John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This book articulates and defends a new philosophical account of laws of nature. According to this account, lawhood is a meta‐theoretic notion: the primary concept is that of a law of a particular ...
More
This book articulates and defends a new philosophical account of laws of nature. According to this account, lawhood is a meta‐theoretic notion: the primary concept is that of a law of a particular scientific theory; to call something a law of nature is to call it a law of whatever true theory is salient in the context. The laws of a scientific theory are the regularities implied by that theory that collectively guarantee the reliability of the empirical methods of measurement and observation that are legitimate according to that theory. Though surprising, this account of lawhood turns out to have many virtues. It makes definite predictions about which of a theory's implications should be called its laws, and these predictions appear to match our intuitive judgments. It is compatible with Humean Supervenience, but does not deflate the idea of the laws' necessity and counterfactual robustness in the way that Humean accounts usually do. It explains why laws are related to counterfactuals in the way that they are, and it illuminates the sense in which laws can be said to govern the universe. Indeed, if the overall argument of the book succeeds, then this account is the only philosophical account of lawhood that can simultaneously make sense of the idea that laws of nature govern the universe and make sense of how empirical science can teach us that we live in a law‐governed universe.Less
This book articulates and defends a new philosophical account of laws of nature. According to this account, lawhood is a meta‐theoretic notion: the primary concept is that of a law of a particular scientific theory; to call something a law of nature is to call it a law of whatever true theory is salient in the context. The laws of a scientific theory are the regularities implied by that theory that collectively guarantee the reliability of the empirical methods of measurement and observation that are legitimate according to that theory. Though surprising, this account of lawhood turns out to have many virtues. It makes definite predictions about which of a theory's implications should be called its laws, and these predictions appear to match our intuitive judgments. It is compatible with Humean Supervenience, but does not deflate the idea of the laws' necessity and counterfactual robustness in the way that Humean accounts usually do. It explains why laws are related to counterfactuals in the way that they are, and it illuminates the sense in which laws can be said to govern the universe. Indeed, if the overall argument of the book succeeds, then this account is the only philosophical account of lawhood that can simultaneously make sense of the idea that laws of nature govern the universe and make sense of how empirical science can teach us that we live in a law‐governed universe.
Stephen Yablo
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199266487
- eISBN:
- 9780191594274
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266487.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book contains a collection of twelve metaphysical chapters that address a range of first-order topics, including identity, coincidence, essence, causation, and properties. Some first-order ...
More
This book contains a collection of twelve metaphysical chapters that address a range of first-order topics, including identity, coincidence, essence, causation, and properties. Some first-order debates are not worth pursuing, the book argues; there is nothing at issue in them. Several of the chapters explore the metaontology of abstract objects, and more generally of objects that are ‘preconceived’, their principal features being settled already by their job-descriptions. The book rejects standard forms of fictionalism, opting ultimately for a view that puts presupposition in the role normally played by pretense.Less
This book contains a collection of twelve metaphysical chapters that address a range of first-order topics, including identity, coincidence, essence, causation, and properties. Some first-order debates are not worth pursuing, the book argues; there is nothing at issue in them. Several of the chapters explore the metaontology of abstract objects, and more generally of objects that are ‘preconceived’, their principal features being settled already by their job-descriptions. The book rejects standard forms of fictionalism, opting ultimately for a view that puts presupposition in the role normally played by pretense.
Marc Lange
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195328134
- eISBN:
- 9780199870042
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328134.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Laws of nature have long puzzled philosophers. What distinguishes laws from facts about the world that do not rise to the level of laws? How can laws be contingent and nevertheless necessary? In what ...
