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The Russian state is examined as a supplier of protection. The chapter first explores how Russian citizens perceive the institutions of authority that are supposed to supply services of protection and dispute resolution, such as the legal system, state (government) officials and the police, and whether they expect fair treatment from them. Survey data from several Eastern European countries are compared in order to establish whether people should be expected to use these institutions and, more generally, to determine the levels of confidence in the legal system: the data indicate a low level of confidence in crucial institutions of authority. The second section of the chapter looks at one instance of state-supplied protection services – the courts of arbitration or Arbitrazh: the court where cases involving property rights and the privatization process are heard. The survey data presented suggest that the majority of the customers of the Arbitrazh courts are large enterprises that were formerly state-owned and were privatized in the 1990s.

This chapter turns to the Belgian Constitutional Court. It argues that, though Belgium only had a constitutional jurisdiction since 1983, it did have some forms of constitutional review divided between several different bodies. This decentralized form of constitutional review, which encompasses legislative and executive rules and case law, was not eliminated with the establishment of the constitutional court either, so that it continues to exist to the present day. The chapter thus presents the fundamental features of this decentralized review. It first describes the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Belgian constitution in 1831, the creation of the Council of State in 1946, and the efforts of the Court of Cassation at constitutional review. A consideration of the reactions elicited by this jurisprudence follows. Finally, the chapter looks into the creation of the Constitutional Court, initially referred to as the Court of Arbitration, in 1983.

This chapter presents three established conceptions that dominate the understanding of the practice and scholarship of international courts: first, the state-oriented conception, which sees international courts as mere instruments of dispute settlement in a state-centric world order; second, the view according to which international courts act as organs of the value-based international community; third, the conception of international courts as institutions of legal regimes. This chapter thereby describes the key international courts from different angles, shows with further nuance that they typically perform multiple functions, and illustrates the growing relevance of international courts. It finally critiques these established basic understandings, which see international courts as instruments, organs, and institutions, but not as actors who exercise public authority. The chapter closes by pointing the way towards the fourth, democracy-oriented conception of international courts.

This chapter traces the historical development of international advocacy from antiquity to the closure of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1945. In identifying a ‘diplomatic tradition’ emanating from the procedures and practices of nineteenth-century inter-State arbitration, the chapter sets the scene for explaining the culture and experiences of advocacy before the International Court of Justice and other inter-State courts in Chapter 4. It focuses upon the origins of procedural rules concerning representation and case presentation and the issues that arose in the practice of this classical period of arbitral dispute resolution that recur before its successor to the present day, including false documents and experts as counsel. It considers the status of agents as well as counsel and advocates in the Hague Peace Conferences, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the Central American Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of International Justice. It sets out early efforts to professionalize the bar of the PCIJ in the 1920s and 1930s as a precursor to the debates today.

This chapter first provides an overview of the history of Sino-Philippine relations, noting the strong improvement during Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s term as president from 2001-2010. It uses each president’s annual State of the Nation Address (SONA) as well as data on the number of state visits to and from China to illustrate the relative strength of these relations over time. The chapter then provides evidence that, despite much closer relations with the Arroyo administration, major investments from China agreed to by Arroyo were halted due to strong domestic opposition. Given the Philippine’s relatively democratic institutions, opposition in the courts, the legislature, the media, and civil society was able to force the administration to halt these Chinese projects and end efforts at cooperation between the two governments in the South China Sea. The chapter also presents the Philippines case against Chinese claims and activities in the South China Sea before the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, which the Philippines instituted partially due to the inability of ASEAN to act collectively regarding the disputes. It concludes by noting efforts of Rodrigo Duterte’s administration to improve relations with China but suggests that these too may be hampered by domestic political opposition.

