C. Stephen Evans
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199217168
- eISBN:
- 9780191712401
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217168.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Philosophy of Religion
This book introduces the concept of theistic natural signs. It argues that these signs, the concept of which comes from a modified and expanded account of Reidian natural signs, provide sufficient ...
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This book introduces the concept of theistic natural signs. It argues that these signs, the concept of which comes from a modified and expanded account of Reidian natural signs, provide sufficient evidence to support belief in God for at least some people. The book first explains the Reidian account of natural signs and adapts that account to provide the framework for theistic natural signs. The book then argues that theistic natural signs provide the intuitions that undergird many of the cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments for God's existence. Cosmic wonder, beneficial order, perception of the self as a responsible and accountable moral agent, and perception of the value of the human person are four natural signs that the book considers at length. It is argued that theistic natural signs should be consistent with the Pascalian constraints formalized in the Wide Accessibility and Easy Resistibility principles, and that each of the four signs mentioned does meet those standards. While it is not argued that theistic natural signs provide a conclusive proof for God, it is maintained that they do provide significant evidence for anyone whose epistemic stance is sufficient to avoid general skepticism. Even though these natural signs, taken alone, may lead only to a thin theism and do not provide what is necessary for a meaningful faith in God, they do provide important overall support for theism.Less
This book introduces the concept of theistic natural signs. It argues that these signs, the concept of which comes from a modified and expanded account of Reidian natural signs, provide sufficient evidence to support belief in God for at least some people. The book first explains the Reidian account of natural signs and adapts that account to provide the framework for theistic natural signs. The book then argues that theistic natural signs provide the intuitions that undergird many of the cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments for God's existence. Cosmic wonder, beneficial order, perception of the self as a responsible and accountable moral agent, and perception of the value of the human person are four natural signs that the book considers at length. It is argued that theistic natural signs should be consistent with the Pascalian constraints formalized in the Wide Accessibility and Easy Resistibility principles, and that each of the four signs mentioned does meet those standards. While it is not argued that theistic natural signs provide a conclusive proof for God, it is maintained that they do provide significant evidence for anyone whose epistemic stance is sufficient to avoid general skepticism. Even though these natural signs, taken alone, may lead only to a thin theism and do not provide what is necessary for a meaningful faith in God, they do provide important overall support for theism.
C. Stephen Evans
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199217168
- eISBN:
- 9780191712401
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217168.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter argues that a theistic natural sign pointing to God's existence lies at the core of cosmological arguments; this sign is called “cosmic wonder” and is sometimes elicited by considering ...
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This chapter argues that a theistic natural sign pointing to God's existence lies at the core of cosmological arguments; this sign is called “cosmic wonder” and is sometimes elicited by considering questions like “Why is there something rather than nothing?” The author first explains some of the different types of the cosmological arguments, argues that the Easy Resistibility Principle explains why we should not be surprised that they fail as conclusive proofs, and considers the thesis that Cosmic Wonder is the source of the persistent intuition that undergirds the arguments. Finally, it is argued that traditional theists, non‐traditional theists, and non‐theists often sense the force of Cosmic Wonder. This fact indicates that it is widely accessible as a sign.Less
This chapter argues that a theistic natural sign pointing to God's existence lies at the core of cosmological arguments; this sign is called “cosmic wonder” and is sometimes elicited by considering questions like “Why is there something rather than nothing?” The author first explains some of the different types of the cosmological arguments, argues that the Easy Resistibility Principle explains why we should not be surprised that they fail as conclusive proofs, and considers the thesis that Cosmic Wonder is the source of the persistent intuition that undergirds the arguments. Finally, it is argued that traditional theists, non‐traditional theists, and non‐theists often sense the force of Cosmic Wonder. This fact indicates that it is widely accessible as a sign.
Herman Philipse
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697533
- eISBN:
- 9780191738470
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697533.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Inductive cosmological arguments are prima facie more promising for the natural theologian than deductive arguments, such as the Kalam cosmological argument, which is not sound. In the cosmological ...
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Inductive cosmological arguments are prima facie more promising for the natural theologian than deductive arguments, such as the Kalam cosmological argument, which is not sound. In the cosmological scenario of an infinitely old universe, however, there is no valid explanandum for the hypothesis of theism. The claim that theism might explain the infinite series of time-slices of the universe ‘as a whole’ is based upon a fallacy of ambiguity. There is no valid explanandum either for a synchronic cosmological argument. Finally, the argument from the Big Bang to God is problematic for a multitude of reasons. It cannot avoid the risk of God-of-the-gaps. It cannot satisfy the relevance condition, because the likelihood of the Big Bang singularity given theism is negligible (if it can be determined at all). Also, the prior probability of the Big Bang singularity cannot be small compared to that of God, for example (if it can be determined at all).Less
Inductive cosmological arguments are prima facie more promising for the natural theologian than deductive arguments, such as the Kalam cosmological argument, which is not sound. In the cosmological scenario of an infinitely old universe, however, there is no valid explanandum for the hypothesis of theism. The claim that theism might explain the infinite series of time-slices of the universe ‘as a whole’ is based upon a fallacy of ambiguity. There is no valid explanandum either for a synchronic cosmological argument. Finally, the argument from the Big Bang to God is problematic for a multitude of reasons. It cannot avoid the risk of God-of-the-gaps. It cannot satisfy the relevance condition, because the likelihood of the Big Bang singularity given theism is negligible (if it can be determined at all). Also, the prior probability of the Big Bang singularity cannot be small compared to that of God, for example (if it can be determined at all).
