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This chapter argues that a theistic natural sign pointing to God's existence lies at the core of cosmological arguments; this sign is called “cosmic wonder” and is sometimes elicited by considering questions like “Why is there something rather than nothing?” The author first explains some of the different types of the cosmological arguments, argues that the Easy Resistibility Principle explains why we should not be surprised that they fail as conclusive proofs, and considers the thesis that Cosmic Wonder is the source of the persistent intuition that undergirds the arguments. Finally, it is argued that traditional theists, non‐traditional theists, and non‐theists often sense the force of Cosmic Wonder. This fact indicates that it is widely accessible as a sign.

Inductive cosmological arguments are prima facie more promising for the natural theologian than deductive arguments, such as the Kalam cosmological argument, which is not sound. In the cosmological scenario of an infinitely old universe, however, there is no valid explanandum for the hypothesis of theism. The claim that theism might explain the infinite series of time-slices of the universe ‘as a whole’ is based upon a fallacy of ambiguity. There is no valid explanandum either for a synchronic cosmological argument. Finally, the argument from the Big Bang to God is problematic for a multitude of reasons. It cannot avoid the risk of God-of-the-gaps. It cannot satisfy the relevance condition, because the likelihood of the Big Bang singularity given theism is negligible (if it can be determined at all). Also, the prior probability of the Big Bang singularity cannot be small compared to that of God, for example (if it can be determined at all).

The cosmological and teleological argument both start with some contingent feature of the actual world and argue that the best or only explanation of that feature is that it was produced by an intelligent and powerful supernatural being. The cosmological argument starts with a general feature, such as the existence of contingent being or the presence of motion and uses some version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) to conclude that this feature must have an explanation. The debate then focuses on two points: first, whether the PSR in question is true, and second, whether the explanation must involve God or at least some God-like being.  The teleological argument begins with a general feature of the cosmos judged to have value, such as the existence of intelligent life or the presence of order in the universe, and argues, usually inductively but sometimes deductively, that this feature is to be explained by the agency of a powerful supernatural being.  Here, the debate tends to focus on whether there are alternate naturalistic explanations, such as Darwinian evolution.

This chapter presents a theistic proof called the Generic Cosmological Argument (GCA). In outline form, the GCA runs as follows: (1) if the universe can be explained, then God exists; (2) everything can be explained; (3) the universe is a thing; (4) therefore the universe can be explained; (5) therefore, God exists. The GCA is also defended against objections.

Although most philosophers would agree with the suggestion that Hume's treatment of the problem of causation “is the center‐piece of the Treatise” (or, at least, of Book I), they also generally hold that Hume's views on causation in the Treatise are of little or no direct relevance to problems of natural religion. In contrast with this, many of Hume's early critics interpreted his views on causation as involving an “atheistic” or irreligious attack on the argument a priori—particularly as defended by Clarke and his followers. This chapter argues that Hume was well aware that his most distinguished adversaries had used Lucretius's (atheistic) maxim “nothing can come from nothing” to defend the cause of “superstition.” In opposition to this, Hume abandoned Lucretius's maxim and embraced its direct opposite: “any thing may produce any thing.” This “curious nostrum” served as Hume's principal weapon in his battle to discredit all efforts to use demonstrative reason to prove the existence of God.

This chapter argues that one of Hume's principal objectives in his discussion of space and time is to discredit the Newtonian doctrine of absolute space and time, which had recently been given a prominent and influential defense by Clarke in his famous correspondence with Leibniz. The significance of this, however, reaches well beyond the immediate issue of space and time. Clarke employed the Newtonian doctrine of absolute space and time as a key part of his “argument a priori.” Considered from this perspective, Hume's critique of Clarke's Newtonian doctrine of absolute space and time serves the deeper purpose of discrediting core features of Clarke's (dogmatic) theological system. So interpreted, Hume's discussion of space has intimate links with his general philosophical system and is an essential component of his wider irreligious intentions.

