Roger W. Shuy
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195181661
- eISBN:
- 9780199788477
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195181661.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This book describes and illustrates eleven powerful conversational strategies used by undercover police officers and cooperating witnesses who secretly tape-record targets in criminal investigations. ...
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This book describes and illustrates eleven powerful conversational strategies used by undercover police officers and cooperating witnesses who secretly tape-record targets in criminal investigations. Twelve actual criminal case studies are used as examples. These strategies creating illusion of guilt include the apparently deliberate use of semantic ambiguity, blocking the targets’ words (by creating static on the tape, interrupting them, speaking on their behalf, and manipulating the off/on switch); rapidly changing the subject before targets can respond (the “hit and run” strategy); contaminating the tape with irrelevant information that can make targets appear to be guilty; camouflaging illegality by making actions appear to be legal; isolating targets from important information that they need in order to make informed choices; inaccurately restating things the target has said; withholding crucial information from targets; lying to targets about critical information; and scripting targets in what to say on tape. These conversational strategies gain power from the fact that the targets do not know that they are being recorded, and often let things go right by them during the discourse. Nor do they know that the real audience of the conversations consists of later jury listeners, who do not know the full context of these conversations. Unlike everyday, unrecorded conversation, the most critical listening takes place at a future time and under very different circumstances. It is shown that undercover officers and their cooperating witnesses make use of essentially the same conversational strategies.Less
This book describes and illustrates eleven powerful conversational strategies used by undercover police officers and cooperating witnesses who secretly tape-record targets in criminal investigations. Twelve actual criminal case studies are used as examples. These strategies creating illusion of guilt include the apparently deliberate use of semantic ambiguity, blocking the targets’ words (by creating static on the tape, interrupting them, speaking on their behalf, and manipulating the off/on switch); rapidly changing the subject before targets can respond (the “hit and run” strategy); contaminating the tape with irrelevant information that can make targets appear to be guilty; camouflaging illegality by making actions appear to be legal; isolating targets from important information that they need in order to make informed choices; inaccurately restating things the target has said; withholding crucial information from targets; lying to targets about critical information; and scripting targets in what to say on tape. These conversational strategies gain power from the fact that the targets do not know that they are being recorded, and often let things go right by them during the discourse. Nor do they know that the real audience of the conversations consists of later jury listeners, who do not know the full context of these conversations. Unlike everyday, unrecorded conversation, the most critical listening takes place at a future time and under very different circumstances. It is shown that undercover officers and their cooperating witnesses make use of essentially the same conversational strategies.
Thomas L. Carson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577415
- eISBN:
- 9780191722813
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577415.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This book addresses questions in ethical theory and practical questions about lying, deception, and information disclosure in public affairs, business and professional ethics, and personal ...
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This book addresses questions in ethical theory and practical questions about lying, deception, and information disclosure in public affairs, business and professional ethics, and personal relationships. Part I is a conceptual map for the rest of the book. It proposes an analysis of the concepts of lying and deception and related concepts such as withholding information, “keeping someone in the dark,” and “half-truths.” Part II addresses questions in ethical theory. The book examines the implications of Kant's theory, act-utilitarianism, Ross's theory, and rule-consequentialism for moral questions about lying and deception. The book argues that Kant's absolutism about lying is untenable and that his moral theory doesn't commit him to being an absolutist. It also argues that the standard debates about lying and deception between act-utilitarians and their critics are inconclusive because they rest on appeals to disputed intuitions. The book defends a version of the golden rule and a theory of moral reasoning. The book's theory implies that there is a moral presumption against lying and deception that cause harm — a presumption that is at least as strong as that endorsed by act-utilitarianism. The book uses this theory to justify its claims about the issues it addresses in Part III: deception and withholding information in sales, deception in advertising, bluffing and deception in negotiations, the duty of professionals to inform their clients, lying and deception by leaders as a pretext for fighting wars (or avoiding wars), lying and deception about history (with special attention to the Holocaust), and cases of distorting the historical record by telling half truths. The book concludes with a qualified defense of the view that honesty is a virtue.Less
This book addresses questions in ethical theory and practical questions about lying, deception, and information disclosure in public affairs, business and professional ethics, and personal relationships. Part I is a conceptual map for the rest of the book. It proposes an analysis of the concepts of lying and deception and related concepts such as withholding information, “keeping someone in the dark,” and “half-truths.” Part II addresses questions in ethical theory. The book examines the implications of Kant's theory, act-utilitarianism, Ross's theory, and rule-consequentialism for moral questions about lying and deception. The book argues that Kant's absolutism about lying is untenable and that his moral theory doesn't commit him to being an absolutist. It also argues that the standard debates about lying and deception between act-utilitarians and their critics are inconclusive because they rest on appeals to disputed intuitions. The book defends a version of the golden rule and a theory of moral reasoning. The book's theory implies that there is a moral presumption against lying and deception that cause harm — a presumption that is at least as strong as that endorsed by act-utilitarianism. The book uses this theory to justify its claims about the issues it addresses in Part III: deception and withholding information in sales, deception in advertising, bluffing and deception in negotiations, the duty of professionals to inform their clients, lying and deception by leaders as a pretext for fighting wars (or avoiding wars), lying and deception about history (with special attention to the Holocaust), and cases of distorting the historical record by telling half truths. The book concludes with a qualified defense of the view that honesty is a virtue.