More
Laws of nature have long puzzled philosophers. What distinguishes laws from facts about the world that do not rise to the level of laws? How can laws be contingent and nevertheless necessary? In what sense are the laws necessary like the broadly logical truths, yet not as necessary as those truths? What are the “lawmakers”: the facts in virtue of which the laws are laws? This book offers provocative and original answers to these questions. It argues that laws are distinguished by their necessity, which is grounded in primitive subjunctive facts (expressed by counterfactual conditionals). This view avoids the notorious circularity afflicting the view that the laws are the truths that would still have held had things been different in any fashion that is logically consistent with … the laws! While recognizing that natural necessity is distinct from logical, metaphysical, and mathematical necessity, the book explains how natural necessity constitutes a species of the same genus as those other varieties of necessity. The book discusses the relation between laws and objective chances, the completeness of the laws of physics, and the laws' immutability, as well as meta-laws such as the symmetry principles so prominent in contemporary physics. It is argued that David Lewis's Humean approach to law fails to do justice the laws' necessity, and that scientific essentialist approaches fail to accommodate the way certain laws transcend the details of others.Less
Laws of nature have long puzzled philosophers. What distinguishes laws from facts about the world that do not rise to the level of laws? How can laws be contingent and nevertheless necessary? In what sense are the laws necessary like the broadly logical truths, yet not as necessary as those truths? What are the “lawmakers”: the facts in virtue of which the laws are laws? This book offers provocative and original answers to these questions. It argues that laws are distinguished by their necessity, which is grounded in primitive subjunctive facts (expressed by counterfactual conditionals). This view avoids the notorious circularity afflicting the view that the laws are the truths that would still have held had things been different in any fashion that is logically consistent with … the laws! While recognizing that natural necessity is distinct from logical, metaphysical, and mathematical necessity, the book explains how natural necessity constitutes a species of the same genus as those other varieties of necessity. The book discusses the relation between laws and objective chances, the completeness of the laws of physics, and the laws' immutability, as well as meta-laws such as the symmetry principles so prominent in contemporary physics. It is argued that David Lewis's Humean approach to law fails to do justice the laws' necessity, and that scientific essentialist approaches fail to accommodate the way certain laws transcend the details of others.
H. Matthew Kramer
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199247561
- eISBN:
- 9780191601927
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247560.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Begins with a few methodological reflections that expand on some of the observations in the opening chapter. It then tackles a host of difficulties relating to the existence of particular freedoms ...
More
Begins with a few methodological reflections that expand on some of the observations in the opening chapter. It then tackles a host of difficulties relating to the existence of particular freedoms and unfreedoms. Among the topics addressed are the range of the contents of particular freedoms and unfreedoms (i.e. the range of the occurrences and states to which freedoms and unfreedoms can pertain), the counterfactual dimension of liberty (i.e. the fact that each person's freedoms and unfreedoms are determined partly by potential events that could have occurred but that do not actually materialize), the existence of freedoms that pertain to the undergoing of irresistible processes or states, the distinction between the value of doing X and the value of being free to do X, the degree to which doctrines of metaphysical or natural determinism can be reconciled with socio-political liberty, and the freedom-curtailing effects of certain psychological incapacities.Less
Begins with a few methodological reflections that expand on some of the observations in the opening chapter. It then tackles a host of difficulties relating to the existence of particular freedoms and unfreedoms. Among the topics addressed are the range of the contents of particular freedoms and unfreedoms (i.e. the range of the occurrences and states to which freedoms and unfreedoms can pertain), the counterfactual dimension of liberty (i.e. the fact that each person's freedoms and unfreedoms are determined partly by potential events that could have occurred but that do not actually materialize), the existence of freedoms that pertain to the undergoing of irresistible processes or states, the distinction between the value of doing X and the value of being free to do X, the degree to which doctrines of metaphysical or natural determinism can be reconciled with socio-political liberty, and the freedom-curtailing effects of certain psychological incapacities.
Ken Perszyk (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199590629
- eISBN:
- 9780191731280
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590629.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Molinism, named after the 16th century Spanish Jesuit Luis de Molina, re‐emerged in the 1970s after it was unwittingly assumed in versions of Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defence against the Logical ...
