Virginia Garrard‐Burnett
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195379648
- eISBN:
- 9780199869176
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379648.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter provides a background to the violence of the early 1980s. It explores the evolution of the revolutionary Left in the 1960s and 1970s. This chapter also explores the development of a ...
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This chapter provides a background to the violence of the early 1980s. It explores the evolution of the revolutionary Left in the 1960s and 1970s. This chapter also explores the development of a well‐defined counterinsurgency movement in Guatemala and its methodical use of terror as a means of controlling the population and staunching the growth of the Marxist opposition. This chapter suggests that by the late 1970s, the ideology of counterinsurgency had degenerated into a chaotic culture of violence that repudiated the authority of the state. Much of the material for this chapter comes from secondary sources. However, it also utilizes primary sources from personal papers of Mario Payeras, who was a founder and intellectual leader of the Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, which have only recently become available for scholarly use.Less
This chapter provides a background to the violence of the early 1980s. It explores the evolution of the revolutionary Left in the 1960s and 1970s. This chapter also explores the development of a well‐defined counterinsurgency movement in Guatemala and its methodical use of terror as a means of controlling the population and staunching the growth of the Marxist opposition. This chapter suggests that by the late 1970s, the ideology of counterinsurgency had degenerated into a chaotic culture of violence that repudiated the authority of the state. Much of the material for this chapter comes from secondary sources. However, it also utilizes primary sources from personal papers of Mario Payeras, who was a founder and intellectual leader of the Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, which have only recently become available for scholarly use.
Virginia Garrard‐Burnett
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195379648
- eISBN:
- 9780199869176
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379648.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter examines the language, images, and discourses that General Ríos Montt employed to promote his war of counterinsurgency. While the military’s war of counterinsurgency forcibly pacified ...
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This chapter examines the language, images, and discourses that General Ríos Montt employed to promote his war of counterinsurgency. While the military’s war of counterinsurgency forcibly pacified the largely indigenous highlands (a campaign that some sources claim produced nearly 50 percent of the civilian deaths that occurred over the course of Guatemala’s thirty‐six‐year armed struggle), Ríos Montt captivated much of Guatemala’s urban and nonindigenous population through his anticorruption campaign and his Sunday sermons — weekly broadcast messages that stressed anticommunism and government loyalty against a backdrop of evangelical language and imagery. This chapter provides an analysis of the sermons and offers an attempt to explain and contextualize Ríos Montt’s political popularity, as he sought to establish order and a fresh ideology for what he called the New Guatemala. This chapter is based almost exclusively on transcripts of Ríos Montt’s Sunday sermons and on newspaper clippings from the period.Less
This chapter examines the language, images, and discourses that General Ríos Montt employed to promote his war of counterinsurgency. While the military’s war of counterinsurgency forcibly pacified the largely indigenous highlands (a campaign that some sources claim produced nearly 50 percent of the civilian deaths that occurred over the course of Guatemala’s thirty‐six‐year armed struggle), Ríos Montt captivated much of Guatemala’s urban and nonindigenous population through his anticorruption campaign and his Sunday sermons — weekly broadcast messages that stressed anticommunism and government loyalty against a backdrop of evangelical language and imagery. This chapter provides an analysis of the sermons and offers an attempt to explain and contextualize Ríos Montt’s political popularity, as he sought to establish order and a fresh ideology for what he called the New Guatemala. This chapter is based almost exclusively on transcripts of Ríos Montt’s Sunday sermons and on newspaper clippings from the period.
Alexander L. Fattal
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780226590509
- eISBN:
- 9780226590783
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226590783.001.0001
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Latin American Cultural Anthropology
Guerrilla Marketing argues that counterinsurgency and marketing have merged together in Colombia. More specifically the book analyzes a government program to persuade FARC guerrillas to defect from ...