A quickened interest in the peace movement was sparked by The Tsar's Rescript of August 29, 1898 inviting other countries to a peace conference. Its ideas suddenly became prominent: the Hague conference of 1899 created an international court of arbitration, this was followed by a second gathering in 1907. In 1901, the word ‘pacifist’ rose to prominence and in 1904 regular National Peace Congresses began. However, these developments reflected a greater breath of interest in war prevention as more people became anxious about the international situation rather than an increased depth of commitment to peace activism. The balance within the peace movement changed significantly, and so did ad hoc bodies including the International Crusade of Peace and a Stop-the-War movement that opposed the conflict in South Africa.

The chapter summarizes the book’s findings on China’s efforts to divide ASEAN and conquer the South China Sea, using variation in member state’s reactions to the decision in favor of the Philippines by the tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration to illustrate the impact of China’s influence. The book concludes that because of the inherent differences within ASEAN, especially in political institutions, as well as the intrinsic difficulties of effective multilateralism and collective action, ASEAN will be unlikely to come together to force China to the negotiating table, as long as China wishes to resist taking a seat. The chapter notes that China’s efforts to influence states in the region have not always been successful, as the case studies illustrate; China has advantages in influencing developing state, authoritarian governments but faces more and higher hurdles in its efforts to influence developing state governments operating within relatively democratic institutions. A brief comparative analysis of China’s bilateral relations in Latin America suggests that the book’s findings are generalizable to China’s relations with developing states globally. The book concludes that the potential evolution of political institutions toward democracy is a form of long-term political risk facing Chinese efforts to influence developing state governments.

This chapter focuses on the OHADA Common Court of Justice and Arbitration. The Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) is the supranational, apex court of the Organization for the Harmonization in Africa of Business Law (OHADA), an organization that currently covers seventeen countries in West and Central Africa. The CCJA’s authority is meaningful only if it actually affects the lives of a broad spectrum of private economic actors within OHADA’s territory, not just the OHADA Treaty’s member states. There is considerable evidence that, in the formal economy, private litigants, state actors and national judges desire and expect CCJA to be enforced. By contrast, in the informal economy that represents a significant portion of the population and national economy, the CCJA is unlikely to have authority because the relevant actors do not look to formal law or formal legal institutions for guidance in commercial transactions or for dispute resolution.

The PCA administered 160 cases in 2017. These cases comprise 7 inter-state arbitrations, 97 investor-state arbitrations, and 55 other mixed arbitrations, involving various combinations of states, intergovernmental organizations, and public or private entities. Of these cases, 41 were initiated in 2017. The investor-state arbitrations arose under various international investment agreements and national investment laws; the other mixed arbitrations, under contracts. Among the decisions issued in 2017, the Award of 22 February 2017, in WNC Factoring Ltd. v. Czech Republic, and the Final Award of 29 June 2017, in Croatia v. Slovenia, are of particular significance, for their contributions to the interpretation and application of international law.

This chapter critically examines The Evolution of the Peace Ideal (1914), a series of four monumental stained glass windows inside the largest courtroom at the Peace Palace in The Hague that now houses the International Court of Justice. It uses the stained glass windows to explain three structuring beliefs held by international lawyers about international adjudication. First, the ethereal effect of the stained glass and its vivid iconography signals international adjudication as essential to the achievement of peace and thus a matter of professional faith. Second, a highly structured evolutionary narrative across the four windows depicts the idea of international adjudication as progress which serves to distinguish ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ states. Third, the windows’ historicism links international adjudication to an immemorial past, an invented tradition that obfuscates significant changes to its practice and meaning over the last century.

This case study supports the conclusions of the general chapters by analysing the application of the free movement and competition rules in the area of sports. Early on, judgments of the CJEU opened the door to the application of the internal market rules against the sporting world’s claim for autonomy. Competition law followed a similar trajectory: it remains broadly applicable over the rules of sporting bodies while creating outlets for justification beyond economic efficiency. The chapter argues that the two sets of rules have converged to an unusual extent in this area and have been used interchangeably. Relying on internal market law, EU institutions have been able to impose limited reforms on sports regulators even in the absence of a legislative competence. Sporting bodies are recognized as legitimate, and EU law defers to their measures as long as they are non-discriminatory and based on good governance principles.