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Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content

Neil Feit

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780195341362
eISBN:
9780199866922
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Some of our beliefs are fundamentally about ourselves: these are beliefs about who we are, where we are, and which features we have. Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs ... More


Remembering, Imagining, and the First Person

James Higginbotham

in Tense, Aspect, and Indexicality

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199239313
eISBN:
9780191716904
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239313.003.0012
Subject:
Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics

It is widely supposed that certain uses of anaphoric forms (pronouns, reflexives, and others) give rise to peculiarly ‘first-personal’ interpretations, and it has become customary following David ... More


MENTAL CONTENT AND THE PROBLEM OF DE SE BELIEF

Neil Feit

in Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780195341362
eISBN:
9780199866922
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter discusses the notion of the content of a cognitive attitude, such as a belief or a desire. According to the doctrine of propositions, the content of such an attitude is always a ... More


Quasi-Indexicality and Puzzling Reports

Eros Corazza

in Reflecting the Mind: Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
November 2004
ISBN:
9780199270187
eISBN:
9780191601484
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019927018X.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Proposes a picture of attitude ascriptions, which relies on the notion of quasi-indicators. The main idea defended is that in an attitude ascription we relate the attributee to a proposition and a ... More


De Se Preservation and Personal Identity: Reply to Shoemaker

Tyler Burge

in Cognition Through Understanding: Self-Knowledge, Interlocution, Reasoning, Reflection: Philosophical Essays, Volume 3

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199672028
eISBN:
9780191751929
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672028.003.0018
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

‘De Se Preservation and Personal Identity: Reply to Shoemaker’ (2011) responds to Shoemaker’s defense of his reductive strategy against the arguments of ‘Memory and Persons’. The response shows that ... More


Attitudes De Dicto and De Se

David Lewis

in Philosophical Papers Volume I

Published in print:
1983
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195032048
eISBN:
9780199833382
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195032047.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, General

In this wide‐ranging paper, Lewis defends the view that propositional attitudes consist in relations to properties, which themselves are sets of possible individuals. In so doing, he champions the ... More


Anaphora, Logophoricity, and Quasi-Indexicality

Eros Corazza

in Reflecting the Mind: Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
November 2004
ISBN:
9780199270187
eISBN:
9780191601484
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019927018X.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Focuses on ‘I’-thoughts and the way we attribute them. It defends the thesis that the only way one can capture an ‘I’-thought in an attribution is via the quasi-indicator ‘s/he (her/himself)’: ‘Jane ... More


Pornography and Imagining about Oneself

Kathleen Stock

in Art and Pornography: Philosophical Essays

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199609581
eISBN:
9780191746260
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609581.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Aesthetics, Moral Philosophy

This chapter explores, and ultimately rejects, the thought that enjoying erotica or pornography must always involve imagining something about oneself. After distinguishing between different kinds of ... More


Memory and Persons

Tyler Burge

in Cognition Through Understanding: Self-Knowledge, Interlocution, Reasoning, Reflection: Philosophical Essays, Volume 3

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199672028
eISBN:
9780191751929
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672028.003.0017
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

‘Memory and Persons’ (2003) argues that purely preservative memory with either de se content or de se presuppositions is constitutive to three psychological activities: use of perception in action; ... More


PRO and the Representation of First-Person Thought

Jason Stanley

in Know How

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199695362
eISBN:
9780191729768
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695362.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

Sentences that ascribe knowing how contain the unpronounced pronoun PRO, which has a de se, or first-personal meaning, in such sentences. On the account of knowing how defended in the book, then, ... More


The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person

Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199686742
eISBN:
9780191766824
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686742.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind

When we represent the world in language, in thought, or in perception, we often represent it from a perspective. We say and think that the meeting is happening now, that it is hot here, that I am in ... More


What is the Problem of De Se Attitudes?

Dilip Ninan

in About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
January 2016
ISBN:
9780198713265
eISBN:
9780191781711
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Do de se thoughts pose a distinctive problem for traditional theories of propositional attitudes? Ever since the seminal work of Perry and Lewis, the standard answer to this question has been in the ... More


The Self

Tim Bayne

in The Unity of Consciousness

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199215386
eISBN:
9780191594786
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215386.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

This chapter has both a negative and a positive agenda. Negatively, it argues that two prominent approaches to the self—namely animalist (or biological) approaches and Lockean (or psychological) ... More


Reporting Belief

Berit Brogaard

in Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199796908
eISBN:
9780199933235
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796908.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

The claim that temporal contents may be the semantic values of truth-evaluable sentences is relatively uncontroversial. Eternalists such as Robert Stalnaker, David Lewis, Mark Richard, Nathan Salmon, ... More


Subjects and Consciousness

Christopher Peacocke

in The Self and Self-Knowledge

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199590650
eISBN:
9780191741043
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590650.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

The first part of the paper proposes a positive account of de se intentional content. De se content is individuated by the condition that it refers de jure to the owner of the mental state or event ... More


De se marking, logophoricity, and ziji

Hsiang-Yun Chen

in Expressing the Self: Cultural Diversity and Cognitive Universals

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
May 2018
ISBN:
9780198786658
eISBN:
9780191828966
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198786658.003.0006
Subject:
Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics

This chapter addresses the assumed connection between de se attitude ascription and logophoricity in the case of Chinese ziji. It is widely believed that logophors are among the paradigm cases of de ... More


Expressing the self: From types of to speech-act types

Kasia M. Jaszczolt and Maciej Witek

in Expressing the Self: Cultural Diversity and Cognitive Universals

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
May 2018
ISBN:
9780198786658
eISBN:
9780191828966
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198786658.003.0010
Subject:
Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics

In this chapter Kasia M. Jaszczolt and Maciej Witek discuss the cognitive significance of the devices used to communicate de se thoughts and argue (and also partially empirically demonstrate) that, ... More


Modes of Presentation in Personal Memory

Christopher McCarroll

in Remembering from the Outside: Personal Memory and the Perspectival Mind

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780190674267
eISBN:
9780190674298
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190674267.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

When thinking about intentional states such as memory, there is a distinction drawn between “content” and “modes of presentation” of that content. How do field and observer perspectives relate to ... More


The De Se and the Semantics of PRO Constructions

Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever

in The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199686742
eISBN:
9780191766824
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686742.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter addresses the question of whether the semantics of PRO constructions can be helpful to those who think there is a distinctive kind of de se content. First, it argues that even if the ... More


About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication

Manuel García-Carpintero and Stephan Torre (eds)

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
January 2016
ISBN:
9780198713265
eISBN:
9780191781711
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This volume addresses foundational issues concerning the nature of first-personal, or de se thought and how such thoughts are communicated. One of the question addressed is whether there is anything ... More


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