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Guerrilla Marketing argues that counterinsurgency and marketing have merged together in Colombia. More specifically the book analyzes a government program to persuade FARC guerrillas to defect from the rebel movement while also rebranding the Colombian army as a humanitarian actor. This program in the Ministry of Defense has partnered with Lowe/SSP3, an advertising firm that has managed the brands of Mazda and RedBull in Colombia. The partnership pitches a new life to guerrilla fighters, one as consumer citizens and entrepreneurial subjects. Those who abandon the insurgency’s ranks are coaxed into informing on their former comrades, providing the military valuable strategic and tactical intelligence. The book develops the concept of brand warfare to describe the fusion of counterinsurgency and consumer culture into an affective assemblage that is key to understanding governance in the early twenty-first century. Guerrilla Marketing follows stories from the perspective of former and active guerrillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), military officers, marketers, peace negotiators in Havana, and exiles living in unexpected places, such as rural Sweden. Testimonials, and their accompanying drawings by Colombian artist Lucas Ospina, separate the chapters. In its conclusion the book analyzes the implications for other war-torn countries, criticizing how Colombia has reframed demobilization in a way that weaponizes the peace-building ethos of the policy. The epilogue contemplates the book’s implications for Colombia’s post-peace accord future by analyzing the FARC’s own guerrilla marketing at its tenth and final conference as a guerrilla army.Less
Guerrilla Marketing argues that counterinsurgency and marketing have merged together in Colombia. More specifically the book analyzes a government program to persuade FARC guerrillas to defect from the rebel movement while also rebranding the Colombian army as a humanitarian actor. This program in the Ministry of Defense has partnered with Lowe/SSP3, an advertising firm that has managed the brands of Mazda and RedBull in Colombia. The partnership pitches a new life to guerrilla fighters, one as consumer citizens and entrepreneurial subjects. Those who abandon the insurgency’s ranks are coaxed into informing on their former comrades, providing the military valuable strategic and tactical intelligence. The book develops the concept of brand warfare to describe the fusion of counterinsurgency and consumer culture into an affective assemblage that is key to understanding governance in the early twenty-first century. Guerrilla Marketing follows stories from the perspective of former and active guerrillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), military officers, marketers, peace negotiators in Havana, and exiles living in unexpected places, such as rural Sweden. Testimonials, and their accompanying drawings by Colombian artist Lucas Ospina, separate the chapters. In its conclusion the book analyzes the implications for other war-torn countries, criticizing how Colombia has reframed demobilization in a way that weaponizes the peace-building ethos of the policy. The epilogue contemplates the book’s implications for Colombia’s post-peace accord future by analyzing the FARC’s own guerrilla marketing at its tenth and final conference as a guerrilla army.
Jesse Ferris
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691155142
- eISBN:
- 9781400845231
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691155142.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, Middle East History
This chapter studies the interplay between the battlefield in Yemen and the domestic front in Egypt. It begins with a revisionist account of the Egyptian counterinsurgency campaign, based on Egyptian ...
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This chapter studies the interplay between the battlefield in Yemen and the domestic front in Egypt. It begins with a revisionist account of the Egyptian counterinsurgency campaign, based on Egyptian memoirs and captured documents, and then proceeds to discuss three Egyptian taboos—casualties, cost, and corruption—demonstrating that the pursuit of revolutionary politics abroad contributed significantly to the enfeeblement of the revolution at home. Although the direct cost of the war in lives and treasure may not have been as great as some have argued, the indirect costs of the war proved catastrophic for Egypt. Furthermore, a number of mutually reinforcing factors impressed upon Nasser the need to come to terms with Saudi Arabia in order to end the conflict in Yemen.Less
This chapter studies the interplay between the battlefield in Yemen and the domestic front in Egypt. It begins with a revisionist account of the Egyptian counterinsurgency campaign, based on Egyptian memoirs and captured documents, and then proceeds to discuss three Egyptian taboos—casualties, cost, and corruption—demonstrating that the pursuit of revolutionary politics abroad contributed significantly to the enfeeblement of the revolution at home. Although the direct cost of the war in lives and treasure may not have been as great as some have argued, the indirect costs of the war proved catastrophic for Egypt. Furthermore, a number of mutually reinforcing factors impressed upon Nasser the need to come to terms with Saudi Arabia in order to end the conflict in Yemen.
Adam Branch
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199782086
- eISBN:
- 9780199919130
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199782086.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Chapter 3 addresses the politics of relief aid distribution as it has been reframed within a human rights-based approach. The chapter explicates the epistemology, techniques, and effects of relief ...
