Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What are the essential properties of ordinary individuals such as people, cats, trees, and tables? The question is notoriously difficult, yet must be answered to obtain a satisfying account of the ...
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What are the essential properties of ordinary individuals such as people, cats, trees, and tables? The question is notoriously difficult, yet must be answered to obtain a satisfying account of the ways in which such individuals could and could not have been different from the way that they are. The book provides a novel treatment of this issue, in the context of a set of debates initiated by the revival of interest in essentialism and de re modality generated by the work of Kripke and others in the 1970s. Via a critical examination of rival theories, it argues for ‘minimalist essentialism’: an unorthodox theory according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. The book therefore presents a challenge to stronger versions of essentialism, including the view that ordinary individuals have non-trivial individual essences; versions of Kripke’s necessity of origin thesis; and the widely held theory of ‘sortal essentialism’, according to which an individual belongs essentially to some sort or kind that determines its conditions for identity over time. The book includes discussion of the rivalry between the interpretation of de re modality in terms of identity across possible worlds and its interpretation in terms of counterpart theory. It provides a detailed defence of the apparently paradoxical claim that there can be possible worlds that differ from one another only in the identities of some of the individuals that they contain, and hence that identities across possible worlds may be ‘bare’ identities. The book also contains a discussion of the relation between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds, and a critical examination of the connection between semantics and natural kind essentialism.Less
What are the essential properties of ordinary individuals such as people, cats, trees, and tables? The question is notoriously difficult, yet must be answered to obtain a satisfying account of the ways in which such individuals could and could not have been different from the way that they are. The book provides a novel treatment of this issue, in the context of a set of debates initiated by the revival of interest in essentialism and de re modality generated by the work of Kripke and others in the 1970s. Via a critical examination of rival theories, it argues for ‘minimalist essentialism’: an unorthodox theory according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. The book therefore presents a challenge to stronger versions of essentialism, including the view that ordinary individuals have non-trivial individual essences; versions of Kripke’s necessity of origin thesis; and the widely held theory of ‘sortal essentialism’, according to which an individual belongs essentially to some sort or kind that determines its conditions for identity over time. The book includes discussion of the rivalry between the interpretation of de re modality in terms of identity across possible worlds and its interpretation in terms of counterpart theory. It provides a detailed defence of the apparently paradoxical claim that there can be possible worlds that differ from one another only in the identities of some of the individuals that they contain, and hence that identities across possible worlds may be ‘bare’ identities. The book also contains a discussion of the relation between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds, and a critical examination of the connection between semantics and natural kind essentialism.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers the proposal that counterpart theory should be adopted as a solution to the problems about identity across possible worlds discussed in the previous chapters: a solution that ...
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This chapter considers the proposal that counterpart theory should be adopted as a solution to the problems about identity across possible worlds discussed in the previous chapters: a solution that requires neither bare identities, extrinsically determined identities, nor non-trivial individual essences. It concludes that unless one is already committed to counterpart theory on other grounds (such as the adoption of David Lewis’s version of realism about possible worlds), one has insufficient reason to prefer a counterpart-theoretic solution to a ‘bare identities’ solution to the problems.Less
This chapter considers the proposal that counterpart theory should be adopted as a solution to the problems about identity across possible worlds discussed in the previous chapters: a solution that requires neither bare identities, extrinsically determined identities, nor non-trivial individual essences. It concludes that unless one is already committed to counterpart theory on other grounds (such as the adoption of David Lewis’s version of realism about possible worlds), one has insufficient reason to prefer a counterpart-theoretic solution to a ‘bare identities’ solution to the problems.
Thomas Sattig
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199279524
- eISBN:
- 9780191604041
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199279527.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter presents a new account of temporal predication — the representational account — combined with four-dimensionalism to yield the temporal-parts account of temporal supervenience. This ...