More
Molinism, named after the 16th century Spanish Jesuit Luis de Molina, re‐emerged in the 1970s after it was unwittingly assumed in versions of Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defence against the Logical Argument from Evil. The Molinist notion of middle knowledge——and especially its main objects, so‐called counterfactuals of (creaturely) freedom—have been the subject of vigorous debate in analytical philosophy of religion ever since. Is middle knowledge logically coherent? Is it a benefit or a liability overall for a satisfying account of divine providence? The essays in this collection examine the status, defensibility, and application of Molinism. Friends and foes of Molinism are well‐represented, and there are some lively exchanges between them. The collection provides a snap‐shot of the current state of the Molinism Wars, along with some discussion of where we've been and where we might go in the future. More battles surely lie ahead; the essays and ideas in this collection are likely to have a major impact on future directions. The essays are specially written by a line‐up of established, well‐respected philosophers of religion, metaphysicians, and logicians. There is a substantive Introduction and an extensive Bibliography to assist both students and professionals.Less
Molinism, named after the 16th century Spanish Jesuit Luis de Molina, re‐emerged in the 1970s after it was unwittingly assumed in versions of Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defence against the Logical Argument from Evil. The Molinist notion of middle knowledge——and especially its main objects, so‐called counterfactuals of (creaturely) freedom—have been the subject of vigorous debate in analytical philosophy of religion ever since. Is middle knowledge logically coherent? Is it a benefit or a liability overall for a satisfying account of divine providence? The essays in this collection examine the status, defensibility, and application of Molinism. Friends and foes of Molinism are well‐represented, and there are some lively exchanges between them. The collection provides a snap‐shot of the current state of the Molinism Wars, along with some discussion of where we've been and where we might go in the future. More battles surely lie ahead; the essays and ideas in this collection are likely to have a major impact on future directions. The essays are specially written by a line‐up of established, well‐respected philosophers of religion, metaphysicians, and logicians. There is a substantive Introduction and an extensive Bibliography to assist both students and professionals.
Jason Stanley
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288038
- eISBN:
- 9780191603679
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288038.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter is devoted to a thorough-going comparison of Interest-Relativism Invariantism and contextualism. It argues that the contextualist is committed to a worse error-theory than the advocate ...
More
This chapter is devoted to a thorough-going comparison of Interest-Relativism Invariantism and contextualism. It argues that the contextualist is committed to a worse error-theory than the advocate of Interest-Relativism Invariantism. It concludes by arguing that neither contextualism nor Interest-Relative Invariantism helps with the problem of skepticism.Less
This chapter is devoted to a thorough-going comparison of Interest-Relativism Invariantism and contextualism. It argues that the contextualist is committed to a worse error-theory than the advocate of Interest-Relativism Invariantism. It concludes by arguing that neither contextualism nor Interest-Relative Invariantism helps with the problem of skepticism.
Trenton Merricks
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199590629
- eISBN:
- 9780191731280
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590629.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
William Hasker and Dean Zimmerman raise objections to Hasker's paper ‘Truth and Molinism’. This chapter responds to those objections.
William Hasker and Dean Zimmerman raise objections to Hasker's paper ‘Truth and Molinism’. This chapter responds to those objections.
Trenton Merricks
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205233
- eISBN:
- 9780191709302
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205233.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Dispositional conditionals include claims such as if the glass had been struck, it would have shattered. Counterfactuals of freedom include claims like if Curley had been offered a bribe, he would ...