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Chapter 3 addresses the politics of relief aid distribution as it has been reframed within a human rights-based approach. The chapter explicates the epistemology, techniques, and effects of relief aid in general and as evidenced in northern Uganda. It argues that, because of the Uganda government’s international political relations, relief aid has been allowed be incorporated into its counterinsurgency with highly destructive consequences, most evident in the archipelago of forced internment camps run by the Ugandan military and international aid agencies. The chapter also shows how the administrative aspect of relief aid tends to discipline the recipients of aid as helpless, passive victims and to criminalize those who refuse that aid.Less
Chapter 3 addresses the politics of relief aid distribution as it has been reframed within a human rights-based approach. The chapter explicates the epistemology, techniques, and effects of relief aid in general and as evidenced in northern Uganda. It argues that, because of the Uganda government’s international political relations, relief aid has been allowed be incorporated into its counterinsurgency with highly destructive consequences, most evident in the archipelago of forced internment camps run by the Ugandan military and international aid agencies. The chapter also shows how the administrative aspect of relief aid tends to discipline the recipients of aid as helpless, passive victims and to criminalize those who refuse that aid.
Gregory A. Daddis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199746873
- eISBN:
- 9780199897179
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199746873.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This study analyzes how the United States Army, particularly the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), attempted to measure its progress and effectiveness while conducting counterinsurgency ...
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This study analyzes how the United States Army, particularly the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), attempted to measure its progress and effectiveness while conducting counterinsurgency operations during the Vietnam War. In short, in a war without front lines, how did the army know if it was winning or losing? White House advisers, Pentagon officials, MACV staff officers, and army field commanders all faced immense challenges in identifying useful metrics for gauging success in an unconventional environment. Throughout the war, they often came to contradictory conclusions. Political, economic, and cultural factors influenced daily the course and conduct of the army’s counterinsurgency operations. In such a complex environment, how did American officers and soldiers know whether or not they were making progress over the course of a decade-long war?Less
This study analyzes how the United States Army, particularly the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), attempted to measure its progress and effectiveness while conducting counterinsurgency operations during the Vietnam War. In short, in a war without front lines, how did the army know if it was winning or losing? White House advisers, Pentagon officials, MACV staff officers, and army field commanders all faced immense challenges in identifying useful metrics for gauging success in an unconventional environment. Throughout the war, they often came to contradictory conclusions. Political, economic, and cultural factors influenced daily the course and conduct of the army’s counterinsurgency operations. In such a complex environment, how did American officers and soldiers know whether or not they were making progress over the course of a decade-long war?
Simon J. Potter
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199568963
- eISBN:
- 9780191741821
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199568963.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Cultural History
After the war, senior BBC officers sought to use broadcasting to restore the status quo, returning to their domestic mission of cultural uplift, and their imperial mission of supporting British ...
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After the war, senior BBC officers sought to use broadcasting to restore the status quo, returning to their domestic mission of cultural uplift, and their imperial mission of supporting British influence overseas. The BBC remained a major presence on short wave and, although rebroadcasting by organisations like the New Zealand Broadcasting Service (NZBS) declined, use of government-subsidized BBC transcriptions increased substantially. Connections with the British world were cultivated, with improved coverage of rugby and cricket, flagship comedies such as the Goon Show, and the broadcasting of ‘media events’ including the Coronation of 1953 and the Royal Tour of 1953/4. Cooperation among public broadcasting authorities continued to be organised on a non-commercial, public-service basis. Contemporaries also assumed that radio would help encourage economic and social ‘development’ in the dependent colonies, and could be used as a tool of counterinsurgency, to suppress resistance to colonial rule.Less
After the war, senior BBC officers sought to use broadcasting to restore the status quo, returning to their domestic mission of cultural uplift, and their imperial mission of supporting British influence overseas. The BBC remained a major presence on short wave and, although rebroadcasting by organisations like the New Zealand Broadcasting Service (NZBS) declined, use of government-subsidized BBC transcriptions increased substantially. Connections with the British world were cultivated, with improved coverage of rugby and cricket, flagship comedies such as the Goon Show, and the broadcasting of ‘media events’ including the Coronation of 1953 and the Royal Tour of 1953/4. Cooperation among public broadcasting authorities continued to be organised on a non-commercial, public-service basis. Contemporaries also assumed that radio would help encourage economic and social ‘development’ in the dependent colonies, and could be used as a tool of counterinsurgency, to suppress resistance to colonial rule.
Gregory A. Daddis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199746873
- eISBN:
- 9780199897179
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199746873.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The work concludes by assessing MACV’s decisions and choices in developing and implementing counterinsurgency metrics of effectiveness and progress in Vietnam. In the end, it asks if the army was an ...