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This chapter presents a new account of temporal predication — the representational account — combined with four-dimensionalism to yield the temporal-parts account of temporal supervenience. This elegant account asserts and explains the theses that the facts of persistence logically supervene on facts about the spatiotemporal location of temporal parts of objects, and that the facts of temporal instantiation logically supervene on facts about the atemporal instantiation of properties by temporal parts of objects. It is further shown that the questions of temporal supervenience as well as the four-dimensionalist answers to these questions have interesting spatial and modal analogues. Despite its success in explaining the supervenience of facts of persistence and change, the temporal-parts account has objectionable consequences. Three problems are raised, the most serious of which is the problem of predicational overkill. Each of these problems concerns the account’s failure to capture certain ordinary temporal facts.Less
This chapter presents a new account of temporal predication — the representational account — combined with four-dimensionalism to yield the temporal-parts account of temporal supervenience. This elegant account asserts and explains the theses that the facts of persistence logically supervene on facts about the spatiotemporal location of temporal parts of objects, and that the facts of temporal instantiation logically supervene on facts about the atemporal instantiation of properties by temporal parts of objects. It is further shown that the questions of temporal supervenience as well as the four-dimensionalist answers to these questions have interesting spatial and modal analogues. Despite its success in explaining the supervenience of facts of persistence and change, the temporal-parts account has objectionable consequences. Three problems are raised, the most serious of which is the problem of predicational overkill. Each of these problems concerns the account’s failure to capture certain ordinary temporal facts.
Douglas Ehring
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199608539
- eISBN:
- 9780191729607
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608539.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
The main goal of this work is to provide a metaphysical account of properties and of how they are related to concrete particulars. On the broadest level, this work is a defense of tropes and of trope ...
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The main goal of this work is to provide a metaphysical account of properties and of how they are related to concrete particulars. On the broadest level, this work is a defense of tropes and of trope bundle theory as the best accounts of properties and objects, respectively, and, second, a defense of a specific brand of trope nominalism, Natural Class Trope Nominalism. Each of these tasks is pursued separately, with the first Part of this work acting as a general introduction and defense of tropes and trope bundle theory, and the second Part acting as the more specific defense of Natural Class Trope Nominalism. In Part 1 it is argued that there are tropes. Part 1 also provides an outline of what tropes can do for us metaphysically, while remaining neutral between different theories of tropes. Included in Part 1 are an account of the universal–particular distinction, an argument for the existence of tropes based on the phenomenon of moving properties, the development of a trope bundle theory of objects and a trope-based solution to the problems of mental causations. The second Part presents a fuller picture of what a trope is by way of Natural Class Trope Nominalism, according to which a trope's nature is determined by membership in natural classes of tropes. In addition, in Part 2 a defense is developed of Natural Class Trope Nominalism against what have been thought to be fatal objections to this view, a defense grounded in property counterpart theory without modal realism.Less
The main goal of this work is to provide a metaphysical account of properties and of how they are related to concrete particulars. On the broadest level, this work is a defense of tropes and of trope bundle theory as the best accounts of properties and objects, respectively, and, second, a defense of a specific brand of trope nominalism, Natural Class Trope Nominalism. Each of these tasks is pursued separately, with the first Part of this work acting as a general introduction and defense of tropes and trope bundle theory, and the second Part acting as the more specific defense of Natural Class Trope Nominalism. In Part 1 it is argued that there are tropes. Part 1 also provides an outline of what tropes can do for us metaphysically, while remaining neutral between different theories of tropes. Included in Part 1 are an account of the universal–particular distinction, an argument for the existence of tropes based on the phenomenon of moving properties, the development of a trope bundle theory of objects and a trope-based solution to the problems of mental causations. The second Part presents a fuller picture of what a trope is by way of Natural Class Trope Nominalism, according to which a trope's nature is determined by membership in natural classes of tropes. In addition, in Part 2 a defense is developed of Natural Class Trope Nominalism against what have been thought to be fatal objections to this view, a defense grounded in property counterpart theory without modal realism.
David Lewis
- Published in print:
- 1983
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195032048
- eISBN:
- 9780199833382
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195032047.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book contains 15 papers by the influential American philosopher, David Lewis. All previously published (between 1966 and 80), these papers are divided into three groups: ontology, the philosophy ...
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This book contains 15 papers by the influential American philosopher, David Lewis. All previously published (between 1966 and 80), these papers are divided into three groups: ontology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language. Lewis supplements eight of the fifteen papers with postscripts in which he amends claims, answers objections, and introduces later reflections. Topics discussed include possible worlds, counterpart theory, modality, personal identity, radical interpretation, language, propositional attitudes, the mind, and intensional semantics. Among the positions Lewis defends are modal realism, materialism, socially contextualized formal semantics, and functionalism of the mind. The volume begins with an introduction in which Lewis discusses his philosophical method.Less
This book contains 15 papers by the influential American philosopher, David Lewis. All previously published (between 1966 and 80), these papers are divided into three groups: ontology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language. Lewis supplements eight of the fifteen papers with postscripts in which he amends claims, answers objections, and introduces later reflections. Topics discussed include possible worlds, counterpart theory, modality, personal identity, radical interpretation, language, propositional attitudes, the mind, and intensional semantics. Among the positions Lewis defends are modal realism, materialism, socially contextualized formal semantics, and functionalism of the mind. The volume begins with an introduction in which Lewis discusses his philosophical method.