Clancy Martin (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195327939
- eISBN:
- 9780199852444
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327939.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book gathers together new chapters on deception and self-deception by leading thinkers on the subject. The chapters discuss topics including the nature and the definition of deception; whether ...
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This book gathers together new chapters on deception and self-deception by leading thinkers on the subject. The chapters discuss topics including the nature and the definition of deception; whether deception is morally blameworthy or not; attacks against and defenses of self-deception; and the most famous philosophical account of lying by Immanuel Kant. Deception of others and self-deception share many more interconnections than is normally recognized, and these chapters reveal the benefits of considering them together.Less
This book gathers together new chapters on deception and self-deception by leading thinkers on the subject. The chapters discuss topics including the nature and the definition of deception; whether deception is morally blameworthy or not; attacks against and defenses of self-deception; and the most famous philosophical account of lying by Immanuel Kant. Deception of others and self-deception share many more interconnections than is normally recognized, and these chapters reveal the benefits of considering them together.
David. Cressy
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198207818
- eISBN:
- 9780191677809
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198207818.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Early Modern History, Cultural History
This chapter tells the story told by an unmarried servant to a Leicestershire magistrate in 1608. Its ingredients include power and dependency, sex and violence, attempted abortion, attempted murder, ...
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This chapter tells the story told by an unmarried servant to a Leicestershire magistrate in 1608. Its ingredients include power and dependency, sex and violence, attempted abortion, attempted murder, suspected infanticide, and the construction of an exculpatory narrative. The story exposes the relationships of gentility and dependency, coercive male mastery and the vulnerabilities of female domestic service. Other topics exposed in the course of its unfolding include subterfuge and resistance, bribery and forgery, the misuse of literacy, and the threatened misuse of the law. The story even has religious dimensions involving the swearing of oaths, invocation of the Devil, recourse to the Bible, and a popular misrepresentation of the doctrine of predestination. The central character, Rose Arnold of Scraptoft, Leicestershire, told her story to her mother, to her minister, and to a magistrate, before retelling it, after much rehearsal, to the clerks of the diocesan court.Less
This chapter tells the story told by an unmarried servant to a Leicestershire magistrate in 1608. Its ingredients include power and dependency, sex and violence, attempted abortion, attempted murder, suspected infanticide, and the construction of an exculpatory narrative. The story exposes the relationships of gentility and dependency, coercive male mastery and the vulnerabilities of female domestic service. Other topics exposed in the course of its unfolding include subterfuge and resistance, bribery and forgery, the misuse of literacy, and the threatened misuse of the law. The story even has religious dimensions involving the swearing of oaths, invocation of the Devil, recourse to the Bible, and a popular misrepresentation of the doctrine of predestination. The central character, Rose Arnold of Scraptoft, Leicestershire, told her story to her mother, to her minister, and to a magistrate, before retelling it, after much rehearsal, to the clerks of the diocesan court.