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The work concludes by assessing MACV’s decisions and choices in developing and implementing counterinsurgency metrics of effectiveness and progress in Vietnam. In the end, it asks if the army was an organization with a deeply flawed mentality that sought to impose measurements on the immeasurable. It also provides historical perspective for those armies currently attempting to measure their own successes and failures in an unconventional environment.Less
The work concludes by assessing MACV’s decisions and choices in developing and implementing counterinsurgency metrics of effectiveness and progress in Vietnam. In the end, it asks if the army was an organization with a deeply flawed mentality that sought to impose measurements on the immeasurable. It also provides historical perspective for those armies currently attempting to measure their own successes and failures in an unconventional environment.
Gregory A. Daddis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199746873
- eISBN:
- 9780199897179
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199746873.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This opening chapter, covering 1955–1965, provides an overview of contemporary counterinsurgency theory and analyzes the army’s counterinsurgency doctrine. It also illustrates the increasing ...
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This opening chapter, covering 1955–1965, provides an overview of contemporary counterinsurgency theory and analyzes the army’s counterinsurgency doctrine. It also illustrates the increasing influence of statistical analysis in the Department of Defense after Robert S. McNamara’s assumption of duties as the Secretary of Defense. The U.S. Army officer entering combat in 1965 seemingly could draw upon a wealth of counterinsurgency information—unless he was looking for how to measure progress and effectiveness. In the absence of doctrinal suggestions on how to develop metrics of progress and effectiveness, MACV, under pressure from McNamara, turned to computers and statistical analysis to help solve their measurement problems.Less
This opening chapter, covering 1955–1965, provides an overview of contemporary counterinsurgency theory and analyzes the army’s counterinsurgency doctrine. It also illustrates the increasing influence of statistical analysis in the Department of Defense after Robert S. McNamara’s assumption of duties as the Secretary of Defense. The U.S. Army officer entering combat in 1965 seemingly could draw upon a wealth of counterinsurgency information—unless he was looking for how to measure progress and effectiveness. In the absence of doctrinal suggestions on how to develop metrics of progress and effectiveness, MACV, under pressure from McNamara, turned to computers and statistical analysis to help solve their measurement problems.
Gregory A. Daddis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199746873
- eISBN:
- 9780199897179
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199746873.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter covers 1962–1964 and argues that a principle reason why MACV could not identify any useful indicators to measure its progress resulted from disagreements over American strategy in South ...
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This chapter covers 1962–1964 and argues that a principle reason why MACV could not identify any useful indicators to measure its progress resulted from disagreements over American strategy in South Vietnam. If there was no clear strategy, what should MACV be measuring? This chapter also analyzes how staff officers developed metrics during General Paul Harkins’s tenure as MACV’s first commander. It argues that MACV’s inability to fully conceptualize the intricacies of counterinsurgency, of balancing and integrating the complex problems of security and pacification, led to a reliance on statistical indicators as a substitute for a fuller comprehension of the political-military conflict.Less
This chapter covers 1962–1964 and argues that a principle reason why MACV could not identify any useful indicators to measure its progress resulted from disagreements over American strategy in South Vietnam. If there was no clear strategy, what should MACV be measuring? This chapter also analyzes how staff officers developed metrics during General Paul Harkins’s tenure as MACV’s first commander. It argues that MACV’s inability to fully conceptualize the intricacies of counterinsurgency, of balancing and integrating the complex problems of security and pacification, led to a reliance on statistical indicators as a substitute for a fuller comprehension of the political-military conflict.
Gregory A. Daddis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199746873
- eISBN:
- 9780199897179
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199746873.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This final chapter concentrates on the final two years of U.S. Army participation in Vietnam, 1971–1972. It first considers any refinements made to counterinsurgency theory since the early 1960s and ...
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This final chapter concentrates on the final two years of U.S. Army participation in Vietnam, 1971–1972. It first considers any refinements made to counterinsurgency theory since the early 1960s and asks if these changes affected how MACV measured its effectiveness and progress late in the war. MACV revised HES in 1970 to overcome biases in reporting. Were other reports revised to account for biases or changes in counterinsurgency theory? From the operational standpoint, the army conducted operations in Laos and Cambodia, expanding the war effort to allow Vietnamization to work and the American army to withdraw from Southeast Asia. How did MACV assess these operations? Did MACV believe the final battles of the war to be a validation of Vietnamization? By the end of 1972, did MACV believe, based on its metrics, that it had successfully completed its mission in South Vietnam?Less
This final chapter concentrates on the final two years of U.S. Army participation in Vietnam, 1971–1972. It first considers any refinements made to counterinsurgency theory since the early 1960s and asks if these changes affected how MACV measured its effectiveness and progress late in the war. MACV revised HES in 1970 to overcome biases in reporting. Were other reports revised to account for biases or changes in counterinsurgency theory? From the operational standpoint, the army conducted operations in Laos and Cambodia, expanding the war effort to allow Vietnamization to work and the American army to withdraw from Southeast Asia. How did MACV assess these operations? Did MACV believe the final battles of the war to be a validation of Vietnamization? By the end of 1972, did MACV believe, based on its metrics, that it had successfully completed its mission in South Vietnam?
