Jochen Prantl
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287680
- eISBN:
- 9780191603723
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287686.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter introduces and defines the terms ‘informal groups of states’, ‘groups of friends’, and ‘contact groups’. It develops a synergistic analytical framework, identifying the causal mechanisms ...
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This chapter introduces and defines the terms ‘informal groups of states’, ‘groups of friends’, and ‘contact groups’. It develops a synergistic analytical framework, identifying the causal mechanisms that contribute to the formation of informal groups of states by borrowing from insights of theories of agency and delegation. It challenges the proposition that centralization and independence are key functional characteristics of international organizations which enhance efficiency. Instead, it argues that decentralization via informal groups of states allows the achievement of policy goals that would be unattainable in a centralized setting. The typology of exit, voice, and loyalty is incorporated into analytical framework to explain the dynamics between informal groups and the Security Council. Such an approach provides substantial explanatory leverage to explain the institutional effects of the Security Council under conditions of systemic change. The chapter concludes with an outline of the book’s contents.Less
This chapter introduces and defines the terms ‘informal groups of states’, ‘groups of friends’, and ‘contact groups’. It develops a synergistic analytical framework, identifying the causal mechanisms that contribute to the formation of informal groups of states by borrowing from insights of theories of agency and delegation. It challenges the proposition that centralization and independence are key functional characteristics of international organizations which enhance efficiency. Instead, it argues that decentralization via informal groups of states allows the achievement of policy goals that would be unattainable in a centralized setting. The typology of exit, voice, and loyalty is incorporated into analytical framework to explain the dynamics between informal groups and the Security Council. Such an approach provides substantial explanatory leverage to explain the institutional effects of the Security Council under conditions of systemic change. The chapter concludes with an outline of the book’s contents.
Lanny W. Martin and Georg Vanberg
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199607884
- eISBN:
- 9780191729676
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199607884.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Coalition governments are the norm in most of the world’s parliamentary democracies. Because these governments are comprised of multiple political parties, they are subject to tensions that are ...
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Coalition governments are the norm in most of the world’s parliamentary democracies. Because these governments are comprised of multiple political parties, they are subject to tensions that are largely absent under single-party government. The pressures of electoral competition and the necessity of delegating substantial authority to ministers affiliated with specific parties threaten the compromise agreements that are at the heart of coalition governance. The central argument of this book is that strong legislative institutions play a critical role in allowing parties to deal with these tensions and to enforce coalition bargains. Based on an analysis of roughly 1,300 government bills across five democracies (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands), the book paints a detailed picture of the treatment of government legislation in contemporary parliaments. Two central contributions emerge. First, the book forces a reconsideration of the common perception that legislatures are largely irrelevant institutions in European democracies. The data presented here make a compelling case that parliaments that feature strong committee systems play an influential role in shaping policy. Second, the book contributes to the field of coalition governance. While scholars have developed detailed accounts of the birth and death of coalitions, much less is known about the manner in which coalitions govern between these bookend events. This book contributes to a richer understanding of how multiparty governments make policy.Less
Coalition governments are the norm in most of the world’s parliamentary democracies. Because these governments are comprised of multiple political parties, they are subject to tensions that are largely absent under single-party government. The pressures of electoral competition and the necessity of delegating substantial authority to ministers affiliated with specific parties threaten the compromise agreements that are at the heart of coalition governance. The central argument of this book is that strong legislative institutions play a critical role in allowing parties to deal with these tensions and to enforce coalition bargains. Based on an analysis of roughly 1,300 government bills across five democracies (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands), the book paints a detailed picture of the treatment of government legislation in contemporary parliaments. Two central contributions emerge. First, the book forces a reconsideration of the common perception that legislatures are largely irrelevant institutions in European democracies. The data presented here make a compelling case that parliaments that feature strong committee systems play an influential role in shaping policy. Second, the book contributes to the field of coalition governance. While scholars have developed detailed accounts of the birth and death of coalitions, much less is known about the manner in which coalitions govern between these bookend events. This book contributes to a richer understanding of how multiparty governments make policy.
Giandomenico Majone
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199250158
- eISBN:
- 9780191599439
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250154.003.0017
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
A distinctive feature of the modern regulatory state is the extensive delegation of powers to politically independent institutions (agencies, boards, commissions, tribunals), and this delegation of ...