Justin Grimmer, Sean J. Westwood, and Solomon Messing
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691162614
- eISBN:
- 9781400852666
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691162614.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Constituents often fail to hold their representatives accountable for federal spending decisions—even though those very choices have a pervasive influence on American life. Why does this happen? ...
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Constituents often fail to hold their representatives accountable for federal spending decisions—even though those very choices have a pervasive influence on American life. Why does this happen? Breaking new ground in the study of representation, this book demonstrates how legislators skillfully inform constituents with strategic communication and how this facilitates or undermines accountability. Using a massive collection of Congressional texts and innovative experiments and methods, the book shows how legislators create an impression of influence through credit claiming messages. Anticipating constituents' reactions, legislators claim credit for programs that elicit a positive response, making constituents believe their legislator is effectively representing their district. This spurs legislators to create and defend projects popular with their constituents. Yet legislators claim credit for much more—they announce projects long before they begin, deceptively imply they deserve credit for expenditures they had little role in securing, and boast about minuscule projects. Unfortunately, legislators get away with seeking credit broadly because constituents evaluate the actions that are reported, rather than the size of the expenditures. This book raises critical questions about how citizens hold their political representatives accountable and when deception is allowable in a democracy.Less
Constituents often fail to hold their representatives accountable for federal spending decisions—even though those very choices have a pervasive influence on American life. Why does this happen? Breaking new ground in the study of representation, this book demonstrates how legislators skillfully inform constituents with strategic communication and how this facilitates or undermines accountability. Using a massive collection of Congressional texts and innovative experiments and methods, the book shows how legislators create an impression of influence through credit claiming messages. Anticipating constituents' reactions, legislators claim credit for programs that elicit a positive response, making constituents believe their legislator is effectively representing their district. This spurs legislators to create and defend projects popular with their constituents. Yet legislators claim credit for much more—they announce projects long before they begin, deceptively imply they deserve credit for expenditures they had little role in securing, and boast about minuscule projects. Unfortunately, legislators get away with seeking credit broadly because constituents evaluate the actions that are reported, rather than the size of the expenditures. This book raises critical questions about how citizens hold their political representatives accountable and when deception is allowable in a democracy.
L. Jonathan Cohen
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198236047
- eISBN:
- 9780191679179
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236047.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This study examines the tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. The book seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the ...
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This study examines the tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. The book seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied at its best in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, this book examines issues in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.Less
This study examines the tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. The book seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied at its best in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, this book examines issues in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.
Steve Vanderheiden
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195334609
- eISBN:
- 9780199868759
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195334609.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
This chapter examines three primary issues raised by some of the conditions that are often assumed to be necessary for attributions of responsibility: first, that persons are largely ignorant of the ...
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This chapter examines three primary issues raised by some of the conditions that are often assumed to be necessary for attributions of responsibility: first, that persons are largely ignorant of the effects of those acts which contribute to climate change and so cannot intend those effects, complicating the assessment of moral responsibility for them; second, there remains some uncertainty concerning the scientific basis of those predicted effects, further complicating attributions of responsibility for consequences about which persons may be ignorant; and third, the evident deception behind at least some widely disseminated climate skepticism further complicates the attribution of responsibility for ongoing emissions. It argues that unreasonable ignorance, in all three cases, cannot exonerate agents from culpability. Finally, it presents a defensible policy strategy for issues (like climate change) that are plagued by problems of uncertainty, endorsing the precautionary principle as well as means of “managing” uncertainty.Less
This chapter examines three primary issues raised by some of the conditions that are often assumed to be necessary for attributions of responsibility: first, that persons are largely ignorant of the effects of those acts which contribute to climate change and so cannot intend those effects, complicating the assessment of moral responsibility for them; second, there remains some uncertainty concerning the scientific basis of those predicted effects, further complicating attributions of responsibility for consequences about which persons may be ignorant; and third, the evident deception behind at least some widely disseminated climate skepticism further complicates the attribution of responsibility for ongoing emissions. It argues that unreasonable ignorance, in all three cases, cannot exonerate agents from culpability. Finally, it presents a defensible policy strategy for issues (like climate change) that are plagued by problems of uncertainty, endorsing the precautionary principle as well as means of “managing” uncertainty.