Austin Carson
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780691181769
- eISBN:
- 9780691184241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691181769.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter focuses on the covert side of the Vietnam War. Secrecy famously helped Richard Nixon cope with dovish domestic opposition toward the end of the war. In contrast, the chapter highlights ...
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This chapter focuses on the covert side of the Vietnam War. Secrecy famously helped Richard Nixon cope with dovish domestic opposition toward the end of the war. In contrast, the chapter highlights the role of covert intervention in helping both sides compete in Vietnam while keeping the war limited during the earlier Johnson years (1964–1968). Even as he greatly expanded U.S. military activity in Vietnam, President Lyndon Johnson acted to avoid provoking a larger war with China or the Soviet Union. Covert U.S. military operations in places like Laos, though an open secret, were a way to prosecute a counterinsurgency while keeping a lid on hostilities. China and the Soviet Union similarly sought to control escalation dangers through covertness. Both communist patrons provided military personnel covertly to improve air defense in North Vietnam. The chapter suggests that all three outside powers worked hard to avoid public and acknowledged clashes up through 1968.Less
This chapter focuses on the covert side of the Vietnam War. Secrecy famously helped Richard Nixon cope with dovish domestic opposition toward the end of the war. In contrast, the chapter highlights the role of covert intervention in helping both sides compete in Vietnam while keeping the war limited during the earlier Johnson years (1964–1968). Even as he greatly expanded U.S. military activity in Vietnam, President Lyndon Johnson acted to avoid provoking a larger war with China or the Soviet Union. Covert U.S. military operations in places like Laos, though an open secret, were a way to prosecute a counterinsurgency while keeping a lid on hostilities. China and the Soviet Union similarly sought to control escalation dangers through covertness. Both communist patrons provided military personnel covertly to improve air defense in North Vietnam. The chapter suggests that all three outside powers worked hard to avoid public and acknowledged clashes up through 1968.
Austin Carson
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780691181769
- eISBN:
- 9780691184241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691181769.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter analyzes the end of the Cold War and external involvement in Afghanistan. On the Soviet side, the December 1979 invasion was preceded by six months of covert involvement in ...
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This chapter analyzes the end of the Cold War and external involvement in Afghanistan. On the Soviet side, the December 1979 invasion was preceded by six months of covert involvement in counterinsurgency military operations. The chapter reviews evidence on the motives for covertness and the detection of it by American leaders. It then assesses covertness in the American weapons supply program after the overt Soviet invasion. Escalation fears—in particular, fear of provoking Soviet retaliation against Pakistan and a larger regional war—led to consistent efforts to keep the expanding U.S. aid program covert from 1979 to 1985. By the mid-1980s, however, American leaders embraced a more aggressive strategy and identified key changes that largely eliminated the risk of escalation, leading them to approve an overt form of weaponry (the Stinger missile system). The chapter also reviews covert Soviet cross-border operations into Pakistan and U.S. inferences from its detection of these activities.Less
This chapter analyzes the end of the Cold War and external involvement in Afghanistan. On the Soviet side, the December 1979 invasion was preceded by six months of covert involvement in counterinsurgency military operations. The chapter reviews evidence on the motives for covertness and the detection of it by American leaders. It then assesses covertness in the American weapons supply program after the overt Soviet invasion. Escalation fears—in particular, fear of provoking Soviet retaliation against Pakistan and a larger regional war—led to consistent efforts to keep the expanding U.S. aid program covert from 1979 to 1985. By the mid-1980s, however, American leaders embraced a more aggressive strategy and identified key changes that largely eliminated the risk of escalation, leading them to approve an overt form of weaponry (the Stinger missile system). The chapter also reviews covert Soviet cross-border operations into Pakistan and U.S. inferences from its detection of these activities.
