of the phrase, “bad language”; descriptive and prescriptive viewpoints of standard language, and ideas that underlie notions of good and bad language.
John M. Anderson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199297412
- eISBN:
- 9780191711176
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297412.003.0005
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Theoretical Linguistics
Thinking about names has exercised most of the leading figures in philosophy. However, Mill's work brought into focus what has remained perhaps the major issue, arising from his contention that names ...
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Thinking about names has exercised most of the leading figures in philosophy. However, Mill's work brought into focus what has remained perhaps the major issue, arising from his contention that names are ‘non-connotative’, i.e., lack sense, in the terminology of Chapter 3. Mill's view has been challenged by ‘descriptivists’, particularly in the form of the need for ‘descriptive backing’. Much of the criticism of Mill is misguided, especially in confusing sense with (co-)reference. Others have added to Mill's account an emphasis on the importance of ‘baptisms’ (nomination) in fixing reference; but the relevance of the sometimes associated notion of ‘rigid designation’ to the characterization of names is doubtful. As with ‘onymic’ reference, Recanati's account of direct reference underplays the categoriality of individual names; but is otherwise close to the views advocated in Chapter 9, which adopts a modified Millian position allowing for basic differences in sense (animacy) among names.Less
Thinking about names has exercised most of the leading figures in philosophy. However, Mill's work brought into focus what has remained perhaps the major issue, arising from his contention that names are ‘non-connotative’, i.e., lack sense, in the terminology of Chapter 3. Mill's view has been challenged by ‘descriptivists’, particularly in the form of the need for ‘descriptive backing’. Much of the criticism of Mill is misguided, especially in confusing sense with (co-)reference. Others have added to Mill's account an emphasis on the importance of ‘baptisms’ (nomination) in fixing reference; but the relevance of the sometimes associated notion of ‘rigid designation’ to the characterization of names is doubtful. As with ‘onymic’ reference, Recanati's account of direct reference underplays the categoriality of individual names; but is otherwise close to the views advocated in Chapter 9, which adopts a modified Millian position allowing for basic differences in sense (animacy) among names.
R. M. Hare
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250326
- eISBN:
- 9780191597602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250320.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Hare explains what he means by ‘Ethical Theory’, and what he means by ‘Taxonomy’. Ethical theory, which Hare contrasts to ‘moral theory’, is a purely formal discipline that is concerned with the ...
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Hare explains what he means by ‘Ethical Theory’, and what he means by ‘Taxonomy’. Ethical theory, which Hare contrasts to ‘moral theory’, is a purely formal discipline that is concerned with the meaning and logical properties of moral words. Hare offers a ‘Taxonomy’ of ethical theories in the sense of a classification into genera and differentia, beginning with what he sees as the basic dichotomy in ethical theory between descriptivism and non‐descriptivism. The difference between descriptivist and non‐descriptivist ethical theories is that, according to the former, the meaning of moral statements is determined entirely by their truth conditions; the latter deny that this is so. Hare divides descriptivism into ‘Naturalism’ (Ch. 4) and ‘Intuitionism’ (Ch. 5), and non‐descriptivism into ‘Emotivism’ (Ch. 6) and ‘Rationalism’ (Ch. 7).Less
Hare explains what he means by ‘Ethical Theory’, and what he means by ‘Taxonomy’. Ethical theory, which Hare contrasts to ‘moral theory’, is a purely formal discipline that is concerned with the meaning and logical properties of moral words. Hare offers a ‘Taxonomy’ of ethical theories in the sense of a classification into genera and differentia, beginning with what he sees as the basic dichotomy in ethical theory between descriptivism and non‐descriptivism. The difference between descriptivist and non‐descriptivist ethical theories is that, according to the former, the meaning of moral statements is determined entirely by their truth conditions; the latter deny that this is so. Hare divides descriptivism into ‘Naturalism’ (Ch. 4) and ‘Intuitionism’ (Ch. 5), and non‐descriptivism into ‘Emotivism’ (Ch. 6) and ‘Rationalism’ (Ch. 7).
