Jody Azzouni
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199738946
- eISBN:
- 9780199866175
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738946.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Ordinary language and scientific language enable us to speak about, in a singular way (with demonstratives and names), what we recognize not to exist: fictions, the contents of our hallucinations, ...
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Ordinary language and scientific language enable us to speak about, in a singular way (with demonstratives and names), what we recognize not to exist: fictions, the contents of our hallucinations, abstract objects, and various idealized nonexistent objects to which our scientific theories more conveniently apply. Indeed, references to such nonexistent items—especially in the case of the application of mathematics to the sciences—are indispensable. Scientific and ordinary languages allow us to say things about Pegasus or about hallucinated objects that are true (or false) such as “Pegasus was believed by the ancient Greeks to be a flying horse,” or “That elf I’m now hallucinating over there is wearing blue shoes.” Standard contemporary metaphysical views and standard contemporary philosophical semantic analyses of singular idioms have not successfully accommodated these routine practices of saying true and false things about the nonexistent while simultaneously honoring the insight that such things do not exist in any way at all (and have no properties). This book reconfigures metaphysics and semantics in a radical way to allow the accommodation of our ordinary ways of speaking of what does not exist while retaining the absolutely crucial assumption that such objects exist in no way at all, have no properties, and so are not the truth-makers for the truths and falsities that are about them.Less
Ordinary language and scientific language enable us to speak about, in a singular way (with demonstratives and names), what we recognize not to exist: fictions, the contents of our hallucinations, abstract objects, and various idealized nonexistent objects to which our scientific theories more conveniently apply. Indeed, references to such nonexistent items—especially in the case of the application of mathematics to the sciences—are indispensable. Scientific and ordinary languages allow us to say things about Pegasus or about hallucinated objects that are true (or false) such as “Pegasus was believed by the ancient Greeks to be a flying horse,” or “That elf I’m now hallucinating over there is wearing blue shoes.” Standard contemporary metaphysical views and standard contemporary philosophical semantic analyses of singular idioms have not successfully accommodated these routine practices of saying true and false things about the nonexistent while simultaneously honoring the insight that such things do not exist in any way at all (and have no properties). This book reconfigures metaphysics and semantics in a radical way to allow the accommodation of our ordinary ways of speaking of what does not exist while retaining the absolutely crucial assumption that such objects exist in no way at all, have no properties, and so are not the truth-makers for the truths and falsities that are about them.
Emma Borg
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199270255
- eISBN:
- 9780191601477
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199270252.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Seeks to defend a formal (e.g. truth-conditional) approach to semantic theorizing from advocates of so-called ‘dual pragmatics’ (e.g. relevance theorists or contextualists). I argue, first, that ...
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Seeks to defend a formal (e.g. truth-conditional) approach to semantic theorizing from advocates of so-called ‘dual pragmatics’ (e.g. relevance theorists or contextualists). I argue, first, that formal semantics is preferable to pragmatically saturated approaches since only formal accounts are compatible with a modularity view of linguistic understanding (a view which is itself, I suggest, independently well motivated). Secondly, I contend that the arguments currently on the table in favour of dual pragmatics fail to show that formal semantics should be abandoned. These arguments for dual pragmatics stem from the existence of overt context-sensitivity in natural languages (for instance, in the form of indexicals and demonstratives) and the purported existence of covert context-sensitivity (in the form of ‘unarticulated constituents’). I look at these arguments in detail and suggest how the formal theorist can accommodate the apparent intrusion of pragmatics into the semantic realm. My defence of formal semantics holds, however, only given an appreciation of what I deem to be the limits of semantic theorizing. Thus, I argue overall for a minimal conception of the nature of semantic theories.Less
Seeks to defend a formal (e.g. truth-conditional) approach to semantic theorizing from advocates of so-called ‘dual pragmatics’ (e.g. relevance theorists or contextualists). I argue, first, that formal semantics is preferable to pragmatically saturated approaches since only formal accounts are compatible with a modularity view of linguistic understanding (a view which is itself, I suggest, independently well motivated). Secondly, I contend that the arguments currently on the table in favour of dual pragmatics fail to show that formal semantics should be abandoned. These arguments for dual pragmatics stem from the existence of overt context-sensitivity in natural languages (for instance, in the form of indexicals and demonstratives) and the purported existence of covert context-sensitivity (in the form of ‘unarticulated constituents’). I look at these arguments in detail and suggest how the formal theorist can accommodate the apparent intrusion of pragmatics into the semantic realm. My defence of formal semantics holds, however, only given an appreciation of what I deem to be the limits of semantic theorizing. Thus, I argue overall for a minimal conception of the nature of semantic theories.
