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Deals with the response of the state to organized crime. During the early 1990s a new anti‐yakuza law was introduced. Having discussed the reasons for this law's introduction, this law is described and analysed with reference to American and European anti‐organized crime laws (both of which were influential in the internal policy debate).

It is likely that within not too many years, we will have effectively neutralized most if not all of the CDC A-list agents as potential bioterror weapons. But for some time now scientists have been asking what the next generation of bioweapons might look like, and how we can prepare ourselves to defend against them. It is now possible, using molecular biology techniques, to genetically alter existing pathogens to make them more deadly, easier to weaponize, more resistant to drugs or vaccines, or even to create new pathogens that have not existed before. Chapter 4 looks at what has been done to date along these lines, and possibilities for the future. In addition to inserting extra toxic genes into pathogens, researchers have been able to rebuild in the laboratory copies of the extremely deadly 1918 flu virus. Such research is beginning to worry many people, and may be in violation of exisiting bioweapons treaties.

This chapter questions whether extraterritorial use of force against non-state actors might, in certain conditions, not be a breach of international law, even if taken outside the framework of self-defence. The concepts of countermeasures, necessity, hot pursuit, and piracy are examined. In addition, there is an analysis of the possibility of alternative paradigms or interpretations that might be claimed to allow for use of force other than in self-defence, such as ‘extraterritorial law enforcement’.

The rapid development of the modern society has resulted in a growing population of workers that have to work around the clock. However, working at other times (which is what a shift-worker does) comes at a cost. Night work is related to short sleep, increased fatigue, intrusions of sleep, worse performance, and increased risk for injuries and accidents. Early morning work is also affected, but to a lesser extent. Working shifts carries long-term health consequences such as an increased risk for developing cardiovascular disease, endocrine and metabolic disturbances, cancer, and gastrointestinal disorders. However, the evidence is far from immaculate and there is a need for studies with better measures of exposure as well as to why there are so large individual differences in tolerance to shift-work. In addition, the negative consequences of shift-work can be reduced by both organizational and individual countermeasures. The interactive effects of combining several countermeasures seem extra promising.

Safety, or safety science, refers to the application of technology, behavioral science and administrative controls to prevent incidents resulting in injury, property loss and lost productivity. Occupational safety is a general field in which safety personnel become experts in preventing injuries on the job through ergonomics and safety engineering. There are many occupational safety problems common to all occupations, such as falls from heights and handling materials. Fatalities are deaths due to injuries on the job. Societies in different times and places have developed different ideas about injury. . Modern safety science uses an approach called Haddon's Countermeasures and an evaluation tool called Haddon's Matrix, both of which were developed by the same safety scientist, who considered injuries to be the adverse consequences of the uncontrolled release of energy acting on a susceptible structure, such as the human body, in an environment that permitted the incident to happen. Injuries tend to be underreported, because workers want to keep their jobs and supervisors do not want to look bad. The injury pyramid is a graphic display of the relationship between fatalities and serious injuries, lost-time injuries, minor injuries, and near-misses. Incidents resulting in injury can be anticipated and prevented by capturing information early on near-misses and minor incidents, which allows planning to prevent the major incidents.

Chapter 5 analyses the implementation of State responsibility for international terrorism through the adoption of non-military measures aimed at securing a wrongdoing State’s compliance with its secondary obligations of cessation and reparation, in particular the adoption of retorsive measures and countermeasures. It assesses potential problems with the adoption of countermeasures in the terrorism context, including the potential for misevaluating the wrongfulness of a target State’s conduct and continued uncertainty surrounding the legitimacy of collective countermeasures. Finally, Chapter 5 explores the extent to which sub-systems of international law, including diplomatic law and the WTO, affect the right to adopt countermeasures in response to breaches of international terrorism obligations, including the extent to which such sub-system exclude the application of the secondary rules of State responsibility or restrict the scope of their wrongfulness preclusion.

This chapter examines how the responsibility of the UN for wrongful Security Council sanctions can be implemented. The normal way of implementation of responsibility in a decentralized legal system is through countermeasures, i.e., through self-help. The chapter accepts that disobedience is the ultimum refugium of States when these are faced with what they consider wrongful Council sanctions. But it seeks to qualify legally this disobedience. It discusses whether it constitutes civil disobedience, whether it is allowed under Article 25 UN Charter, which — it is argued — obligates States to comply with valid, intra vires acts of the Council, or whether it constitutes an illegal acts that is justifiable as a countermeasure. It concludes that it is the latter, not less so because acts of the Council are always valid, even if they are illegal, for lack of an instance to determine their invalidity.

Food supply chain fraud occurs as a result of a multiplicity of drivers, motivations, and intended outcomes. The aim of this book chapter is to consider one aspect of food fraud, namely adulteration and provide comment on reported prevalence, and critique the use of countermeasures, including product sampling, to minimise, or where possible eliminate, food adulteration risk. Procedural and policy driven countermeasures and/or traditional process controls alone will not give sufficient protection against food adulteration. Instead additional measures such as risk based product testing, responsive surveillance and verification mechanisms that are underpinned by real-time supply chain intelligence also need to be in place. This requires food supply chain leaders and managers to firstly recognise the specific risk of food adulteration associated with their organisations and products, implement effective risk characterisation, risk assessment and risk mitigation, and appropriate food adulteration risk communication programs.