Gabriele Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198235804
- eISBN:
- 9780191604058
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235801.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explores the nature of self and self-consciousness. The self is that which gives a person her identity as she herself sees it, and that means that she has sufficient complexity to be ...
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This chapter explores the nature of self and self-consciousness. The self is that which gives a person her identity as she herself sees it, and that means that she has sufficient complexity to be able to form intentions, to evaluate and select. Self-consciousness is itself constitutive of the self, and constituent of the self are consequently evaluations and decisions about what it is worthwhile to do and what to avoid, about the sort of life one wants to lead, and the kind of person one wants to be. The interdependence of the elements of the shape of experiences means that they will be ‘edited’, that some experiences will be seen as important and others as negligible according to how they fit into existing frameworks of beliefs and inclinations.Less
This chapter explores the nature of self and self-consciousness. The self is that which gives a person her identity as she herself sees it, and that means that she has sufficient complexity to be able to form intentions, to evaluate and select. Self-consciousness is itself constitutive of the self, and constituent of the self are consequently evaluations and decisions about what it is worthwhile to do and what to avoid, about the sort of life one wants to lead, and the kind of person one wants to be. The interdependence of the elements of the shape of experiences means that they will be ‘edited’, that some experiences will be seen as important and others as negligible according to how they fit into existing frameworks of beliefs and inclinations.
Jennifer Mather Saul
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199603688
- eISBN:
- 9780191745454
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603688.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Moral Philosophy
Many people (both philosophers and not) find it very natural to think that deceiving someone in a way that avoids lying — by merely misleading — is morally preferable to simply lying. Others think ...
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Many people (both philosophers and not) find it very natural to think that deceiving someone in a way that avoids lying — by merely misleading — is morally preferable to simply lying. Others think this preference is deeply misguided. But all sides agree that there is a distinction. In this book, I undertake a close examination of the lying/misleading distinction. First, I use this very intuitive distinction to shed new light on entrenched debates in philosophy of language over notions like what is said. Next, I tackle the puzzling but widespread moral preference for misleading over lying, arriving at a new view regarding the moral significance of the distinction. Finally, I bring all this together in an examination of historically important and interesting cases, ranging from modern politicians to early JesuitsLess
Many people (both philosophers and not) find it very natural to think that deceiving someone in a way that avoids lying — by merely misleading — is morally preferable to simply lying. Others think this preference is deeply misguided. But all sides agree that there is a distinction. In this book, I undertake a close examination of the lying/misleading distinction. First, I use this very intuitive distinction to shed new light on entrenched debates in philosophy of language over notions like what is said. Next, I tackle the puzzling but widespread moral preference for misleading over lying, arriving at a new view regarding the moral significance of the distinction. Finally, I bring all this together in an examination of historically important and interesting cases, ranging from modern politicians to early Jesuits
Alan Millar
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199254408
- eISBN:
- 9780191719721
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199254408.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The view outlined thus far implicates a ‘high’ conception of beliefs and intentions on which those attitudes essentially involve reflective capacities, since the impact of our beliefs and intentions ...
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The view outlined thus far implicates a ‘high’ conception of beliefs and intentions on which those attitudes essentially involve reflective capacities, since the impact of our beliefs and intentions upon us is shaped by our knowledge of those very beliefs and intentions and of the normative commitments they incur. The view is defended through consideration of the phenomenology of belief and intention. There is a problem posed for the ‘high’ conception of intention and belief by the plausible thought animals lacking reflective capacities can have beliefs and intentions. The problem is addressed in terms of the idea that our (reflexive) believing and intending differs in psychological kind from any believing and intending on the part of non-reflective animals. A discussion of self-deception addresses an objection to the favoured view of intention deriving from the idea that we can unknowingly intentionally deceive ourselves.Less
The view outlined thus far implicates a ‘high’ conception of beliefs and intentions on which those attitudes essentially involve reflective capacities, since the impact of our beliefs and intentions upon us is shaped by our knowledge of those very beliefs and intentions and of the normative commitments they incur. The view is defended through consideration of the phenomenology of belief and intention. There is a problem posed for the ‘high’ conception of intention and belief by the plausible thought animals lacking reflective capacities can have beliefs and intentions. The problem is addressed in terms of the idea that our (reflexive) believing and intending differs in psychological kind from any believing and intending on the part of non-reflective animals. A discussion of self-deception addresses an objection to the favoured view of intention deriving from the idea that we can unknowingly intentionally deceive ourselves.
