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Holism about Reasons

Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge

in Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal

Particularists often try to draw support for their view from the alleged context sensitivity of reasons, and more specifically holism. According to holism about reasons, a consideration that is a ... More

Particularists often try to draw support for their view from the alleged context sensitivity of reasons, and more specifically holism. According to holism about reasons, a consideration that is a reason in one context may not be similarly a reason in another context because of differences in the presence or absence of defeating and enabling conditions. This chapter distinguishes several versions of the argument from holism, and shows that despite wide currency, no version establishes any significant particularist thesis.Less

Defeaters

Michael Bergmann

in Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism

This chapter begins by explaining the different kinds of defeaters and no-defeater conditions. It argues for the inclusion of a no-defeater condition in the analysis of justification, and concludes ... More

This chapter begins by explaining the different kinds of defeaters and no-defeater conditions. It argues for the inclusion of a no-defeater condition in the analysis of justification, and concludes by responding to a number of objections.Less

Fallible A Priori Justification

Albert Casullo

in A Priori Justification

This chapter articulates the requirements of fallible a priori justification. It distinguishes two senses of fallibility: c-fallibility, justification that does not guarantee truth; and ... More

This chapter articulates the requirements of fallible a priori justification. It distinguishes two senses of fallibility: c-fallibility, justification that does not guarantee truth; and p-fallibility, justification that is defeasible. It argues that although these senses are logically independent of one another, there are some significant relations between them mediated by the concepts of self-revision, overriding defeater, and undermining defeater. It is shown that several alternative fallibilist accounts of a priori justification face difficulties that are avoided by the account defended in Chapter 2.Less

Refutation of the Reformed Objection

Herman Philipse

in God in the Age of Science?: A Critique of Religious Reason

The aim of Chapter 4 is to decide whether Alvin Plantinga’s reformed objection to natural theology is successful for modern, well-educated Christian believers. Although there is a solution to the ... More

The aim of Chapter 4 is to decide whether Alvin Plantinga’s reformed objection to natural theology is successful for modern, well-educated Christian believers. Although there is a solution to the problem of generality for Plantinga’s externalist theory of warrant, it is argued that the problem of religious diversity introduces insuperable difficulties for the Extended Aquinas/Calvin model of warranted Christian belief, because other religions can function as defeaters. ‘Decent’ Christian believers cannot neutralize these defeaters unless they engage in natural theology and show that their creed is true. The A/C warrant for Christian belief cannot be an intrinsic neutralizer of the defeaters. Furthermore, mere negative apologetics will not suffice in order to restore the warrant of Christian belief if it is undercut by a defeating secular explanation of religious beliefs. In short, the positive apologetics of natural theology is indispensable to well-educated, contemporary Christians, even if they have read their Plantinga.Less

World Creation when there are Prime Worlds

Bruce Langtry

in God, the Best, and Evil

There is a presumption that in bringing about the better overall outcome one acts in the better way. But the presumption can be defeated by special circumstances. This chapter argues that if there ... More

There is a presumption that in bringing about the better overall outcome one acts in the better way. But the presumption can be defeated by special circumstances. This chapter argues that if there are prime worlds and God is choosing which world to create, then it is implausible that any relevant defeater obtains, and so God will create a prime world. Combined with one of the results of Chapter 2 this yields the conclusion that even if there is a world than which there is none better, God cannot create it.Less

Rejecting Transmission

Jennifer Lackey

in Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge

The focus of this chapter is a view dominating discussion in the current epistemological literature — the Belief View of Testimony — according to which transmission lies at the heart of testimonial ... More

The focus of this chapter is a view dominating discussion in the current epistemological literature — the Belief View of Testimony — according to which transmission lies at the heart of testimonial exchanges. According to the necessity claim of this thesis, a hearer knows (believes with justification/warrant) that p, on the basis of a speaker's testimony that p, only if the speaker herself knows (believes with justification/warrant) that p. According to the sufficiency claim of this thesis, if a speaker knows (believes with justification/warrant) that p, and a hearer comes to believe that p, on the basis of the content of this speaker's testimony that p without possessing any relevant defeaters, then the hearer also knows (believes with justification/warrant) that p. This chapter argues, first, that unreliable believers can nonetheless be reliable testifiers, thereby showing that the necessity claim is false and, second, that reliable believers can nonetheless be unreliable testifiers, thereby showing that the sufficiency claim is false.Less

‘S knows that A’

