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Deals with the response of the state to organized crime. During the early 1990s a new anti‐yakuza law was introduced. Having discussed the reasons for this law's introduction, this law is described and analysed with reference to American and European anti‐organized crime laws (both of which were influential in the internal policy debate).

It is likely that within not too many years, we will have effectively neutralized most if not all of the CDC A-list agents as potential bioterror weapons. But for some time now scientists have been asking what the next generation of bioweapons might look like, and how we can prepare ourselves to defend against them. It is now possible, using molecular biology techniques, to genetically alter existing pathogens to make them more deadly, easier to weaponize, more resistant to drugs or vaccines, or even to create new pathogens that have not existed before. Chapter 4 looks at what has been done to date along these lines, and possibilities for the future. In addition to inserting extra toxic genes into pathogens, researchers have been able to rebuild in the laboratory copies of the extremely deadly 1918 flu virus. Such research is beginning to worry many people, and may be in violation of exisiting bioweapons treaties.

This chapter questions whether extraterritorial use of force against non-state actors might, in certain conditions, not be a breach of international law, even if taken outside the framework of self-defence. The concepts of countermeasures, necessity, hot pursuit, and piracy are examined. In addition, there is an analysis of the possibility of alternative paradigms or interpretations that might be claimed to allow for use of force other than in self-defence, such as ‘extraterritorial law enforcement’.

The rapid development of the modern society has resulted in a growing population of workers that have to work around the clock. However, working at other times (which is what a shift-worker does) comes at a cost. Night work is related to short sleep, increased fatigue, intrusions of sleep, worse performance, and increased risk for injuries and accidents. Early morning work is also affected, but to a lesser extent. Working shifts carries long-term health consequences such as an increased risk for developing cardiovascular disease, endocrine and metabolic disturbances, cancer, and gastrointestinal disorders. However, the evidence is far from immaculate and there is a need for studies with better measures of exposure as well as to why there are so large individual differences in tolerance to shift-work. In addition, the negative consequences of shift-work can be reduced by both organizational and individual countermeasures. The interactive effects of combining several countermeasures seem extra promising.

Safety, or safety science, refers to the application of technology, behavioral science and administrative controls to prevent incidents resulting in injury, property loss and lost productivity. Occupational safety is a general field in which safety personnel become experts in preventing injuries on the job through ergonomics and safety engineering. There are many occupational safety problems common to all occupations, such as falls from heights and handling materials. Fatalities are deaths due to injuries on the job. Societies in different times and places have developed different ideas about injury. . Modern safety science uses an approach called Haddon's Countermeasures and an evaluation tool called Haddon's Matrix, both of which were developed by the same safety scientist, who considered injuries to be the adverse consequences of the uncontrolled release of energy acting on a susceptible structure, such as the human body, in an environment that permitted the incident to happen. Injuries tend to be underreported, because workers want to keep their jobs and supervisors do not want to look bad. The injury pyramid is a graphic display of the relationship between fatalities and serious injuries, lost-time injuries, minor injuries, and near-misses. Incidents resulting in injury can be anticipated and prevented by capturing information early on near-misses and minor incidents, which allows planning to prevent the major incidents.

Chapter 5 analyses the implementation of State responsibility for international terrorism through the adoption of non-military measures aimed at securing a wrongdoing State’s compliance with its secondary obligations of cessation and reparation, in particular the adoption of retorsive measures and countermeasures. It assesses potential problems with the adoption of countermeasures in the terrorism context, including the potential for misevaluating the wrongfulness of a target State’s conduct and continued uncertainty surrounding the legitimacy of collective countermeasures. Finally, Chapter 5 explores the extent to which sub-systems of international law, including diplomatic law and the WTO, affect the right to adopt countermeasures in response to breaches of international terrorism obligations, including the extent to which such sub-system exclude the application of the secondary rules of State responsibility or restrict the scope of their wrongfulness preclusion.

This chapter examines how the responsibility of the UN for wrongful Security Council sanctions can be implemented. The normal way of implementation of responsibility in a decentralized legal system is through countermeasures, i.e., through self-help. The chapter accepts that disobedience is the ultimum refugium of States when these are faced with what they consider wrongful Council sanctions. But it seeks to qualify legally this disobedience. It discusses whether it constitutes civil disobedience, whether it is allowed under Article 25 UN Charter, which — it is argued — obligates States to comply with valid, intra vires acts of the Council, or whether it constitutes an illegal acts that is justifiable as a countermeasure. It concludes that it is the latter, not less so because acts of the Council are always valid, even if they are illegal, for lack of an instance to determine their invalidity.

This concluding chapter recalls the major themes and issues addressed in Part III of the monograph, emphasizing that the invocation of self-defence (or more modest forcible reactions) in response to global security violations should be a solution of last resort. It also acknowledges that self-defence repertoire and the law of State responsibility may differ in both scope and consequences. Ultimately, this chapter argues for a strong role for the Security Council in vetting forcible responses and monitoring States’ violations of global security obligations.

This chapter argues that international organisations can be conducive to the emergence or consolidation of the customary status of those primary rules of international law which their sanctions are meant to vindicate. It shows that the contribution of sanctions to the formation of custom varies significantly depending on the concrete situation. In cases where international organisations react to breaches of obligations that already have an erga omnes status and their standing to adopt sanctions is uncontested under the law of countermeasures, international organisations contribute to consolidation and clarification of custom. Ironically, however, the potential for customary law-making is greater when the erga omnes status of an obligation towards which an international organisation is reacting to is not yet confirmed. The illegality or legal uncertainty shrouding such sanctions under the law of responsibility does not preclude their potential in customary law-making – in fact, it may maximise their contribution. In discussing these situations, the present chapter makes an important distinction between the act of sanction and the act of protest. This makes it possible to argue that it is protests accompanying the act of sanction that have a role to play in custom-making, rather than the act of sanction itself.