Kevin Scharp
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199890576
- eISBN:
- 9780199980031
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199890576.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The work of Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan, and others initiated a tradition that has come to be known as anti-descriptivism. This chapter argues that when properly interpreted, Sellars is a staunch ...
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The work of Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan, and others initiated a tradition that has come to be known as anti-descriptivism. This chapter argues that when properly interpreted, Sellars is a staunch anti-descriptivist. Not only does it accept most of the conclusions drawn by the anti-descriptivists, it goes beyond their critiques to reject the fundamental tenant of descriptivism—that understanding a linguistic expression consists in mentally grasping its meaning and associating that meaning with the expression. The chapter shows that Sellars' accounts of language and the mind provide novel justifications for the anti-descriptivists' conclusions. It presents what he takes to be a Sellarsian analysis of the relation between metaphysical modal and epistemic modal notions. The chapter's account involves extension of the strategy Sellars uses to explain both the relation between physical object concepts and sensation concepts, and the relation between concepts that apply to linguistic activity and those that apply to conceptual activity.Less
The work of Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan, and others initiated a tradition that has come to be known as anti-descriptivism. This chapter argues that when properly interpreted, Sellars is a staunch anti-descriptivist. Not only does it accept most of the conclusions drawn by the anti-descriptivists, it goes beyond their critiques to reject the fundamental tenant of descriptivism—that understanding a linguistic expression consists in mentally grasping its meaning and associating that meaning with the expression. The chapter shows that Sellars' accounts of language and the mind provide novel justifications for the anti-descriptivists' conclusions. It presents what he takes to be a Sellarsian analysis of the relation between metaphysical modal and epistemic modal notions. The chapter's account involves extension of the strategy Sellars uses to explain both the relation between physical object concepts and sensation concepts, and the relation between concepts that apply to linguistic activity and those that apply to conceptual activity.
Tyler Burge
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199581405
- eISBN:
- 9780191723223
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199581405.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter focuses on relations between second-family Individual Representationalism and other standpoints that either reinforced it or began to undermine it. Sense-data theory was the prevailing ...
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This chapter focuses on relations between second-family Individual Representationalism and other standpoints that either reinforced it or began to undermine it. Sense-data theory was the prevailing form of Individual Representationalism in mainstream philosophy during the first half of the 20th century. By the early 1950s, the influence of sense-data theory was fast evaporating. Sense-data theories did not influence subsequent philosophizing except negatively. Apart from their departures from common sense, sense-data approaches were rejected on two main grounds: they were criticized as subjectivistic and atomistic. Philosophical work at mid-century took on a more realist, more objectivist flavour. It emphasized dependence on context, public availability of expression, and interlocking psychological capacities that make cognition and language use possible. Many philosophers insisted on a role for language even in perception and the simplest perception-based thought.Less
This chapter focuses on relations between second-family Individual Representationalism and other standpoints that either reinforced it or began to undermine it. Sense-data theory was the prevailing form of Individual Representationalism in mainstream philosophy during the first half of the 20th century. By the early 1950s, the influence of sense-data theory was fast evaporating. Sense-data theories did not influence subsequent philosophizing except negatively. Apart from their departures from common sense, sense-data approaches were rejected on two main grounds: they were criticized as subjectivistic and atomistic. Philosophical work at mid-century took on a more realist, more objectivist flavour. It emphasized dependence on context, public availability of expression, and interlocking psychological capacities that make cognition and language use possible. Many philosophers insisted on a role for language even in perception and the simplest perception-based thought.
Simon Blackburn
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199267989
- eISBN:
- 9780191708268
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter is an expanded version of a review of Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics that the author wrote for the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. It attempts to sketch the essence of ...
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This chapter is an expanded version of a review of Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics that the author wrote for the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. It attempts to sketch the essence of Jackson's approach to metaphysics and ethics, and to indicate some of the places where it is surprising and, inevitably, controversial. It focuses on the ‘analytic descriptivism’, or the ‘a priori passage principle’ that Jackson stands by, generating ‘the view that for each true statement concerning our world, there is a statement in physical terms that a priori entails that statement’ (Jackson 2003).Less
This chapter is an expanded version of a review of Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics that the author wrote for the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. It attempts to sketch the essence of Jackson's approach to metaphysics and ethics, and to indicate some of the places where it is surprising and, inevitably, controversial. It focuses on the ‘analytic descriptivism’, or the ‘a priori passage principle’ that Jackson stands by, generating ‘the view that for each true statement concerning our world, there is a statement in physical terms that a priori entails that statement’ (Jackson 2003).
Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199267989
- eISBN:
- 9780191708268
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In chapters 4 and 5 of his 1998 book From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Frank Jackson propounds and defends a form of moral realism that he calls both ‘moral functionalism’ ...
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In chapters 4 and 5 of his 1998 book From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Frank Jackson propounds and defends a form of moral realism that he calls both ‘moral functionalism’ and ‘analytical descriptivism’. This chapter argues that this metaethical position, referred to as ‘analytical moral functionalism’, is untenable. It does this by applying a generic thought-experimental deconstructive recipe that has been used against other views that posit moral properties and identify them with certain natural properties — a recipe that is applicable to virtually any metaphysically naturalist version of moral realism. The recipe deploys a scenario called Moral Twin Earth.Less
In chapters 4 and 5 of his 1998 book From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Frank Jackson propounds and defends a form of moral realism that he calls both ‘moral functionalism’ and ‘analytical descriptivism’. This chapter argues that this metaethical position, referred to as ‘analytical moral functionalism’, is untenable. It does this by applying a generic thought-experimental deconstructive recipe that has been used against other views that posit moral properties and identify them with certain natural properties — a recipe that is applicable to virtually any metaphysically naturalist version of moral realism. The recipe deploys a scenario called Moral Twin Earth.
François Recanati
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199567881
- eISBN:
- 9780191722783
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567881.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
This chapter argues that singular thought about an object involves nondescriptive or de re ways of thinking of that object, that is, modes of presentation resting on contextual relations of ...
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This chapter argues that singular thought about an object involves nondescriptive or de re ways of thinking of that object, that is, modes of presentation resting on contextual relations of ‘acquaintance’ to the object. Such modes of presentation are analysed as mental files in which the subject can store information gained through the acquaintance relations in question. The paper shows that the mental‐file approach provides an answer to the objection from ‘acquaintanceless de re thought’ (to the effect that tokening a singular thought does not require being actually acquainted with the object the thought is about), as well as a solution to a vexing problem regarding the communication of singular thoughts: if singular thoughts depend upon contextual relations to the objects of thought, how can they be communicated across contexts ? What makes communication possible when the speaker and the addressee do not stand in the same contextual relations to the objects the speaker's thought is about?Less
This chapter argues that singular thought about an object involves nondescriptive or de re ways of thinking of that object, that is, modes of presentation resting on contextual relations of ‘acquaintance’ to the object. Such modes of presentation are analysed as mental files in which the subject can store information gained through the acquaintance relations in question. The paper shows that the mental‐file approach provides an answer to the objection from ‘acquaintanceless de re thought’ (to the effect that tokening a singular thought does not require being actually acquainted with the object the thought is about), as well as a solution to a vexing problem regarding the communication of singular thoughts: if singular thoughts depend upon contextual relations to the objects of thought, how can they be communicated across contexts ? What makes communication possible when the speaker and the addressee do not stand in the same contextual relations to the objects the speaker's thought is about?
François Recanati
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199659982
- eISBN:
- 9780191745409
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659982.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
This book attempts to recast the ‘nondescriptivist’ approach to reference that has dominated the philosophy of language and mind in the late twentieth-century in terms of mental files. According to ...