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A distinctive feature of the modern regulatory state is the extensive delegation of powers to politically independent institutions (agencies, boards, commissions, tribunals), and this delegation of legislative powers to unelected policy- makers has always been somewhat problematic from the viewpoint of democratic theory. The American regulatory state has grappled with this issue for more than a century, and regulatory legitimacy is becoming an increasingly important political problem also in Europe, both at national and Community levels. In the United States the ‘non–delegation doctrine’ was the first attempt to resolve the normative problems raised by the emergence of a modern system of administrative regulation, and found widespread acceptance, but the delegation problem is considerably more complicated in the European Community/European Union (EC/EU), where various initiatives have been enacted. In both the United States and in Europe, constitutional doctrines against delegation have unravelled because the practical case for allowing regulatory discretion is overwhelming, so it is impossible to study the politics of regulation without first understanding why political principals choose to delegate rule–making powers. This is the subject of the first section of this chapter, which then goes on to analyse the relation between delegation and agency independence using the concept of political property rights, and to discuss the future of European regulation, and the politics of institutional change.Less
A distinctive feature of the modern regulatory state is the extensive delegation of powers to politically independent institutions (agencies, boards, commissions, tribunals), and this delegation of legislative powers to unelected policy- makers has always been somewhat problematic from the viewpoint of democratic theory. The American regulatory state has grappled with this issue for more than a century, and regulatory legitimacy is becoming an increasingly important political problem also in Europe, both at national and Community levels. In the United States the ‘non–delegation doctrine’ was the first attempt to resolve the normative problems raised by the emergence of a modern system of administrative regulation, and found widespread acceptance, but the delegation problem is considerably more complicated in the European Community/European Union (EC/EU), where various initiatives have been enacted. In both the United States and in Europe, constitutional doctrines against delegation have unravelled because the practical case for allowing regulatory discretion is overwhelming, so it is impossible to study the politics of regulation without first understanding why political principals choose to delegate rule–making powers. This is the subject of the first section of this chapter, which then goes on to analyse the relation between delegation and agency independence using the concept of political property rights, and to discuss the future of European regulation, and the politics of institutional change.
Matthew Flinders
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199271603
- eISBN:
- 9780191709241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271603.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics, Political Economy
Having examined the long-term institutional layering and sedimentation that has occurred, this chapter sets out to map out the topography of the state as it currently exists. In doing so, it succeeds ...
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Having examined the long-term institutional layering and sedimentation that has occurred, this chapter sets out to map out the topography of the state as it currently exists. In doing so, it succeeds where numerous parliamentary, official, and academic studies have failed. It also provides a new conceptual tool — in the form of the Russian Doll Model — through which different degrees of delegation can be represented and through this, the ‘drift’ of functions across a ‘spectrum of autonomy’.Less
Having examined the long-term institutional layering and sedimentation that has occurred, this chapter sets out to map out the topography of the state as it currently exists. In doing so, it succeeds where numerous parliamentary, official, and academic studies have failed. It also provides a new conceptual tool — in the form of the Russian Doll Model — through which different degrees of delegation can be represented and through this, the ‘drift’ of functions across a ‘spectrum of autonomy’.
Matthew Flinders
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199271603
- eISBN:
- 9780191709241
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271603.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics, Political Economy
The delegation of functions and responsibilities to quasi-autonomous bodies operating with a significant degree of autonomy arguably empowers governments to address a wide range of social issues ...
