Dennis G Fryback
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195322989
- eISBN:
- 9780199869206
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195322989.003.0037
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter presents an obituary for Ward Edwards. Ward Edwards is considered the father of behavioral decision theory. He authored or co-authored four books and over 200 journal articles.
This chapter presents an obituary for Ward Edwards. Ward Edwards is considered the father of behavioral decision theory. He authored or co-authored four books and over 200 journal articles.
James Bergin
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199280292
- eISBN:
- 9780191602498
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199280290.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
Covers a standard range of topics in microeconomics theory. These include decision theory, strategic and extensive form games, the economics of information, bargaining, principal agent problems, ...
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Covers a standard range of topics in microeconomics theory. These include decision theory, strategic and extensive form games, the economics of information, bargaining, principal agent problems, cooperative games, and evolutionary game theory. Coverage is at the level of a graduate course in microeconomic theory.Less
Covers a standard range of topics in microeconomics theory. These include decision theory, strategic and extensive form games, the economics of information, bargaining, principal agent problems, cooperative games, and evolutionary game theory. Coverage is at the level of a graduate course in microeconomic theory.
Jie W Weiss and David J Weiss
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195322989
- eISBN:
- 9780199869206
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195322989.003.0004
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter reviews ideas and work done or in progress which seem to indicate where basic research on human decision processes is going. These ideas have two closely related foci: dynamic decision ...
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This chapter reviews ideas and work done or in progress which seem to indicate where basic research on human decision processes is going. These ideas have two closely related foci: dynamic decision theory and Probabilistic Information Processing systems (PIP). The chapter begins by presenting the problem of dynamic decision theory and by proposing a taxonomy of human decision tasks to which such a theory should be applied. It then reviews current thought and experimentation in five areas that are crucial to the development of such a theory: information seeking, man as intuitive statistician, sequential prediction, Bayesian information processing, and dynamic programming. Finally, the idea of a probabilistic information-processing system is presented, both as a kind of system which is urgently needed in several military contexts and as a vehicle for research in dynamic decision theory.Less
This chapter reviews ideas and work done or in progress which seem to indicate where basic research on human decision processes is going. These ideas have two closely related foci: dynamic decision theory and Probabilistic Information Processing systems (PIP). The chapter begins by presenting the problem of dynamic decision theory and by proposing a taxonomy of human decision tasks to which such a theory should be applied. It then reviews current thought and experimentation in five areas that are crucial to the development of such a theory: information seeking, man as intuitive statistician, sequential prediction, Bayesian information processing, and dynamic programming. Finally, the idea of a probabilistic information-processing system is presented, both as a kind of system which is urgently needed in several military contexts and as a vehicle for research in dynamic decision theory.
Paul Weirich
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780195171259
- eISBN:
- 9780199834976
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019517125X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Decision theory aims at a general account of rationality covering humans but to begin makes idealizations about decision problems and agents' resources and circumstances. It treats inerrant agents ...
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Decision theory aims at a general account of rationality covering humans but to begin makes idealizations about decision problems and agents' resources and circumstances. It treats inerrant agents with unlimited cognitive power facing tractable decision problems. This book systematically rolls back idealizations and without loss of precision treats errant agents with limited cognitive abilities facing decision problems without a stable top option. It recommends choices that maximize utility using quantizations of beliefs and desires in cases where probabilities and utilities are indeterminate and using higher-order utility analysis in cases of limited access to probabilities and utilities. For agents burdened with mistakes, it advocates reasonable attempts to correct unacceptable mistakes before deciding. In decision problems without a stable top option, a topic of game theory, it proposes maximizing self-conditional utility among self-supporting options. In games of strategy, the new principles lead to solutions that are Pareto optimal among equilibria composed of jointly self-supporting strategies. Offering an account of bounded rationality, the bookmakes large strides toward realism in decision theory.Less
Decision theory aims at a general account of rationality covering humans but to begin makes idealizations about decision problems and agents' resources and circumstances. It treats inerrant agents with unlimited cognitive power facing tractable decision problems. This book systematically rolls back idealizations and without loss of precision treats errant agents with limited cognitive abilities facing decision problems without a stable top option. It recommends choices that maximize utility using quantizations of beliefs and desires in cases where probabilities and utilities are indeterminate and using higher-order utility analysis in cases of limited access to probabilities and utilities. For agents burdened with mistakes, it advocates reasonable attempts to correct unacceptable mistakes before deciding. In decision problems without a stable top option, a topic of game theory, it proposes maximizing self-conditional utility among self-supporting options. In games of strategy, the new principles lead to solutions that are Pareto optimal among equilibria composed of jointly self-supporting strategies. Offering an account of bounded rationality, the bookmakes large strides toward realism in decision theory.
