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Instances of Freedom

H. Matthew Kramer

in The Quality of Freedom

Begins with a few methodological reflections that expand on some of the observations in the opening chapter. It then tackles a host of difficulties relating to the existence of particular freedoms ... More

Begins with a few methodological reflections that expand on some of the observations in the opening chapter. It then tackles a host of difficulties relating to the existence of particular freedoms and unfreedoms. Among the topics addressed are the range of the contents of particular freedoms and unfreedoms (i.e. the range of the occurrences and states to which freedoms and unfreedoms can pertain), the counterfactual dimension of liberty (i.e. the fact that each person's freedoms and unfreedoms are determined partly by potential events that could have occurred but that do not actually materialize), the existence of freedoms that pertain to the undergoing of irresistible processes or states, the distinction between the value of doing X and the value of being free to do X, the degree to which doctrines of metaphysical or natural determinism can be reconciled with socio-political liberty, and the freedom-curtailing effects of certain psychological incapacities.Less

Interest‐Relative Invariantism versus Contextualism

Jason Stanley

in Knowledge and Practical Interests

This chapter is devoted to a thorough-going comparison of Interest-Relativism Invariantism and contextualism. It argues that the contextualist is committed to a worse error-theory than the advocate ... More

This chapter is devoted to a thorough-going comparison of Interest-Relativism Invariantism and contextualism. It argues that the contextualist is committed to a worse error-theory than the advocate of Interest-Relativism Invariantism. It concludes by arguing that neither contextualism nor Interest-Relative Invariantism helps with the problem of skepticism.Less

Replies to Hasker and Zimmerman

Trenton Merricks

in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate

William Hasker and Dean Zimmerman raise objections to Hasker's paper ‘Truth and Molinism’. This chapter responds to those objections.

Subjunctive Conditionals

Trenton Merricks

in Truth and Ontology

Dispositional conditionals include claims such as if the glass had been struck, it would have shattered. Counterfactuals of freedom include claims like if Curley had been offered a bribe, he would ... More

Dispositional conditionals include claims such as if the glass had been struck, it would have shattered. Counterfactuals of freedom include claims like if Curley had been offered a bribe, he would have freely taken it. This chapter argues that neither dispositional conditionals nor counterfactuals of freedom can be made acceptable to Truthmaker or TSB. This is not a problem for these conditionals. For subjunctive conditionals are not about the mere existence of something. Nor are they about something's actually having a certain property. So, this chapter argues, they do not need to meet the demands of Truthmaker or TSB. More generally, the chapter concludes that only truths about the mere existence of something must have truthmakers and only truths about what properties are actually had by actually existing things must satisfy TSB. All other truths are counterexamples to the claim that every truth depends substantively on being.Less

Causation, Counterfactuals, and the Third Factor

Tim Maudlin

in The Metaphysics Within Physics

This chapter argues that the attempt to analyse causation in terms of counterfactuals is wrong-headed in a way that no amount of fine-tuning can fix. Causation is not to be analysed in terms of ... More

This chapter argues that the attempt to analyse causation in terms of counterfactuals is wrong-headed in a way that no amount of fine-tuning can fix. Causation is not to be analysed in terms of counterfactual dependency at all, no matter how many equants and epicycles are appended to the original rough draft. The systematic connections between judgements about causes and judgements about counterfactuals can be explained by the involvement of a third factor, some component of the truth conditions of counterfactual claims that is also a component of the truth conditions for causal claims. This third factor would provide the analogue of a ‘common cause’ explanation for the systematic connections between causal claims and counterfactuals: neither underpins the other but the third factor underpins them both.Less

The Global Argument Continued

Peter van Inwagen

in The Problem of Evil: The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St Andrews in 2003

The chapter begins with an examination of three philosophical theses about free will, each of which would, if true, refute Theist's attempt to reply to the argument from evil by employing the ... More

The chapter begins with an examination of three philosophical theses about free will, each of which would, if true, refute Theist's attempt to reply to the argument from evil by employing the free-will defence: compatibilism; the incompatibility of free will and divine foreknowledge; and the existence of ‘middle knowledge’. It is shown how Theist can cast sufficient doubt on these theses to block Atheist's attempt at conversion. The body of the chapter is devoted to Atheist's contention that the free-will defence cannot account for ‘natural evil’. Theist is represented as employing a version of the free-will defence that postulates a primordial separation of our remote ancestors from God, and as defending the conclusion that according to this story, the suffering of human beings that is caused proximately by natural evils might also be remotely caused by the abuse of free will.Less