Thomas Sattig
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199279524
- eISBN:
- 9780191604041
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199279527.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Part of the problem of temporal supervenience is the problem of spatiotemporal location: how are objects located in spacetime? This chapter provides a detailed statement of various answers to this ...
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Part of the problem of temporal supervenience is the problem of spatiotemporal location: how are objects located in spacetime? This chapter provides a detailed statement of various answers to this problem. The main answers are three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism. The three-dimensionalist holds that an object occupies many temporally unextended regions of spacetime, whereas the four-dimensionalist holds that an object occupies only a single temporally extended region of spacetime. Subsequently to stating these accounts of spatiotemporal location, the chapter discusses the relationship of three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism to other theses and theories, including the theory of temporal parts, endurantism, perdurantism, eternalism, and presentism.Less
Part of the problem of temporal supervenience is the problem of spatiotemporal location: how are objects located in spacetime? This chapter provides a detailed statement of various answers to this problem. The main answers are three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism. The three-dimensionalist holds that an object occupies many temporally unextended regions of spacetime, whereas the four-dimensionalist holds that an object occupies only a single temporally extended region of spacetime. Subsequently to stating these accounts of spatiotemporal location, the chapter discusses the relationship of three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism to other theses and theories, including the theory of temporal parts, endurantism, perdurantism, eternalism, and presentism.
Fraser MacBride
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199283569
- eISBN:
- 9780191712708
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283569.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
The early David Lewis was a staunch critic of the Truthmaker Principle. To endorse the principle, he argued, is to accept that states of affairs are truthmakers for contingent predications. But ...
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The early David Lewis was a staunch critic of the Truthmaker Principle. To endorse the principle, he argued, is to accept that states of affairs are truthmakers for contingent predications. But states of affairs violate Hume's prohibition of necessary connections between distinct existences. So Lewis offered to replace the Truthmaker Principle with the weaker principle that ‘truth supervenes upon being’. This chapter argues that even this principle violates Hume's prohibition. Later Lewis came to ‘withdraw’ his doubts about the Truthmaker Principle, invoking counterpart theory to show how it is possible to respect the principle whilst admitting only things that do not violate Hume's prohibition. What this really reveals is that the Truthmaker Principle is no explanatory advance on the supervenience principle. Extending Lewis's use of counterpart theory also allows us to explain away the necessary connections that threatened to undermine his earlier statements of supervenience.Less
The early David Lewis was a staunch critic of the Truthmaker Principle. To endorse the principle, he argued, is to accept that states of affairs are truthmakers for contingent predications. But states of affairs violate Hume's prohibition of necessary connections between distinct existences. So Lewis offered to replace the Truthmaker Principle with the weaker principle that ‘truth supervenes upon being’. This chapter argues that even this principle violates Hume's prohibition. Later Lewis came to ‘withdraw’ his doubts about the Truthmaker Principle, invoking counterpart theory to show how it is possible to respect the principle whilst admitting only things that do not violate Hume's prohibition. What this really reveals is that the Truthmaker Principle is no explanatory advance on the supervenience principle. Extending Lewis's use of counterpart theory also allows us to explain away the necessary connections that threatened to undermine his earlier statements of supervenience.
Alvin Plantinga
Matthew Davidson (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195103762
- eISBN:
- 9780199833573
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195103769.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William ...
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This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W. V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.Less
This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W. V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1978
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244141
- eISBN:
- 9780191598241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198244142.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 6 is an attempt to show that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals (TWI)—i.e. the theory that any object exists in exactly one possible world—is false, and that there's no good reason to deny ...