David J Weiss and James Shanteau
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195322989
- eISBN:
- 9780199869206
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195322989.003.0039
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Following on from the previous two chapters presents an obituary for Ward Edwards. Ward's 1954 paper in the Psychological Bulletin introduced decision making as a research topic for psychologists. He ...
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Following on from the previous two chapters presents an obituary for Ward Edwards. Ward's 1954 paper in the Psychological Bulletin introduced decision making as a research topic for psychologists. He continued to make significant contributions to the field for more than fifty years, contributing some 200 publications to the literature. He died from Parkinson's Disease on February 1, 2005.Less
Following on from the previous two chapters presents an obituary for Ward Edwards. Ward's 1954 paper in the Psychological Bulletin introduced decision making as a research topic for psychologists. He continued to make significant contributions to the field for more than fifty years, contributing some 200 publications to the literature. He died from Parkinson's Disease on February 1, 2005.
Jeff Jordan
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199291328
- eISBN:
- 9780191710698
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291328.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Pascal's Wager employed infinite utilities, but standard decision theory is incompatible with infinite utilities. In this chapter, the consequences of restricting the Wager to finite utilities are ...
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Pascal's Wager employed infinite utilities, but standard decision theory is incompatible with infinite utilities. In this chapter, the consequences of restricting the Wager to finite utilities are explored. The St. Petersburg paradox is also examined.Less
Pascal's Wager employed infinite utilities, but standard decision theory is incompatible with infinite utilities. In this chapter, the consequences of restricting the Wager to finite utilities are explored. The St. Petersburg paradox is also examined.
David Wallace
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199546961
- eISBN:
- 9780191741418
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546961.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter extends chapter 5's formal proof into a general discussion of how we should assess evidence — and, in particular, how we should test scientific theories — given the possibility that ...
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This chapter extends chapter 5's formal proof into a general discussion of how we should assess evidence — and, in particular, how we should test scientific theories — given the possibility that Everettian quantum mechanics is correct. The chapter proves — initially with informal arguments, but in due course with full mathematical rigor — that rational scientists should treat the branch weights assigned by quantum theory to quantum-mechanical branches exactly as if they were probabilities; as such, the chapter argues, probability is actually on firmer conceptual footing in quantum theory than in classical physics. After a brief digression to consider probability in approaches to quantum theory other than the Everett interpretation, the chapter concludes by placing the work in the broader context of recent work on Everett probability.Less
This chapter extends chapter 5's formal proof into a general discussion of how we should assess evidence — and, in particular, how we should test scientific theories — given the possibility that Everettian quantum mechanics is correct. The chapter proves — initially with informal arguments, but in due course with full mathematical rigor — that rational scientists should treat the branch weights assigned by quantum theory to quantum-mechanical branches exactly as if they were probabilities; as such, the chapter argues, probability is actually on firmer conceptual footing in quantum theory than in classical physics. After a brief digression to consider probability in approaches to quantum theory other than the Everett interpretation, the chapter concludes by placing the work in the broader context of recent work on Everett probability.
Jeff Jordan
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199291328
- eISBN:
- 9780191710698
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291328.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Six kinds of Pascal's Wager are explored via a look at decision theory and the logic of pragmatic arguments. Of these six, one version dubbed ‘the Jamesian Wager’, in honour of William James's ...
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Six kinds of Pascal's Wager are explored via a look at decision theory and the logic of pragmatic arguments. Of these six, one version dubbed ‘the Jamesian Wager’, in honour of William James's argument in his 1896 essay The Will to Believe, is the focus of an extended treatment throughout the book. It is a primary contention of the book that the Jamesian Wager provides a sound argument in support of theistic belief.Less
Six kinds of Pascal's Wager are explored via a look at decision theory and the logic of pragmatic arguments. Of these six, one version dubbed ‘the Jamesian Wager’, in honour of William James's argument in his 1896 essay The Will to Believe, is the focus of an extended treatment throughout the book. It is a primary contention of the book that the Jamesian Wager provides a sound argument in support of theistic belief.