This concluding chapter recalls the major themes and issues addressed in Part III of the monograph, emphasizing that the invocation of self-defence (or more modest forcible reactions) in response to global security violations should be a solution of last resort. It also acknowledges that self-defence repertoire and the law of State responsibility may differ in both scope and consequences. Ultimately, this chapter argues for a strong role for the Security Council in vetting forcible responses and monitoring States’ violations of global security obligations.

This introductory chapter provides a background of biodefense and biological weapons. Biological weapons harm only living organisms because they incapacitate or kill through disease instead of causing blunt or penetrating trauma. The damage that these weapons cause can be limited through a combination of medical countermeasures, detection and identification, and physical protection—the key components of biodefense. Physical protection limits exposure to infection through face masks and filters that reduce the risk of inhaling aerosolized biological weapon agents. Detection and identification involves sensors and surveillance to help determine when a biological attack has occurred and what pathogens might be present. Lastly, medical countermeasures can prevent or treat infection through prophylactic vaccines and therapeutic drugs such as antibiotics.

This Chapter explores how the law of neutrality affects the conduct of cyber operations by neutral and belligerent states. It first establishes in what situations the law of neutrality applies and subsequently explores what cyber activities carried out by the belligerent and neutral states may breach their obligations under the law of neutrality by distinguishing operations from, through, and with effects on neutral territory, as well as other cyber and cyber-related activities, including the use of cyber infrastructures on neutral territory for communication purposes. The impact of the entry into force of the UN Charter on the law of neutrality is then discussed, while the last section looks at the remedies against cyber activities that breach the law of neutrality, in particular the resort to forcible and non-forcible countermeasures against such violations.

The rapid development of modern society has resulted in a growing population of workers that have to work around the clock. However, working at different times comes at a cost. Night work is related to short sleep, increased fatigue, falling asleep at work, worse performance, and increased risk for injuries and accidents. Early morning work is also affected, but to a lesser extent. Working shifts can carry long-term health consequences such as an increased risk for developing cardiovascular disease, endocrine and metabolic disturbances, cancer, and gastrointestinal disorders. However, the evidence is far from immaculate and there is a need for studies with better measures of exposure and more knowledge regarding why there are such large individual differences in tolerance to shift work. In addition, the negative consequences of shift work can be reduced by both organizational and individual countermeasures. The interactive effects of combining several countermeasures seem especially promising.

This chapter explores the influence of sleep on human performance and well-being. A general discussion of the role of sleep in humans is followed by a description of the functions of various stages of sleep. The authors explore causal factors of insufficient sleep and inventory known effects of sleep restriction on human performance. They then describe the particular challenges of fatigue and sleep deprivation in military operational environments. The efficacy of fatigue countermeasures and alertness aids commonly used in military settings is presented. The chapter concludes with an argument for more deliberately protecting and promoting sleep, particularly in vulnerable populations such as shiftworkers.

When the first host-to-host message was sent across the ARPANET in October 1969, few could have fully anticipated the degree to which the internet, and now the internet of things, would explode across the globe and revolutionize nearly every facet of public and private life. Nor could anyone have predicted the degree to which it would establish an entirely new realm—cyberspace—through which States could engage in traditional, and not-so-traditional, statecraft and conflict. However, it is now clear that States have fully embraced cyber operations as a means to pursue their national interests and gain low-cost asymmetric advantages over their adversaries. Cyberspace has become a new instrument of statecraft and presents novel and challenging questions about the applicability of existing legal orders. Adversaries are leveraging and exploiting the numerous technical, policy, and legal ambiguities surrounding cyberspace operations to conduct a range of intrusive and increasing aggressive activities. While some of these cyber operations have been conducted as part of ongoing armed conflicts, the vast majority have taken place in the so-called gray zone—the far more uncertain space between war and peace. Also known as gray-zone challenges or gray-zone conflicts, these activities are more accurately understood as actions that are coercive and aggressive in nature and rise above normal, everyday peacetime geo-political competition, yet remain below the threshold of war. This chapter will identify and consider some of the more challenging domestic and international legal issues raised by the conduct of cyber operations in the gray zone between peace and war.

This chapter explores the defence tools that a host state can use against conflict-related investment claims. The first part analyses security exceptions which have been introduced to investment protection law after the Second World War. While it is widely believed that such exceptions provide for the most persuasive safeguard of the state’s security interests, it is argued that their effectiveness will depend on the wording of the provision, determining their scope, the degree of autonomy given to a state in responding to a security threat, and their relationship with other treaty provisions. The chapter addresses these aspects. The second part focuses on the defences in the general law of state responsibility (necessity, force majeure, and countermeasures), explaining why their potential as a defence is limited.

This chapter is a case study on the EU’s response to a public health emergency in the form of countermeasures. More specifically, the scope of the case study is the involvement of the EU in the response to the outbreak of swine flu (influenza A H1N1) in 2009–10. The case study explores and maps legally the manner by which health policymaking can become strengthened through intertwining with more formal rules and the impact this may have for EU fundamental rights and values. It illustrates the growth and impact of EU health policy beyond legislative powers, where Member State engagement in EU health policymaking may have an impact beyond what is envisioned in law. The chapter first addresses how measures to counter a public health emergency can be taken at EU level, particularly focusing on the institutional actors. Second, the chapter identifies the countermeasures taken at EU level to combat the swine flu pandemic. Third, the chapter looks at the ways informal health policy (deliberately) intertwines with more formal regulation. Lastly, the impact of EU health law and policy in this particular case is analysed in terms of fundamental rights and values. The case study shows that the precarious balancing between public health and individual rights is not done by Member States alone.