John Hawthorne and David Manley
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693672
- eISBN:
- 9780191739002
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693672.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
This book critically examines some widespread views about the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. It begins by denying that either is tied to a special ...
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This book critically examines some widespread views about the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. It begins by denying that either is tied to a special relation of causal or epistemic acquaintance. It goes on to challenge the alleged semantic rift between definite and indefinite descriptions on the one hand, and names and demonstratives on the other—a division that has been motivated in part by appeals to considerations of acquaintance. Drawing on recent work in semantics, a more unified account of all four types of expression is explored, according to which none of them paradigmatically fits the profile of a referential term. The authors argue that all four involve existential quantification but admit of uses that exhibit many of the traits associated with reference—a phenomenon that is due to the presence of what we call a ‘singular restriction’ on the existentially quantified domain. The Afterword draws out some implications of the proposed semantic picture for the traditional categories of reference and singular thought.Less
This book critically examines some widespread views about the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. It begins by denying that either is tied to a special relation of causal or epistemic acquaintance. It goes on to challenge the alleged semantic rift between definite and indefinite descriptions on the one hand, and names and demonstratives on the other—a division that has been motivated in part by appeals to considerations of acquaintance. Drawing on recent work in semantics, a more unified account of all four types of expression is explored, according to which none of them paradigmatically fits the profile of a referential term. The authors argue that all four involve existential quantification but admit of uses that exhibit many of the traits associated with reference—a phenomenon that is due to the presence of what we call a ‘singular restriction’ on the existentially quantified domain. The Afterword draws out some implications of the proposed semantic picture for the traditional categories of reference and singular thought.
R. M. Sainsbury
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199241804
- eISBN:
- 9780191602696
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241805.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book concerns the nature of reference, and the theory it develops is intermediate between direct reference theories and descriptivist theories. A guiding thought is that just as truth conditions ...
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This book concerns the nature of reference, and the theory it develops is intermediate between direct reference theories and descriptivist theories. A guiding thought is that just as truth conditions (rather than truth values) can throw light on the meaning of sentences so can reference conditions (rather than referents) throw light on the meaning of referring expressions. A reference condition need not be a descriptive condition, and it need not be satisfied. The first of these points marks the divergence from descriptivist theories, and the second, from direct reference theories. This idea is applied to proper names, pronouns, and definite descriptions (singular, plural and mass); problems of existential and fictional sentences are addressed; and, in the final chapter, an analogue of the main idea is applied to mental content.Less
This book concerns the nature of reference, and the theory it develops is intermediate between direct reference theories and descriptivist theories. A guiding thought is that just as truth conditions (rather than truth values) can throw light on the meaning of sentences so can reference conditions (rather than referents) throw light on the meaning of referring expressions. A reference condition need not be a descriptive condition, and it need not be satisfied. The first of these points marks the divergence from descriptivist theories, and the second, from direct reference theories. This idea is applied to proper names, pronouns, and definite descriptions (singular, plural and mass); problems of existential and fictional sentences are addressed; and, in the final chapter, an analogue of the main idea is applied to mental content.
Austen Clark
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198238515
- eISBN:
- 9780191679650
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238515.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book offers a general account of the forms of mental representation that we call ‘sensory’. To sense something, one must have some capacity to discriminate among sensory qualities; but there are ...