Sumit Ganguly and C. Christine Fair
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195342048
- eISBN:
- 9780199852017
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342048.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This introductory chapter begins by identifying the two specific problems of counterinsurgency that have received inadequate attention in the scholarly literature. It then sets out the purpose of the ...
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This introductory chapter begins by identifying the two specific problems of counterinsurgency that have received inadequate attention in the scholarly literature. It then sets out the purpose of the book, which is to address these gaps in several important ways. First, it explains why sacred space is important both to insurgents and to counterinsurgency forces. Second, it discusses a series of case studies evaluating the most important counterinsurgency operations on sacred space in the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins by identifying the two specific problems of counterinsurgency that have received inadequate attention in the scholarly literature. It then sets out the purpose of the book, which is to address these gaps in several important ways. First, it explains why sacred space is important both to insurgents and to counterinsurgency forces. Second, it discusses a series of case studies evaluating the most important counterinsurgency operations on sacred space in the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.
Ron E. Hassner
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195342048
- eISBN:
- 9780199852017
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342048.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines the key problems that counterinsurgency operations pose in sacred places. It first delineates the concept of a “sacred space” and explains the key features that grant such ...
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This chapter examines the key problems that counterinsurgency operations pose in sacred places. It first delineates the concept of a “sacred space” and explains the key features that grant such spaces a sacral quality. It then examines how insurgent groups can usefully occupy and exploit sacred places. It argues that insurgents can mingle with pilgrims and worshippers and can also use the sacredness of shrines, mosques, and temples as sanctuaries from counterinsurgent forces who may be understandably loath to offend local religious sensibilities by using force against such locales. The chapter outlines possible strategies and potential pitfalls for security forces when they are seeking to flush out insurgents who have taken refuge in sacred arenas. Finally, it looks at some of the lessons derived from the Israeli siege of the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem, where several Palestinian militants retreated in 2002.Less
This chapter examines the key problems that counterinsurgency operations pose in sacred places. It first delineates the concept of a “sacred space” and explains the key features that grant such spaces a sacral quality. It then examines how insurgent groups can usefully occupy and exploit sacred places. It argues that insurgents can mingle with pilgrims and worshippers and can also use the sacredness of shrines, mosques, and temples as sanctuaries from counterinsurgent forces who may be understandably loath to offend local religious sensibilities by using force against such locales. The chapter outlines possible strategies and potential pitfalls for security forces when they are seeking to flush out insurgents who have taken refuge in sacred arenas. Finally, it looks at some of the lessons derived from the Israeli siege of the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem, where several Palestinian militants retreated in 2002.
C. Christine Fair
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195342048
- eISBN:
- 9780199852017
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342048.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines two important operations waged by Indian security forces to counter Sikh insurgents operating in India's northern state of Punjab, from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. The ...
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This chapter examines two important operations waged by Indian security forces to counter Sikh insurgents operating in India's northern state of Punjab, from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. The first operation was a military as well as a public-relations debacle. The Indian Army had inadequate and flawed intelligence about the strength and capabilities of the insurgents who had entered and occupied the Golden Temple, and they failed to forge a viable public-relations strategy and ultimately used excessive force to prevail. Fortunately, the Indian state was capable of learning from its initial errors. When Sikh militants again attempted to use the temple as a sanctuary, the Indian security forces launched a second assault, which involved a prolonged siege, but one marked by careful attention to the sentiments of religious authorities and by a deft public-relations strategy. The two contrasting episodes underscore how the same regime, under different circumstances, can cope with and respond to the requirements of a counterinsurgency operation in a sacred site.Less
This chapter examines two important operations waged by Indian security forces to counter Sikh insurgents operating in India's northern state of Punjab, from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. The first operation was a military as well as a public-relations debacle. The Indian Army had inadequate and flawed intelligence about the strength and capabilities of the insurgents who had entered and occupied the Golden Temple, and they failed to forge a viable public-relations strategy and ultimately used excessive force to prevail. Fortunately, the Indian state was capable of learning from its initial errors. When Sikh militants again attempted to use the temple as a sanctuary, the Indian security forces launched a second assault, which involved a prolonged siege, but one marked by careful attention to the sentiments of religious authorities and by a deft public-relations strategy. The two contrasting episodes underscore how the same regime, under different circumstances, can cope with and respond to the requirements of a counterinsurgency operation in a sacred site.
