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Subjunctive Conditionals

Trenton Merricks

in Truth and Ontology

Dispositional conditionals include claims such as if the glass had been struck, it would have shattered. Counterfactuals of freedom include claims like if Curley had been offered a bribe, he would ... More

Dispositional conditionals include claims such as if the glass had been struck, it would have shattered. Counterfactuals of freedom include claims like if Curley had been offered a bribe, he would have freely taken it. This chapter argues that neither dispositional conditionals nor counterfactuals of freedom can be made acceptable to Truthmaker or TSB. This is not a problem for these conditionals. For subjunctive conditionals are not about the mere existence of something. Nor are they about something's actually having a certain property. So, this chapter argues, they do not need to meet the demands of Truthmaker or TSB. More generally, the chapter concludes that only truths about the mere existence of something must have truthmakers and only truths about what properties are actually had by actually existing things must satisfy TSB. All other truths are counterexamples to the claim that every truth depends substantively on being.Less

Introduction

Ken Perszyk

in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate

Ken Perszyk documents the resurgence of Molinism in contemporary philosophy of religion. He explains the main motivation (historical and contemporary) for endorsing the Molinist notion of middle ... More

Ken Perszyk documents the resurgence of Molinism in contemporary philosophy of religion. He explains the main motivation (historical and contemporary) for endorsing the Molinist notion of middle knowledge, and in particular its chief objects—counterfactuals of freedom. He sketches the main lines of objection—theoretical and ‘applied’—to it. There are also brief descriptions of the contents of the essays that follow.Less

The Global Argument Continued

Peter van Inwagen

in The Problem of Evil: The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St Andrews in 2003

The chapter begins with an examination of three philosophical theses about free will, each of which would, if true, refute Theist's attempt to reply to the argument from evil by employing the ... More

The chapter begins with an examination of three philosophical theses about free will, each of which would, if true, refute Theist's attempt to reply to the argument from evil by employing the free-will defence: compatibilism; the incompatibility of free will and divine foreknowledge; and the existence of ‘middle knowledge’. It is shown how Theist can cast sufficient doubt on these theses to block Atheist's attempt at conversion. The body of the chapter is devoted to Atheist's contention that the free-will defence cannot account for ‘natural evil’. Theist is represented as employing a version of the free-will defence that postulates a primordial separation of our remote ancestors from God, and as defending the conclusion that according to this story, the suffering of human beings that is caused proximately by natural evils might also be remotely caused by the abuse of free will.Less

Yet Another Failed Anti‐Molinist Argument

William Lane Craig

in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate

Perhaps the most serious objection to a Molinist theory of providence is that it is too successful in showing how God could sovereignly control a world of free creatures. For it must be fact how S ... More

Perhaps the most serious objection to a Molinist theory of providence is that it is too successful in showing how God could sovereignly control a world of free creatures. For it must be fact how S would choose in C. But there may be an indefinite number of circumstances C* in which S would choose differently than in C. So God, by placing S in one of these circumstances C*, could bring it about that S choose freely whatever God wishes. This objection, however, is predicated upon a number of questionable assumptions. Zimmerman has retreated to a more modest version of the objection: if it is even possible that God finds Himself confronted with counterfactuals of freedom which afford Him perfect control of creatures by means of making seemingly irrelevant alterations in their circumstances, then creaturely freedom would not exist and God would find Himself incapable of creating free creatures. This chapter argues that Zimmerman's version is no more successful in undermining a Molinist account of providenceLess

Truth and Molinism

Trenton Merricks

in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate

Molinism implies that, for every possible agent S in every possible circumstance C, there are true propositions like that if S were in C, S would freely do A. Thus Molinism implies that there are ... More

Molinism implies that, for every possible agent S in every possible circumstance C, there are true propositions like that if S were in C, S would freely do A. Thus Molinism implies that there are true counterfactuals of freedom. This chapter begins by responding to a single argument against the claim that there are true counterfactuals of freedom. But this response will lead to positive conclusions about—and even a new characterization of—Molinism itself. In particular, this chapter will conclude that Molinism's fundamental commitment is that the world is a certain way. And if the world is the way that the Molinist says it is, then a variety of counterfactuals of freedom are true—and true because of how the world is.Less

Tilting at Molinism

Edward Wierenga

in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate

Molinism holds that, in deciding which world to create, God exploits his middle knowledge, which is typically taken to include knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom. Counterfactual conditionals, ... More

Molinism holds that, in deciding which world to create, God exploits his middle knowledge, which is typically taken to include knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom. Counterfactual conditionals, however, do not satisfy strengthening (of the antecedent). But then knowledge of the truth of a counterfactual of freedom would not give God enough on which to base a decision about which world to create; for such a conditional could be true while related ones with fuller information in the antecedent are false. This chapter rejects the suggestion that so‐called ‘counterfactuals of world‐actualization’ provide a way around the problem and instead develops an approach according to which the relevant conditionals are built up in stages, with the antecedents of the conditionals at each stage including information about the initial segment of the world up to that point. Finally, Molinism is defended against the objections of Perszyk, van Inwagen, and Zimmerman.Less

The (Non‐)Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals

William Hasker

in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate

This chapter reviews the main objections against the existence of the ‘counterfactuals of creaturely freedom’ featured by Molinism. The objections are (1) These (true) counterfactuals cannot exist ... More

This chapter reviews the main objections against the existence of the ‘counterfactuals of creaturely freedom’ featured by Molinism. The objections are (1) These (true) counterfactuals cannot exist because they fail to be grounded in reality (the ‘grounding objection’); and (2) If we assume that the counterfactuals do exist, their existence turns out to be incompatible with libertarian free will; thus, they are not counterfactuals of freedom. Each objection is stated, responses to the objections are explained, and there is some discussion of how the debate concerning the objections has developed. There are also tentative suggestions concerning how the discussion might be carried on beyond the point it has presently arrived at.Less

Replies to Hasker and Zimmerman

Trenton Merricks

in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate

William Hasker and Dean Zimmerman raise objections to Hasker's paper ‘Truth and Molinism’. This chapter responds to those objections.

The Free Will Defense

Hugh J. McCann

in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate

This chapter is a critique of views that seek to resolve the problem of moral evil by holding that such evil is owing to exercises of human freedom that escape God's control as creator. It is argued ... More

This chapter is a critique of views that seek to resolve the problem of moral evil by holding that such evil is owing to exercises of human freedom that escape God's control as creator. It is argued that the three most common treatments of this kind are all unsatisfactory in that none of them provides sufficiently for God's omniscience and sovereignty. Boethian views preserve an omniscient God, but deprive him of any control over what exercises of creaturely freedom will occur. Openness theories deprive God of both omniscience and sovereignty. Finally, Molinist treatments largely fail to provide for either perfection, in that so‐called counterfactuals or subjunctives of freedom often lack grounding, and cannot be known by God prior to creation.Less

Putting Molinism in Its Place

John Martin Fischer

in Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will

This chapter argues that Luis de Molina’s idea of Middle Knowledge presupposes, but does not itself provide, a response to the argument for incompatibilism about God’s foreknowledge and human freedom ... More

This chapter argues that Luis de Molina’s idea of Middle Knowledge presupposes, but does not itself provide, a response to the argument for incompatibilism about God’s foreknowledge and human freedom to do otherwise. Middle Knowledge involves counterfactuals of freedom, which specify what human agents would freely do in various circumstances. Molina supposed that a total catalog of such counterfactuals of freedom was available to God prior to His decision as to which world to make actual. Whereas Molinism is an elegant and important picture of God’s providence, it is not on a par with (say) Ockhamism as a response to the argument for incompatibilism.Less