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Logic, Graded Belief, and Preferences

David Christensen

in Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199263257
eISBN:
9780191602603
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199263256.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

Defends probabilistic coherence as a logical constraint on graded belief. Standard Dutch Book and Representation Theorem arguments seek to defend coherence by positing very tight—even ... More


Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle

Hartry Field

in Truth and the Absence of Fact

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199242894
eISBN:
9780191597381
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199242895.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Discusses the question of how to reconcile the acceptance of indeterminacy in one's own language with the acceptance of a minimal notion of truth. Argues that regarding a sentence of one's own ... More


The Value of Truth

Paul Horwich

in Truth -- Meaning -- Reality

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199268900
eISBN:
9780191708459
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268900.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

This chapter attempts to clarify and defend the idea, VT, that true belief is desirable and false belief undesirable, to see if one can explain why it is correct, and to examine its epistemological ... More


Two Models of Belief

David Christensen

in Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199263257
eISBN:
9780191602603
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199263256.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

Ties the book's central question to a choice between a qualitative binary (all-or-nothing) conception of belief and a quantitative graded conception of belief (degrees of belief). The two conceptions ... More


Three common objections to Bayesian frameworks

Michael G. Titelbaum

in Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199658305
eISBN:
9780191748134
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter shows how the Certainty-Loss Framework (CLF) and its interpretation developed in the previous two chapters offers new responses to traditional objections to Subjective Bayesianism. ... More


Deliberate Expansion

Isaac Levi

in Mild Contraction: Evaluating Loss of Information Due to Loss of Belief

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780199270705
eISBN:
9780191601774
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199270708.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The justification of deliberate expansion is the topic of this chapter, and it is argued that any possible expansion should be assessed with respect to two desiderata: the enquirer should seek to ... More


Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief

David Christensen

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199263257
eISBN:
9780191602603
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199263256.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

Are rational beliefs constrained by formal logic? This book argues that if beliefs are seen in a binary way (either one believes a proposition or one doesn't), then the standard constraints of ... More


The Framework

Alvin I. Goldman

in Knowledge in a Social World

Published in print:
1999
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198238201
eISBN:
9780191597527
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198238207.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

From a veritistic standpoint, true belief is better than either ignorance or error, and higher degrees of belief in truths are better than lower degrees of belief, at least on topics of interest. ... More


Kripke's Theory of Truth (Strong Kleene Version)

Hartry Field

in Saving Truth From Paradox

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199230747
eISBN:
9780191710933
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230747.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter is an exposition of the strong Kleene version of Kripke's fixed point semantics, and the theories of truth that can be obtained from it. Emphasis is put on the distinction between ... More


The modeling framework and what models represent

Michael G. Titelbaum

in Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199658305
eISBN:
9780191748134
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter presents the core formal elements of the Certainty-Loss Framework (CLF). It therefore supplies the basic formal materials from which everything in the later chapters will be built. The ... More


Development of a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action

Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig

in Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199251346
eISBN:
9780191602634
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199251347.003.0017
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Explains a development in Davidson’s account of the procedures of the radical interpreter which involves bringing to bear more explicitly the constraints imposed by the framework of decision theory ... More


An Introduction to Paraconsistent Dialetheism

Hartry Field

in Saving Truth From Paradox

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199230747
eISBN:
9780191710933
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230747.003.0025
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter introduces ‘dialetheic’ approaches, according to which Liar sentences are both true and false, indeed both true and not true. (Some contradictions are accepted.) Dialetheism provides ... More


Expressivism, Normative Uncertainty, and Arguments for Probabilism

Julia Staffel

in Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
March 2019
ISBN:
9780198833314
eISBN:
9780191871658
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I argue that in order to account for normative uncertainty, an expressivist theory of normative language and thought must accomplish two things: first, it needs to find room in its framework for a ... More


Theme: Bayesian Philosophy of Science

Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann

in Bayesian Philosophy of Science

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
October 2019
ISBN:
9780199672110
eISBN:
9780191881671
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199672110.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

This chapter sets the stage for what follows, introducing the reader to the philosophical principles and the mathematical formalism behind Bayesian inference and its scientific applications. We ... More


Introducing Degrees

Martin Smith

in Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
March 2016
ISBN:
9780198755333
eISBN:
9780191816635
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755333.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This chapter develops a formal theory of degrees of safety and of normic support. The theory predicts that the degrees of normic support imposed upon propositions by a body of evidence will meet the ... More


Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief *

Jane Friedman

in Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 4

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199672707
eISBN:
9780191751905
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

There has been much discussion about whether traditional epistemology’s doxastic attitudes are reducible to degrees of belief. In this paper it is argued that what we may call the Straightforward ... More


Attitudes in Active Reasoning

Julia Staffel

in Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
July 2019
ISBN:
9780198791478
eISBN:
9780191876844
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198791478.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Active reasoning is the kind of reasoning that we do deliberately and consciously. In characterizing the nature of active reasoning and the norms it should obey, the question arises which attitudes ... More


Rational Faith and Justified Belief

Lara Buchak

in Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
June 2014
ISBN:
9780199672158
eISBN:
9780191751264
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672158.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter presents a general account of the attitude of faith in proposition P (both religious and non-religious), on which it consists in stopping one’s search for evidence for P and committing ... More


Models, Idealizations and Objective Chance

Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann

in Bayesian Philosophy of Science

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
October 2019
ISBN:
9780199672110
eISBN:
9780191881671
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199672110.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

How does Bayesian inference handle the highly idealized nature of many (statistical) models in science? The standard interpretation of probability as degree of belief in the truth of a model does not ... More


Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief

Michael G. Titelbaum

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199658305
eISBN:
9780191748134
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Subjective Bayesianism is one of the most popular tools of contemporary epistemology, using probability mathematics to provide comprehensive rational constraints both for an agent’s degrees of belief ... More


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