Food supply chain fraud occurs as a result of a multiplicity of drivers, motivations, and intended outcomes. The aim of this book chapter is to consider one aspect of food fraud, namely adulteration and provide comment on reported prevalence, and critique the use of countermeasures, including product sampling, to minimise, or where possible eliminate, food adulteration risk. Procedural and policy driven countermeasures and/or traditional process controls alone will not give sufficient protection against food adulteration. Instead additional measures such as risk based product testing, responsive surveillance and verification mechanisms that are underpinned by real-time supply chain intelligence also need to be in place. This requires food supply chain leaders and managers to firstly recognise the specific risk of food adulteration associated with their organisations and products, implement effective risk characterisation, risk assessment and risk mitigation, and appropriate food adulteration risk communication programs.

This introductory chapter provides a background of biodefense and biological weapons. Biological weapons harm only living organisms because they incapacitate or kill through disease instead of causing blunt or penetrating trauma. The damage that these weapons cause can be limited through a combination of medical countermeasures, detection and identification, and physical protection—the key components of biodefense. Physical protection limits exposure to infection through face masks and filters that reduce the risk of inhaling aerosolized biological weapon agents. Detection and identification involves sensors and surveillance to help determine when a biological attack has occurred and what pathogens might be present. Lastly, medical countermeasures can prevent or treat infection through prophylactic vaccines and therapeutic drugs such as antibiotics.

This Chapter explores how the law of neutrality affects the conduct of cyber operations by neutral and belligerent states. It first establishes in what situations the law of neutrality applies and subsequently explores what cyber activities carried out by the belligerent and neutral states may breach their obligations under the law of neutrality by distinguishing operations from, through, and with effects on neutral territory, as well as other cyber and cyber-related activities, including the use of cyber infrastructures on neutral territory for communication purposes. The impact of the entry into force of the UN Charter on the law of neutrality is then discussed, while the last section looks at the remedies against cyber activities that breach the law of neutrality, in particular the resort to forcible and non-forcible countermeasures against such violations.

The rapid development of modern society has resulted in a growing population of workers that have to work around the clock. However, working at different times comes at a cost. Night work is related to short sleep, increased fatigue, falling asleep at work, worse performance, and increased risk for injuries and accidents. Early morning work is also affected, but to a lesser extent. Working shifts can carry long-term health consequences such as an increased risk for developing cardiovascular disease, endocrine and metabolic disturbances, cancer, and gastrointestinal disorders. However, the evidence is far from immaculate and there is a need for studies with better measures of exposure and more knowledge regarding why there are such large individual differences in tolerance to shift work. In addition, the negative consequences of shift work can be reduced by both organizational and individual countermeasures. The interactive effects of combining several countermeasures seem especially promising.

This chapter explores the influence of sleep on human performance and well-being. A general discussion of the role of sleep in humans is followed by a description of the functions of various stages of sleep. The authors explore causal factors of insufficient sleep and inventory known effects of sleep restriction on human performance. They then describe the particular challenges of fatigue and sleep deprivation in military operational environments. The efficacy of fatigue countermeasures and alertness aids commonly used in military settings is presented. The chapter concludes with an argument for more deliberately protecting and promoting sleep, particularly in vulnerable populations such as shiftworkers.

Functionalism is conventionally considered the mainstream paradigm of the law of international organizations: organizations are agents of their member states by the means of a contractual relationship; the law created by international organizations is purely international law; the institutional veil is characterized by a crystallin transparency; the autonomy of the organization is minimal and only granted by a rigid conferral of competences and few implied powers; the conduct of member states acting in the institutional forum is relevant as a matter of international law. This chapter introduces the historical roots of this conceptualization and elaborates why under this perspective the rules of the organizations are purely international law. It describes the flaws of this theory, discussing the breach of institutional rules by the organization and the adoption of countermeasures against a wrongful act committed by a member state.

When the first host-to-host message was sent across the ARPANET in October 1969, few could have fully anticipated the degree to which the internet, and now the internet of things, would explode across the globe and revolutionize nearly every facet of public and private life. Nor could anyone have predicted the degree to which it would establish an entirely new realm—cyberspace—through which States could engage in traditional, and not-so-traditional, statecraft and conflict. However, it is now clear that States have fully embraced cyber operations as a means to pursue their national interests and gain low-cost asymmetric advantages over their adversaries. Cyberspace has become a new instrument of statecraft and presents novel and challenging questions about the applicability of existing legal orders. Adversaries are leveraging and exploiting the numerous technical, policy, and legal ambiguities surrounding cyberspace operations to conduct a range of intrusive and increasing aggressive activities. While some of these cyber operations have been conducted as part of ongoing armed conflicts, the vast majority have taken place in the so-called gray zone—the far more uncertain space between war and peace. Also known as gray-zone challenges or gray-zone conflicts, these activities are more accurately understood as actions that are coercive and aggressive in nature and rise above normal, everyday peacetime geo-political competition, yet remain below the threshold of war. This chapter will identify and consider some of the more challenging domestic and international legal issues raised by the conduct of cyber operations in the gray zone between peace and war.