Joseph Heath
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195370294
- eISBN:
- 9780199871230
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370294.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book attempts to show how rule-following can be understood as an essential element of rational action. The first step involves showing how rational choice theory can be modified to incorporate ...
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This book attempts to show how rule-following can be understood as an essential element of rational action. The first step involves showing how rational choice theory can be modified to incorporate deontic constraint as a feature of rational deliberation. The second involves disarming the suspicion that there is something mysterious or irrational about the psychological states underlying rule-following. Human rationality is interpreted as a by-product of the so-called “language upgrade” that we receive as a consequence of the development of specific social practices. As a result, certain constitutive features of our social environment — such as the rule-governed structure of social life — migrate inwards, and become constitutive features of our psychological faculties. This in turn explains why there is an indissoluble bond between practical rationality and deontic constraint. In the end, the book offers a naturalistic, evolutionary argument in favor of the traditional Kantian view that there is an internal connection between being a rational agent and feeling the force of one's moral obligations.Less
This book attempts to show how rule-following can be understood as an essential element of rational action. The first step involves showing how rational choice theory can be modified to incorporate deontic constraint as a feature of rational deliberation. The second involves disarming the suspicion that there is something mysterious or irrational about the psychological states underlying rule-following. Human rationality is interpreted as a by-product of the so-called “language upgrade” that we receive as a consequence of the development of specific social practices. As a result, certain constitutive features of our social environment — such as the rule-governed structure of social life — migrate inwards, and become constitutive features of our psychological faculties. This in turn explains why there is an indissoluble bond between practical rationality and deontic constraint. In the end, the book offers a naturalistic, evolutionary argument in favor of the traditional Kantian view that there is an internal connection between being a rational agent and feeling the force of one's moral obligations.
Jie W Weiss and David J Weiss
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195322989
- eISBN:
- 9780199869206
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195322989.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter shows that if the subjective probabilities of a set of events of which one must happen and not more than one can happen must add up to a specified constant (usually taken as one for ...
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This chapter shows that if the subjective probabilities of a set of events of which one must happen and not more than one can happen must add up to a specified constant (usually taken as one for convenience), then utility can be measured on an interval scale and subjective probability on a ratio scale. But if subjective probabilities do not have this additivity property, then both utility and subjective probability must be measured on a ratio scale. It begins by defining two classes of decision theories. After some preliminary discussion of utility and subjective probability functions, it considers the class of theories which result when subjective probabilities are assumed to add up to one. A brief review of experimental evidence provides empirical reasons for avoiding these difficulties by rejecting additivity. The chapter then examines models which do not require subjective probabilities to add up to one. Such models require a reformulation of the concept of utility; utility scales must have true zero points. Finally, two experimentally testable properties are derived, which any plausible utility-subjective probability model—additive or otherwise—must have.Less
This chapter shows that if the subjective probabilities of a set of events of which one must happen and not more than one can happen must add up to a specified constant (usually taken as one for convenience), then utility can be measured on an interval scale and subjective probability on a ratio scale. But if subjective probabilities do not have this additivity property, then both utility and subjective probability must be measured on a ratio scale. It begins by defining two classes of decision theories. After some preliminary discussion of utility and subjective probability functions, it considers the class of theories which result when subjective probabilities are assumed to add up to one. A brief review of experimental evidence provides empirical reasons for avoiding these difficulties by rejecting additivity. The chapter then examines models which do not require subjective probabilities to add up to one. Such models require a reformulation of the concept of utility; utility scales must have true zero points. Finally, two experimentally testable properties are derived, which any plausible utility-subjective probability model—additive or otherwise—must have.
Herbert Gintis
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691160849
- eISBN:
- 9781400851348
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691160849.003.0001
- Subject:
- Sociology, Economic Sociology
This chapter begins by describing the beliefs, preferences, and constraints (BPC) model of the rational actor. It develops a set of behavioral properties that together will ensure the modeling of ...