M. Jamie Ferreira
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195130256
- eISBN:
- 9780199834181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195130251.003.0015
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Love attempts to restore broken bonds – our responsibility is to maintain and cultivate community. Reconciliation lacks the judicial sting of the category of forgiveness, but it nevertheless does not ...
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Love attempts to restore broken bonds – our responsibility is to maintain and cultivate community. Reconciliation lacks the judicial sting of the category of forgiveness, but it nevertheless does not avoid the burden of confronting someone with the truth about their sin. Love does not entail self‐deception or deception of others.Less
Love attempts to restore broken bonds – our responsibility is to maintain and cultivate community. Reconciliation lacks the judicial sting of the category of forgiveness, but it nevertheless does not avoid the burden of confronting someone with the truth about their sin. Love does not entail self‐deception or deception of others.
Amelie Rorty
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195327939
- eISBN:
- 9780199852444
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327939.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter presents a summary of many thoughtful, persuasive, and articulate defenses of the practice of self-deception, and reviews forms of self-deception about which one should be ambivalent and ...
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This chapter presents a summary of many thoughtful, persuasive, and articulate defenses of the practice of self-deception, and reviews forms of self-deception about which one should be ambivalent and wary. Although many varieties of self-deception are ineradicable and useful, it is not good all the time. The discussion surveys the field of the many and various forms of self-deception, good and bad. It also gives a long and helpful list of what self-deception is not.Less
This chapter presents a summary of many thoughtful, persuasive, and articulate defenses of the practice of self-deception, and reviews forms of self-deception about which one should be ambivalent and wary. Although many varieties of self-deception are ineradicable and useful, it is not good all the time. The discussion surveys the field of the many and various forms of self-deception, good and bad. It also gives a long and helpful list of what self-deception is not.
Mele Alfred R.
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195311952
- eISBN:
- 9780199871070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Audi has suggested that the difference between self‐deception and delusion with respect to a false proposition turns on whether the subject believes the false proposition: the self‐deceived do not ...
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Audi has suggested that the difference between self‐deception and delusion with respect to a false proposition turns on whether the subject believes the false proposition: the self‐deceived do not actually believe what they avow. But the chapter holds that the self‐deceived and the deluded both believe the false proposition, and so an account of the difference between self‐deception and delusion that differs from Audi's must be offered. The chapter discusses several standard cases of self‐deception, sketching his view of self‐deception as the product of motivational or emotional biases. It then considers three psychiatric delusions found in volume IV of the American Psychiatric Association's, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and argues that they are best explained not by the kind of biasing characteristic of self‐deception, but instead by the presence of cognitive deficits.Less
Audi has suggested that the difference between self‐deception and delusion with respect to a false proposition turns on whether the subject believes the false proposition: the self‐deceived do not actually believe what they avow. But the chapter holds that the self‐deceived and the deluded both believe the false proposition, and so an account of the difference between self‐deception and delusion that differs from Audi's must be offered. The chapter discusses several standard cases of self‐deception, sketching his view of self‐deception as the product of motivational or emotional biases. It then considers three psychiatric delusions found in volume IV of the American Psychiatric Association's, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and argues that they are best explained not by the kind of biasing characteristic of self‐deception, but instead by the presence of cognitive deficits.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195311952
- eISBN:
- 9780199871070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Audi addresses challenges to his views about intention, moral psychology, and reasons for action that are raised by Fred Adams (Chapter 12), Alfred R. Mele (Chapter 13), and Raimo Tuomela (Chapter ...
