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Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content

Neil Feit

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780195341362
eISBN:
9780199866922
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Some of our beliefs are fundamentally about ourselves: these are beliefs about who we are, where we are, and which features we have. Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs ... More


MENTAL CONTENT AND THE PROBLEM OF DE SE BELIEF

Neil Feit

in Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780195341362
eISBN:
9780199866922
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter discusses the notion of the content of a cognitive attitude, such as a belief or a desire. According to the doctrine of propositions, the content of such an attitude is always a ... More


Reporting Belief

Berit Brogaard

in Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199796908
eISBN:
9780199933235
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796908.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

The claim that temporal contents may be the semantic values of truth-evaluable sentences is relatively uncontroversial. Eternalists such as Robert Stalnaker, David Lewis, Mark Richard, Nathan Salmon, ... More


Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief

Mark Richard

in Context and the Attitudes: Meaning in Context, Volume 1

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199557950
eISBN:
9780191747267
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557950.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Motivations for ‘direct reference’ views in semantics are discussed. It is shown that such views are not committed to the claim that substitution of co-referential names in attitude ascriptions ... More


The property theory and de se attitudes

Wayne A. Davis

in Reference and Representation in Thought and Language

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
August 2017
ISBN:
9780198714217
eISBN:
9780191782626
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198714217.003.0012
Subject:
Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics

The property theory of de se belief denies that believing is a propositional attitude, maintaining instead that for Lingens to believe that he himself is lost is for him to self-attribute the ... More


The demise of indexicals: A case study

Kasia M. Jaszczolt

in Meaning in Linguistic Interaction: Semantics, Metasemantics, Philosophy of Language

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
June 2016
ISBN:
9780199602469
eISBN:
9780191815867
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199602469.003.0006
Subject:
Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics

Chapter 5 addresses the semantic aspects of expressing the self/ego, and in particular it contains a case study first-person reference from a cross-linguistic as well as philosophical perspective, ... More


The incremental self

John Perry

in Expressing the Self: Cultural Diversity and Cognitive Universals

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
May 2018
ISBN:
9780198786658
eISBN:
9780191828966
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198786658.003.0011
Subject:
Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics

In this chapter John Perry introduces his incremental theory of truth-conditions to account for cognitive differences between I have the flu and Elwood has the flu, both uttered by Elwood. He argues ... More


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