More
Dispositional conditionals include claims such as if the glass had been struck, it would have shattered. Counterfactuals of freedom include claims like if Curley had been offered a bribe, he would have freely taken it. This chapter argues that neither dispositional conditionals nor counterfactuals of freedom can be made acceptable to Truthmaker or TSB. This is not a problem for these conditionals. For subjunctive conditionals are not about the mere existence of something. Nor are they about something's actually having a certain property. So, this chapter argues, they do not need to meet the demands of Truthmaker or TSB. More generally, the chapter concludes that only truths about the mere existence of something must have truthmakers and only truths about what properties are actually had by actually existing things must satisfy TSB. All other truths are counterexamples to the claim that every truth depends substantively on being.Less
Dispositional conditionals include claims such as if the glass had been struck, it would have shattered. Counterfactuals of freedom include claims like if Curley had been offered a bribe, he would have freely taken it. This chapter argues that neither dispositional conditionals nor counterfactuals of freedom can be made acceptable to Truthmaker or TSB. This is not a problem for these conditionals. For subjunctive conditionals are not about the mere existence of something. Nor are they about something's actually having a certain property. So, this chapter argues, they do not need to meet the demands of Truthmaker or TSB. More generally, the chapter concludes that only truths about the mere existence of something must have truthmakers and only truths about what properties are actually had by actually existing things must satisfy TSB. All other truths are counterexamples to the claim that every truth depends substantively on being.
Tim Maudlin
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199218219
- eISBN:
- 9780191711596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218219.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the attempt to analyse causation in terms of counterfactuals is wrong-headed in a way that no amount of fine-tuning can fix. Causation is not to be analysed in terms of ...
More
This chapter argues that the attempt to analyse causation in terms of counterfactuals is wrong-headed in a way that no amount of fine-tuning can fix. Causation is not to be analysed in terms of counterfactual dependency at all, no matter how many equants and epicycles are appended to the original rough draft. The systematic connections between judgements about causes and judgements about counterfactuals can be explained by the involvement of a third factor, some component of the truth conditions of counterfactual claims that is also a component of the truth conditions for causal claims. This third factor would provide the analogue of a ‘common cause’ explanation for the systematic connections between causal claims and counterfactuals: neither underpins the other but the third factor underpins them both.Less
This chapter argues that the attempt to analyse causation in terms of counterfactuals is wrong-headed in a way that no amount of fine-tuning can fix. Causation is not to be analysed in terms of counterfactual dependency at all, no matter how many equants and epicycles are appended to the original rough draft. The systematic connections between judgements about causes and judgements about counterfactuals can be explained by the involvement of a third factor, some component of the truth conditions of counterfactual claims that is also a component of the truth conditions for causal claims. This third factor would provide the analogue of a ‘common cause’ explanation for the systematic connections between causal claims and counterfactuals: neither underpins the other but the third factor underpins them both.
Peter van Inwagen
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199245604
- eISBN:
- 9780191715310
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245604.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The chapter begins with an examination of three philosophical theses about free will, each of which would, if true, refute Theist's attempt to reply to the argument from evil by employing the ...
More
The chapter begins with an examination of three philosophical theses about free will, each of which would, if true, refute Theist's attempt to reply to the argument from evil by employing the free-will defence: compatibilism; the incompatibility of free will and divine foreknowledge; and the existence of ‘middle knowledge’. It is shown how Theist can cast sufficient doubt on these theses to block Atheist's attempt at conversion. The body of the chapter is devoted to Atheist's contention that the free-will defence cannot account for ‘natural evil’. Theist is represented as employing a version of the free-will defence that postulates a primordial separation of our remote ancestors from God, and as defending the conclusion that according to this story, the suffering of human beings that is caused proximately by natural evils might also be remotely caused by the abuse of free will.Less
The chapter begins with an examination of three philosophical theses about free will, each of which would, if true, refute Theist's attempt to reply to the argument from evil by employing the free-will defence: compatibilism; the incompatibility of free will and divine foreknowledge; and the existence of ‘middle knowledge’. It is shown how Theist can cast sufficient doubt on these theses to block Atheist's attempt at conversion. The body of the chapter is devoted to Atheist's contention that the free-will defence cannot account for ‘natural evil’. Theist is represented as employing a version of the free-will defence that postulates a primordial separation of our remote ancestors from God, and as defending the conclusion that according to this story, the suffering of human beings that is caused proximately by natural evils might also be remotely caused by the abuse of free will.