Keith Hossack

in The Metaphysics of Knowledge

This chapter expounds the central thesis that knowledge is a relation of a mind to a fact. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 argues that knowledge is not a propositional attitude. Section ... More

This chapter expounds the central thesis that knowledge is a relation of a mind to a fact. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 argues that knowledge is not a propositional attitude. Section 2 classifies knowledge as a relation between a mind and a fact. Section 3 discusses whether the connection between knowledge and mental acts is causal or constitutive. Section 4 discusses epistemic faculties, and section 5 examines defeaters. Section 6 discusses some unsuccessful attempts to define reliability. Section 7 defines reliability as knowing if one believes, and warrant as being disposed to know if one believes. Section 8 concludes that explaining other things in terms of knowledge can be a fruitful strategy.Less

Misleading Defeaters

Richard Foley

in When Is True Belief Knowledge?

This chapter proposes a game in a similar vein to the Gettier game: when a subject has a true belief but seems not to have knowledge, it looks for some key aspect of the situation about which the ... More

This chapter proposes a game in a similar vein to the Gettier game: when a subject has a true belief but seems not to have knowledge, it looks for some key aspect of the situation about which the subject lacks true beliefs. Defeasibility theorists make a strikingly similar recommendation. When confronted with cases in which a subject intuitively lacks knowledge despite having a justified true belief, they too recommend looking for a truth about the situation that the subject lacks, but because they are committed to the Gettier game, they link the subject's ignorance of this truth with the justification requirement. The chapter examines a story discussed by a leading proponent of the defeasibility theory, Peter Klein, before positing its own solution to the game.Less

Epistemological Objections to Materialism 1

Robert C. Koons

in The Waning of Materialism

This chapter argues that materialism is vulnerable to two kinds of epistemological objections: transcendental arguments, that show that materialism is incompatible with the very possibility of ... More

This chapter argues that materialism is vulnerable to two kinds of epistemological objections: transcendental arguments, that show that materialism is incompatible with the very possibility of knowledge; and defeater arguments, that show that belief in materialism provides an effective defeaters to claims to knowledge. It constructs objections of these two kinds in three areas of epistemology: our knowledge of the laws of nature (and of scientific essences), our knowledge of the ontology of material objects, mathematical and logical knowledge. The chapter argues that these epistemological weaknesses place the materialist in a dialectically weak position in respect of ontological identity claims, since the materialist cannot know the causal powers or persistence conditions of material objects. It also argues that the materialist can provide no non-circular account of epistemic normativity. Anti-realist accounts of normativity are unavailable because normativity is already implicated in all intentionality. Moreover, materialists face a fatal dilemma in attempting to carry out an etiological reduction of teleological norms, since neither Humean nor anti-Humean accounts of causation yield defensible results.Less

Disarming the Live Sceptical Threat

Bryan Frances

in Scepticism Comes Alive

The live sceptic’s threat is disarmed by taking away their sword: making the factors that threaten one’s beliefs lose their punch without meeting them head on. In this way, the mere mortal need not ... More

The live sceptic’s threat is disarmed by taking away their sword: making the factors that threaten one’s beliefs lose their punch without meeting them head on. In this way, the mere mortal need not have any impressive epistemic factors such as evidence that neutralize the sceptical hypotheses, as the latter never posed any threat that had not somehow been rendered truth-conditionally irrelevant to knowledge assertions. Two such strategies are presented. The first, the Set-Aside solution, claims that people explicitly or implicitly set the live sceptical hypotheses aside as truth conditionally irrelevant when they assert ‘S knows P’ and P conflicts with the hypotheses. The second, the Practicality solution, claims that in ordinary contexts practicality and other contextualist factors bracket the sceptical hypotheses so that they aren’t threatening.Less

Do Live Sceptical Hypotheses Pose Real Threats?

Bryan Frances

in Scepticism Comes Alive

The so-called “No Threat” solutions claim that the epistemic factors that the live sceptic claims defeat our claims to knowledge are too feeble to mount a threat. On the face of it, the epistemic ... More

The so-called “No Threat” solutions claim that the epistemic factors that the live sceptic claims defeat our claims to knowledge are too feeble to mount a threat. On the face of it, the epistemic factors the live sceptic says defeat our chances at knowledge make it look like the sceptical hypotheses are about to ruin our chances at knowledge, but this is an illusion. This chapter presents and evaluates eight such strategies, four of which examine the relation of philosophy to common sense.Less

Introduction: When a Sceptical Hypothesis is Live

Bryan Frances

in Scepticism Comes Alive

This book’s topic is introduced via a brief discussion of what is often found objectionable in traditional forms of scepticism. Some of the more interesting features of Live Scepticism, the theory ... More

This book’s topic is introduced via a brief discussion of what is often found objectionable in traditional forms of scepticism. Some of the more interesting features of Live Scepticism, the theory presented in this book, are listed. Finally, an outline of the remainder of the book is given.Less

When Experts Make Mistakes

Bryan Frances

in Scepticism Comes Alive

The main themes of the book are introduced in a preliminary and intuitive way.