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Audi addresses challenges to his views about intention, moral psychology, and reasons for action that are raised by Fred Adams (Chapter 12), Alfred R. Mele (Chapter 13), and Raimo Tuomela (Chapter 14) in Part III, “Intention, Self‐Deception, and Reasons for Action.”Less
Audi addresses challenges to his views about intention, moral psychology, and reasons for action that are raised by Fred Adams (Chapter 12), Alfred R. Mele (Chapter 13), and Raimo Tuomela (Chapter 14) in Part III, “Intention, Self‐Deception, and Reasons for Action.”
Thomas L. Carson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577415
- eISBN:
- 9780191722813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577415.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter examines cases in which political leaders and public figures told lies or engaged in deception as a pretext for fighting wars. The examples given here include William Randolph Hearst, ...
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This chapter examines cases in which political leaders and public figures told lies or engaged in deception as a pretext for fighting wars. The examples given here include William Randolph Hearst, Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, George W. Bush, and Dick Cheney. The chapter devotes particular attention to the case of Bush and Cheney and argues that they lied and attempted to deceive the public. Although this claim will strike many readers as obvious, it has not been adequately defended by those who make it. The journalists, public officials, and commentators who have accused Bush and Cheney of lying and deception do not offer careful definitions of lying and deception, much less a careful application of those definitions to the cases at issue. Certain features of my definition of lying are salient in these cases and help to show that Bush and Cheney lied and attempted to deceive the public – they strongly warranted the truth of claims that they knew were open to serious doubts. In most of these cases, lying and deception led to disastrous consequences and were morally wrong. However, the chapter argues that Franklin Roosevelt was morally justified in his lying and deception in order to aid Britain during the early stages of WWII. The chapter also discusses cases in which Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, and Dwight Eisenhower may have engaged in lying and deception in order to avoid wars. These also seem be to cases of justifiable lying/deception.Less
This chapter examines cases in which political leaders and public figures told lies or engaged in deception as a pretext for fighting wars. The examples given here include William Randolph Hearst, Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, George W. Bush, and Dick Cheney. The chapter devotes particular attention to the case of Bush and Cheney and argues that they lied and attempted to deceive the public. Although this claim will strike many readers as obvious, it has not been adequately defended by those who make it. The journalists, public officials, and commentators who have accused Bush and Cheney of lying and deception do not offer careful definitions of lying and deception, much less a careful application of those definitions to the cases at issue. Certain features of my definition of lying are salient in these cases and help to show that Bush and Cheney lied and attempted to deceive the public – they strongly warranted the truth of claims that they knew were open to serious doubts. In most of these cases, lying and deception led to disastrous consequences and were morally wrong. However, the chapter argues that Franklin Roosevelt was morally justified in his lying and deception in order to aid Britain during the early stages of WWII. The chapter also discusses cases in which Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, and Dwight Eisenhower may have engaged in lying and deception in order to avoid wars. These also seem be to cases of justifiable lying/deception.
EYAL ZAMIR and BARAK MEDINA
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195372168
- eISBN:
- 9780199776078
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372168.003.09
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter discusses contract law. Ordinarily, market transactions do not involve infringements of deontological constraints. For this reason (and since they usually involve money or easily ...
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This chapter discusses contract law. Ordinarily, market transactions do not involve infringements of deontological constraints. For this reason (and since they usually involve money or easily monetized goods), standard cost-benefit analysis is particularly apt for analyzing contract law. Nevertheless, it is argued that certain deontological constraints apply to contracting behavior and that combining deontological constraints with economic analysis of contract law, may be fruitful. The chapter briefly surveys the deontological constraints pertinent to contract law and critically examines the standard economic response to them. It then demonstrates how deontological constraints may be integrated with economic analysis of the contracting stage, focusing on the doctrines of mistake and misrepresentation. Last, it highlights the differences between economic and deontological analyses of contract performance and breach, and discusses the difficulties facing integration of deontological constraints with the economic analysis of contract remedies, given the current state of the pertinent theories.Less
This chapter discusses contract law. Ordinarily, market transactions do not involve infringements of deontological constraints. For this reason (and since they usually involve money or easily monetized goods), standard cost-benefit analysis is particularly apt for analyzing contract law. Nevertheless, it is argued that certain deontological constraints apply to contracting behavior and that combining deontological constraints with economic analysis of contract law, may be fruitful. The chapter briefly surveys the deontological constraints pertinent to contract law and critically examines the standard economic response to them. It then demonstrates how deontological constraints may be integrated with economic analysis of the contracting stage, focusing on the doctrines of mistake and misrepresentation. Last, it highlights the differences between economic and deontological analyses of contract performance and breach, and discusses the difficulties facing integration of deontological constraints with the economic analysis of contract remedies, given the current state of the pertinent theories.