Sumit Ganguly
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195342048
- eISBN:
- 9780199852017
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342048.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter explains the dramatically different outcomes of two sieges conducted in the course of combating India's Kashmir insurgency: one of a historic mosque in an urban setting, and the other of ...
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This chapter explains the dramatically different outcomes of two sieges conducted in the course of combating India's Kashmir insurgency: one of a historic mosque in an urban setting, and the other of an ancient shrine in a rural milieu. The first siege, that at the Hazratbal mosque in the capital city of Indian-controlled Kashmir, ended peacefully. The siege of the shrine of Sheikh Nooruddin Noorani, a Sufi saint, however, ended in a bloody conflagration culminating in the destruction of the shrine. It is argued that the markedly different locations of the two religious sites partially explain the different outcomes of the two sieges. The Hazratbal mosque, located in the heart of Srinagar, promptly attracted the attention of the national government in New Delhi, which granted an able civilian administrator to handle the negotiations while allowing the military to maintain a vigilant posture. The Charar-e-Sharief shrine, on the other hand, was located near the Line of Control (the de facto international border) in Kashmir and therefore was removed from significant political attention. This situation led the military and local police forces to adopt a more unyielding posture toward the insurgents. The demographic composition of the insurgents in the two sites also played a vital role in shaping the final outcomes.Less
This chapter explains the dramatically different outcomes of two sieges conducted in the course of combating India's Kashmir insurgency: one of a historic mosque in an urban setting, and the other of an ancient shrine in a rural milieu. The first siege, that at the Hazratbal mosque in the capital city of Indian-controlled Kashmir, ended peacefully. The siege of the shrine of Sheikh Nooruddin Noorani, a Sufi saint, however, ended in a bloody conflagration culminating in the destruction of the shrine. It is argued that the markedly different locations of the two religious sites partially explain the different outcomes of the two sieges. The Hazratbal mosque, located in the heart of Srinagar, promptly attracted the attention of the national government in New Delhi, which granted an able civilian administrator to handle the negotiations while allowing the military to maintain a vigilant posture. The Charar-e-Sharief shrine, on the other hand, was located near the Line of Control (the de facto international border) in Kashmir and therefore was removed from significant political attention. This situation led the military and local police forces to adopt a more unyielding posture toward the insurgents. The demographic composition of the insurgents in the two sites also played a vital role in shaping the final outcomes.
Manjeet S. Pardesi
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195342048
- eISBN:
- 9780199852017
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342048.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter discusses the July 2007 Pakistan military operation against the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. It begins by briefly describing the role of Islam in ...
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This chapter discusses the July 2007 Pakistan military operation against the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. It begins by briefly describing the role of Islam in contemporary Pakistan, focusing on the rise of Islamist militant groups, especially those affiliated with the Deobandi school of thought and the nexus between the Establishment and the Islamists in Pakistan. The chapter then discusses the growing Islamization of the Pakistani state and society, within which the occupation of the Red Mosque by armed insurgents took place; and the conduct of Operation Sunrise and the recapture of the mosque complex by Pakistani security forces. It is argued that while Operation Sunrise was a success in military terms, its political consequences have contributed to Pakistan's ever-deepening instability and to Islamist militancy in the tribal belt and beyond. Prospects are slim that Islamabad has the will or capability to address the structural context within which the events at the Red Mosque transpired.Less
This chapter discusses the July 2007 Pakistan military operation against the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. It begins by briefly describing the role of Islam in contemporary Pakistan, focusing on the rise of Islamist militant groups, especially those affiliated with the Deobandi school of thought and the nexus between the Establishment and the Islamists in Pakistan. The chapter then discusses the growing Islamization of the Pakistani state and society, within which the occupation of the Red Mosque by armed insurgents took place; and the conduct of Operation Sunrise and the recapture of the mosque complex by Pakistani security forces. It is argued that while Operation Sunrise was a success in military terms, its political consequences have contributed to Pakistan's ever-deepening instability and to Islamist militancy in the tribal belt and beyond. Prospects are slim that Islamabad has the will or capability to address the structural context within which the events at the Red Mosque transpired.
Pascal Ménoret
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195342048
- eISBN:
- 9780199852017
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342048.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter discusses the 1979 siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The chapter is organized as follows. The first section examines the history of Juhayman's movement, “The Salafi Group that commands ...
