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This chapter examines the use of counterfactual analysis in making causal inferences in the qualitative and quantitative research paradigms. To assess a counterfactual claim about a particular case, the typical approach is to conduct a within-case analysis of that case. Qualitative researchers formulate counterfactuals that are “conceivable,” in the sense that imagining that a cause had not occurred (or occurred differently) does not require fundamentally rewriting history. By contrast, quantitative scholars use counterfactuals mainly to illustrate a general causal model. The chapter first considers the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference, which is the problem of a counterfactual, before discussing the statistical approach to counterfactuals. In particular, it describes the “minimum rewrite” rule. It suggests that counterfactual analyses are an important mode of causal inference within the qualitative tradition, but not commonly used within the quantitative tradition.

This chapter analyzes Robert Nozick's theory on knowledge. Nozick advocates what has been called an “externalist,” or “reliabilist,” analysis of knowledge. In his text Nozick states his indebtedness to those philosophers, such as Alvin Goldman, who give causal accounts of knowledge. His own contribution is to abandon causation in favor of a counterfactual analysis, which, he believes, will allow a uniform treatment of mathematical and ethical knowledge along with the straightforward empirical cases that seem to be more readily amenable to a causal analysis. However, as Nozick acknowledges in a footnote, actually he has rediscovered an approach that was in the published literature at least a decade before his book appeared.

This chapter talks about “What-if” history, which did not originate in the provocative minds of a few Anglo-American historians at the beginning of the millennium, nor from the pen of some nineteenth-century novelist. The approach was adopted early on by historians and then by researchers in other social sciences who defended very different, even contradictory interpretations of counterfactual analysis. The chapter probes historical depths by presenting some of the most famous cases, such as the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. It highlights a familiar strangeness that characterizes what is called today as counterfactual or “what-if” history. Counterfactual argumentation was employed early on as a kind of digression.

This chapter focuses on a criticism of reflective knowledge, which is taken by Vogel as a decisive objection to tracking theories. This criticism finds its roots in Vogel’s earlier work and recurs in papers by Ernest Sosa, who suggests that the externalist idea behind tracking is spot on, but that Nozick’s counterfactual is a misbegotten regimentation of the idea. In its place, Sosa offers his own counterfactual “safety” condition that properly captures the externalist idea, and which is mentioned here to point out that the criticism, which is the subject of investigation, is meant to do a lot of work. In Sosa’s case the criticism is meant to motivate his own counterfactual analysis, and in Vogel’s it promises to be a silver bullet against a theory that has recently found renewed life in the work of Keith DeRose. The chapter argues that the criticism is misguided.

This chapter compares imagined intersubjectivity to common knowledge in context of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, arguing that imagined intersubjectivity led the United States and the Soviet Union toward cooperation. For instance, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger offered to negotiate ABMs because of a mistaken assumption that the Soviets would reject the offer. The pattern of concession-making that led to the agreement resulted from a critical ambiguity that prompted each party to publicly commit to the treaty. Through counterfactual analysis, the chapter then shows that if common knowledge had existed, cooperation likely would have been shallow or would not have occurred at all.

For economic growth to accelerate, as it did in Spain in the decade after 1950, requires more than just increased political stability. This chapter documents the drastic turnaround in economic policymaking that took place, from an autarkic and statist orientation to a more open and market-friendly one. It also provides a counterfactual exercise to help us gauge the impact of economic reforms. The analysis makes clear two important conclusions. First and foremost, the growth dividend from improving economic policies in Spain was large. The most impactful reforms were those that implied removing excesses that were causing large distortions, such as the misalignment in the exchange rate. The second conclusion is that this improved performance was the result of a decade-long reform process. The results from the counterfactual exercise suggest that the early reforms undertaken before 1959 played almost as much of a role as the 1959 Plan did in stoking growth. This finding is in contrast with most of the literature which, with few exceptions, has focused perhaps too much on the importance of the 1959 Stabilization Plan. This finding also raises important questions why reforms were undertaken and puts in doubt the existing mainstream view that a desperate economic situation had prompted the adoption of the 1959 Stabilization Plan.

This chapter sets out the puzzle: what explains the rise of investor–state arbitration? It defines the rise of investor–state arbitration as one process with two phases: the creation of the ICSID Convention and eliciting state consent to ISDS. Conventional theoretical accounts, in which investor lobbying and then intergovernmental bargaining drive the rise of investor–state arbitration, are outlined. These accounts contrast with the book’s explanation, that international officials provided support to one institutional framework, ICSID, which led to its creation over other possibilities. The creation of ICSID kicked off a process of gradual institutional development that led to contemporary investor–state arbitration. The book’s sources include 30,000 pages of primary material and dozens of interviews, and the methods are based on counterfactual reasoning. Finally, the book’s four main findings are introduced.

This chapter presents a comparative review of the operation of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), focusing on five key themes: compliance; socialization; adaptation and contestation; instrumental use of law; and the special role of the United States. It then considers potential reasons for the observed variation between cases, with reference to hypothesized factors drawn from the International Relations literature. Finally, the chapter employs counterfactual analysis to assess the MBT and ICC against their principal alternative scenarios—conceding to great power demands in the negotiations or abandoning multilateral efforts altogether. The chapter contends that either strategy would have led to weaker norms and resulted in less, rather than more, international governance capacity. This provides the basis for the concluding chapter’s reflections on the status of non-great power multilateralism in its current manifestations and future prospects.