Gary Goertz and James Mahoney
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691149707
- eISBN:
- 9781400845446
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691149707.003.0009
- Subject:
- Sociology, Social Research and Statistics
This chapter examines the use of counterfactual analysis in making causal inferences in the qualitative and quantitative research paradigms. To assess a counterfactual claim about a particular case, ...
More
This chapter examines the use of counterfactual analysis in making causal inferences in the qualitative and quantitative research paradigms. To assess a counterfactual claim about a particular case, the typical approach is to conduct a within-case analysis of that case. Qualitative researchers formulate counterfactuals that are “conceivable,” in the sense that imagining that a cause had not occurred (or occurred differently) does not require fundamentally rewriting history. By contrast, quantitative scholars use counterfactuals mainly to illustrate a general causal model. The chapter first considers the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference, which is the problem of a counterfactual, before discussing the statistical approach to counterfactuals. In particular, it describes the “minimum rewrite” rule. It suggests that counterfactual analyses are an important mode of causal inference within the qualitative tradition, but not commonly used within the quantitative tradition.Less
This chapter examines the use of counterfactual analysis in making causal inferences in the qualitative and quantitative research paradigms. To assess a counterfactual claim about a particular case, the typical approach is to conduct a within-case analysis of that case. Qualitative researchers formulate counterfactuals that are “conceivable,” in the sense that imagining that a cause had not occurred (or occurred differently) does not require fundamentally rewriting history. By contrast, quantitative scholars use counterfactuals mainly to illustrate a general causal model. The chapter first considers the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference, which is the problem of a counterfactual, before discussing the statistical approach to counterfactuals. In particular, it describes the “minimum rewrite” rule. It suggests that counterfactual analyses are an important mode of causal inference within the qualitative tradition, but not commonly used within the quantitative tradition.
John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Much of the recent literature on laws of nature is about the dispute between Humean and Non‐Humean accounts of laws. The MAL does not fit easily in either camp. Like Humean views, it is ontologically ...
More
Much of the recent literature on laws of nature is about the dispute between Humean and Non‐Humean accounts of laws. The MAL does not fit easily in either camp. Like Humean views, it is ontologically parsimonious and consistent with Humean Supervenience; like Non‐Humean views, it denies that the laws are simply economical summaries of the universe, it provides a robust sense in which laws govern the universe, and it does not make the relation between laws and counterfactuals depend on what we choose to ‘hold constant’ in our counterfactual reasoning. The chapter concludes with an examination of the MAL's implications for various metaphysical issues, including natural theology, the relation between God and the universe, freedom and responsibility, and what the law‐governedness of the world consists in.Less
Much of the recent literature on laws of nature is about the dispute between Humean and Non‐Humean accounts of laws. The MAL does not fit easily in either camp. Like Humean views, it is ontologically parsimonious and consistent with Humean Supervenience; like Non‐Humean views, it denies that the laws are simply economical summaries of the universe, it provides a robust sense in which laws govern the universe, and it does not make the relation between laws and counterfactuals depend on what we choose to ‘hold constant’ in our counterfactual reasoning. The chapter concludes with an examination of the MAL's implications for various metaphysical issues, including natural theology, the relation between God and the universe, freedom and responsibility, and what the law‐governedness of the world consists in.
Peter Menzies and Christian List
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199583621
- eISBN:
- 9780191723483
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
The systems studied in the special sciences are often said to be causally autonomous, in the sense that their higher‐level properties have causal powers that are independent of those of their more ...
