Derek Parfit
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198778608
- eISBN:
- 9780191853487
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0020
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter introduces a number of claims. If we are not act consequentialists, we may think that we could always reasonably want and hope that things will go in the ways that would be best and that ...
More
This chapter introduces a number of claims. If we are not act consequentialists, we may think that we could always reasonably want and hope that things will go in the ways that would be best and that it would often be best if some people acted wrongly. Therefore we could often reasonably want and hope that some people will act wrongly. Act consequentialists claim that, when it would be best if people acted in some way, this fact would make this act right. Some other people claim that the badness of any wrong act would prevent this act from making things go best. This second claim is false. Some wrong acts make things go better by preventing several other similar wrong acts. There are other wrong acts, most of us believe, that would make things go best.Less
This chapter introduces a number of claims. If we are not act consequentialists, we may think that we could always reasonably want and hope that things will go in the ways that would be best and that it would often be best if some people acted wrongly. Therefore we could often reasonably want and hope that some people will act wrongly. Act consequentialists claim that, when it would be best if people acted in some way, this fact would make this act right. Some other people claim that the badness of any wrong act would prevent this act from making things go best. This second claim is false. Some wrong acts make things go better by preventing several other similar wrong acts. There are other wrong acts, most of us believe, that would make things go best.
Derek Parfit
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198778608
- eISBN:
- 9780191853487
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0022
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter reveals some insights into act consequentialism. It begins with the claim that it would often be wrong to treat people in certain ways, such as deceiving or coercing them, or breaking ...
More
This chapter reveals some insights into act consequentialism. It begins with the claim that it would often be wrong to treat people in certain ways, such as deceiving or coercing them, or breaking our promises to them, even when such acts would make things go better. The chapter then turns to deontic and non-deontic badness. These are different kinds of badness, as is shown by cases in which such acts are not wrong, because their non-deontic badness is outweighed by the goodness of their effects. Since these acts would have this intrinsic badness, though they would not be wrong, it could not be their wrongness that made them intrinsically bad.Less
This chapter reveals some insights into act consequentialism. It begins with the claim that it would often be wrong to treat people in certain ways, such as deceiving or coercing them, or breaking our promises to them, even when such acts would make things go better. The chapter then turns to deontic and non-deontic badness. These are different kinds of badness, as is shown by cases in which such acts are not wrong, because their non-deontic badness is outweighed by the goodness of their effects. Since these acts would have this intrinsic badness, though they would not be wrong, it could not be their wrongness that made them intrinsically bad.