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The delegation of functions and responsibilities to quasi-autonomous bodies operating with a significant degree of autonomy arguably empowers governments to address a wide range of social issues simultaneously without having to be involved with the minutiae of day-to-day socio-political interactions. Delegation therefore provides a structural and esoteric capacity beyond the cognitive and physical limits of politicians. There is nothing wrong with delegation as such. The problem relates to the failure to manage delegation in Britain. And yet we actually know very little about how the state beyond the core actually operates, how many bodies exist, what they do, how they are recruited, or why they were created. These gaps in our knowledge are all the more problematic in light of recent pronouncements by politicians at the national and European levels that ‘depoliticization’ is a central strand of their approach to governing. This book seeks to fill these gaps in our knowledge while at the same time cultivating a more balanced or sophisticated approach to the study of delegation. Delegated public bodies as they have been used as a tool of governance in the past should not be confused with how they might be used in the future. This book draws upon research conducted within the very core of the British political system during a Whitehall Fellowship within the Cabinet Office. It argues that the British state is ‘walking without order’ due to a general acceptance of the logic of delegation without any detailed or principled consideration of the administrative of democratic consequences of this process.Less
The delegation of functions and responsibilities to quasi-autonomous bodies operating with a significant degree of autonomy arguably empowers governments to address a wide range of social issues simultaneously without having to be involved with the minutiae of day-to-day socio-political interactions. Delegation therefore provides a structural and esoteric capacity beyond the cognitive and physical limits of politicians. There is nothing wrong with delegation as such. The problem relates to the failure to manage delegation in Britain. And yet we actually know very little about how the state beyond the core actually operates, how many bodies exist, what they do, how they are recruited, or why they were created. These gaps in our knowledge are all the more problematic in light of recent pronouncements by politicians at the national and European levels that ‘depoliticization’ is a central strand of their approach to governing. This book seeks to fill these gaps in our knowledge while at the same time cultivating a more balanced or sophisticated approach to the study of delegation. Delegated public bodies as they have been used as a tool of governance in the past should not be confused with how they might be used in the future. This book draws upon research conducted within the very core of the British political system during a Whitehall Fellowship within the Cabinet Office. It argues that the British state is ‘walking without order’ due to a general acceptance of the logic of delegation without any detailed or principled consideration of the administrative of democratic consequences of this process.
Sharan Jagpal
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195371055
- eISBN:
- 9780199870745
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195371055.003.0016
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Marketing
This chapter shows how the firm should design sales force compensation plans to maximize its performance. It distinguishes whether or not the firm can observe the salesperson's effort. It shows how ...
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This chapter shows how the firm should design sales force compensation plans to maximize its performance. It distinguishes whether or not the firm can observe the salesperson's effort. It shows how marketing-finance fusion allows the firm to design compensation plans based on such factors as the firm's cost structure, cost and demand uncertainty, consumer satisfaction, the firm's cost of capital, and whether or not the firm delegates price-setting or sales call policy to the salesperson. It shows how the sales force compensation plan should allow for multiperiod effects and the impact of Internet advertising. In particular, it distinguishes different scenarios (e.g., whether Internet advertising and conventional advertising are substitutes or complements).Less
This chapter shows how the firm should design sales force compensation plans to maximize its performance. It distinguishes whether or not the firm can observe the salesperson's effort. It shows how marketing-finance fusion allows the firm to design compensation plans based on such factors as the firm's cost structure, cost and demand uncertainty, consumer satisfaction, the firm's cost of capital, and whether or not the firm delegates price-setting or sales call policy to the salesperson. It shows how the sales force compensation plan should allow for multiperiod effects and the impact of Internet advertising. In particular, it distinguishes different scenarios (e.g., whether Internet advertising and conventional advertising are substitutes or complements).
Alec Stone Sweet
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199275533
- eISBN:
- 9780191602009
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019927553X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
The law and politics of European integration have been inseparable since the 1960s, when the European Court of Justice rendered a set of foundational decisions that gradually served to ...