Roger W. Shuy
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195181661
- eISBN:
- 9780199788477
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195181661.003.01973
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This book is about language evidence, not the more commonly known physical evidence such as DNA or fingerprints. The cases described will include the discourse of targets such as millionaires, ...
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This book is about language evidence, not the more commonly known physical evidence such as DNA or fingerprints. The cases described will include the discourse of targets such as millionaires, average people, business tycoons, salesmen, and lawyers. All who suddenly find themselves embroiled in criminal cases that demonstrate the various ways that unfair and deceptive conversational strategies can be used on anyone. Although no claims are made that such strategies are widely used by all law enforcement, when they are employed, perhaps because of their own professional vision, the analysis of a forensic linguist can be helpful.Less
This book is about language evidence, not the more commonly known physical evidence such as DNA or fingerprints. The cases described will include the discourse of targets such as millionaires, average people, business tycoons, salesmen, and lawyers. All who suddenly find themselves embroiled in criminal cases that demonstrate the various ways that unfair and deceptive conversational strategies can be used on anyone. Although no claims are made that such strategies are widely used by all law enforcement, when they are employed, perhaps because of their own professional vision, the analysis of a forensic linguist can be helpful.
Paul Hammond
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197264706
- eISBN:
- 9780191734557
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264706.003.0004
- Subject:
- Literature, Milton Studies
Setting aside his concern with political and theological principles, Milton's most distinctive contribution in culture is his poetry, where he thinks through the consequences of the principles in ...
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Setting aside his concern with political and theological principles, Milton's most distinctive contribution in culture is his poetry, where he thinks through the consequences of the principles in poetic language, which is more humanly complex than the combative polemics of his prose. This chapter examines Milton's thinking about the Fall of Man. His conception of the Fall is predominantly a meditation on egoism and disobedience, on selfishness and self-sacrificial love, on blindness and recognition. The chapter aims to elucidate some of the poetic means by which Milton draws his reader into the narrative of the Fall. Milton's poetry of the Fall is inter alia the fall of couples to individuals who enclose themselves in self-seeking forms of selfhood; and the fall of reason into modes of self-deception, exemplified by the recourse to the rhetorical questions that close off true reasoning and substitute human wishful thinking for the obedience to divine commands.Less
Setting aside his concern with political and theological principles, Milton's most distinctive contribution in culture is his poetry, where he thinks through the consequences of the principles in poetic language, which is more humanly complex than the combative polemics of his prose. This chapter examines Milton's thinking about the Fall of Man. His conception of the Fall is predominantly a meditation on egoism and disobedience, on selfishness and self-sacrificial love, on blindness and recognition. The chapter aims to elucidate some of the poetic means by which Milton draws his reader into the narrative of the Fall. Milton's poetry of the Fall is inter alia the fall of couples to individuals who enclose themselves in self-seeking forms of selfhood; and the fall of reason into modes of self-deception, exemplified by the recourse to the rhetorical questions that close off true reasoning and substitute human wishful thinking for the obedience to divine commands.
Pat Willmer
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691128610
- eISBN:
- 9781400838943
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691128610.003.0023
- Subject:
- Biology, Ecology
This chapter examines how flowers cheat visitors and other flowers. Pollination is not an altruistic exercise; there is a conflict of needs that makes both plants and pollinators liable to cheat to ...
