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The Afterword opens with a letter of 1791 in which Mozart relates an experience he has while attending a performance of Die Zauberflöte. He represents the episode as a recognition narrative in miniature that illuminates the opera's dependence on recognition as a vehicle for enlightenment. A final section makes two observations about the workings of recognition in the operatic context: the first concerning the almost unfailing optimism of the operas of Mozart and his contemporaries, and the second concerning the power of recognition in contexts beyond Mozart. The book concludes with the thought that critical thinking about recognition has much to tell us about operas of other types and periods.

This chapter provides an overview of the history of Ph.D. in the United States, including a Ph.D. in social work. Topics covered include the definition of the doctoral degree and examination of the careers available for social work doctoral degree holders, as well as the structure of Ph.D. and doctoral education in general. The importance of social work values as they relate to dissertation research is examined, as is research on the quality of social work dissertations. In addition, the concepts of decision analysis and critical thinking (dimensions skill and traits) are also presented as useful aids in dissertation research.

Our world gets more complex and technical with each passing day. Not only is there more information and more complex information, but information is increasingly more accessible. There are numerous benefits to the ease with which we can obtain information, but people today need to be savvy navigators of the information superhighway in order to avoid the pitfalls and pratfalls associated with determining whether information is credible or not and how to apply what they have learned in diverse situations. The set of skills and the disposition required to obtain desirable outcomes in a variety of contexts is generally known as critical thinking (Halpern, 1998; 2004). These skills are required to make informed decisions, solve problems, formulate inferences, and calculate likelihoods. Critical thinking is goal-directed and purposeful thinking. There is strong evidence to suggest that critical thinking can and should be taught as part of an education in psychology, but it is also a vital component of psychological literacy. A psychologically literacy citizen is a person who is knowledgeable of the content matter in psychology, utilizes critical thinking skills, has a critical thinking disposition, and uses scientific reasoning (a subset of all three components). This chapter discusses the conceptual underpinnings and overlap between psychological literacy and critical thinking, and suggests ways to assess them.

This chapter treats the fundamental pleasure principle of Bentham's utility, which is Smith's value‐in‐use. It covers a range of Bentham's writings including Principles of Morals and Legislation, ‘Table of the Springs of Action,’ ‘Manual of Political Economy,’ ‘Panopticon,’ ‘Defense of Usury,’ and ‘Sextus.’ Contrary to expectations of a dry Gradgrindian style, Bentham is a spokesman for pleasure in works that are a pleasure to read. Topics include: self‐interest; sympathy; the moral sanction/impartial spectator; critical thinking; critique of asceticism; fascinations and frustrations of language; push‐pin versus poetry in a Utilitarian assessment. The chapter proceeds to an interpretation of Dickens's Hard Times that goes against the grain of most criticism, arguing that Mr. Gradgrind exemplifies not mistaken faith in a false Smith‐Benthamite creed, but failure to hold true to that creed's own first principle of pleasure.

Empire is again the concern in discussion of writings on India by Bentham‐‐‐with parallels in Smith‐‐‐and the Mills. Revisiting the principle of liberty, the chapter asks how the liberalism of the age can be reconciled with its imperialism. It treats reform rationales for India concerning: equalization of persons; penal code; education; and, in a distinctly original culminating section, government revenue/land tenure. The discussion is historically specific and mindful of postcolonial theory. Imperialism is undoubtedly dominatory, but critical thinking remains important under the Raj. Indeed it is spurred and finds opportunities, including opportunities to learn from India, with results in both India and Britain that are rightly called liberal. This last chapter gives reminders of principles in practice and of shared ground between writers in the traditions of Utilitarianism and political economy and other Victorian writers usually set apart from them and more often than not deemed their foes.

The word liberty provides the label of liberalism attaching to Utilitarian political economy, yet it is striking how often liberalism has been identified with the opposite of liberty, with Gradgrindian repression and ‘carceral’ social discipline. Some Bentham scholarship challenges this view. So does this chapter. There is no need to dissociate Mill from his tradition to recognize features of his principle of liberty. The chapter demonstrates ‘On Liberty's adherence to Benthamite‐Smithean principles and its next step to theorize liberty as not only instrumental to utility but itself a utility. This exemplifies the critical, actively developmental thinking of the whole school. The discussion incorporates analysis of Mill's style. Mill defends liberty on grounds of instrumental and intrinsic worth through a double address to readers accessible to the one appeal or the other.

Chapter 4 examines critical thinking as the skill that tolerance workers understood to be crucial for cultivating tolerant selves and publics in Latvia. Tolerance workers’ belief that critical thinking would lead to the correct conclusions about how to understand and live with ethnic, racial, and religious diversity coincided with extensive projects of promoting critical thinking in the former socialist world. From the liberal perspective, the former socialist world lacked critical thinking due to the legacies of an authoritarian political system and memorization-based education. This was thought to hinder the postsocialist subjects’ ability to establish the kind of relationship to their collective past that the European moral and political landscape demanded. However, lessons in political liberalism overlooked the multiplicity and heterogeneity of critical practices of former socialist subjects and obfuscated the historical specificity and ideological underpinnings of “critical thinking” as the special truth-producing instrument of actually existing political liberalism.