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The law and politics of European integration have been inseparable since the 1960s, when the European Court of Justice rendered a set of foundational decisions that gradually served to ‘constitutionalize’ the Treaty of Rome. In this book, the author, one of the world's foremost social scientists and legal scholars, blends deductive theory, quantitative analysis of aggregate data, and qualitative case studies to explain the dynamics of European integration and institutional change in the European Union (EU) since 1959. He shows that the activities of market actors, lobbyists, legislators, litigators, and judges became connected to one another in various ways, giving the EU its fundamentally expansionary character. The first chapter, ‘The European Court and Integration’, provides an introduction to the book. The second, written with Thomas Brunell, assesses the impact of Europe's unique legal system on the evolution of supranational governance. The following three chapters trace the outcomes in three policy domains: free movement of goods (written with Margaret McCown), sex equality (written with Rachel Cichowski), and environmental protection (written with Markus Gehring). There is also a concluding chapter. The book integrates diverse themes, including: the testing of hypotheses derived from regional integration theory; the ‘judicialization’ of legislative processes; the path dependence of precedent and legal argumentation; the triumph of the ‘rights revolution’ in the EU; delegation, agency, and trusteeship; balancing as a technique of judicial rulemaking and governance; and why national administration and justice have been steadily ‘Europeanized’.Less
The law and politics of European integration have been inseparable since the 1960s, when the European Court of Justice rendered a set of foundational decisions that gradually served to ‘constitutionalize’ the Treaty of Rome. In this book, the author, one of the world's foremost social scientists and legal scholars, blends deductive theory, quantitative analysis of aggregate data, and qualitative case studies to explain the dynamics of European integration and institutional change in the European Union (EU) since 1959. He shows that the activities of market actors, lobbyists, legislators, litigators, and judges became connected to one another in various ways, giving the EU its fundamentally expansionary character. The first chapter, ‘The European Court and Integration’, provides an introduction to the book. The second, written with Thomas Brunell, assesses the impact of Europe's unique legal system on the evolution of supranational governance. The following three chapters trace the outcomes in three policy domains: free movement of goods (written with Margaret McCown), sex equality (written with Rachel Cichowski), and environmental protection (written with Markus Gehring). There is also a concluding chapter. The book integrates diverse themes, including: the testing of hypotheses derived from regional integration theory; the ‘judicialization’ of legislative processes; the path dependence of precedent and legal argumentation; the triumph of the ‘rights revolution’ in the EU; delegation, agency, and trusteeship; balancing as a technique of judicial rulemaking and governance; and why national administration and justice have been steadily ‘Europeanized’.
Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199261185
- eISBN:
- 9780191601507
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199261180.003.0017
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
Besides decentralization to executive agencies and social organizations, public management reform involves devolution to sub-national units of activities and the corresponding fiscal resources to ...
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Besides decentralization to executive agencies and social organizations, public management reform involves devolution to sub-national units of activities and the corresponding fiscal resources to finance them. It involves also making public managers more autonomous and more accountable. In synthesis, decentralization–delegating authority to lower levels–is crucial to managerial public administration. Decentralization is a public management strategy, but devolution is a political decision with managerial consequences. Decentralization is often decided top-down and is a strategy for increasing the head-offices’ capacity to achieve proposed objectives, but devolution is usually a response to demands for more local or regional autonomy to which government officials in the central government reluctantly accede.Less
Besides decentralization to executive agencies and social organizations, public management reform involves devolution to sub-national units of activities and the corresponding fiscal resources to finance them. It involves also making public managers more autonomous and more accountable. In synthesis, decentralization–delegating authority to lower levels–is crucial to managerial public administration. Decentralization is a public management strategy, but devolution is a political decision with managerial consequences. Decentralization is often decided top-down and is a strategy for increasing the head-offices’ capacity to achieve proposed objectives, but devolution is usually a response to demands for more local or regional autonomy to which government officials in the central government reluctantly accede.
Berthold Rittberger
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199273423
- eISBN:
- 9780191602764
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199273421.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Develops a three-staged theory to explain why national governments have created and successively empowered the European Parliament. In a first step, it is argued that attempts by national governments ...
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Develops a three-staged theory to explain why national governments have created and successively empowered the European Parliament. In a first step, it is argued that attempts by national governments to transfer sovereignty to the EU-level in order to improve the problem-solving capacity of their domestic polities threaten to undermine domestic channels of interest representation and accountability. These challenges are commonly perceived by political elites in the member states as a ‘democratic legitimacy deficit’. In a second step, it is argued that the proposals political elites in different member states advance to alleviate the ‘democratic legitimacy deficit’ vary across and even within member states. In the final step, the chapter inquires how the different concerns about the ‘democratic legitimacy deficit’ affect the interaction among national governments during Treaty amending intergovernmental conferences. For each stage in the development of the theory, the chapter develops a set of hypotheses and observable implications. The hypotheses are subjected to empirical scrutiny in the ensuing chapters.Less
Develops a three-staged theory to explain why national governments have created and successively empowered the European Parliament. In a first step, it is argued that attempts by national governments to transfer sovereignty to the EU-level in order to improve the problem-solving capacity of their domestic polities threaten to undermine domestic channels of interest representation and accountability. These challenges are commonly perceived by political elites in the member states as a ‘democratic legitimacy deficit’. In a second step, it is argued that the proposals political elites in different member states advance to alleviate the ‘democratic legitimacy deficit’ vary across and even within member states. In the final step, the chapter inquires how the different concerns about the ‘democratic legitimacy deficit’ affect the interaction among national governments during Treaty amending intergovernmental conferences. For each stage in the development of the theory, the chapter develops a set of hypotheses and observable implications. The hypotheses are subjected to empirical scrutiny in the ensuing chapters.