More
The systems studied in the special sciences are often said to be causally autonomous, in the sense that their higher‐level properties have causal powers that are independent of those of their more basic physical properties. This chapter aims to clarify what is implied by the doctrine of the causal autonomy of special‐science properties and to defend the doctrine using an interventionist theory of causation. In terms of this theory, it shows that a special‐science property can make a difference to some effect while the physical property that realizes it does not. Moreover, the theory permits identification of necessary and sufficient conditions for the causal autonomy of a higher‐level property, and to show that these are satisfied when causal claims about higher‐level properties have a special feature we call realization‐insensitivity. This feature consists in the fact that the relevant claims are true regardless of the way the higher‐level properties they describe are physically realized. The findings here are consistent with those of other philosophers, for example Alan Garfinkel, who have noted the realization‐insensitivity of higher‐level causal relations as a distinctive feature of the special sciences and have suggested that this feature ensures their independence from lower‐level causal relations.Less
The systems studied in the special sciences are often said to be causally autonomous, in the sense that their higher‐level properties have causal powers that are independent of those of their more basic physical properties. This chapter aims to clarify what is implied by the doctrine of the causal autonomy of special‐science properties and to defend the doctrine using an interventionist theory of causation. In terms of this theory, it shows that a special‐science property can make a difference to some effect while the physical property that realizes it does not. Moreover, the theory permits identification of necessary and sufficient conditions for the causal autonomy of a higher‐level property, and to show that these are satisfied when causal claims about higher‐level properties have a special feature we call realization‐insensitivity. This feature consists in the fact that the relevant claims are true regardless of the way the higher‐level properties they describe are physically realized. The findings here are consistent with those of other philosophers, for example Alan Garfinkel, who have noted the realization‐insensitivity of higher‐level causal relations as a distinctive feature of the special sciences and have suggested that this feature ensures their independence from lower‐level causal relations.
John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter defends four assumptions that will be taken for granted in the chapters to follow. None of these four assumptions is uncommon, but none is uncontroversial. One assumption is that at ...
More
This chapter defends four assumptions that will be taken for granted in the chapters to follow. None of these four assumptions is uncommon, but none is uncontroversial. One assumption is that at least some laws of nature are metaphysically contingent. Many philosophers have recently defended a version of necessitarianism about laws called scientific essentialism; this chapter argues that even if the key metaphysical theses of scientific essentialism are correct, it is still more plausible than not that some (though not all) laws of nature are contingent. For the regularities that are related to counterfactuals in the ways that are distinctive of laws must include some regularities that are contingent, even if scientific essentialism is true. The other three assumptions defended in this chapter are that laws are propositions, that laws are true, and that the logically contingent consequences of laws are laws themselves.Less
This chapter defends four assumptions that will be taken for granted in the chapters to follow. None of these four assumptions is uncommon, but none is uncontroversial. One assumption is that at least some laws of nature are metaphysically contingent. Many philosophers have recently defended a version of necessitarianism about laws called scientific essentialism; this chapter argues that even if the key metaphysical theses of scientific essentialism are correct, it is still more plausible than not that some (though not all) laws of nature are contingent. For the regularities that are related to counterfactuals in the ways that are distinctive of laws must include some regularities that are contingent, even if scientific essentialism is true. The other three assumptions defended in this chapter are that laws are propositions, that laws are true, and that the logically contingent consequences of laws are laws themselves.
John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
The principle NP (for ‘nomological preservation’) says (speaking roughly) that if it had been the case that A, then the actual laws of nature would still have been the laws of nature—for any ...
More
The principle NP (for ‘nomological preservation’) says (speaking roughly) that if it had been the case that A, then the actual laws of nature would still have been the laws of nature—for any counterfactual supposition A that does not say or entail anything inconsistent with the lawhood of the actual laws. This chapter argues that NP plausibly captures what it means for the universe to be governed by the laws of nature. It also captures what it means for laws to support counterfactuals, to be inevitable, and to enjoy a kind of necessity. But counterfactuals are notoriously context‐dependent. This raises the possibility that NP itself is true in some contexts but false in others. If that is so, then it poses a threat to the idea that the universe is governed by laws.Less
The principle NP (for ‘nomological preservation’) says (speaking roughly) that if it had been the case that A, then the actual laws of nature would still have been the laws of nature—for any counterfactual supposition A that does not say or entail anything inconsistent with the lawhood of the actual laws. This chapter argues that NP plausibly captures what it means for the universe to be governed by the laws of nature. It also captures what it means for laws to support counterfactuals, to be inevitable, and to enjoy a kind of necessity. But counterfactuals are notoriously context‐dependent. This raises the possibility that NP itself is true in some contexts but false in others. If that is so, then it poses a threat to the idea that the universe is governed by laws.