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This book offers a general account of the forms of mental representation that we call ‘sensory’. To sense something, one must have some capacity to discriminate among sensory qualities; but there are other requirements. What are they, and how can they be put together to yield full-blown sensing? Drawing on the findings of current neuroscience, the author proposes and defends the hypothesis that the various modalities of sensation share a generic form that he calls ‘feature-placing’. Sensing proceeds by picking out place-times in or around the body of the sentient organism, and characterizing qualities (features) that appear at those place-times. Such feature-placing is a primitive kind — probably the most primitive kind — of mental representation. Once its peculiarities have been described, many of the puzzles about the intentionality of sensation, and the phenomena that lead some to label it ‘pseudo-intentional’, can be resolved. The hypothesis casts light on many other troublesome phenomena, including the varieties of illusion, the problem of projection, the notion of a visual field, the location of after-images, the existence of sense-data, and the role of perceptual demonstratives.Less
This book offers a general account of the forms of mental representation that we call ‘sensory’. To sense something, one must have some capacity to discriminate among sensory qualities; but there are other requirements. What are they, and how can they be put together to yield full-blown sensing? Drawing on the findings of current neuroscience, the author proposes and defends the hypothesis that the various modalities of sensation share a generic form that he calls ‘feature-placing’. Sensing proceeds by picking out place-times in or around the body of the sentient organism, and characterizing qualities (features) that appear at those place-times. Such feature-placing is a primitive kind — probably the most primitive kind — of mental representation. Once its peculiarities have been described, many of the puzzles about the intentionality of sensation, and the phenomena that lead some to label it ‘pseudo-intentional’, can be resolved. The hypothesis casts light on many other troublesome phenomena, including the varieties of illusion, the problem of projection, the notion of a visual field, the location of after-images, the existence of sense-data, and the role of perceptual demonstratives.
John Campbell
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199243815
- eISBN:
- 9780191597145
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199243816.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Conscious attention to an object, singling it out in experience, provides knowledge of the reference of a demonstrative term. Knowledge of reference is the foundation of the ability to verify ...
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Conscious attention to an object, singling it out in experience, provides knowledge of the reference of a demonstrative term. Knowledge of reference is the foundation of the ability to verify propositions about the object and of the ability to act on the object. To understand the relations between knowledge of reference, verification, and action, we have to look at the relations between conscious attention, visual information processing, and the motor system.Why should it be specifically conscious attention that provides the knowledge of reference? Knowledge of reference demands acquaintance with the individual, categorical substances around us, and not merely collections of affordances. I argue that only experience of objects can provide this kind of acquaintance with individual substances.The approach is extended beyond understanding one's own uses of visual demonstratives to cases of joint attention and to memory demonstratives. The approach has implications for Dummett's anti‐realism and Quine's theses of inscrutability and indeterminacy. The book concludes with remarks on the metaphysics of individual substances.Less
Conscious attention to an object, singling it out in experience, provides knowledge of the reference of a demonstrative term. Knowledge of reference is the foundation of the ability to verify propositions about the object and of the ability to act on the object. To understand the relations between knowledge of reference, verification, and action, we have to look at the relations between conscious attention, visual information processing, and the motor system.
Why should it be specifically conscious attention that provides the knowledge of reference? Knowledge of reference demands acquaintance with the individual, categorical substances around us, and not merely collections of affordances. I argue that only experience of objects can provide this kind of acquaintance with individual substances.
The approach is extended beyond understanding one's own uses of visual demonstratives to cases of joint attention and to memory demonstratives. The approach has implications for Dummett's anti‐realism and Quine's theses of inscrutability and indeterminacy. The book concludes with remarks on the metaphysics of individual substances.
Janet Levin
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195171655
- eISBN:
- 9780199871339
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter presents a version of the phenomenal concept strategy based on a limited defense of the “demonstrative account” of phenomenal concepts. In this account, phenomenal concepts pick out ...
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This chapter presents a version of the phenomenal concept strategy based on a limited defense of the “demonstrative account” of phenomenal concepts. In this account, phenomenal concepts pick out their referents directly, much like demonstratives, without mediation by any mode of presentation. It is argued that this shows that many type-B materialists appeal to this account to help explain why there is an epistemic gap but no metaphysical gap, and that the account can meet objections present elsewhere. It is further argued that recent emendations to the account, including those by Katalin Balog, Block, Papineau, and Levine, concede too much to the antiphysicalists while accomplishing too little. Demonstrative theorists are urged to return to their roots.Less
This chapter presents a version of the phenomenal concept strategy based on a limited defense of the “demonstrative account” of phenomenal concepts. In this account, phenomenal concepts pick out their referents directly, much like demonstratives, without mediation by any mode of presentation. It is argued that this shows that many type-B materialists appeal to this account to help explain why there is an epistemic gap but no metaphysical gap, and that the account can meet objections present elsewhere. It is further argued that recent emendations to the account, including those by Katalin Balog, Block, Papineau, and Levine, concede too much to the antiphysicalists while accomplishing too little. Demonstrative theorists are urged to return to their roots.