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Chapter 6 is an attempt to show that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals (TWI)—i.e. the theory that any object exists in exactly one possible world—is false, and that there's no good reason to deny that objects exist in more than one world. First, arguments that attempt to show that a denial of TWI entails a contradiction fail, and the so‐called Problem of Transworld Identity is no problem at all. Second, TWI should be rejected because it entails that all of an object's properties are essential to it. The defender of TWI may attempt to defend his view by adopting Counterpart Theory. I conclude by arguing that the Counterpart Theory is both semantically and metaphysically inadequate.Less
Chapter 6 is an attempt to show that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals (TWI)—i.e. the theory that any object exists in exactly one possible world—is false, and that there's no good reason to deny that objects exist in more than one world. First, arguments that attempt to show that a denial of TWI entails a contradiction fail, and the so‐called Problem of Transworld Identity is no problem at all. Second, TWI should be rejected because it entails that all of an object's properties are essential to it. The defender of TWI may attempt to defend his view by adopting Counterpart Theory. I conclude by arguing that the Counterpart Theory is both semantically and metaphysically inadequate.
David Lewis
- Published in print:
- 1983
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195032048
- eISBN:
- 9780199833382
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195032047.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In this landmark paper, Lewis outlines his theory of modality and counterparts. The eight postulates constitutive of Lewis's counterpart theory are expressed in an extensional first‐order language ...
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In this landmark paper, Lewis outlines his theory of modality and counterparts. The eight postulates constitutive of Lewis's counterpart theory are expressed in an extensional first‐order language that replaces the modal operators (characteristic of traditional quantified modal logic) with four primitive predicates: ‘x is a possible world’, ‘x is in possible world y’, ‘x is actual’, and ‘x is a counterpart of y’. Upon presenting a scheme for translating sentences expressed in quantified modal logic into those expressed in his preferred extensional language, Lewis demonstrates that the latter is nevertheless a richer language; while every sentence of quantified modal logic may be translated into a sentence expressed in counterpart theory, the reverse is not the case. Lewis concludes the paper by considering the implications of his view for several well‐known topics (notably, Aristotelian essentialism). The postscript includes numerous additions and emendations (including a specification of the primitive predicate, ‘x is in possible world y’).Less
In this landmark paper, Lewis outlines his theory of modality and counterparts. The eight postulates constitutive of Lewis's counterpart theory are expressed in an extensional first‐order language that replaces the modal operators (characteristic of traditional quantified modal logic) with four primitive predicates: ‘x is a possible world’, ‘x is in possible world y’, ‘x is actual’, and ‘x is a counterpart of y’. Upon presenting a scheme for translating sentences expressed in quantified modal logic into those expressed in his preferred extensional language, Lewis demonstrates that the latter is nevertheless a richer language; while every sentence of quantified modal logic may be translated into a sentence expressed in counterpart theory, the reverse is not the case. Lewis concludes the paper by considering the implications of his view for several well‐known topics (notably, Aristotelian essentialism). The postscript includes numerous additions and emendations (including a specification of the primitive predicate, ‘x is in possible world y’).
Theodore Sider
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199244430
- eISBN:
- 9780191598425
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924443X.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
We need a general solution to a cluster of related paradoxes in which numerically distinct material objects appear to share exactly the same parts. Those paradoxes include the statue and the lump of ...
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We need a general solution to a cluster of related paradoxes in which numerically distinct material objects appear to share exactly the same parts. Those paradoxes include the statue and the lump of clay, undetached parts, fission, fusion and longevity, vague identity, and conventional identity. A good solution is given by the ‘worm theory’, according to which continuants are aggregates of temporal parts; a better solution is given by the ‘stage theory’, according to which continuants are instantaneous temporal parts, whose temporal properties are understood via temporal counterpart theory. There are other solutions that do not appeal to temporal parts: Wiggins's constitution theory, Burke's dominance view, Gallois's temporary identity theory, eliminativism, and mereological essentialism. But these are arguably inferior: some are insufficiently general, others are subject to powerful criticisms.Less
We need a general solution to a cluster of related paradoxes in which numerically distinct material objects appear to share exactly the same parts. Those paradoxes include the statue and the lump of clay, undetached parts, fission, fusion and longevity, vague identity, and conventional identity. A good solution is given by the ‘worm theory’, according to which continuants are aggregates of temporal parts; a better solution is given by the ‘stage theory’, according to which continuants are instantaneous temporal parts, whose temporal properties are understood via temporal counterpart theory. There are other solutions that do not appeal to temporal parts: Wiggins's constitution theory, Burke's dominance view, Gallois's temporary identity theory, eliminativism, and mereological essentialism. But these are arguably inferior: some are insufficiently general, others are subject to powerful criticisms.