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This book attempts to recast the ‘nondescriptivist’ approach to reference that has dominated the philosophy of language and mind in the late twentieth-century in terms of mental files. According to this book, we refer through mental files, which play the role of so-called ‘modes of presentation’. The reference of linguistic expressions is inherited from that of the files we associate with them. The reference of a file is determined relationally, not satisfactionally; so a file is not to be equated to the body of (mis-)information it contains. Files are like singular terms in the language of thought, with a nondescriptivist semantics. In contrast to other authors, this book offers an indexical model according to which files are typed by their function, which is to store information derived through certain types of relation to objects in the environment. The type of the file corresponds to the type of contextual relation it exploits. Even detached files or ‘encyclopedia entries’ are based on epistemically rewarding relations to their referent, on this account. Among the topics discussed in this wide-ranging book are: acquaintance relations and singular thought; cognitive significance; the vehicle/content distinction; the nature of indexical concepts; co-reference de jureand judgments of identity; cognitive dynamics; recognitional and perceptual concepts; confused thought and the transparency requirement on modes of presentation; descriptive names and ‘acquaintanceless’ singular thought; the communication of indexical thoughts; two-dimensional defences of Descriptivism; the Generality Constraint; attitude ascriptions and the ‘vicarious’ use of mental files; first-person thinking; token-reflexivity in language and thought.Less
This book attempts to recast the ‘nondescriptivist’ approach to reference that has dominated the philosophy of language and mind in the late twentieth-century in terms of mental files. According to this book, we refer through mental files, which play the role of so-called ‘modes of presentation’. The reference of linguistic expressions is inherited from that of the files we associate with them. The reference of a file is determined relationally, not satisfactionally; so a file is not to be equated to the body of (mis-)information it contains. Files are like singular terms in the language of thought, with a nondescriptivist semantics. In contrast to other authors, this book offers an indexical model according to which files are typed by their function, which is to store information derived through certain types of relation to objects in the environment. The type of the file corresponds to the type of contextual relation it exploits. Even detached files or ‘encyclopedia entries’ are based on epistemically rewarding relations to their referent, on this account. Among the topics discussed in this wide-ranging book are: acquaintance relations and singular thought; cognitive significance; the vehicle/content distinction; the nature of indexical concepts; co-reference de jureand judgments of identity; cognitive dynamics; recognitional and perceptual concepts; confused thought and the transparency requirement on modes of presentation; descriptive names and ‘acquaintanceless’ singular thought; the communication of indexical thoughts; two-dimensional defences of Descriptivism; the Generality Constraint; attitude ascriptions and the ‘vicarious’ use of mental files; first-person thinking; token-reflexivity in language and thought.
R. M. Hare
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250326
- eISBN:
- 9780191597602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250320.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Naturalism is a species of descriptivism, and is described as the proposal to specify the truth conditions of moral statements without reference to moral words, i.e. without reference to the ...
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Naturalism is a species of descriptivism, and is described as the proposal to specify the truth conditions of moral statements without reference to moral words, i.e. without reference to the attitudes of the speakers. Hence, the truth conditions of moral statements are non‐moral properties. Hare subdivides Naturalism into ‘objectivist’ and ‘subjectivist’ varieties. The variety of Naturalism that interests Hare in this chapter is objectivist naturalism, according to which the non‐moral properties are objective. Naturalism, Hare argues, results inevitably in relativism, and any ethical theory that implies relativism must be rejected.Less
Naturalism is a species of descriptivism, and is described as the proposal to specify the truth conditions of moral statements without reference to moral words, i.e. without reference to the attitudes of the speakers. Hence, the truth conditions of moral statements are non‐moral properties. Hare subdivides Naturalism into ‘objectivist’ and ‘subjectivist’ varieties. The variety of Naturalism that interests Hare in this chapter is objectivist naturalism, according to which the non‐moral properties are objective. Naturalism, Hare argues, results inevitably in relativism, and any ethical theory that implies relativism must be rejected.
R. M. Hare
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250326
- eISBN:
- 9780191597602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250320.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The thesis of Emotivism, a species of non‐descriptivism, is that there is more to the meaning of moral statements than syntax and truth conditions; in particular, moral statements have an expressive, ...