Nathan Salmon
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199284726
- eISBN:
- 9780191713774
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This volume brings together Nathan Salmon's papers from the early 1980s to 2006 on closely connected topics central to analytic philosophy, on the theory of direct reference, names and descriptions, ...
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This volume brings together Nathan Salmon's papers from the early 1980s to 2006 on closely connected topics central to analytic philosophy, on the theory of direct reference, names and descriptions, demonstratives, reflexivity, propositional attitudes, apriority, meaning and use, and more generally, the distinction between semantics and pragmatics.Less
This volume brings together Nathan Salmon's papers from the early 1980s to 2006 on closely connected topics central to analytic philosophy, on the theory of direct reference, names and descriptions, demonstratives, reflexivity, propositional attitudes, apriority, meaning and use, and more generally, the distinction between semantics and pragmatics.
Nathan Salmon
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199284726
- eISBN:
- 9780191713774
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter investigates the philosophical semantics of demonstratives. It is argued that Kaplan endorses Frege's thesis that a demonstration supplements a demonstrative (the bare expression) to ...
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This chapter investigates the philosophical semantics of demonstratives. It is argued that Kaplan endorses Frege's thesis that a demonstration supplements a demonstrative (the bare expression) to form the complete expression, while embracing the anti-Fregean thesis that demonstratives are directly referential. Against the former it is argued that demonstrations form part of the context, not the expression, and that consequently demonstratives are pure indexicals. A semantic rule for complex demonstratives is proposed and its philosophical implications explored.Less
This chapter investigates the philosophical semantics of demonstratives. It is argued that Kaplan endorses Frege's thesis that a demonstration supplements a demonstrative (the bare expression) to form the complete expression, while embracing the anti-Fregean thesis that demonstratives are directly referential. Against the former it is argued that demonstrations form part of the context, not the expression, and that consequently demonstratives are pure indexicals. A semantic rule for complex demonstratives is proposed and its philosophical implications explored.
Rosanna Keefe
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199570386
- eISBN:
- 9780191722134
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0021
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Can supervaluationism successfully handle indirect speech reports? This chapter considers and rejects Schiffer's claim that they cannot. One alleged problem with indirect speech reports is that the ...
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Can supervaluationism successfully handle indirect speech reports? This chapter considers and rejects Schiffer's claim that they cannot. One alleged problem with indirect speech reports is that the truth of ‘Carla said that Bob is tall’ implausibly requires that Carla said all of a huge number of precise things (i.e. that Bob was over n feet tall, for values of n corresponding to precisifications of ‘tall’). This chapter shows why the supervaluationist is not committed to this. It argues that vague singular terms are no particular problem for supervaluationism within indirect speech reports, but there remain some issues surrounding certain vague demonstratives. The supervaluationist has good responses available, however, and any remaining questions face all theories of vagueness and are more appropriately addressed within a theory of demonstratives rather than a theory of vagueness.Less
Can supervaluationism successfully handle indirect speech reports? This chapter considers and rejects Schiffer's claim that they cannot. One alleged problem with indirect speech reports is that the truth of ‘Carla said that Bob is tall’ implausibly requires that Carla said all of a huge number of precise things (i.e. that Bob was over n feet tall, for values of n corresponding to precisifications of ‘tall’). This chapter shows why the supervaluationist is not committed to this. It argues that vague singular terms are no particular problem for supervaluationism within indirect speech reports, but there remain some issues surrounding certain vague demonstratives. The supervaluationist has good responses available, however, and any remaining questions face all theories of vagueness and are more appropriately addressed within a theory of demonstratives rather than a theory of vagueness.
