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This chapter provides an explanation of the demand-rights associated with promises and agreements, presenting and defending novel accounts of both as a species of joint decision, where a joint decision as such is constituted by a joint commitment to endorse as a body a certain plan of action. Given their appeal to a particular explicit way of arriving at the joint commitment in each case, these accounts can accommodate both the kinship and distinctness of promises and agreements. Notably, the primary obligations at issue are not moral requirements but directed obligations of joint commitment, the equivalents of the associated demand-rights. Further, these obligations are inevitable given the promise or agreement, irrespective of its content, circumstances, or consequences.

After noting that joint commitments can be made gradually and by more subtle means than those constitutive of agreements and promises, and that they may obtain in large populations spread over great distances, this chapter argues that many central social phenomena other than agreements and promises are constituted by joint commitments with associated demand-rights and directed obligations. These phenomena range from the instantaneous occurrence of “mutual recognition” between two people in close proximity to large, enduring social groups. They include shared intentions or plans, doing things together, and collective attitudes such as collective value judgments. It is argued also that a particular kind of joint commitment offers an intelligible ground for command authority. Thus, should joint commitment be the only source of demand-rights, such rights will still be ubiquitous in human lives.

A moral demand-right as understood here is a demand-right discovered by moral argument without any appeal to a joint commitment as the immediate basis of the right. This chapter focuses on individualized moral demand-rights, such as a moral demand-right of each person to each person’s refraining from assaulting him, and concludes that their existence is doubtful. Among other things it critically reviews several arguments to the contrary, including H. L. A. Hart’s famous attempt to prove that there is at least one “natural” right, in a new interpretation, and some arguments suggested by Stephen Darwall. It then argues that given only a case of mutual recognition as characterized in chapter ten, the parties accrue demand-rights of joint commitment with the same content as central supposed moral demand-rights, such as a right not to be assaulted. The same goes with relevant changes for joint commitments in general.

The first part of this chapter addresses the question whether there are any generalized moral demand-rights, such as a moral demand-right of each person against each person that he not assault anyone. Moral demand-rights are demand-rights discovered by moral argument without any appeal to joint commitment as the immediate basis of the right. Discussion includes consideration of a variety of understandings of the idea of a moral community. No ground for any generalized moral demand-right is found. Several alternative definitions of “moral demand-right” are noted. If there are moral demand-rights in one of these senses, that does not show that there are moral demand-right in the sense at issue. Finally, a range of interpretations of the phrase “moral right” prevalent in moral theory are reviewed. The non-existence of moral demand-rights does not mean that there are no moral rights in any of these prevalent senses.

The abstract and concrete conceptions of a legal system are distinguished, and it is proposed that legal systems abstractly conceived can accord both analogues of demand-rights and demand-rights. On the concrete conception a legal system exists in a given population. Do members of the population then have demand-rights against each other to conformity with the rules of the system? The answer depends on one’s account of the existence of a legal system. A number of possible criteria of adequacy for such an account are listed, and a range of candidate accounts are sketched. Only a joint commitment account allows for a positive answer. It also satisfies all of the criteria of adequacy listed. Given that a legal system exists according to the joint commitment account, does one with a legal demand-right in that system have the corresponding demand-right period? A positive answer is defended and its implications discussed.

This chapter discusses the implications of the argument of this book for our understanding of human rights. On one common conception human rights are conceived of as moral rights, on another as legal or more broadly institutional rights. Within either conception, they may be conceived of as demand-rights. The argument of this book implies that if they are then conceived of as moral rights existing independently of human commitments, their possibility is moot. If they are conceived of as institutional rights, they are, as such, normatively inert. The outcome of the discussion is this: the way to gain the standing to demand actions to which one is understood to have a human right on either conception is by way of an appropriate joint commitment. Human rights theorists whose work is discussed include Henry Shue, Alan Buchanan, and Charles Beitz.

In offering accounts of the obligation accrued by a promisor on the basis of his promise some theorists invoke a social convention or practice of promising and some do not. Promise theorists of both types generally assume that the primary obligation of a promisor is a moral requirement derived from a moral principle. Taking Thomas Scanlon’s prominent practice-independent account as its focus, this chapter argues that moral principle approaches cannot account for the inevitability of a promisor’s obligation. Nor can they account for its directedness. They cannot therefore account for a promisee’s demand-right which is equivalent to the directed obligation of his promisor. The demand-right problem for promises, therefore, remains unsolved.

This chapter provides a solution to the demand-right problem. It argues that joint commitment is a ground of demand-rights. A joint commitment in the sense in question is not a conjunction of personal commitments. It is formed when two or more people together commit them all. Given this ground, the right’s addressee is subject to a peremptory normative constraint. There is also a clear sense in which a right-holder can view the action to which he has a right as his. Further, the directed obligation of the right’s addressee can plausibly be said to be willed into being by those who jointly committed themselves. The question whether joint commitment is the only ground of demand-rights is raised. In a coda, pertinent passages in Kant’s discussion of contract right are reviewed.