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This chapter begins by describing the beliefs, preferences, and constraints (BPC) model of the rational actor. It develops a set of behavioral properties that together will ensure the modeling of agents as maximizers of preferences. It then explains the existence time inconsistency and its importance in modeling human behavior. This is followed by discussions of Bayesian rationality and subjective priors, and how preferences are state dependent. The chapter argues that the rational actor model in general, and the expected utility principle in particular, are acceptably accurate as a basis of modeling behavior in most situations. However, there are well established situations in which individuals violate, or at least appear to violate, these principles. It goes on to review the most challenging of these apparent violations of decision–theoretic rationality.Less
This chapter begins by describing the beliefs, preferences, and constraints (BPC) model of the rational actor. It develops a set of behavioral properties that together will ensure the modeling of agents as maximizers of preferences. It then explains the existence time inconsistency and its importance in modeling human behavior. This is followed by discussions of Bayesian rationality and subjective priors, and how preferences are state dependent. The chapter argues that the rational actor model in general, and the expected utility principle in particular, are acceptably accurate as a basis of modeling behavior in most situations. However, there are well established situations in which individuals violate, or at least appear to violate, these principles. It goes on to review the most challenging of these apparent violations of decision–theoretic rationality.
Giandomenico Majone
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274307
- eISBN:
- 9780191603310
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274304.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Under the Community method, policy is largely the by-product of actions undertaken to advance the integration process or to preserve institutional balance, rather than to solve concrete problems ...
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Under the Community method, policy is largely the by-product of actions undertaken to advance the integration process or to preserve institutional balance, rather than to solve concrete problems efficiently. The policy that eventually emerges is all too often the best bargain that can be negotiated politically. This chapter discusses some clear-cut cases of policy failure, such as the common fisheries and agricultural policies. EU environmental policy is shown to lack a clear rationale, and highly uncertain in its actual results. Risk regulation is a particularly interesting case. The central tenet of EU risk policy — the precautionary principle — is logically defective, tends to distort, rather than clarify regulatory priorities, and has isolated the EU internationally on several occasions.Less
Under the Community method, policy is largely the by-product of actions undertaken to advance the integration process or to preserve institutional balance, rather than to solve concrete problems efficiently. The policy that eventually emerges is all too often the best bargain that can be negotiated politically. This chapter discusses some clear-cut cases of policy failure, such as the common fisheries and agricultural policies. EU environmental policy is shown to lack a clear rationale, and highly uncertain in its actual results. Risk regulation is a particularly interesting case. The central tenet of EU risk policy — the precautionary principle — is logically defective, tends to distort, rather than clarify regulatory priorities, and has isolated the EU internationally on several occasions.
Brian Weatherson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693702
- eISBN:
- 9780191741265
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the interest-relativity of knowledge cannot be explained by the interest-relativity of belief. The discussion starts with an argument that knowledge plays a key pair of roles ...
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This chapter argues that the interest-relativity of knowledge cannot be explained by the interest-relativity of belief. The discussion starts with an argument that knowledge plays a key pair of roles in decision theory. It is then argued that knowledge cannot play that role unless knowledge is interest-relative. The theory of the interest-relativity of belief is reviewed and revised. That theory can explain some of the cases that are used to suggest knowledge is interest-relative. But it can’t explain some cases involving ignorance, or mistake, about the odds at which a bet is offered. The paper ends with an argument that these cases require positing interest-relative defeaters, which affect whether an agent knows something without affecting whether she believes it, or is justified in believing it.Less
This chapter argues that the interest-relativity of knowledge cannot be explained by the interest-relativity of belief. The discussion starts with an argument that knowledge plays a key pair of roles in decision theory. It is then argued that knowledge cannot play that role unless knowledge is interest-relative. The theory of the interest-relativity of belief is reviewed and revised. That theory can explain some of the cases that are used to suggest knowledge is interest-relative. But it can’t explain some cases involving ignorance, or mistake, about the odds at which a bet is offered. The paper ends with an argument that these cases require positing interest-relative defeaters, which affect whether an agent knows something without affecting whether she believes it, or is justified in believing it.
Joseph Heath
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195370294
- eISBN:
- 9780199871230
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370294.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter examines how the consequentialism postulate, namely, the view that actions are valued only for the sake of their consequences, came to be enshrined in modern rational choice theory. It ...
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This chapter examines how the consequentialism postulate, namely, the view that actions are valued only for the sake of their consequences, came to be enshrined in modern rational choice theory. It goes on to consider some of the reasons that a rational action theory of this type gives rise to the so-called “problem of order.” The latter is analyzed under two rubrics, first the problem of multiple equilibria, and second, the problem of suboptimal equilibria. Taken together, these problems suggest that rational choice theory, in its canonical formulation, cannot serve as a general theory of rational action for the social sciences.Less
This chapter examines how the consequentialism postulate, namely, the view that actions are valued only for the sake of their consequences, came to be enshrined in modern rational choice theory. It goes on to consider some of the reasons that a rational action theory of this type gives rise to the so-called “problem of order.” The latter is analyzed under two rubrics, first the problem of multiple equilibria, and second, the problem of suboptimal equilibria. Taken together, these problems suggest that rational choice theory, in its canonical formulation, cannot serve as a general theory of rational action for the social sciences.