Kent Bach
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331639
- eISBN:
- 9780199867981
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331639.003.0002
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
The notions of linguistic reference and speaker reference are commonly used very loosely. In many cases what passes for reference falls short of it, and in many other cases a speaker uses an ...
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The notions of linguistic reference and speaker reference are commonly used very loosely. In many cases what passes for reference falls short of it, and in many other cases a speaker uses an expression to refer without the expression itself referring. Indexicals, demonstratives, proper names, and definite descriptions (and even indefinites) can all be used to refer, but they can all be used non-referentially as well. This chapter sets out criteria on the topic of what it takes for an expression to refer and for a speaker to refer in using an expression. It sketches out what is involved in conveying a reference and in understanding one, by explaining the roles of the speaker's intention, the hearer's inference, and the context of utterance.Less
The notions of linguistic reference and speaker reference are commonly used very loosely. In many cases what passes for reference falls short of it, and in many other cases a speaker uses an expression to refer without the expression itself referring. Indexicals, demonstratives, proper names, and definite descriptions (and even indefinites) can all be used to refer, but they can all be used non-referentially as well. This chapter sets out criteria on the topic of what it takes for an expression to refer and for a speaker to refer in using an expression. It sketches out what is involved in conveying a reference and in understanding one, by explaining the roles of the speaker's intention, the hearer's inference, and the context of utterance.
Donna K. Byron, Sarah Brown-Schmidt, and Michael K. Tanenhaus
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331639
- eISBN:
- 9780199867981
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331639.003.0007
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This chapter explores pragmatic distinctions between personal pronouns such as ‘it’ and demonstrative pronouns such as ‘that’ in English. These two categories of pronoun are typically employed in ...
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This chapter explores pragmatic distinctions between personal pronouns such as ‘it’ and demonstrative pronouns such as ‘that’ in English. These two categories of pronoun are typically employed in contexts that vary based on how attentionally prominent the pronoun's referent is; however, many authors have observed that they are occasionally used by speakers in contexts where the other pronoun would have been predicted. This chapter analyzes such cases using data from two studies, and concludes that the attentional salience is only one of a set of factors that comes into play when a speaker chooses which pronominal form to employ. Conceptual structures used by the addressee in interpretation can override the normal implication of salience signaled by the pronoun's category.Less
This chapter explores pragmatic distinctions between personal pronouns such as ‘it’ and demonstrative pronouns such as ‘that’ in English. These two categories of pronoun are typically employed in contexts that vary based on how attentionally prominent the pronoun's referent is; however, many authors have observed that they are occasionally used by speakers in contexts where the other pronoun would have been predicted. This chapter analyzes such cases using data from two studies, and concludes that the attentional salience is only one of a set of factors that comes into play when a speaker chooses which pronominal form to employ. Conceptual structures used by the addressee in interpretation can override the normal implication of salience signaled by the pronoun's category.
Massimo Poesio
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331639
- eISBN:
- 9780199867981
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331639.003.0009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
Reliable techniques were developed to annotate corpora with the information to test several instantiations of Centering, and software that could be used to automatically compute CFs and CB of ...
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Reliable techniques were developed to annotate corpora with the information to test several instantiations of Centering, and software that could be used to automatically compute CFs and CB of utterances according to a variety of proposals.These methods were then used to evaluate several claims concerning discourse topics. Support was found for a variant of proposals by Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski concerning when demonstratives will be used to realize a discourse entity. Secondly, it was found that the transitions in which CB=CP are most predictive of subject pronominalization. The third studyrevealed a clear, but not very predictive, correlation between segment boundaries and the use of `discontinuous' transitions in which one or both of the utterances have no CB. Finally, support was found for the claim by Hitzeman and Poesio that only entities that have been CBs serve as the antecedent of long-distance pronouns.Less
Reliable techniques were developed to annotate corpora with the information to test several instantiations of Centering, and software that could be used to automatically compute CFs and CB of utterances according to a variety of proposals.These methods were then used to evaluate several claims concerning discourse topics. Support was found for a variant of proposals by Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski concerning when demonstratives will be used to realize a discourse entity. Secondly, it was found that the transitions in which CB=CP are most predictive of subject pronominalization. The third studyrevealed a clear, but not very predictive, correlation between segment boundaries and the use of `discontinuous' transitions in which one or both of the utterances have no CB. Finally, support was found for the claim by Hitzeman and Poesio that only entities that have been CBs serve as the antecedent of long-distance pronouns.