Alexander R. Pruss and Richard M. Gale
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195138092
- eISBN:
- 9780199835348
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138090.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
The cosmological and teleological argument both start with some contingent feature of the actual world and argue that the best or only explanation of that feature is that it was produced by an ...
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The cosmological and teleological argument both start with some contingent feature of the actual world and argue that the best or only explanation of that feature is that it was produced by an intelligent and powerful supernatural being. The cosmological argument starts with a general feature, such as the existence of contingent being or the presence of motion and uses some version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) to conclude that this feature must have an explanation. The debate then focuses on two points: first, whether the PSR in question is true, and second, whether the explanation must involve God or at least some God-like being. The teleological argument begins with a general feature of the cosmos judged to have value, such as the existence of intelligent life or the presence of order in the universe, and argues, usually inductively but sometimes deductively, that this feature is to be explained by the agency of a powerful supernatural being. Here, the debate tends to focus on whether there are alternate naturalistic explanations, such as Darwinian evolution.Less
The cosmological and teleological argument both start with some contingent feature of the actual world and argue that the best or only explanation of that feature is that it was produced by an intelligent and powerful supernatural being. The cosmological argument starts with a general feature, such as the existence of contingent being or the presence of motion and uses some version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) to conclude that this feature must have an explanation. The debate then focuses on two points: first, whether the PSR in question is true, and second, whether the explanation must involve God or at least some God-like being. The teleological argument begins with a general feature of the cosmos judged to have value, such as the existence of intelligent life or the presence of order in the universe, and argues, usually inductively but sometimes deductively, that this feature is to be explained by the agency of a powerful supernatural being. Here, the debate tends to focus on whether there are alternate naturalistic explanations, such as Darwinian evolution.
Stephen T. Davis
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199284597
- eISBN:
- 9780191603778
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199284598.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter presents a theistic proof called the Generic Cosmological Argument (GCA). In outline form, the GCA runs as follows: (1) if the universe can be explained, then God exists; (2) everything ...
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This chapter presents a theistic proof called the Generic Cosmological Argument (GCA). In outline form, the GCA runs as follows: (1) if the universe can be explained, then God exists; (2) everything can be explained; (3) the universe is a thing; (4) therefore the universe can be explained; (5) therefore, God exists. The GCA is also defended against objections.Less
This chapter presents a theistic proof called the Generic Cosmological Argument (GCA). In outline form, the GCA runs as follows: (1) if the universe can be explained, then God exists; (2) everything can be explained; (3) the universe is a thing; (4) therefore the universe can be explained; (5) therefore, God exists. The GCA is also defended against objections.
Paul Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195110333
- eISBN:
- 9780199872084
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195110333.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Although most philosophers would agree with the suggestion that Hume's treatment of the problem of causation “is the center‐piece of the Treatise” (or, at least, of Book I), they also generally hold ...
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Although most philosophers would agree with the suggestion that Hume's treatment of the problem of causation “is the center‐piece of the Treatise” (or, at least, of Book I), they also generally hold that Hume's views on causation in the Treatise are of little or no direct relevance to problems of natural religion. In contrast with this, many of Hume's early critics interpreted his views on causation as involving an “atheistic” or irreligious attack on the argument a priori—particularly as defended by Clarke and his followers. This chapter argues that Hume was well aware that his most distinguished adversaries had used Lucretius's (atheistic) maxim “nothing can come from nothing” to defend the cause of “superstition.” In opposition to this, Hume abandoned Lucretius's maxim and embraced its direct opposite: “any thing may produce any thing.” This “curious nostrum” served as Hume's principal weapon in his battle to discredit all efforts to use demonstrative reason to prove the existence of God.Less
Although most philosophers would agree with the suggestion that Hume's treatment of the problem of causation “is the center‐piece of the Treatise” (or, at least, of Book I), they also generally hold that Hume's views on causation in the Treatise are of little or no direct relevance to problems of natural religion. In contrast with this, many of Hume's early critics interpreted his views on causation as involving an “atheistic” or irreligious attack on the argument a priori—particularly as defended by Clarke and his followers. This chapter argues that Hume was well aware that his most distinguished adversaries had used Lucretius's (atheistic) maxim “nothing can come from nothing” to defend the cause of “superstition.” In opposition to this, Hume abandoned Lucretius's maxim and embraced its direct opposite: “any thing may produce any thing.” This “curious nostrum” served as Hume's principal weapon in his battle to discredit all efforts to use demonstrative reason to prove the existence of God.
