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Degree of Belief is Expected Truth Value

Nicholas J. J. Smith

in Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, & its Logic

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199570386
eISBN:
9780191722134
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0029
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A number of authors have noted that vagueness engenders degrees of belief, but that these degrees of belief do not behave like subjective probabilities. So should we countenance two different kinds ... More


The Gods of Risk

Witham Larry

in Marketplace of the Gods: How Economics Explains Religion

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780195394757
eISBN:
9780199777372
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195394757.003.0004
Subject:
Religion, Religion and Society

Religion is a form of risk management in human lives and in religious groups. Pascal’s Wager famously illustrates the calculation of loss and benefit in religious belief. But there are other economic ... More


Analogical Arguments

Paul F. A. Bartha

in By Parallel Reasoning: The Construction and Evaluation of Analogical Arguments

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780195325539
eISBN:
9780199776313
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195325539.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This introductory chapter motivates the importance of a normative theory of analogical arguments as part of the broader project of understanding analogical reasoning. The chapter further recommends ... More


Belief

Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath

in Knowledge in an Uncertain World

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199550623
eISBN:
9780191722684
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550623.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language

If justified belief in p requires that p be warranted enough to be a justifier, what implications does this have for the nature of belief? Must belief be itself pragmatic if justified belief is to ... More


Chance in the Everett Interpretation

Simon Saunders

in Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199560561
eISBN:
9780191721380
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560561.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

The concept of objective probability — chance — has three distinctive features: chances are measured by statistics, but only with high chance, increasing with the number of trials involved; when the ... More


Many Gods, Many Wagers: Pascal’s Wager Meets the Replicator Dynamics

Paul Bartha

in Probability in the Philosophy of Religion

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199604760
eISBN:
9780191741548
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604760.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The many-gods objection is perhaps the most famous criticism levelled against Pascal’s wager. This chapter offers a response that combines two main ideas. The first is the development of the ... More


Dutch Book Arguments *

Alan Hájek

in The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780199290420
eISBN:
9780191710506
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290420.003.0008
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare

Dutch Book arguments purport to show that rationality requires certain constraints on an agent's subjective probabilities, on pain of the agent being susceptible to sure losses in corresponding bets. ... More


Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6

Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds)

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
March 2019
ISBN:
9780198833314
eISBN:
9780191871658
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198833314.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publication offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed ... More


A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance

David Lewis

in Philosophical Papers Volume II

Published in print:
1987
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195036466
eISBN:
9780199833399
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195036468.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Formulates a principle about reasonable subjective probabilities conditional on propositions about objective probability in the single case. Consequences of the principle for objective probabilities ... More


Probabilities in Physics

Claus Beisbart and Stephan Hartmann (eds)

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199577439
eISBN:
9780191730603
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577439.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Many theories and models from physics are probabilistic. This observation raises several philosophical questions: What are probabilities in physics? Do they reflect objective chances which exist ... More


Information and Assertoric Force *

Peter Pagin

in Assertion: New Philosophical Essays

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199573004
eISBN:
9780191595127
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A new account of assertion is presented. Rough short statement: an assertion is an utterance that is prima facie informative. The idea of an informative utterance of a sentence is explicated in terms ... More


Beyond Chance and Credence: A Theory of Hybrid Probabilities

Wayne C. Myrvold

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
February 2021
ISBN:
9780198865094
eISBN:
9780191897481
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198865094.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

Probability concepts permeate physics. This is obvious in statistical mechanics, in which probabilities appear explicitly. But even in cases when predictions are made with near-certainty, there is ... More


Probabilistic Knowledge

Sarah Moss

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
March 2018
ISBN:
9780198792154
eISBN:
9780191861260
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198792154.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Traditional philosophical discussions of knowledge have focused on the epistemic status of full beliefs. This book argues that in addition to full beliefs, credences can constitute knowledge. For ... More


Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality

Julia Staffel

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
February 2020
ISBN:
9780198833710
eISBN:
9780191872136
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198833710.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

How should thinkers cope with uncertainty? What makes their degrees of belief rational, and how should they reason about uncertain matters? Recent research in epistemology has attempted to answer ... More


The Rational Mind

Scott Sturgeon

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
June 2020
ISBN:
9780198845799
eISBN:
9780191880988
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198845799.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The book develops a unified approach to the rationality and metaphysics of belief and of confidence. As such it lies at the intersection of epistemology and the philosophy of mind. The primary aim of ... More


Chance in the World: A Humean Guide to Objective Chance

Carl Hoefer

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
October 2019
ISBN:
9780190907419
eISBN:
9780190907440
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190907419.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This book argues that objective chance, or probability, should not be understood as a metaphysical primitive, nor as a dispositional property of certain systems (“propensity”). Given that traditional ... More


Two Senses of “Probability”

Wayne C. Myrvold

in Beyond Chance and Credence: A Theory of Hybrid Probabilities

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
February 2021
ISBN:
9780198865094
eISBN:
9780191897481
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198865094.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

The word “probability” has long been used in (at least) two distinct senses. One sense has to do with a rational agent’s degree of belief, commonly called credence in the philosophical literature. ... More


Knowledge and Conditionals: Essays on the Structure of Inquiry

Robert C. Stalnaker

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780198810346
eISBN:
9780191847332
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198810346.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A set of interconnected chapters on topics in the theory of knowledge. Part 1 considers the concept of knowledge, its logical properties, and its relation to belief and partial belief, or credence. ... More


The Problem of Weighting Changing Selves

Richard Pettigrew

in Choosing for Changing Selves

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
January 2020
ISBN:
9780198814962
eISBN:
9780191852800
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198814962.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter summarizes the conclusions of the first part of the book and introduces the work of the second part. The first part proposed the Aggregate Utility Solution to the problem of choosing for ... More


The Principal Principle

Richard Pettigrew

in Accuracy and the Laws of Credence

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
May 2016
ISBN:
9780198732716
eISBN:
9780191797019
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This chapter begins Part II of the book, which treats the accuracy argument for various chance-credence principles. This chapter considers David Lewis’ Principal Principle. It introduces the ... More


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