ANDREW CAPLIN
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195328318
- eISBN:
- 9780199851768
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328318.003.0015
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
As models are often subjected to empirical testing to evaluate their ability to predict economically sound choices, these models are also solved by means of using optimization measures that are ...
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As models are often subjected to empirical testing to evaluate their ability to predict economically sound choices, these models are also solved by means of using optimization measures that are grounded on understanding both the quantitative and qualitative links of the actual choice data to the models. What sets economics apart from the other social sciences is how the decision-theoretic methodology brings about influential positive externalities. Although this aspect of economics seems to be well-organized, others would notice how classical decision theory does not integrate psychological factors. This chapter attempts to illustrate the developments that have furthered the use of nonstandard economic models while also accounting for the new forms of “psychological data” which involves eye movements, neurological responses, and other such indicators in expanding economic theory.Less
As models are often subjected to empirical testing to evaluate their ability to predict economically sound choices, these models are also solved by means of using optimization measures that are grounded on understanding both the quantitative and qualitative links of the actual choice data to the models. What sets economics apart from the other social sciences is how the decision-theoretic methodology brings about influential positive externalities. Although this aspect of economics seems to be well-organized, others would notice how classical decision theory does not integrate psychological factors. This chapter attempts to illustrate the developments that have furthered the use of nonstandard economic models while also accounting for the new forms of “psychological data” which involves eye movements, neurological responses, and other such indicators in expanding economic theory.
David Wallace
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199546961
- eISBN:
- 9780191741418
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546961.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Building on work originally carried out by David Deutsch, the chapter develops a mathematically rigorous framework for discussing the quantum probability rule in terms of the preferences between ...
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Building on work originally carried out by David Deutsch, the chapter develops a mathematically rigorous framework for discussing the quantum probability rule in terms of the preferences between various courses of action of rational agents. Within this framework, the chapter proves formally that any rational agent who believes in the truth of Everettian quantum mechanics and who knows (or thinks they know) the current quantum state of their branch will act as if future branching was a probabilistic process with the probabilities given by the standard quantum-mechanical probability rule (the ‘Born rule’). The chapter concludes by analysing other proposed rules for action in a quantum universe and showing where they violate the axioms for quantum decision making which it proposes and defends.Less
Building on work originally carried out by David Deutsch, the chapter develops a mathematically rigorous framework for discussing the quantum probability rule in terms of the preferences between various courses of action of rational agents. Within this framework, the chapter proves formally that any rational agent who believes in the truth of Everettian quantum mechanics and who knows (or thinks they know) the current quantum state of their branch will act as if future branching was a probabilistic process with the probabilities given by the standard quantum-mechanical probability rule (the ‘Born rule’). The chapter concludes by analysing other proposed rules for action in a quantum universe and showing where they violate the axioms for quantum decision making which it proposes and defends.
JESS BENHABIB and ALBERTO BISIN
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195328318
- eISBN:
- 9780199851768
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328318.003.0014
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
Because the traditional method of decision theory accounts only for explaining choice instead of also looking into the process that underlies choice, other approaches such as behavioral economics and ...
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Because the traditional method of decision theory accounts only for explaining choice instead of also looking into the process that underlies choice, other approaches such as behavioral economics and neuroeconomics attempt to come up with theories that would account for both the choice and the process. Such models which embody joint implications that consider both process and theory comprise a whole different area in analyzing decision theory. It is emphasized that the literature related to such measures would adopt structural empirical methods that are vital in testing and analyzing the models. The gap between traditional theory and that which considers neuroscience signifies the need to establish a structural approach that would explain the implicit identifying assumptions observed on both sides. Also, the chapter includes a discussion about how a structural analysis in the context of intertermporal decision theory is essential in examining decision theory.Less
Because the traditional method of decision theory accounts only for explaining choice instead of also looking into the process that underlies choice, other approaches such as behavioral economics and neuroeconomics attempt to come up with theories that would account for both the choice and the process. Such models which embody joint implications that consider both process and theory comprise a whole different area in analyzing decision theory. It is emphasized that the literature related to such measures would adopt structural empirical methods that are vital in testing and analyzing the models. The gap between traditional theory and that which considers neuroscience signifies the need to establish a structural approach that would explain the implicit identifying assumptions observed on both sides. Also, the chapter includes a discussion about how a structural analysis in the context of intertermporal decision theory is essential in examining decision theory.
