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One of the central aims of deliberative theory is to redeem the ideal of impartiality by defining political processes in a manner that avoids bias against valid social interests. The first section of this chapter presents the broad outlines of theories of deliberative democracy and explores the place of the concept of impartiality within them. In the next section, the different kinds of contributions that marginalized group perspectives make to democratic deliberation are explored. Next, drawing on and extending the recent feminist critiques of deliberative democracy, two interrelated challenges to deliberative theory are examined: one focused on the standard of reasonableness and the idea of reason‐giving, and the other on the contingent social and political circumstances under which marginalized‐group perspectives may sway the judgement of other citizens. Finally, the implications of these changes for our more general notions of the virtues and responsibilities of citizenship are examined.

This chapter takes up an essential contention of deliberative democracy, namely the idea that citizens can improve their communicative competencies in ways that lead to self-transformative learning. It explores this argument by examining the nature of critical social learning, in particular the way it turns on underlying assumptions and tacit understandings. Toward this end, the text employs theoretical contributions from the field of adult education, especially work on ‘transformational learning’ pioneered by theorists such as Freire and Mezirow. In the process, it speaks to the role of differences in deliberative theory — especially those related to culture, gender, class, or race — and their crucial function in the dialectical processes of argumentation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of tacit knowledge for expert practices and the facilitation of democratic dialogue.

This chapter examines the criticisms leveled against deliberative citizen engagement. It analyzes the merits of those censures and presents counterarguments that deliberation advocates present. Specifically, critics of deliberation point to low citizen motivation and aptitude, excessive idealism, the privileging of reason-based argumentation, and the inability of citizens to be open-minded as significant problems in instituting deliberative systems. Others raise practical concerns such as deliberation's struggle with representing diverse viewpoints or the divide between deliberative events and policy making. Defenders of deliberation maintain that citizens are interested in deliberative styles of governance, and that these systems can indeed be implemented in practical, cost-effective ways. Practitioners have worked in recent years to accommodate alternative styles of communication, and deliberative forums are more effective than conventional political processes at dealing with prejudices and a wide range of viewpoints. Finally, policy-related deliberative events have been successful, although benefits to participants and costs vary.

Referendums are criticized not just for obvious process defects but also on the basis that the subject matter is open to manipulation, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to put a fair question to the people. This chapter addresses this issue, asking what factors contribute to the fairness, and hence the legitimacy, of a referendum question. One issue is the clarity and intelligibility of the questions and the impediments to achieving a clear question. But another equally important concern is that the referendum represents a meaningful choice between options which a plurality of people consider important and worth both deliberating over and voting on. A particular concern is divided societies; the chapter asks whether a referendum is ever appropriate in such an environment and if so what issue-framing and other process factors would be needed for such an act to meet the demands of deliberative theory.

The introduction introduces the topic and central argument of the book: that at the heart of the human embryo research debates was the question of how the public should reason together about a domain of science and technology that touches upon the most fundamental dimensions of human life. It introduces the methodological approach and coproductionist theoretical framework of the study. It introduces the idea of the “constitutional position of science” in American democracy, and illustrates the unacknowledged but constitutional position of scientific authority in John Rawls' idea of public reason.

This chapter deals with subjective theories, which appeal to facts about our present desires, aims, and choices. On the simplest subjective theory, which we can call the desire-based theory, we have a reason to do whatever would fulfil any of our present desires. For subjective theories to be plausible, however, they must admit that some desires do not give us reasons. There are two ways to explain why your desire to run away gives you no reason for acting. Subjectivists might claim that: reasons are provided only by desires that depend on true beliefs, or reasons are provided only by telic desires, or aims. On the simplest plausible subjective theory, which we can call the telic desire theory, we have most reason to do whatever would best fulfil or achieve our present telic desires or aims. This chapter first expounds on subjectivism about reasons before explaining why people accept subjective theories. It also discusses the error-free desire theory, the informed desire theory, and the deliberative theory, along with analytical subjectivism and the agony argument.

This chapter considers the purposes of workplace voice and their implication for assessment of techniques used to promote voice. In so doing, we address the significance of identities, institutions, and locations of voice; while assessing what it means for law to ensure that voices are ‘heard’. Cross-cutting theoretical themes that possess a deep comparative resonance are explored. In particular, the role of deliberative theory, human rights discourse, and the impact of the common law upon worker voice are assessed. The chapter concludes with an affirmation of the enduring significance of labour law’s doctrinal autonomy and the interplay between industrial and political voice in the Voices countries.

Chapter 8 concludes by reflecting upon the scientific and political developments that ended the stem cell controversy of the 2000s. It argues that the most lasting consequences of this political moment lie less in the scientific and technological trajectories that it engendered, than in the imaginations—and institutions—of democracy that emerged out of it. It argues that the embryo debates reflect the dynamics of public reasoning in the United States about the meaning of emerging biotechnologies for democratic visions of progress and the good.