Delia Graff Fara
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199659081
- eISBN:
- 9780191745201
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659081.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This is (fairly) uncontroversial: a is possibly-Φ when a counterpart of a is Φ in some world. It becomes (more) controversial only once the italicized relations are constrained in some way. For Saul ...
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This is (fairly) uncontroversial: a is possibly-Φ when a counterpart of a is Φ in some world. It becomes (more) controversial only once the italicized relations are constrained in some way. For Saul Kripke, the counterpart relation was identity while objects could exist in more than one world. For David Lewis, the counterpart relation was a similarity relation while objects could not exist in more than one world. Further controversy: identity is an equivalence relation but similarity is not. Different constraints are developed here. The counterpart relation is sortal-relative sameness. Individuals may exist in more than one world but can be sortal-relatively the same as something other than themselves in some different possible world. Sortal-relative sameness is a weak equivalence relation. This intermediate version of counterpart theory is put to use in solving a puzzle of material constitution.Less
This is (fairly) uncontroversial: a is possibly-Φ when a counterpart of a is Φ in some world. It becomes (more) controversial only once the italicized relations are constrained in some way. For Saul Kripke, the counterpart relation was identity while objects could exist in more than one world. For David Lewis, the counterpart relation was a similarity relation while objects could not exist in more than one world. Further controversy: identity is an equivalence relation but similarity is not. Different constraints are developed here. The counterpart relation is sortal-relative sameness. Individuals may exist in more than one world but can be sortal-relatively the same as something other than themselves in some different possible world. Sortal-relative sameness is a weak equivalence relation. This intermediate version of counterpart theory is put to use in solving a puzzle of material constitution.
Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251483
- eISBN:
- 9780191602320
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251487.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This paper explores a different version of the counterpart theory - that the actualist can coherently combine a belief in primitive thisness and genuine identity across possible worlds with a version ...
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This paper explores a different version of the counterpart theory - that the actualist can coherently combine a belief in primitive thisness and genuine identity across possible worlds with a version of counterpart theory that permits one to make sense of contingent identity and distinctness, i.e., if the claims that one thing might have been two, and that distinct things might have been identical. The theses called haecceitism is analysed, and it is argued that this doctrine can be reconciled with a version of counterpart theory, and with the coherence of contingent identity. The impact of this account of counterparts and identity on the abstract semantics of quatified modal logic is considered.Less
This paper explores a different version of the counterpart theory - that the actualist can coherently combine a belief in primitive thisness and genuine identity across possible worlds with a version of counterpart theory that permits one to make sense of contingent identity and distinctness, i.e., if the claims that one thing might have been two, and that distinct things might have been identical. The theses called haecceitism is analysed, and it is argued that this doctrine can be reconciled with a version of counterpart theory, and with the coherence of contingent identity. The impact of this account of counterparts and identity on the abstract semantics of quatified modal logic is considered.
Graeme Forbes
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199570386
- eISBN:
- 9780191722134
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0025
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter draws out some parallels between Chisholm's Paradox and puzzles about identity through time. It focuses on the example of Old Number One, the Bentley racing car in which Wolf ‘Babe’ ...
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This chapter draws out some parallels between Chisholm's Paradox and puzzles about identity through time. It focuses on the example of Old Number One, the Bentley racing car in which Wolf ‘Babe’ Barnato won the Le Mans 24 hour race in 1929 and (debatably) 1930. Attempts in 1990 to sell a certain car, also referred to as Old Number One, were resisted by some on the grounds that too many upgrades, modifications, and repairs had taken place for the 1929 car to be considered the same car as the 1990 car. The chapter argues for the coherence of a ‘no fact of the matter’ verdict about such puzzles, and develops apparatus that involves a novel conception of degrees of truth in terms of higher-order levels of vagueness, thereby avoiding the need for talk of ‘degrees of identity’.Less
This chapter draws out some parallels between Chisholm's Paradox and puzzles about identity through time. It focuses on the example of Old Number One, the Bentley racing car in which Wolf ‘Babe’ Barnato won the Le Mans 24 hour race in 1929 and (debatably) 1930. Attempts in 1990 to sell a certain car, also referred to as Old Number One, were resisted by some on the grounds that too many upgrades, modifications, and repairs had taken place for the 1929 car to be considered the same car as the 1990 car. The chapter argues for the coherence of a ‘no fact of the matter’ verdict about such puzzles, and develops apparatus that involves a novel conception of degrees of truth in terms of higher-order levels of vagueness, thereby avoiding the need for talk of ‘degrees of identity’.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195103762
- eISBN:
- 9780199833573
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195103769.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In the first part of this chapter, I sketch out three grades of modal realism. After developing modal realism, I examine David Lewis's modal theory. I argue that Lewis's theory satisfies none of the ...