John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
The principle NP (nomological preservation) says (roughly) that the actual laws of nature would still have been the laws of nature under any counterfactual supposition that does not logically entail ...
More
The principle NP (nomological preservation) says (roughly) that the actual laws of nature would still have been the laws of nature under any counterfactual supposition that does not logically entail a difference in the laws. NP plausibly captures the relation that must hold between laws and counterfactuals in order for the laws to govern the universe. But NP is not true in all contexts of utterance: there are some possible theological contexts in which the true counterfactuals conflict with NP; there may also be philosophical contexts in which this is so. However, NP appears to be true in all possible scientific contexts. David Lewis's arguments about backtracking do pose apparent counterexamples to NP even in scientific contexts. But those counterexamples are merely apparent.Less
The principle NP (nomological preservation) says (roughly) that the actual laws of nature would still have been the laws of nature under any counterfactual supposition that does not logically entail a difference in the laws. NP plausibly captures the relation that must hold between laws and counterfactuals in order for the laws to govern the universe. But NP is not true in all contexts of utterance: there are some possible theological contexts in which the true counterfactuals conflict with NP; there may also be philosophical contexts in which this is so. However, NP appears to be true in all possible scientific contexts. David Lewis's arguments about backtracking do pose apparent counterexamples to NP even in scientific contexts. But those counterexamples are merely apparent.
John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
One crucial part of the law‐governed world‐picture is the idea that empirical science is capable of showing that the universe is governed by laws of nature; we do not have to rely on extra‐scientific ...
More
One crucial part of the law‐governed world‐picture is the idea that empirical science is capable of showing that the universe is governed by laws of nature; we do not have to rely on extra‐scientific sources of epistemic justification (such as speculative metaphysics or revealed religion) to be justified in believing that laws govern the universe. This chapter argues that this part of the law‐governed world‐picture is true if and only if the principle NP (nomological preservation) is presupposed to be true in every possible scientific context. But it is not easy to see how this could be so. For NP implies the truth of a large class of logically contingent counterfactuals, and we seem to be able to conceive of beings who engage in scientific inquiry but who do not affirm or presuppose any logically contingent counterfactuals at all.Less
One crucial part of the law‐governed world‐picture is the idea that empirical science is capable of showing that the universe is governed by laws of nature; we do not have to rely on extra‐scientific sources of epistemic justification (such as speculative metaphysics or revealed religion) to be justified in believing that laws govern the universe. This chapter argues that this part of the law‐governed world‐picture is true if and only if the principle NP (nomological preservation) is presupposed to be true in every possible scientific context. But it is not easy to see how this could be so. For NP implies the truth of a large class of logically contingent counterfactuals, and we seem to be able to conceive of beings who engage in scientific inquiry but who do not affirm or presuppose any logically contingent counterfactuals at all.
John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
In every scientific context, some procedures are presupposed to be legitimate measurement (or observation) procedures. But to regard some procedure as a legitimate measurement procedure is to ...
More
In every scientific context, some procedures are presupposed to be legitimate measurement (or observation) procedures. But to regard some procedure as a legitimate measurement procedure is to presuppose not only that that method is de facto reliable, but also that it would still have been reliable under a broad range of counterfactual suppositions. In this way, and only in this way, scientific methodology as such constrains the way in which we evaluate logically contingent counterfactuals. So, the principle NP (nomological preservation) is presupposed in every possible scientific context if and only if the propositions that are presupposed to be laws of nature in any given scientific context are exactly those regularities that collectively underwrite the reliability of the measurement procedures that are considered legitimate in that context. It follows that the elements of the law‐governed world‐picture are all correct if, and only if, a certain account of lawhood is true.Less
In every scientific context, some procedures are presupposed to be legitimate measurement (or observation) procedures. But to regard some procedure as a legitimate measurement procedure is to presuppose not only that that method is de facto reliable, but also that it would still have been reliable under a broad range of counterfactual suppositions. In this way, and only in this way, scientific methodology as such constrains the way in which we evaluate logically contingent counterfactuals. So, the principle NP (nomological preservation) is presupposed in every possible scientific context if and only if the propositions that are presupposed to be laws of nature in any given scientific context are exactly those regularities that collectively underwrite the reliability of the measurement procedures that are considered legitimate in that context. It follows that the elements of the law‐governed world‐picture are all correct if, and only if, a certain account of lawhood is true.