Matthew Flinders
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199271603
- eISBN:
- 9780191709241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271603.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics, Political Economy
State structures have been radically reformulated in recent decades. In both developed and developing countries a neo-liberal informed model or narrative of ‘good governance’ has seen many functions ...
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State structures have been radically reformulated in recent decades. In both developed and developing countries a neo-liberal informed model or narrative of ‘good governance’ has seen many functions and responsibilities hived-off or delegated beyond the direct control of politicians and public officials. However, the state has not been ‘withered away’ or ‘rolled back’ — it has been transformed. This chapter examines how this transformation has been based upon the notion of delegation and why this matters, in both administrative and democratic terms.Less
State structures have been radically reformulated in recent decades. In both developed and developing countries a neo-liberal informed model or narrative of ‘good governance’ has seen many functions and responsibilities hived-off or delegated beyond the direct control of politicians and public officials. However, the state has not been ‘withered away’ or ‘rolled back’ — it has been transformed. This chapter examines how this transformation has been based upon the notion of delegation and why this matters, in both administrative and democratic terms.
Matthew Flinders
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199271603
- eISBN:
- 9780191709241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271603.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics, Political Economy
Delegation is not a new phenomenon. This chapter illustrates the persistence, growth, and evolution of delegated governance from the earliest stages of state development in Britain through to the ...
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Delegation is not a new phenomenon. This chapter illustrates the persistence, growth, and evolution of delegated governance from the earliest stages of state development in Britain through to the first decade of the 21st century. It reveals the long-term bureaucratic layering which has occurred, and considers why political elites failed to take advantage of specific windows of opportunity when broad reform initiative could have been introduced.Less
Delegation is not a new phenomenon. This chapter illustrates the persistence, growth, and evolution of delegated governance from the earliest stages of state development in Britain through to the first decade of the 21st century. It reveals the long-term bureaucratic layering which has occurred, and considers why political elites failed to take advantage of specific windows of opportunity when broad reform initiative could have been introduced.
Mark A. Pollack
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251179
- eISBN:
- 9780191600111
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251177.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the ...
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The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. Drawing from principal‐agent analyses of delegation, agency and agenda setting, this book seeks to analyse and explain the delegation of powers by governmental principals to supranational agents, as well as the subsequent role played by those agents in the process of European integration. The book is divided into two parts. The first part of the book analyses the historical and functional patterns of delegation to the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Parliament, suggesting that delegation to the first two is motivated by a desire to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, as predicted by principal‐agent models. By contrast, the delegation of powers to the Parliament fits poorly with such models, and primarily reflects the concern of member governments to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Union. The second part of the book focuses on the role of supranational agents in both the liberalization and re‐regulation of the European market, and suggests that the Commission, Court and Parliament have played a causally important role alongside member governments as the ‘engines of integration’, but that their ability to do so has varied historically and across issue‐areas as a function of the discretion delegated to them by the member governments.Less
The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. Drawing from principal‐agent analyses of delegation, agency and agenda setting, this book seeks to analyse and explain the delegation of powers by governmental principals to supranational agents, as well as the subsequent role played by those agents in the process of European integration. The book is divided into two parts. The first part of the book analyses the historical and functional patterns of delegation to the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Parliament, suggesting that delegation to the first two is motivated by a desire to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, as predicted by principal‐agent models. By contrast, the delegation of powers to the Parliament fits poorly with such models, and primarily reflects the concern of member governments to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Union. The second part of the book focuses on the role of supranational agents in both the liberalization and re‐regulation of the European market, and suggests that the Commission, Court and Parliament have played a causally important role alongside member governments as the ‘engines of integration’, but that their ability to do so has varied historically and across issue‐areas as a function of the discretion delegated to them by the member governments.
Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198297840
- eISBN:
- 9780191602016
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829784X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Parliamentary democracy is the most common way of organizing delegation and accountability in contemporary democracies. Yet knowledge of this type of regime has been incomplete and often ...
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Parliamentary democracy is the most common way of organizing delegation and accountability in contemporary democracies. Yet knowledge of this type of regime has been incomplete and often unsystematic. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies offers new conceptual clarity on the topic. Taking principal-agent theory as its framework, the work illustrates how a variety of apparently unrelated representation issues can now be understood. This procedure allows scholarship to move well beyond what have previously been cloudy and confusing debates aimed at defining the virtues and perils of parliamentarism. This new empirical investigation includes all 17 West European parliamentary democracies. These countries are compared in a series of cross-national tables and figures, and 17 country chapters provide a wealth of information on four discrete stages in the delegation process: delegation from voters to parliamentary representatives, delegation from parliament to the prime minister and cabinet, delegation within the cabinet, and delegation from cabinet ministers to civil servants. Each chapter illustrates how political parties serve as bonding instruments, which align incentives and permit citizen control of the policy process. This is complemented by a consideration of external constraints, such as courts, central banks, corporatism, and the European Union, which can impinge on national-level democratic delegation. The concluding chapters go on to consider how well the problems of delegation and accountability are solved in these countries. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies provides an unprecedented guide to contemporary European parliamentary democracies. As democratic governance is transformed at the dawn of the twenty-first century, it illustrates the important challenges faced by the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe.Less
Parliamentary democracy is the most common way of organizing delegation and accountability in contemporary democracies. Yet knowledge of this type of regime has been incomplete and often unsystematic. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies offers new conceptual clarity on the topic. Taking principal-agent theory as its framework, the work illustrates how a variety of apparently unrelated representation issues can now be understood. This procedure allows scholarship to move well beyond what have previously been cloudy and confusing debates aimed at defining the virtues and perils of parliamentarism. This new empirical investigation includes all 17 West European parliamentary democracies. These countries are compared in a series of cross-national tables and figures, and 17 country chapters provide a wealth of information on four discrete stages in the delegation process: delegation from voters to parliamentary representatives, delegation from parliament to the prime minister and cabinet, delegation within the cabinet, and delegation from cabinet ministers to civil servants. Each chapter illustrates how political parties serve as bonding instruments, which align incentives and permit citizen control of the policy process. This is complemented by a consideration of external constraints, such as courts, central banks, corporatism, and the European Union, which can impinge on national-level democratic delegation. The concluding chapters go on to consider how well the problems of delegation and accountability are solved in these countries. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies provides an unprecedented guide to contemporary European parliamentary democracies. As democratic governance is transformed at the dawn of the twenty-first century, it illustrates the important challenges faced by the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe.
Michael Banton
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198280613
- eISBN:
- 9780191598760
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198280610.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Most states saw accession to the Convention as a matter of foreign policy. Many perceived it as a way of demonstrating their anti‐apartheid credentials, with but few implications for their internal ...
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Most states saw accession to the Convention as a matter of foreign policy. Many perceived it as a way of demonstrating their anti‐apartheid credentials, with but few implications for their internal affairs. In its first eight years, CERD had to concentrate upon establishing the novel reporting regime, upon tutoring state delegations as to the nature of their new obligations, and on agreeing some boundaries to the Committee's mandate.Less
Most states saw accession to the Convention as a matter of foreign policy. Many perceived it as a way of demonstrating their anti‐apartheid credentials, with but few implications for their internal affairs. In its first eight years, CERD had to concentrate upon establishing the novel reporting regime, upon tutoring state delegations as to the nature of their new obligations, and on agreeing some boundaries to the Committee's mandate.
Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198297840
- eISBN:
- 9780191602016
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829784X.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Parliamentary government is the most common way to organize delegation and accountability in contemporary democracies. Parliamentary government is a system of government in which the prime minister ...