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In the first part of this chapter, I sketch out three grades of modal realism. After developing modal realism, I examine David Lewis's modal theory. I argue that Lewis's theory satisfies none of the grades of modal realism, and that it is really a case of modal reductionism. In particular, I demonstrate that Counterpart Theory is a rejection of the view that objects have properties accidentally or essentially. Moreover, I claim that Lewis merely models things such as propositions, possible worlds or state of affairs, and that he, in fact, is an antirealist with regard to such entities.Less
In the first part of this chapter, I sketch out three grades of modal realism. After developing modal realism, I examine David Lewis's modal theory. I argue that Lewis's theory satisfies none of the grades of modal realism, and that it is really a case of modal reductionism. In particular, I demonstrate that Counterpart Theory is a rejection of the view that objects have properties accidentally or essentially. Moreover, I claim that Lewis merely models things such as propositions, possible worlds or state of affairs, and that he, in fact, is an antirealist with regard to such entities.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195103762
- eISBN:
- 9780199833573
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195103769.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The Theory of Worldbound Individuals (T.W.I.) is the view that each object exists in just one possible world. In this chapter, I argue that (a) there is no good reason to accept T.W.I. and (b) T.W.I. ...
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The Theory of Worldbound Individuals (T.W.I.) is the view that each object exists in just one possible world. In this chapter, I argue that (a) there is no good reason to accept T.W.I. and (b) T.W.I. has implausible consequences. I begin by demonstrating that traditional arguments for T.W.I., including the Problem of Transworld Identification, are based on confusion and do not pose problems for the thesis that objects exist in more than one possible world. In the final section of the chapter, I argue that T.W.I. entails that every object has all of its properties essentially. Moreover, T.W.I. entails this even if it is fortified with David Lewis's Counterpart Theory.Less
The Theory of Worldbound Individuals (T.W.I.) is the view that each object exists in just one possible world. In this chapter, I argue that (a) there is no good reason to accept T.W.I. and (b) T.W.I. has implausible consequences. I begin by demonstrating that traditional arguments for T.W.I., including the Problem of Transworld Identification, are based on confusion and do not pose problems for the thesis that objects exist in more than one possible world. In the final section of the chapter, I argue that T.W.I. entails that every object has all of its properties essentially. Moreover, T.W.I. entails this even if it is fortified with David Lewis's Counterpart Theory.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1978
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244141
- eISBN:
- 9780191598241
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198244142.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re ...
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This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re modality in terms of de dicto modality. In Ch. 4, I explicate the concept of a possible world and define what it is for an object x to have a property P essentially. I then use the concept of an essential property to give an account of essences and their relationship to proper names. In Ch. 6, I argue that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals—even when fortified with Counterpart Theory—is false. Chapters 7 and 8 address the subject of possible but non‐existent objects; I argue here for the conclusion that there is no good reason to think that there are any such objects. In Ch. 9, I apply my theory of modality to the Problem of Evil in an effort to show that the Free Will Defense defeats this particular objection to theism. In Ch. 10, I present a sound modal version of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Finally, in the appendix, I address Quinean objections to quantified modal logic.Less
This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re modality in terms of de dicto modality. In Ch. 4, I explicate the concept of a possible world and define what it is for an object x to have a property P essentially. I then use the concept of an essential property to give an account of essences and their relationship to proper names. In Ch. 6, I argue that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals—even when fortified with Counterpart Theory—is false. Chapters 7 and 8 address the subject of possible but non‐existent objects; I argue here for the conclusion that there is no good reason to think that there are any such objects. In Ch. 9, I apply my theory of modality to the Problem of Evil in an effort to show that the Free Will Defense defeats this particular objection to theism. In Ch. 10, I present a sound modal version of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Finally, in the appendix, I address Quinean objections to quantified modal logic.
David Lewis
- Published in print:
- 1983
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195032048
- eISBN:
- 9780199833382
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195032047.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The possibility of a person switching bodies presents a challenge to Lewis's conviction that necessarily, a person occupies a body at a time if and only if that person is identical with that body at ...