John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
The Measurability Account of Laws (MAL) says that to be a law of a scientific theory is to be one of the regularities that collectively guarantee the reliability of all the observation and ...
More
The Measurability Account of Laws (MAL) says that to be a law of a scientific theory is to be one of the regularities that collectively guarantee the reliability of all the observation and measurement procedures that are legitimate according to that theory; to call something a law of nature is to say that it is a law of the salient true theory. Laws bear the relation to counterfactuals that they must bear in order for the law‐governed world‐picture to be true if and only if the MAL is the correct account of lawhood. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that in cases of typical scientific theories, the MAL will sort the regularities implied by that theory into laws and non‐laws correctly.Less
The Measurability Account of Laws (MAL) says that to be a law of a scientific theory is to be one of the regularities that collectively guarantee the reliability of all the observation and measurement procedures that are legitimate according to that theory; to call something a law of nature is to say that it is a law of the salient true theory. Laws bear the relation to counterfactuals that they must bear in order for the law‐governed world‐picture to be true if and only if the MAL is the correct account of lawhood. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that in cases of typical scientific theories, the MAL will sort the regularities implied by that theory into laws and non‐laws correctly.
Michael S. Moore
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199256860
- eISBN:
- 9780191719653
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256860.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This book is about the role causation plays in the attribution of both moral responsibility and legal liability (in the law of crimes, torts, and to a lesser extent, contracts). The book strips away ...
More
This book is about the role causation plays in the attribution of both moral responsibility and legal liability (in the law of crimes, torts, and to a lesser extent, contracts). The book strips away many of the usages of the word ‘causation’ in law and legal theory, on the grounds that such usages have little to do with causation itself. What remains is the law's use of ‘causation’ to name a natural relation that is at the heart of both ordinary and scientific explanations of the world. Some normative defense is offered as to why causation in this sense is a proper basis for assessing degrees of both culpability and permissibility in morality and also in law. A more extended metaphysical defense is also offered, as to the nature of the causal relation and as to the nature of the things related by the causal relation. This normative and metaphysical analysis is used as the springboard from which to critique much of what the law currently says about causation, including the law's counterfactual test for cause in fact, its notions of intervening cause, foreseeability, harm within the risk, accomplice liability, the causal status of omissions and of non-omissive allowings, and more besides. The result is a rethinking of causation's nature and role in our legal and moral practices of assigning blame and responsibility.Less
This book is about the role causation plays in the attribution of both moral responsibility and legal liability (in the law of crimes, torts, and to a lesser extent, contracts). The book strips away many of the usages of the word ‘causation’ in law and legal theory, on the grounds that such usages have little to do with causation itself. What remains is the law's use of ‘causation’ to name a natural relation that is at the heart of both ordinary and scientific explanations of the world. Some normative defense is offered as to why causation in this sense is a proper basis for assessing degrees of both culpability and permissibility in morality and also in law. A more extended metaphysical defense is also offered, as to the nature of the causal relation and as to the nature of the things related by the causal relation. This normative and metaphysical analysis is used as the springboard from which to critique much of what the law currently says about causation, including the law's counterfactual test for cause in fact, its notions of intervening cause, foreseeability, harm within the risk, accomplice liability, the causal status of omissions and of non-omissive allowings, and more besides. The result is a rethinking of causation's nature and role in our legal and moral practices of assigning blame and responsibility.
