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This chapter is dedicated to procedural hassle—the degradation of arrest and police custody, the stress and frequency of court appearances, and the opportunity costs incurred in order to make court appearances or to comply with court orders. The technique of procedural hassle is distinct from marking. In this case, it is not about tracing a potentially risky defendant in the outside world but rather about delaying, engaging, and compelling the defendant to conform to the institutional and organizational demands of the court and court actors. The chapter shows that these experiences are something more than a set of inconvenient burdens that dissuade defendants from pushing adjudication or even a collection of informal means by which judges and prosecutors punish defendants. They can be also a set of active, productive tools in the ongoing relationship of social control that lower courts have with defendant populations.

This chapter focuses on only one aspect of procedural law: that relating to citations, the process by which parties were summoned to appear before a court. It examines three specific parts of the law of citations. First is the question of its necessity. Did one have always to issue a formal citation before adjudication? Second is the question of time. How long an interval had to come between service of the citation and the required appearance in court? Third is the question of the citation's contents. How much information had to be placed in it to establish its validity? The task is to investigate how the ius commune came into being. The three topics chosen are important and are illustrative.

One of the implications of situations wherein cases are not immediately subjected to trial is that the lay participants are presented with opportunities to contemplate more about how they would present themselves and how they would appear in court. These lay participants hardly know what to expect because they would not have any idea about what other parties would ask, what sort of points would be thrown at them, and other such issues. Because of this, there would be situations wherein the victims would feel that they are the ones who are subjected to trial instead of the actual suspects of the crimes. A number of violent incidences do not make it to court because of the many anxieties and inconveniences involved in trial. Although these participants may be provided with pre-trial advice, upset and a range of other such emotions cannot be avoided.

This chapter focuses on Attorney General John C. Hart's great legal victory for the state in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., in which he enjoyed neither the sense of finality nor the financial rewards of an ongoing billable case. There was a time when Georgia's attorneys general received fees for court appearances. That ended when the state constitution of 1877 placed the office on a salaried basis. Hart earned $2,000 per annum from the state, a handsome salary compared to the earnings of laborers at the time, but a pittance compared to the large fees received by the corporate lawyers he regularly bested. His income bore no relationship to his caseload. Georgia's constitution mandated that Hart's understaffed office handle every appeal of capital murder cases and every civil claim to which the state was a party. As Hart's caseload increased, his income remained flat.

The principal subject matter of this Chapter is bail, which may be defined as the release of a person subject to a duty to surrender to custody at an appointed time and place. The time when a person bailed is to surrender to custody may be fixed when bail is granted or, in the case of a person sent on bail to the Crown Court for trial or sentence, it may be notified to him subsequently. The place where he is to surrender is either a court or a police station, usually the former. The granting of bail in criminal proceedings is governed by the Bail Act 1976.