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This chapter discusses the 1979 siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The chapter is organized as follows. The first section examines the history of Juhayman's movement, “The Salafi Group that commands virtue and combats sin,” from its creation as a semi-official body in 1965 to the first signs of secession between its political wing, headed by Juhayman, and a pietistic minority. The second section details the open confrontation of Juhayman's followers with the Saudi authorities and the ensuing crackdown in 1976–1978. These efforts to repress the movement appear to have further radicalized it, since its violent millenarianism can be traced from that point. The third section analyzes the group's strategy and exposes why insurgents sought to occupy the Grand Mosque. The fourth section analyzes the counterinsurgency operations, which spanned two weeks from November 20 to December 4, 1979. Finally, the chapter details the ways in which the insurgency revealed the weaknesses of a government whose military and media strategies decisively failed.Less
This chapter discusses the 1979 siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The chapter is organized as follows. The first section examines the history of Juhayman's movement, “The Salafi Group that commands virtue and combats sin,” from its creation as a semi-official body in 1965 to the first signs of secession between its political wing, headed by Juhayman, and a pietistic minority. The second section details the open confrontation of Juhayman's followers with the Saudi authorities and the ensuing crackdown in 1976–1978. These efforts to repress the movement appear to have further radicalized it, since its violent millenarianism can be traced from that point. The third section analyzes the group's strategy and exposes why insurgents sought to occupy the Grand Mosque. The fourth section analyzes the counterinsurgency operations, which spanned two weeks from November 20 to December 4, 1979. Finally, the chapter details the ways in which the insurgency revealed the weaknesses of a government whose military and media strategies decisively failed.
David Siddhartha Patel
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195342048
- eISBN:
- 9780199852017
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342048.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter focuses upon two uprisings in 2004 in Najaf, one of the holiest cities in Shi'ite Islam and home to the revered Imam Ali shrine. In the first uprising, in April 2004, U.S. army forces ...
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This chapter focuses upon two uprisings in 2004 in Najaf, one of the holiest cities in Shi'ite Islam and home to the revered Imam Ali shrine. In the first uprising, in April 2004, U.S. army forces immediately attacked insurgents elsewhere in Iraq but deferred significant offensive operations against those in Najaf by four weeks. During those operations, they did not pursue insurgents into Najaf's Old City or the shrine. The second uprising occurred in August in 2004 and was put down by U.S. Marines. In contrast, the Marines immediately attacked insurgents throughout Najaf, reducing their exclusion zone around the shrine and around abandoned no-fire zones. The chapter asks why, despite similar risks, did U.S. forces aggressively pursue insurgents in Najaf's sacred spaces in August but not in April? It argues that the most important variable explaining the two different outcomes was the nature of the government at the time of the operations. In April, Iraq was governed by Paul Bremer, III, who was the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). In contrast, by August the CPA had been dissolved and “power” was transferred to an appointed Iraqi Interim Government with Iyad Allawi as the prime minister. Allawi's government vociferously supported decisive action against insurgents in Najaf in August. The support of this nominally sovereign Iraqi government may explain the later U.S. willingness to assault Najaf's sacred sites. Earlier in the year, U.S. planners were unwilling to do so because they were uncertain about how Iraq's Shi'ites would respond.Less
This chapter focuses upon two uprisings in 2004 in Najaf, one of the holiest cities in Shi'ite Islam and home to the revered Imam Ali shrine. In the first uprising, in April 2004, U.S. army forces immediately attacked insurgents elsewhere in Iraq but deferred significant offensive operations against those in Najaf by four weeks. During those operations, they did not pursue insurgents into Najaf's Old City or the shrine. The second uprising occurred in August in 2004 and was put down by U.S. Marines. In contrast, the Marines immediately attacked insurgents throughout Najaf, reducing their exclusion zone around the shrine and around abandoned no-fire zones. The chapter asks why, despite similar risks, did U.S. forces aggressively pursue insurgents in Najaf's sacred spaces in August but not in April? It argues that the most important variable explaining the two different outcomes was the nature of the government at the time of the operations. In April, Iraq was governed by Paul Bremer, III, who was the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). In contrast, by August the CPA had been dissolved and “power” was transferred to an appointed Iraqi Interim Government with Iyad Allawi as the prime minister. Allawi's government vociferously supported decisive action against insurgents in Najaf in August. The support of this nominally sovereign Iraqi government may explain the later U.S. willingness to assault Najaf's sacred sites. Earlier in the year, U.S. planners were unwilling to do so because they were uncertain about how Iraq's Shi'ites would respond.