Paul Weirich
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780195171259
- eISBN:
- 9780199834976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019517125X.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Decision theory is multidisciplinary. Philosophical decision theory formulates principles of rationality for decisions. Its principles treat primarily instrumental rationality and cover both ...
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Decision theory is multidisciplinary. Philosophical decision theory formulates principles of rationality for decisions. Its principles treat primarily instrumental rationality and cover both procedural and substantive rationality. My school evaluates an option in terms of its consequences, using an agent’s preferences taken in the ordinary, nonbehavioristic sense. This book generalizes principles by removing selected idealizations and making adjustments for their absence.Less
Decision theory is multidisciplinary. Philosophical decision theory formulates principles of rationality for decisions. Its principles treat primarily instrumental rationality and cover both procedural and substantive rationality. My school evaluates an option in terms of its consequences, using an agent’s preferences taken in the ordinary, nonbehavioristic sense. This book generalizes principles by removing selected idealizations and making adjustments for their absence.
Simon Saunders
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199560561
- eISBN:
- 9780191721380
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560561.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This introductory chapter summarizes the principal positive theses of the book (Section 1), namely, that the unitary evolution of the quantum state, for sufficiently large systems of particles in ...
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This introductory chapter summarizes the principal positive theses of the book (Section 1), namely, that the unitary evolution of the quantum state, for sufficiently large systems of particles in thermal environments, yields a multiplicity of branching structures (worlds) obeying approximately classical equations, a result that follows from decoherence theory with no special assumptions or additions to the quantum formalism; and that further, the branching of worlds has a natural interpretation in terms of probability, as quantified by the Born rule in terms of ratios of squared norms of branch amplitudes. In particular, an agent who knows the branching structures of the quantum state that will result from his actions is rationally compelled to order his preferences among actions by the expected utilities of those branching structures as defined by the Born rule. He is, moreover, entitled to view a branching process as involving uncertainty as to which branch he will find himself. But independent of the truth of these claims, the theory is still testable: an agent who does not know the branching structure of the state, and who is indeed undecided between a many-worlds and a one-world theory, is rationally bound to update her credences in such theories by conditionalisation on observed statistical evidence, just as she is bound to do in the case of conventional quantum mechanics. Section 2 summarizes some of the arguments and counter-arguments for these claims as developed in subsequent chapters. Section 3 provides some more mathematical and historical background to the Everett interpretation, including a brief introduction to the decoherent histories formalism.Less
This introductory chapter summarizes the principal positive theses of the book (Section 1), namely, that the unitary evolution of the quantum state, for sufficiently large systems of particles in thermal environments, yields a multiplicity of branching structures (worlds) obeying approximately classical equations, a result that follows from decoherence theory with no special assumptions or additions to the quantum formalism; and that further, the branching of worlds has a natural interpretation in terms of probability, as quantified by the Born rule in terms of ratios of squared norms of branch amplitudes. In particular, an agent who knows the branching structures of the quantum state that will result from his actions is rationally compelled to order his preferences among actions by the expected utilities of those branching structures as defined by the Born rule. He is, moreover, entitled to view a branching process as involving uncertainty as to which branch he will find himself. But independent of the truth of these claims, the theory is still testable: an agent who does not know the branching structure of the state, and who is indeed undecided between a many-worlds and a one-world theory, is rationally bound to update her credences in such theories by conditionalisation on observed statistical evidence, just as she is bound to do in the case of conventional quantum mechanics. Section 2 summarizes some of the arguments and counter-arguments for these claims as developed in subsequent chapters. Section 3 provides some more mathematical and historical background to the Everett interpretation, including a brief introduction to the decoherent histories formalism.
David Lewis
- Published in print:
- 1987
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195036466
- eISBN:
- 9780199833399
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195036468.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This paper argues that, considered as puzzles about rationality, the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem are essentially one and the same problem.
This paper argues that, considered as puzzles about rationality, the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem are essentially one and the same problem.