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The possibility of a person switching bodies presents a challenge to Lewis's conviction that necessarily, a person occupies a body at a time if and only if that person is identical with that body at that time. In order to meet this challenge, Lewis modifies his counterpart theory to allow for multiple counterpart relations (e.g., one's personal counterpart, one's bodily counterpart). The wider significance of this modification lies in the general scheme it offers for translating any modal predication in which referential transparency fails (because the sense of the subject term is used in a way that extends beyond a determination of its denotation) into sentences of counterpart theory with multiple counterpart relations.Less
The possibility of a person switching bodies presents a challenge to Lewis's conviction that necessarily, a person occupies a body at a time if and only if that person is identical with that body at that time. In order to meet this challenge, Lewis modifies his counterpart theory to allow for multiple counterpart relations (e.g., one's personal counterpart, one's bodily counterpart). The wider significance of this modification lies in the general scheme it offers for translating any modal predication in which referential transparency fails (because the sense of the subject term is used in a way that extends beyond a determination of its denotation) into sentences of counterpart theory with multiple counterpart relations.
Allen Hazen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199659081
- eISBN:
- 9780191745201
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659081.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The simplest (and, arguably, correct at the level of descriptive adequacy) semantics for quantified modal logic uses objects that exist in multiple worlds. David Lewis's counterpart theoretic ...
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The simplest (and, arguably, correct at the level of descriptive adequacy) semantics for quantified modal logic uses objects that exist in multiple worlds. David Lewis's counterpart theoretic semantics was an attempt to replace this with something more metaphysically palatable, but fails at the descriptive level, not validating the intuitively correct logic. It turns out to be surprisingly difficult to define a semantics that combines the virtues of these extremes. This chapter notes a new difficulty, argues that various obvious solutions for it won’t do, and tentatively suggests one that uses more sophisticated logical machinery than is usual in discussions of modal semantics.Less
The simplest (and, arguably, correct at the level of descriptive adequacy) semantics for quantified modal logic uses objects that exist in multiple worlds. David Lewis's counterpart theoretic semantics was an attempt to replace this with something more metaphysically palatable, but fails at the descriptive level, not validating the intuitively correct logic. It turns out to be surprisingly difficult to define a semantics that combines the virtues of these extremes. This chapter notes a new difficulty, argues that various obvious solutions for it won’t do, and tentatively suggests one that uses more sophisticated logical machinery than is usual in discussions of modal semantics.
Theodore Sider
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199244430
- eISBN:
- 9780191598425
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924443X.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
If four‐dimensionalism is an ontological, rather than conceptual or ordinary‐language, thesis, some traditional objections are misguided. It then does not require any particular semantics for tensed ...
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If four‐dimensionalism is an ontological, rather than conceptual or ordinary‐language, thesis, some traditional objections are misguided. It then does not require any particular semantics for tensed claims, does not imply any conceptual or epistemic priority of stage‐talk, and does not preclude a distinction in ordinary thought between processes and things. A more metaphysical traditional objection is that four‐dimensionalism precludes genuine change, but there is no good reason to regard the four‐dimensionalist's conception of change as non‐genuine. A better objection: four‐dimensionalism assigns the wrong modal properties to continuants. Reply: everyone, not just a four‐dimensionalist, should accept a ‘flexible’ account of de re modal predication. Counterpart theory is one such account, but not the only one. Best objection: four‐dimensionalism precludes motion in homogeneous substances. Reply: it is only four‐dimensionalism plus Humean supervenience that has the consequence, and even then, motion in homogenous substances may be allowed in many cases, assuming a holistic account of genidentity.Less
If four‐dimensionalism is an ontological, rather than conceptual or ordinary‐language, thesis, some traditional objections are misguided. It then does not require any particular semantics for tensed claims, does not imply any conceptual or epistemic priority of stage‐talk, and does not preclude a distinction in ordinary thought between processes and things. A more metaphysical traditional objection is that four‐dimensionalism precludes genuine change, but there is no good reason to regard the four‐dimensionalist's conception of change as non‐genuine. A better objection: four‐dimensionalism assigns the wrong modal properties to continuants. Reply: everyone, not just a four‐dimensionalist, should accept a ‘flexible’ account of de re modal predication. Counterpart theory is one such account, but not the only one. Best objection: four‐dimensionalism precludes motion in homogeneous substances. Reply: it is only four‐dimensionalism plus Humean supervenience that has the consequence, and even then, motion in homogenous substances may be allowed in many cases, assuming a holistic account of genidentity.