Ronald W. Langacker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331967
- eISBN:
- 9780199868209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331967.003.0009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
Grounding is the grammaticized means of relating the thing profiled by a nominal, or the process profiled by a finite clause, to the ground (the speech event and its participants). As narrowly ...
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Grounding is the grammaticized means of relating the thing profiled by a nominal, or the process profiled by a finite clause, to the ground (the speech event and its participants). As narrowly defined, grounding elements make very fundamental specifications of a basically epistemic nature. Moreover, they construe the ground subjectively—leaving it implicit as the offstage locus of conception—with the profiled entity being the focused, onstage object of conception. Whereas a lexical noun or verb merely names a type of thing or process, a full nominal or finite clause designates and grounds an instance of the type. An instance differs from a type by being thought of as having a particular location in the domain of instantiation, one that distinguishes it from other instances. The profiled instance is not necessarily an actual individual, but may also be a virtual (or fictive) entity confined to a special mental space. A nominal referent is generally identified through a combination of description, which selects a set of eligible candidates, and grounding, which directs attention to a member of this set. Two basic grounding strategies are deixis (abstract pointing) and quantification. The deictic grounding elements—demonstratives and the definite article—are definite: they single out the intended referent independently of the content of the clause containing the nominal. By contrast, with indefinite grounding elements the referent is initially virtual, pending its identification by means of the clausal content (in the case of indefinite articles), or is necessarily virtual (in the case of quantifiers). Clausal grounding is less concerned with identification than with existence, i.e. whether or not an event occurs. For English the basic grounding elements are tense and the modals. The tense opposition present vs. past is a special case of the more schematic value of immediate vs. non-immediate (with respect to the ground). The absence of a modal indicates that the speaker accepts the profiled occurrence as part of the speaker's conception of reality. The presence of a modal indicates that it does not yet have this status, but is still a target for realization. The choice of modal registers the impetus for speaker control, which occurs on either of two levels: effective vs. epistemic control (corresponding to root vs. epistemic modals).Less
Grounding is the grammaticized means of relating the thing profiled by a nominal, or the process profiled by a finite clause, to the ground (the speech event and its participants). As narrowly defined, grounding elements make very fundamental specifications of a basically epistemic nature. Moreover, they construe the ground subjectively—leaving it implicit as the offstage locus of conception—with the profiled entity being the focused, onstage object of conception. Whereas a lexical noun or verb merely names a type of thing or process, a full nominal or finite clause designates and grounds an instance of the type. An instance differs from a type by being thought of as having a particular location in the domain of instantiation, one that distinguishes it from other instances. The profiled instance is not necessarily an actual individual, but may also be a virtual (or fictive) entity confined to a special mental space. A nominal referent is generally identified through a combination of description, which selects a set of eligible candidates, and grounding, which directs attention to a member of this set. Two basic grounding strategies are deixis (abstract pointing) and quantification. The deictic grounding elements—demonstratives and the definite article—are definite: they single out the intended referent independently of the content of the clause containing the nominal. By contrast, with indefinite grounding elements the referent is initially virtual, pending its identification by means of the clausal content (in the case of indefinite articles), or is necessarily virtual (in the case of quantifiers). Clausal grounding is less concerned with identification than with existence, i.e. whether or not an event occurs. For English the basic grounding elements are tense and the modals. The tense opposition present vs. past is a special case of the more schematic value of immediate vs. non-immediate (with respect to the ground). The absence of a modal indicates that the speaker accepts the profiled occurrence as part of the speaker's conception of reality. The presence of a modal indicates that it does not yet have this status, but is still a target for realization. The choice of modal registers the impetus for speaker control, which occurs on either of two levels: effective vs. epistemic control (corresponding to root vs. epistemic modals).
A. M. Devine and Laurence D. Stephens
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195181685
- eISBN:
- 9780199789146
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195181685.003.0006
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Prose and Writers: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This chapter analyzes the interaction of semantic and pragmatic factors in conditioning the order of adjectives relative to the noun and of stacked adjectives relative to one another. It covers ...