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The thesis of Emotivism, a species of non‐descriptivism, is that there is more to the meaning of moral statements than syntax and truth conditions; in particular, moral statements have an expressive, and a causative aspect. Drawing upon J. L. Austin's distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, Hare argues that emotivists try to explain the meaning of moral statements, which they assimilate to imperatives, in terms of their perlocutionary effect. The difficulty with this is that, firstly, the emotivists hold a false theory of imperatives, and secondly, perlocutionary effect cannot explain meaning. Furthermore, emotivists deny the possibility of rational moral argument, and therefore embrace irrationalism. Towards the end of this chapter, Hare identifies six essential features of moral language, and its logic, that must be recognized and accounted for by an adequate moral theory: (1) Neutrality, (2) Practicality, (3) Incompatibility, (4) Logicality, (5) Arguability, and (6) Conciliation.Less
The thesis of Emotivism, a species of non‐descriptivism, is that there is more to the meaning of moral statements than syntax and truth conditions; in particular, moral statements have an expressive, and a causative aspect. Drawing upon J. L. Austin's distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, Hare argues that emotivists try to explain the meaning of moral statements, which they assimilate to imperatives, in terms of their perlocutionary effect. The difficulty with this is that, firstly, the emotivists hold a false theory of imperatives, and secondly, perlocutionary effect cannot explain meaning. Furthermore, emotivists deny the possibility of rational moral argument, and therefore embrace irrationalism. Towards the end of this chapter, Hare identifies six essential features of moral language, and its logic, that must be recognized and accounted for by an adequate moral theory: (1) Neutrality, (2) Practicality, (3) Incompatibility, (4) Logicality, (5) Arguability, and (6) Conciliation.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145281
- eISBN:
- 9780199833702
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145283.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The chapter explains the idea that names are rigid designators, and how it is used in Kripke's modal argument against the view that names are synonymous with descriptions associated with them by ...
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The chapter explains the idea that names are rigid designators, and how it is used in Kripke's modal argument against the view that names are synonymous with descriptions associated with them by speakers. The modal argument is defended against the two leading attempts to circumvent it and reinstate descriptivism – one which claims that names are rigidified descriptions, and the other which claims that they are descriptions that are required to take wide scope when embedded in modal (but not epistemic) constructions. These views are refuted, with the result that Kripke's original modal argument is strengthened and extended so as to constitute a decisive objection to all standard forms of descriptivism. However, this result is shown to be compatible with the possibility that there may be a class of linguistically complex, partially descriptive proper names, like Princeton University, the meanings of which include some descriptive elements.Less
The chapter explains the idea that names are rigid designators, and how it is used in Kripke's modal argument against the view that names are synonymous with descriptions associated with them by speakers. The modal argument is defended against the two leading attempts to circumvent it and reinstate descriptivism – one which claims that names are rigidified descriptions, and the other which claims that they are descriptions that are required to take wide scope when embedded in modal (but not epistemic) constructions. These views are refuted, with the result that Kripke's original modal argument is strengthened and extended so as to constitute a decisive objection to all standard forms of descriptivism. However, this result is shown to be compatible with the possibility that there may be a class of linguistically complex, partially descriptive proper names, like Princeton University, the meanings of which include some descriptive elements.
Frank Jackson
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250616
- eISBN:
- 9780191597787
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250614.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter gives more detail on how to identify ethical properties with descriptive ones using the roles the former play in folk morality. The construction uses the Lewis–Carnap–Ramsey way of ...
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This chapter gives more detail on how to identify ethical properties with descriptive ones using the roles the former play in folk morality. The construction uses the Lewis–Carnap–Ramsey way of defining theoretical terms and implies that ethical terms are analyzable in descriptive terms. This approach is contrasted with Cornell Realism, and there is discussion of the open‐question argument and how belief about ethical properties connects with motivation on the version of analytical descriptivism being defended.Less
This chapter gives more detail on how to identify ethical properties with descriptive ones using the roles the former play in folk morality. The construction uses the Lewis–Carnap–Ramsey way of defining theoretical terms and implies that ethical terms are analyzable in descriptive terms. This approach is contrasted with Cornell Realism, and there is discussion of the open‐question argument and how belief about ethical properties connects with motivation on the version of analytical descriptivism being defended.
R. M. Hare
- Published in print:
- 1981
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198246602
- eISBN:
- 9780191597596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198246609.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Hare explicates descriptivism and J. L. Mackie's error theory and explains what is wrong with them with respect to moral disagreement and the prescriptive force of moral terms. The meaning of moral ...