How Live Hypotheses Sabotage Knowledge

Bryan Frances

in Scepticism Comes Alive

The argument template used to generate the new sceptical arguments is presented. In doing so, what it means for a hypothesis to be “live”, what it means for someone to be a “mere mortal” with regard ... More

The argument template used to generate the new sceptical arguments is presented. In doing so, what it means for a hypothesis to be “live”, what it means for someone to be a “mere mortal” with regard to a live hypothesis, what it means to be able to “rule out” a hypothesis are explained. The key premises of the argument: the Modesty Principle, the Live Hypothesis Principle, and the Mere Mortal Premiss are formulated. Roughly put, if one is a mere mortal with regard to a live hypothesis H, then in order for one to know something P obviously inconsistent with H, one needs to be able to rule out or neutralize H. But since one is a mere mortal, one can’t neutralize H; so one does not know P.Less

The First Live Sceptical Hypothesis

Bryan Frances

in Scepticism Comes Alive

The argument template used to generate new sceptical arguments was presented in chapter 3. In this chapter, the template is used to generate the first live sceptical argument by plugging ‘No one ... More

The argument template used to generate new sceptical arguments was presented in chapter 3. In this chapter, the template is used to generate the first live sceptical argument by plugging ‘No one believes anything’, or belief eliminativism, into the template. It is argued that in some close possible worlds, eliminativism is a live hypothesis (even though false!), and many (not all) philosophers and cognitive scientists are mere mortals with respect to it. The obvious objections are addressed, and this live sceptical argument is compared with arguments concerning evidence one does not possess.Less

Additional Sceptical Hypotheses

Bryan Frances

in Scepticism Comes Alive

The argument template of chapter 3 is taken together with other live hypotheses to generate other kinds of live scepticism. For instance, one can focus on error theories with regard to colour, or ... More

The argument template of chapter 3 is taken together with other live hypotheses to generate other kinds of live scepticism. For instance, one can focus on error theories with regard to colour, or pain location, or character traits. Or, oddly enough, we can plug in, as a live hypothesis, the hypothesis that no one knows any external world proposition. The upshot is that in intellectual communities, in which error theories about belief, pain locations, character traits, and colour are live, mere mortals don’t know that fire engines are red, don’t know that they sometimes have pains in their lower backs, don’t know that John Rawls was kind, and don’t even know that they believe any of those truths.Less

The Sceptical Solution

Bryan Frances

in Scepticism Comes Alive

It is argued that most of the counterintuitive elements of traditional sceptical theories do not apply to the live sceptical theories, and that the live sceptic’s argument is identical in form to ... More

It is argued that most of the counterintuitive elements of traditional sceptical theories do not apply to the live sceptical theories, and that the live sceptic’s argument is identical in form to arguments we rely on without hesitation. The live sceptic is not denying anyone of the warrant they think they have; neither are they denying its quality. The knowledge denied by the live sceptic (knowledge of our own beliefs, the locations of our own pains, and the colours of objects in perfect view) is frequently ruled out in uncontroversial circumstances. This is important to the live sceptic’s case because it might be objected that it’s nearly impossible not to know one’s own beliefs, pain locations, or sock colours when the beliefs are formed in maximally veridical ways.Less

Universal Scepticism

Bryan Frances

in Scepticism Comes Alive

Suppose the following principle P is true: in order to know X, one needs to be able to rule out scenarios that one is aware is both live and incompatible with one knowing X. If P is true, then the ... More

Suppose the following principle P is true: in order to know X, one needs to be able to rule out scenarios that one is aware is both live and incompatible with one knowing X. If P is true, then the live sceptical argument template can be modified to generate an argument for universal scepticism: in intellectual communities in which belief eliminativism is live, mere mortals with respect to belief eliminativism know absolutely nothing. The principle P and related principles are explored.Less