Search Results

This chapter examines Western powers’ democracy promotion strategies. It contrasts Western perceptions on democratic change in relation to three conceptually distinct security logics: managing states of strategic concern, the preservation of alliances, and the management of conflict within developing states. Support was forthcoming for very gradual processes of political change, through a combination of bottom-up direct initiatives and support for top-heavy political structures to manage reform processes.

Questions the assumptions underlying US democracy promotion policies, namely, that democracy is a self‐evident and uncontentious concept and that the US‐style democracy is applicable across different cultures and societies. It argues that the US promotes a formal electoral model of democracy that dissociates politics from its socio–economic setting and is designed to advance American economic interests in the global system.

The conclusions revisit the conceptual debates outlined in the first chapter in light of the study of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean and East Asia. The EU's efforts to develop deeply embedded institutionalized regimes based on democratic norms are conceptualized. The conclusion also examines the relationship between material interests and international norms in EU policies; the extent of internal EU coherence and coordination over democracy policies; and the implications of EU policies for theoretical explanations of the democratization's external dimensions.

This chapter outlines the nature of the instruments introduced by the EU pursuant to the democracy promotion commitment and examines the shortcomings and lacuna that remained in the range of policy tools available. The chapter describes the EU's new democracy aid provisions, its instruments of political conditionality, and the democracy‐related initiatives of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Different theories of integration are explored in relation to the development of the EU's presence as an international actor.

In charting European Union democracy promotion policy in the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership as it evolved during the 1990s, this chapter finds evidence of a genuinely new approach towards political change in the Mediterranean. The chapter analyses European approaches towards political Islam and security in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The analysis uncovers important ways in which EU measures were less than fully developed and argues that the EU failed fully to follow through the logic of its own change of approach.

This chapter presents an overview of European democracy promotion strategies in East Asia, in particular, within the ASEM process, and outlines the debates that emerged over the nature of European commercial and strategic interests during the 1990s. The contrast in strategies adopted towards individual Asian states is analysed, along with a more detailed examination of EU policy towards Indonesia both prior to and after the country's 1998 transition. A final section examines the European response to the Asian financial crisis and analyses the significance of this for the EU's democracy and good governance agenda.

Explores the many facets of democracy promotion as a grand foreign policy strategy during the Clinton administration. It argues that far from being a Wilsonian idealist, Clinton viewed democracy promotion as a pragmatic strategy to enhance US influence worldwide. In his integrated worldview, there was no necessary conflict between global order, market economics, and democracy promotion. All three were intimately connected and could reinforce each other.

Discusses the impact of public opinion upon American democracy promotion after the Cold War. It seeks to answer the following questions: How strong is public support for promoting democracy abroad? To what extent do the views of the general public diverge from those of opinion leaders? How has the end of the Cold War affected support for democracy promotion? Has this goal served to bridge the partisan and ideological gap over foreign policy issues within the US political class?

This chapter explores two issues that are at the heart of this study, namely the rise of international administration of territory as a practice in international relations, and the similarly significant emergence of democracy as the preferred form of governance for many in the international community. The first section explores the changing nature of international administration during the 20th century, and culminates in an examination of contemporary international administration missions and a discussion of the particular cases that will be examined in the following chapters. The second section explores the rise of the norm of democracy and the practice of international democracy promotion, addressing the shift in both international ideas and practices regarding democratic governance and the increasing role of international authorities in relation to domestic processes of regime change.

Analyses democracy promotion as part of America's ‘liberal grand strategy’, i.e. the notion that the US is better able to pursue its interests, reduce security threats, and foster a stable political order when other states are democracies. It provides answers to the following questions: What are the elements of the liberal grand strategy? Why has it been so persistent? Which groups support it within the foreign policy community? How significant is the liberal democratic orientation in current American foreign policy?

The author argues that in order to understand the impact of US democracy promotion efforts it is vital to examine what he terms the three different ‘frameworks’ that now shape the American outlook of the world: the Westphalian, the anti‐Utopian, and the Philadelphian. All three coexist in a very uneasy way and compete with each other to determine US foreign policy in Asia‐Pacific. He looks at the cases of China, Japan, and Cambodia.

Explores the gap between rhetoric and practice in the American policy of promoting democracy. It attributes it to the US, promoting two inconsistent goals at the same time: democratization and free market capitalism. This is not because the US responds only to corporate interests. Instead, this policy mix stems from America's image of its own success: at the time of its foundation, democratic development was compatible with economic individualism due to extraordinary socio–economic circumstances. However, given the contemporary socio–economic circumstances of new democracies, it would be more appropriate to promote social democracy rather than liberal democracy.

Discussed in this chapter are US and EU views on democracy and international democratization, as well as normative and instrumental beliefs about the benefits and intrinsic merits of democracy as a political system that underlie the US and EU frames. Despite the growing strategic importance of Central Asia for both the US and EU, the official discourses of American and European administrations have framed democracy assistance as a necessary, if not inevitable, element of foreign policy. Western-sponsored foundations and NGOs pursued a range of liberalization and democracy-enhancement projects in Central Asia that were similar to those introduced in other former Soviet territories. The IMF and World Bank also became heavily involved in advising all the Central Asian governments on the macro-level reforms required for rapid economic liberalization. This chapter names democracy, good governance, and the rule of law as the focus of US and EU engagement with the region. There are, however, important differences in terms of views on democracy and expectations in Central Asia that must be supported to facilitate these countries' democratic transformation, conveyed through the language of discourse.

This chapter elaborates on the concept of ‘national security liberalism’, i.e. the idea that promoting democracy abroad is not only morally correct but is also in the self‐interest of US. It examines the role played by liberalism in American foreign policy throughout history, both as an expression of America's values and as a means to achieve pragmatic ends. In the last section, it underlines the limits of democracy promotion as an American foreign policy tool.

This chapter begins with a discussion of international perspectives on democratization, premised on the assumption that the strategies of international actors determine the outcomes of democracy promotion abroad. It then offers a novel perspective on international democratization that relies on the concept of frames to discern the content of democracy promotion discourses. Specifically, this chapter looks at democracy promotion frames, which encompass a certain understanding of democracy, assumptions about why it is important, intended goals of democratization, and explanations of how to meet these democratic expectations. This chapter also outlines the various forms of research and analysis the author utilized for the study, including the process by which she examined texts produced by representatives of the US, EU, Russia, China, and the Central Asian governments, as well as her survey design.

This chapter talks about a combination of several factors that led to the rapid rise of monitoring. First, proponents were able to frame monitoring as a mechanism for upholding evolving political and civil rights at the same time as historical changes made relatively strong intrusions into domestic affairs more acceptable. Second, the end of the Cold War shifted the focus from security to democracy promotion and the domestic turmoil in many transition states created a demand for monitoring. Finally, donors and international organizations increased their use of political conditionality and this led even more governments to invite monitors. Nowadays, monitoring is widespread and involves many different types of organizations, ranging from global and regional intergovernmental organizations to NGOs. These organizations take on a range of activities and vary greatly in their resources.