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Parliamentary government is the most common way to organize delegation and accountability in contemporary democracies. Parliamentary government is a system of government in which the prime minister and his or her cabinet are accountable to any majority of the members of parliament and can be voted out of office by the latter. Parliamentary democracy is a chain of delegation and accountability, from the voters to the ultimate policy makers, in which at each link (stage), a principal (in whom authority is originally) delegates to an agent, whom the principal has conditionally authorized to act in his or her name and place. The parliamentary chain of delegation is characterized by indirectness and singularity (i.e. at each link of the parliamentary chain, a single principal delegates to a single agent). At each stage of this chain, delegation problems (such as adverse selection and moral hazard) can occur.Less
Parliamentary government is the most common way to organize delegation and accountability in contemporary democracies. Parliamentary government is a system of government in which the prime minister and his or her cabinet are accountable to any majority of the members of parliament and can be voted out of office by the latter. Parliamentary democracy is a chain of delegation and accountability, from the voters to the ultimate policy makers, in which at each link (stage), a principal (in whom authority is originally) delegates to an agent, whom the principal has conditionally authorized to act in his or her name and place. The parliamentary chain of delegation is characterized by indirectness and singularity (i.e. at each link of the parliamentary chain, a single principal delegates to a single agent). At each stage of this chain, delegation problems (such as adverse selection and moral hazard) can occur.
Kaare Strøm
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198297840
- eISBN:
- 9780191602016
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829784X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Identifies three motivations for political delegation (capacity, competence, collective action problems) and discusses agency problems and mechanisms of accountability. An ideal-typical form of ...
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Identifies three motivations for political delegation (capacity, competence, collective action problems) and discusses agency problems and mechanisms of accountability. An ideal-typical form of parliamentary democracy is introduced to reveal that singularity and indirect delegation are key ingredients of delegation and accountability. Develops a delegation model that reveals more agency loss (policy slippage) in parliamentary democracy than in two versions of presidentialism. Parliamentary democracies use ex ante screening by cohesive political parties to protect against adverse selection. Delegation and accountability make parliamentary democracies more efficient, but frequently less transparent. Identifies the implications of different forms of parliamentarism, such as Westminster parliamentarism, pivotal parliamentarism, and constrained parliamentarism.Less
Identifies three motivations for political delegation (capacity, competence, collective action problems) and discusses agency problems and mechanisms of accountability. An ideal-typical form of parliamentary democracy is introduced to reveal that singularity and indirect delegation are key ingredients of delegation and accountability. Develops a delegation model that reveals more agency loss (policy slippage) in parliamentary democracy than in two versions of presidentialism. Parliamentary democracies use ex ante screening by cohesive political parties to protect against adverse selection. Delegation and accountability make parliamentary democracies more efficient, but frequently less transparent. Identifies the implications of different forms of parliamentarism, such as Westminster parliamentarism, pivotal parliamentarism, and constrained parliamentarism.
Mark A. Pollack
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251179
- eISBN:
- 9780191600111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251177.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the ...
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The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. Drawing from principal‐agent analyses of delegation, agency and agenda setting, seeks to analyse and explain the delegation of powers by governmental principals to supranational agents, as well as the subsequent role played by those agents in the process of European integration.Less
The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. Drawing from principal‐agent analyses of delegation, agency and agenda setting, seeks to analyse and explain the delegation of powers by governmental principals to supranational agents, as well as the subsequent role played by those agents in the process of European integration.
Mark A. Pollack
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251179
- eISBN:
- 9780191600111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251177.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Principal‐agent theories of delegation generate specific, testable hypotheses about delegation to supranational organizations in the European Union, including: the specific functions delegated to ...