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This chapter examines how flowers cheat visitors and other flowers. Pollination is not an altruistic exercise; there is a conflict of needs that makes both plants and pollinators liable to cheat to their own benefit. Deception is very common in pollination biology. For a plant, this essentially means getting pollinated and hence fertilized without giving up any reward or resources. This can commonly be achieved by resembling a rewarding species. For a visiting animal, cheating involves extracting nectar or pollen in ways that do not carry any pollen to another flower. The chapter discusses mimicry in flowers and aids to mimicry, including pseudoflowers, pseudonectar, and pseudopollen and pseudoanthers. It also looks at empty flowers as mimics and cheats before concluding with an analysis of mimicry of objects other than flowers, such as reproductive mimicry of brood sites and potential mates (pseudocopulation).Less
This chapter examines how flowers cheat visitors and other flowers. Pollination is not an altruistic exercise; there is a conflict of needs that makes both plants and pollinators liable to cheat to their own benefit. Deception is very common in pollination biology. For a plant, this essentially means getting pollinated and hence fertilized without giving up any reward or resources. This can commonly be achieved by resembling a rewarding species. For a visiting animal, cheating involves extracting nectar or pollen in ways that do not carry any pollen to another flower. The chapter discusses mimicry in flowers and aids to mimicry, including pseudoflowers, pseudonectar, and pseudopollen and pseudoanthers. It also looks at empty flowers as mimics and cheats before concluding with an analysis of mimicry of objects other than flowers, such as reproductive mimicry of brood sites and potential mates (pseudocopulation).
Thomas L. Carson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577415
- eISBN:
- 9780191722813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577415.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Deception can be defined roughly as intentionally causing someone to have false beliefs, but this definition needs to be qualified to deal with certain cases, including the following. I intentionally ...
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Deception can be defined roughly as intentionally causing someone to have false beliefs, but this definition needs to be qualified to deal with certain cases, including the following. I intentionally cause you to believe statement X and X is false, but I neither believe that X is true nor believe that X is false. The chapter also discuss several other cases that may require modifications of this definition and formulate several revised versions of the definition; the chapter counts cases in which people intentionally cause others to persist in false beliefs as cases of deception. There are two main differences between lying and deception. First, unlike “lying,” “deception” implies success. An act must actually cause someone to have false beliefs in order to count as a case of deception. Intentional false statements need not succeed in deceiving others in order to count as lies. Second, although a lie must be a false statement, deception need not involve making a false statement; true statements can be deceptive, and many forms of deception do not involve making statements of any sort. Thus, many instances of deception do not constitute lying. The chapter also explains the relationship between deception and the notions of withholding information, concealing information, “keeping someone in the dark,” “spin,” and “half‐truths,” and the chapter analyzes the relationship between lying, deception, and bullshit. Harry Frankfurt, to the contrary, suggests bullshit does not require the intent to deceive and bullshit can constitute lying. The chapter also argues that Frankfurt's famous claim that bullshitters, qua bullshitters, are unlike liars in that they are unconcerned with the truth (unconcerned with knowing “how things are”) is mistaken. As Frankfurt claims that unconcern with the truth is the essence of bullshit, this shows that his analysis of bullshit is mistaken.Less
Deception can be defined roughly as intentionally causing someone to have false beliefs, but this definition needs to be qualified to deal with certain cases, including the following. I intentionally cause you to believe statement X and X is false, but I neither believe that X is true nor believe that X is false. The chapter also discuss several other cases that may require modifications of this definition and formulate several revised versions of the definition; the chapter counts cases in which people intentionally cause others to persist in false beliefs as cases of deception. There are two main differences between lying and deception. First, unlike “lying,” “deception” implies success. An act must actually cause someone to have false beliefs in order to count as a case of deception. Intentional false statements need not succeed in deceiving others in order to count as lies. Second, although a lie must be a false statement, deception need not involve making a false statement; true statements can be deceptive, and many forms of deception do not involve making statements of any sort. Thus, many instances of deception do not constitute lying. The chapter also explains the relationship between deception and the notions of withholding information, concealing information, “keeping someone in the dark,” “spin,” and “half‐truths,” and the chapter analyzes the relationship between lying, deception, and bullshit. Harry Frankfurt, to the contrary, suggests bullshit does not require the intent to deceive and bullshit can constitute lying. The chapter also argues that Frankfurt's famous claim that bullshitters, qua bullshitters, are unlike liars in that they are unconcerned with the truth (unconcerned with knowing “how things are”) is mistaken. As Frankfurt claims that unconcern with the truth is the essence of bullshit, this shows that his analysis of bullshit is mistaken.