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This chapter analyzes the interaction of semantic and pragmatic factors in conditioning the order of adjectives relative to the noun and of stacked adjectives relative to one another. It covers intersectives, adjectives of age, evaluation and measure, as well as some quantifiers and demonstratives.Less
This chapter analyzes the interaction of semantic and pragmatic factors in conditioning the order of adjectives relative to the noun and of stacked adjectives relative to one another. It covers intersectives, adjectives of age, evaluation and measure, as well as some quantifiers and demonstratives.
Bernd Heine and Tania Kuteva
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199297337
- eISBN:
- 9780191711220
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297337.003.0003
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This chapter is devoted to one particular functional domain: that of definite and indefinite reference. Specifically, it concerns the system of articles found in European languages. Obligatory ...
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This chapter is devoted to one particular functional domain: that of definite and indefinite reference. Specifically, it concerns the system of articles found in European languages. Obligatory markers for definite and indefinite reference are cross-linguistically not very common. In the languages of (western) Europe, however, they are a salient structural characteristic. This has not always been the case: two millennia ago there were essentially no real articles in the languages of Europe. The main goal of the chapter is to show how articles are spreading throughout Europe.Less
This chapter is devoted to one particular functional domain: that of definite and indefinite reference. Specifically, it concerns the system of articles found in European languages. Obligatory markers for definite and indefinite reference are cross-linguistically not very common. In the languages of (western) Europe, however, they are a salient structural characteristic. This has not always been the case: two millennia ago there were essentially no real articles in the languages of Europe. The main goal of the chapter is to show how articles are spreading throughout Europe.
John Hawthorne and David Manley
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693672
- eISBN:
- 9780191739002
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693672.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter considers demonstratives and proper names. It begins by arguing for a semantically unified treatment of demonstratives on which they are specific existentials (like specific indefinites ...
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This chapter considers demonstratives and proper names. It begins by arguing for a semantically unified treatment of demonstratives on which they are specific existentials (like specific indefinites and definite descriptions) but have their own distinctive presuppositional profile. Next, the chapter turns to the category of proper names and their various uses. The authors acknowledge that there are shortcomings to semantic orthodoxy, which treats proper names as paradigmatically referential tags, and that standard Kripkean modal arguments are ineffectual against the view that all proper names are semantically predicative. However, the authors finally reject the predicative view in favor of a new alternative to semantic orthodoxy—one that fits well with their preferred accounts of various other noun phrases.Less
This chapter considers demonstratives and proper names. It begins by arguing for a semantically unified treatment of demonstratives on which they are specific existentials (like specific indefinites and definite descriptions) but have their own distinctive presuppositional profile. Next, the chapter turns to the category of proper names and their various uses. The authors acknowledge that there are shortcomings to semantic orthodoxy, which treats proper names as paradigmatically referential tags, and that standard Kripkean modal arguments are ineffectual against the view that all proper names are semantically predicative. However, the authors finally reject the predicative view in favor of a new alternative to semantic orthodoxy—one that fits well with their preferred accounts of various other noun phrases.
Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231195
- eISBN:
- 9780191710810
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231195.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter focuses on Donald Davidson's paper “Quotation”, which is the most discussed and influential paper on quotation. Davidson's view is alternatively called “the Demonstrative Theory of ...
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This chapter focuses on Donald Davidson's paper “Quotation”, which is the most discussed and influential paper on quotation. Davidson's view is alternatively called “the Demonstrative Theory of Quotation” or “the Paratactic Theory of Quotation”. The strengths and weaknesses of the Demonstrative Theory are discussed. It is argued that seen in its historical context, Davidson's proposal is extraordinarily interesting and highly original. It took into account data that no other theory at the time could accommodate, and took the device of quotation more seriously than any other theory at the time did. However, it is now time to leave that theory firmly behind. The subject has moved to a point where we are much clearer on the totality of data and the relevant facts about syntax and semantics than Davidson was. As a result, the Demonstrative Theory is no longer a useful starting point.Less
This chapter focuses on Donald Davidson's paper “Quotation”, which is the most discussed and influential paper on quotation. Davidson's view is alternatively called “the Demonstrative Theory of Quotation” or “the Paratactic Theory of Quotation”. The strengths and weaknesses of the Demonstrative Theory are discussed. It is argued that seen in its historical context, Davidson's proposal is extraordinarily interesting and highly original. It took into account data that no other theory at the time could accommodate, and took the device of quotation more seriously than any other theory at the time did. However, it is now time to leave that theory firmly behind. The subject has moved to a point where we are much clearer on the totality of data and the relevant facts about syntax and semantics than Davidson was. As a result, the Demonstrative Theory is no longer a useful starting point.