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Principal‐agent theories of delegation generate specific, testable hypotheses about delegation to supranational organizations in the European Union, including: the specific functions delegated to such agents; the conditions under which member‐state principals delegate greater or lesser discretion to their agents; and the conditions under which supranational organizations such as the Commission are able to pursue their distinct preferences, within the limits of their statutory discretion. Such principal‐agent analyses, drawn from rational choice theory and transaction‐costs approaches, represent a parsimonious and internally consistent approach to the study of delegation; however, a competing approach, derived from sociological institutionalism, generates strikingly different predictions. This book examines both the delegation stage (at which member‐state principals create supranational organizations, delegate powers to them and establish control mechanisms to limit their discretion) and the subsequent behaviour of supranational agents in the day‐to‐day conduct of their executive, judicial and legislative powers. Although causally related, these two stages raise very different methodological challenges, and thus the two parts of the book utilize distinct research designs and methods to answer the questions posed in each.Less
Principal‐agent theories of delegation generate specific, testable hypotheses about delegation to supranational organizations in the European Union, including: the specific functions delegated to such agents; the conditions under which member‐state principals delegate greater or lesser discretion to their agents; and the conditions under which supranational organizations such as the Commission are able to pursue their distinct preferences, within the limits of their statutory discretion. Such principal‐agent analyses, drawn from rational choice theory and transaction‐costs approaches, represent a parsimonious and internally consistent approach to the study of delegation; however, a competing approach, derived from sociological institutionalism, generates strikingly different predictions. This book examines both the delegation stage (at which member‐state principals create supranational organizations, delegate powers to them and establish control mechanisms to limit their discretion) and the subsequent behaviour of supranational agents in the day‐to‐day conduct of their executive, judicial and legislative powers. Although causally related, these two stages raise very different methodological challenges, and thus the two parts of the book utilize distinct research designs and methods to answer the questions posed in each.
Mark A. Pollack
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251179
- eISBN:
- 9780191600111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251177.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
European Union governments have delegated executive and agenda‐setting powers to the Commission primarily to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, and they have designed complex control ...
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European Union governments have delegated executive and agenda‐setting powers to the Commission primarily to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, and they have designed complex control mechanisms to limit the discretion of the Commission in the policy process. Examines the record of delegation to the Commission throughout the EU's history, measuring the extent of delegation and Commission discretion across 35 different issue‐areas. Almost without exception, member states delegate to the Commission precisely the functions hypothesized by principal‐agent models, including most notably monitoring compliance, setting the legislative agenda and laying down expert and credible market regulations. Similarly, however, the Commission is closely monitored by member governments, which have adopted a carefully designed and calibrated system of appointment and censure mechanisms, ‘comitology’ or oversight committees and administrative law and judicial review by the European Court of Justice.Less
European Union governments have delegated executive and agenda‐setting powers to the Commission primarily to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, and they have designed complex control mechanisms to limit the discretion of the Commission in the policy process. Examines the record of delegation to the Commission throughout the EU's history, measuring the extent of delegation and Commission discretion across 35 different issue‐areas. Almost without exception, member states delegate to the Commission precisely the functions hypothesized by principal‐agent models, including most notably monitoring compliance, setting the legislative agenda and laying down expert and credible market regulations. Similarly, however, the Commission is closely monitored by member governments, which have adopted a carefully designed and calibrated system of appointment and censure mechanisms, ‘comitology’ or oversight committees and administrative law and judicial review by the European Court of Justice.
Mark A. Pollack
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251179
- eISBN:
- 9780191600111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251177.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
European Union governments have delegated judicial powers to the European Court of Justice primarily to monitor national compliance with EU law and to solve problems of incomplete contracting, and ...
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European Union governments have delegated judicial powers to the European Court of Justice primarily to monitor national compliance with EU law and to solve problems of incomplete contracting, and they have granted the Court extraordinarily wide discretion to do so.Member‐state principals enjoy a comparatively small range of control mechanisms vis‐a‐vis the ECJ (e.g. the power of appointment, legislative reversal of Court judgments, and unilateral non‐compliance with those judgments). The Court's broad discretion has allowed it to pursue an integrationist agenda with little regard to the preferences of powerful member states or to the likelihood of legislative overruling. In response to such judicial activism, however, EU member governments have recently been more reluctant to delegate extensive new powers to the Court, which enjoys no jurisdiction in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy and only partial jurisdiction in the area of Justice and Home Affairs.Less
European Union governments have delegated judicial powers to the European Court of Justice primarily to monitor national compliance with EU law and to solve problems of incomplete contracting, and they have granted the Court extraordinarily wide discretion to do so.
Member‐state principals enjoy a comparatively small range of control mechanisms vis‐a‐vis the ECJ (e.g. the power of appointment, legislative reversal of Court judgments, and unilateral non‐compliance with those judgments). The Court's broad discretion has allowed it to pursue an integrationist agenda with little regard to the preferences of powerful member states or to the likelihood of legislative overruling. In response to such judicial activism, however, EU member governments have recently been more reluctant to delegate extensive new powers to the Court, which enjoys no jurisdiction in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy and only partial jurisdiction in the area of Justice and Home Affairs.