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Hare explicates descriptivism and J. L. Mackie's error theory and explains what is wrong with them with respect to moral disagreement and the prescriptive force of moral terms. The meaning of moral words, and their logic, lead us to believe that moral judgements are universal or universalizable prescriptions that are either overriding or related to overriding principles. When ordinary people use moral words, they are not intending to ascribe objective prescriptive properties to action. They are, in fact, intending to ascribe ordinary descriptive properties like the property of being, or the breaking of a promise. However, as a result of this state of affairs, individuals can very easily fall into the conceptual error of thinking that there are objective prescriptive properties. Hare seeks to show why philosophers make this mistake.Less
Hare explicates descriptivism and J. L. Mackie's error theory and explains what is wrong with them with respect to moral disagreement and the prescriptive force of moral terms. The meaning of moral words, and their logic, lead us to believe that moral judgements are universal or universalizable prescriptions that are either overriding or related to overriding principles. When ordinary people use moral words, they are not intending to ascribe objective prescriptive properties to action. They are, in fact, intending to ascribe ordinary descriptive properties like the property of being, or the breaking of a promise. However, as a result of this state of affairs, individuals can very easily fall into the conceptual error of thinking that there are objective prescriptive properties. Hare seeks to show why philosophers make this mistake.
R. M. Hare
- Published in print:
- 1965
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198810926
- eISBN:
- 9780191597589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019881092X.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Outlines the features of descriptive terms and judgements. The role played by descriptive meaning in moral statements is elucidated by examining the general nature of descriptivist statements and the ...
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Outlines the features of descriptive terms and judgements. The role played by descriptive meaning in moral statements is elucidated by examining the general nature of descriptivist statements and the connection with universalizability. It is argued that any singular descriptive judgement is universalizable in the sense that it commits the speaker to making the same judgement about relevantly similar subjects. Value judgements and generally descriptive judgements share descriptive content and are therefore universalizable in the same way. But in the case of moral judgements, the universal rules that determine the descriptive meaning are not mere meaning‐rules, but rules of substance. The logical connections between descriptivism, prescriptivism, naturalism, and the thesis of universalizability are explored.Less
Outlines the features of descriptive terms and judgements. The role played by descriptive meaning in moral statements is elucidated by examining the general nature of descriptivist statements and the connection with universalizability. It is argued that any singular descriptive judgement is universalizable in the sense that it commits the speaker to making the same judgement about relevantly similar subjects. Value judgements and generally descriptive judgements share descriptive content and are therefore universalizable in the same way. But in the case of moral judgements, the universal rules that determine the descriptive meaning are not mere meaning‐rules, but rules of substance. The logical connections between descriptivism, prescriptivism, naturalism, and the thesis of universalizability are explored.
LaPorte Joseph
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199609208
- eISBN:
- 9780191745027
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609208.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
In this chapter, it is argued that the distinction defended in chapter 1 is a genuine rigid — nonrigid distinction because it assigns the right role to rigidity and nonrigidity. Rigidity performs the ...
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In this chapter, it is argued that the distinction defended in chapter 1 is a genuine rigid — nonrigid distinction because it assigns the right role to rigidity and nonrigidity. Rigidity performs the right duties: principally supporting the necessity and contingency of identity statements containing the right combination of rigid and nonrigid designators. Several other alleged duties have been said to belong to rigidity's role: these are rejected as not properly belonging to rigidity. They include securing essential property attributions, like ‘white is a color’, securing externalism, securing aposteriority, refuting descriptivism, and securing linguistic stability. None of these are really central to rigidity's role so it does not matter that rigidity does not perform them or perform them well.Less
In this chapter, it is argued that the distinction defended in chapter 1 is a genuine rigid — nonrigid distinction because it assigns the right role to rigidity and nonrigidity. Rigidity performs the right duties: principally supporting the necessity and contingency of identity statements containing the right combination of rigid and nonrigid designators. Several other alleged duties have been said to belong to rigidity's role: these are rejected as not properly belonging to rigidity. They include securing essential property attributions, like ‘white is a color’, securing externalism, securing aposteriority, refuting descriptivism, and securing linguistic stability. None of these are really central to rigidity's role so it does not matter that rigidity does not perform them or perform them well.