Paul Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195110333
- eISBN:
- 9780199872084
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195110333.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Although most philosophers would agree with the suggestion that Hume's treatment of the problem of causation “is the center‐piece of the Treatise” (or, at least, of Book I), they also generally hold ...
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Although most philosophers would agree with the suggestion that Hume's treatment of the problem of causation “is the center‐piece of the Treatise” (or, at least, of Book I), they also generally hold that Hume's views on causation in the Treatise are of little or no direct relevance to problems of natural religion. In contrast with this, many of Hume's early critics interpreted his views on causation as involving an “atheistic” or irreligious attack on the argument a priori—particularly as defended by Clarke and his followers. This chapter argues that Hume was well aware that his most distinguished adversaries had used Lucretius's (atheistic) maxim “nothing can come from nothing” to defend the cause of “superstition.” In opposition to this, Hume abandoned Lucretius's maxim and embraced its direct opposite: “any thing may produce any thing.” This “curious nostrum” served as Hume's principal weapon in his battle to discredit all efforts to use demonstrative reason to prove the existence of God.Less
Although most philosophers would agree with the suggestion that Hume's treatment of the problem of causation “is the center‐piece of the Treatise” (or, at least, of Book I), they also generally hold that Hume's views on causation in the Treatise are of little or no direct relevance to problems of natural religion. In contrast with this, many of Hume's early critics interpreted his views on causation as involving an “atheistic” or irreligious attack on the argument a priori—particularly as defended by Clarke and his followers. This chapter argues that Hume was well aware that his most distinguished adversaries had used Lucretius's (atheistic) maxim “nothing can come from nothing” to defend the cause of “superstition.” In opposition to this, Hume abandoned Lucretius's maxim and embraced its direct opposite: “any thing may produce any thing.” This “curious nostrum” served as Hume's principal weapon in his battle to discredit all efforts to use demonstrative reason to prove the existence of God.
Henry E. Allison
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199532889
- eISBN:
- 9780191714450
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199532889.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter provides an outline of the structure of Hume's epistemology, as presented in the first two sections of Part III of the first book of the Treatise. Whereas in the more familiar discussion ...
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This chapter provides an outline of the structure of Hume's epistemology, as presented in the first two sections of Part III of the first book of the Treatise. Whereas in the more familiar discussion in the Enquiry, Hume divides the epistemological terrain into two domains: ‘relations of ideas’, in which either intuitive or demonstrative knowledge is attainable; and ‘matters of fact’, in which it is not (often termed ‘Hume's Fork’), the present discussion focuses on the basically equivalent but more complex formulation in the Treatise in terms of two species of ‘philosophical relations’. The aim is to show how Hume's analysis is best seen as a modification of Locke's and is intimately connected with the perceptual model of cognition. In view of the latter, it is also argued that a priori knowledge for Hume is neither analytic nor synthetic in the Kantian sense.Less
This chapter provides an outline of the structure of Hume's epistemology, as presented in the first two sections of Part III of the first book of the Treatise. Whereas in the more familiar discussion in the Enquiry, Hume divides the epistemological terrain into two domains: ‘relations of ideas’, in which either intuitive or demonstrative knowledge is attainable; and ‘matters of fact’, in which it is not (often termed ‘Hume's Fork’), the present discussion focuses on the basically equivalent but more complex formulation in the Treatise in terms of two species of ‘philosophical relations’. The aim is to show how Hume's analysis is best seen as a modification of Locke's and is intimately connected with the perceptual model of cognition. In view of the latter, it is also argued that a priori knowledge for Hume is neither analytic nor synthetic in the Kantian sense.