Emma Williams’ “In Excess of Epistemology” (2015) admirably endeavors to open the way to an account of critical thinking that goes beyond the one I have defended ad nauseam in recent decades by developing, via the work of Charles Taylor and Martin Heidegger, “a radically different conception of thinking and the human being who thinks,” one that “does more justice to receptive and responsible conditions of human thought.” In this response I hope to show that much of Williams’ alternative approach is compatible with my own; that, where incompatible, the alternative is problematic; and, finally, that there is a risk of talking past one another, of talking at cross-purposes, that all sides must work to overcome.

Chapter ten reports on the findings of the fieldwork conducted for this book, including a cross-national study of teaching practices in Japan, China, Singapore, and the U.S. The chapter pays particular attention to American teachers’ opinions about a sample of lessons that were videotaped in Japan. Their responses to those videos suggest that the goals of educators in the U.S. and Japan overlap in many areas. Heightened pressures associated with high stakes tests, however, are making it difficult for American teachers to use methods designed to enhance children’s creativity, critical thinking skills, and problem solving abilities.

This chapter tackles issues that lie at the intersection of epistemology and the philosophy of education. In keeping with the veritistic theme, it holds that a primary aim of education is the learning of truths, though this does not mean that teachers should always instruct students rather than allow them to learn independently. The ostensible conflict between multiculturalism and a truth‐oriented aim of education is more appearance than reality. That diverse cultural traditions have diverse values, experiences, and perspectives is itself a truth that needs to be learnt. The role of critical thinking versus trust in education is discussed in detail, given its overlap with the topic of testimony in epistemology.

This chapter discusses one of the works of Lorenzo Valla, who was considered a genius for his critical thinking and who is consistently connected to the subject of humanist lexicography. His work is the main focus of this chapter, and the chapter looks particularly at the Elegantiae linguae latinae, a six book series that details the use of Latin words that are exemplified in phrases and locutions collected from classical authors. This collection became a huge influence on humanist lexicographical practice.

Nussbaum defends literacy and education for women as a crucial condition for lessening many of the problems that women face worldwide, such as abusive marriages, inadequate jobs, and poor health, which restrict women’s capacities to engage in citizenship practices. Nussbaum’s proposal extends to secondary and higher education and particularly urges the development of women’s critical faculties and imagination. At present, the commitments of poorer nations and states, as well as those of wealthy nations, their citizens, and their corporations are woefully inadequate to serve women’s needs. Female education is sometimes opposed on the grounds that it destroys non-literate cultures, which have their own values; yet such cultures may harbor misery and injustice and their norms may even be opposed by the women in the cultures. Nussbaum suggests that if governments cannot improve female education, non-governmental organizations may be able to take on the responsibility.

This chapter examines how clinical legal education, including its curriculum, teachers, teaching-methods, students, and social justice mission, influence legal education generally and connect law schools to their surrounding communities. It shows how clinical education introduced the study of lawyering to mainstream legal education and has promoted the use interactive teaching methods, including simulations, supervised case work, and problem-solving exercises, which help foster critical thinking necessary. Clinics also draw client interests, social justice, and professional values into the center of legal education, and have the capacity to promote links among various groups interested in the outcomes of legal education, serving as a bridge to broader community and professional engagement. The chapter argues that clinics have the greatest impact when insights from clinical experiences are incorporated in an integrative model with other teaching to form a developmental progression.

In his recent work in social epistemology, Alvin Goldman argues that truth is the fundamental epistemic end of education, and that critical thinking is of merely instrumental value with respect to that fundamental end. He also argues that there is a central place for testimony and trust in the classroom, and an educational danger in overemphasizing the fostering of students’ critical thinking. This chapter takes issue with these claims and argues that (1) critical thinking is a fundamental end of education, independently of its instrumental tie to truth, and (2) it is critical thinking, rather than testimony and trust, that is educationally basic.

During the 20th century, the United States undertook one of the most expansive programs of higher education ever witnessed. In the next century, whether such expansion continues or not, the college-educated person will make a major difference in shaping the future. So will the professoriate and those who administer the nation's colleges and universities. Their effect on American religion will be considerable. But what will this effect be? Is it possible to combine a deep personal commitment to the Christian faith with the life of the mind? Or is critical thought simply incompatible with Christian orthodoxy? As the 20th century began, conservative Christianity appeared to be already at war with the prevailing values of an enlightened society. In 1938, noted sociologist Robert Merton published an influential book in which he examined the connection between Puritanism and the rise of science in 17th-century England. We might say that Christianity sacralizes—makes sacred—the intellectual life. It gives the questions we struggle with in our work and in our lives a larger significance.