Counterfactuals

Gary Goertz and James Mahoney

in A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences

This chapter examines the use of counterfactual analysis in making causal inferences in the qualitative and quantitative research paradigms. To assess a counterfactual claim about a particular case, ... More

This chapter examines the use of counterfactual analysis in making causal inferences in the qualitative and quantitative research paradigms. To assess a counterfactual claim about a particular case, the typical approach is to conduct a within-case analysis of that case. Qualitative researchers formulate counterfactuals that are “conceivable,” in the sense that imagining that a cause had not occurred (or occurred differently) does not require fundamentally rewriting history. By contrast, quantitative scholars use counterfactuals mainly to illustrate a general causal model. The chapter first considers the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference, which is the problem of a counterfactual, before discussing the statistical approach to counterfactuals. In particular, it describes the “minimum rewrite” rule. It suggests that counterfactual analyses are an important mode of causal inference within the qualitative tradition, but not commonly used within the quantitative tradition.Less

Beyond Humean and non‐Humean

John T. Roberts

in The Law-Governed Universe

Much of the recent literature on laws of nature is about the dispute between Humean and Non‐Humean accounts of laws. The MAL does not fit easily in either camp. Like Humean views, it is ontologically ... More

Much of the recent literature on laws of nature is about the dispute between Humean and Non‐Humean accounts of laws. The MAL does not fit easily in either camp. Like Humean views, it is ontologically parsimonious and consistent with Humean Supervenience; like Non‐Humean views, it denies that the laws are simply economical summaries of the universe, it provides a robust sense in which laws govern the universe, and it does not make the relation between laws and counterfactuals depend on what we choose to ‘hold constant’ in our counterfactual reasoning. The chapter concludes with an examination of the MAL's implications for various metaphysical issues, including natural theology, the relation between God and the universe, freedom and responsibility, and what the law‐governedness of the world consists in.Less

The Causal Autonomy of the Special Sciences

Peter Menzies and Christian List

in Emergence in Mind

The systems studied in the special sciences are often said to be causally autonomous, in the sense that their higher‐level properties have causal powers that are independent of those of their more ... More

The systems studied in the special sciences are often said to be causally autonomous, in the sense that their higher‐level properties have causal powers that are independent of those of their more basic physical properties. This chapter aims to clarify what is implied by the doctrine of the causal autonomy of special‐science properties and to defend the doctrine using an interventionist theory of causation. In terms of this theory, it shows that a special‐science property can make a difference to some effect while the physical property that realizes it does not. Moreover, the theory permits identification of necessary and sufficient conditions for the causal autonomy of a higher‐level property, and to show that these are satisfied when causal claims about higher‐level properties have a special feature we call realization‐insensitivity. This feature consists in the fact that the relevant claims are true regardless of the way the higher‐level properties they describe are physically realized. The findings here are consistent with those of other philosophers, for example Alan Garfinkel, who have noted the realization‐insensitivity of higher‐level causal relations as a distinctive feature of the special sciences and have suggested that this feature ensures their independence from lower‐level causal relations.Less

In defense of some received views

John T. Roberts

in The Law-Governed Universe

This chapter defends four assumptions that will be taken for granted in the chapters to follow. None of these four assumptions is uncommon, but none is uncontroversial. One assumption is that at ... More

This chapter defends four assumptions that will be taken for granted in the chapters to follow. None of these four assumptions is uncommon, but none is uncontroversial. One assumption is that at least some laws of nature are metaphysically contingent. Many philosophers have recently defended a version of necessitarianism about laws called scientific essentialism; this chapter argues that even if the key metaphysical theses of scientific essentialism are correct, it is still more plausible than not that some (though not all) laws of nature are contingent. For the regularities that are related to counterfactuals in the ways that are distinctive of laws must include some regularities that are contingent, even if scientific essentialism is true. The other three assumptions defended in this chapter are that laws are propositions, that laws are true, and that the logically contingent consequences of laws are laws themselves.Less