This chapter argues that there is a plausible cosmological argument, where cosmic purpose is introduced to explain why there is something rather than nothing. It then highlights the importance within cosmological arguments of evaluative claims about the comparative objective value of different possible worlds. Special attention is paid to Leslie’s axiarchism, where cosmic purpose exists without God. The chapter also argues that Ananthropocentric Purposivism can borrow the best contemporary cosmological arguments. Cosmological arguments support cosmic purpose, while leaving it open whether that purpose is human-centred. This chapter also introduces Leibniz’s claims that God must create the best and that this is the best of all possible worlds. It argues that Ananthropocentric Purposivism breathes new life into Leibniz’s maximalism. Finally, the chapter argues that some empirical questions are more significant to human morality than they might initially appear. Moral philosophers can no longer ignore cosmology!

This chapter presents different arguments for and against God's existence. There are two widely held beliefs supporting the existence of God. According to the cosmological argument, the existence of the world in general is to be explained by a self-sufficient, eternal creator who brings the universe into being. The other is the design argument. It holds that the regular movement of the planets, the intricacy of body organs, and the ways in which species are well adapted to their environment all attest to a wisdom and design that have been superimposed upon the cosmos. Meanwhile, new atheism offers the following claims: the standard arguments for divine existence are weak and almost entirely lacking in validity; the increasingly successful explanatory power of the natural sciences renders theological explanation redundant; and the counter-evidence of evil tells decisively against any relevant form of theism.

In Theism and Explanation, Tim O'Connor provides ‘an argument for the existence of a transcendent necessary being as the source and basis of the ultimate explanation of contingent beings and their interconnected histories’. This chapter argues that O'Connor's argument is unsuccessful: each of the three most plausible naturalistic views concerning ‘the ultimate explanation of contingent beings and their interconnected histories’ is more theoretically virtuous than any account that is committed to transcendent necessary beings. Thus, the chapter argues that naturalists can reasonably refuse to choose between ‘infinite regress’, ‘brute contingency’, and ‘immanent necessity’ (at least insofar as we are concerned with the ultimate explanation of contingent beings and their interconnected histories).

This chapter reviews Mendelssohn’s early defense of the ontological and cosmological arguments for the existence of God, then examines Kant’s criticism of those arguments, especially in his 1763 book Only Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God and his attempt at a new proof of the existence of God as the ground of all possibility rather than actuality. The chapter then examines Mendelssohn’s critique of Kant’s new argument and defense of his own position in a review of Kant’s book.

This chapter defends the use of theistic proofs in a wide variety of religiously significant contexts; argues that classical proofs such as the ontological or cosmological arguments for God’s existence are actually parts of wider cumulative case arguments; develops and explores the implications of George Mavrodes’s contention that arguments are “person-relative” in the sense that a good argument for one person may not be a good argument for another; and defends the conception of a rational religious belief that emerges from the discussion against an objection suggested by some recent work of John Schellenberg.

It is difficult to see how purely philosophical considerations might lead to an understanding of why there should be anything at all. After looking at the cosmological and ontological arguments for the existence of God, and considering issues associated with the notions of essence and existence, a negative answer is returned to the question whether it makes sense to suppose that there might have been nothing. No particular being had to be, but there had to be something. This leads on to a discussion of the question whether it can be said that the universe began to exist, as Big Bang cosmologies would appear to imply.

This chapter discusses that Nietzsche's ‘naturalism’ is best understood as a rejection of the transcendental idea of space and time, as Kant argues for in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’. It notes that this creates a puzzle about how to understand the relationship between appearances and reality, provided Nietzsche' continuing adherence to Kantian thesis that the mind imposes order on its experiences on the one hand, and his abandonment of things-in-themselves, on the other. It also talks about Nietzsche's employment of ‘cosmological’ argument in association with the doctrine of eternal recurrence.