Laws, governing, and counterfactuals

John T. Roberts

in The Law-Governed Universe

The principle NP (for ‘nomological preservation’) says (speaking roughly) that if it had been the case that A, then the actual laws of nature would still have been the laws of nature—for any ... More

The principle NP (for ‘nomological preservation’) says (speaking roughly) that if it had been the case that A, then the actual laws of nature would still have been the laws of nature—for any counterfactual supposition A that does not say or entail anything inconsistent with the lawhood of the actual laws. This chapter argues that NP plausibly captures what it means for the universe to be governed by the laws of nature. It also captures what it means for laws to support counterfactuals, to be inevitable, and to enjoy a kind of necessity. But counterfactuals are notoriously context‐dependent. This raises the possibility that NP itself is true in some contexts but false in others. If that is so, then it poses a threat to the idea that the universe is governed by laws.Less

When would the laws have been different?

John T. Roberts

in The Law-Governed Universe

The principle NP (nomological preservation) says (roughly) that the actual laws of nature would still have been the laws of nature under any counterfactual supposition that does not logically entail ... More

The principle NP (nomological preservation) says (roughly) that the actual laws of nature would still have been the laws of nature under any counterfactual supposition that does not logically entail a difference in the laws. NP plausibly captures the relation that must hold between laws and counterfactuals in order for the laws to govern the universe. But NP is not true in all contexts of utterance: there are some possible theological contexts in which the true counterfactuals conflict with NP; there may also be philosophical contexts in which this is so. However, NP appears to be true in all possible scientific contexts. David Lewis's arguments about backtracking do pose apparent counterexamples to NP even in scientific contexts. But those counterexamples are merely apparent.Less

How could science show that the laws govern?

John T. Roberts

in The Law-Governed Universe

One crucial part of the law‐governed world‐picture is the idea that empirical science is capable of showing that the universe is governed by laws of nature; we do not have to rely on extra‐scientific ... More

One crucial part of the law‐governed world‐picture is the idea that empirical science is capable of showing that the universe is governed by laws of nature; we do not have to rely on extra‐scientific sources of epistemic justification (such as speculative metaphysics or revealed religion) to be justified in believing that laws govern the universe. This chapter argues that this part of the law‐governed world‐picture is true if and only if the principle NP (nomological preservation) is presupposed to be true in every possible scientific context. But it is not easy to see how this could be so. For NP implies the truth of a large class of logically contingent counterfactuals, and we seem to be able to conceive of beings who engage in scientific inquiry but who do not affirm or presuppose any logically contingent counterfactuals at all.Less

Measurement and counterfactuals

John T. Roberts

in The Law-Governed Universe

In every scientific context, some procedures are presupposed to be legitimate measurement (or observation) procedures. But to regard some procedure as a legitimate measurement procedure is to ... More

In every scientific context, some procedures are presupposed to be legitimate measurement (or observation) procedures. But to regard some procedure as a legitimate measurement procedure is to presuppose not only that that method is de facto reliable, but also that it would still have been reliable under a broad range of counterfactual suppositions. In this way, and only in this way, scientific methodology as such constrains the way in which we evaluate logically contingent counterfactuals. So, the principle NP (nomological preservation) is presupposed in every possible scientific context if and only if the propositions that are presupposed to be laws of nature in any given scientific context are exactly those regularities that collectively underwrite the reliability of the measurement procedures that are considered legitimate in that context. It follows that the elements of the law‐governed world‐picture are all correct if, and only if, a certain account of lawhood is true.Less

What lawhood is

John T. Roberts

in The Law-Governed Universe

The Measurability Account of Laws (MAL) says that to be a law of a scientific theory is to be one of the regularities that collectively guarantee the reliability of all the observation and ... More

The Measurability Account of Laws (MAL) says that to be a law of a scientific theory is to be one of the regularities that collectively guarantee the reliability of all the observation and measurement procedures that are legitimate according to that theory; to call something a law of nature is to say that it is a law of the salient true theory. Laws bear the relation to counterfactuals that they must bear in order for the law‐governed world‐picture to be true if and only if the MAL is the correct account of lawhood. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that in cases of typical scientific theories, the MAL will sort the regularities implied by that theory into laws and non‐laws correctly.Less