Herman Philipse
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697533
- eISBN:
- 9780191738470
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697533.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is a critical examination of the philosophical strategies for defending religious belief. The main strategies may be presented as conforming to the end nodes of a decision tree for a ...
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This book is a critical examination of the philosophical strategies for defending religious belief. The main strategies may be presented as conforming to the end nodes of a decision tree for a believer. The faithful can interpret a credal statement (e.g. ‘God exists’) either as a factual claim, or otherwise. If it is a factual claim, they can either be warranted to endorse it without evidence, etc., or not. Finally, should religious belief require evidential support, then ought that support be assessed by the same criteria that we use in evaluating evidence in science, or not? Each of these options has been defended by prominent analytic philosophers of religion. In Part I, Herman Philipse assesses the tenability of each of these strategies and argues that the most promising option for believers who want to be justified in accepting their creed in our scientific age is the Bayesian cumulative case strategy developed by Richard Swinburne. Parts II and III are devoted to an in-depth analysis of this case for theism. Using a ‘strategy of subsidiary arguments’, Philipse concludes (1) that theism cannot be stated meaningfully; (2) that if theism were meaningful, it would have no predictive power concerning existing evidence, so that Bayesian arguments cannot get started; and (3) that if the Bayesian cumulative case strategy did work, one should conclude that atheism is more probable than theism. According to a referee, the book is ‘full of careful, rigorous reasoning – much of it original’.Less
This book is a critical examination of the philosophical strategies for defending religious belief. The main strategies may be presented as conforming to the end nodes of a decision tree for a believer. The faithful can interpret a credal statement (e.g. ‘God exists’) either as a factual claim, or otherwise. If it is a factual claim, they can either be warranted to endorse it without evidence, etc., or not. Finally, should religious belief require evidential support, then ought that support be assessed by the same criteria that we use in evaluating evidence in science, or not? Each of these options has been defended by prominent analytic philosophers of religion. In Part I, Herman Philipse assesses the tenability of each of these strategies and argues that the most promising option for believers who want to be justified in accepting their creed in our scientific age is the Bayesian cumulative case strategy developed by Richard Swinburne. Parts II and III are devoted to an in-depth analysis of this case for theism. Using a ‘strategy of subsidiary arguments’, Philipse concludes (1) that theism cannot be stated meaningfully; (2) that if theism were meaningful, it would have no predictive power concerning existing evidence, so that Bayesian arguments cannot get started; and (3) that if the Bayesian cumulative case strategy did work, one should conclude that atheism is more probable than theism. According to a referee, the book is ‘full of careful, rigorous reasoning – much of it original’.
William Lane Craig
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198263838
- eISBN:
- 9780191682650
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198263838.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Theology
This chapter criticizes Quentin Smith's cosmological argument for God's non-existence. It analyses the elements of Smith's Big Bang cosmological argument for the non-existence of God and offers a ...
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This chapter criticizes Quentin Smith's cosmological argument for God's non-existence. It analyses the elements of Smith's Big Bang cosmological argument for the non-existence of God and offers a counter-argument for each of them. It explains that the ontological status of the Big Bang singularity is a metaphysical question and that Smith made incorrect assumptions. Another incorrect assumption made by Smith is that animate beings that exist are those that exist in the physical universe. It explains that, according to Christian theism, the physical universe does not exhaust the created order.Less
This chapter criticizes Quentin Smith's cosmological argument for God's non-existence. It analyses the elements of Smith's Big Bang cosmological argument for the non-existence of God and offers a counter-argument for each of them. It explains that the ontological status of the Big Bang singularity is a metaphysical question and that Smith made incorrect assumptions. Another incorrect assumption made by Smith is that animate beings that exist are those that exist in the physical universe. It explains that, according to Christian theism, the physical universe does not exhaust the created order.
Quentin Smith
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198263838
- eISBN:
- 9780191682650
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198263838.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Theology
This chapter argues in defence of the cosmological argument about God's non-existence. It proposes a coherent and plausible Big Bang cosmology that is better justified and is capable of standing up ...
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This chapter argues in defence of the cosmological argument about God's non-existence. It proposes a coherent and plausible Big Bang cosmology that is better justified and is capable of standing up to the challenge of the theistic interpretation. It explains that the objective of the argument is to further establish that Big Bang cosmology is actually inconsistent with theism, and argues that if Big Bang cosmology is true, then God does not exist.Less
This chapter argues in defence of the cosmological argument about God's non-existence. It proposes a coherent and plausible Big Bang cosmology that is better justified and is capable of standing up to the challenge of the theistic interpretation. It explains that the objective of the argument is to further establish that Big Bang cosmology is actually inconsistent with theism, and argues that if Big Bang cosmology is true, then God does not exist.
Paul Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195110333
- eISBN:
- 9780199872084
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195110333.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter argues that one of Hume's principal objectives in his discussion of space and time is to discredit the Newtonian doctrine of absolute space and time, which had recently been given a ...
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This chapter argues that one of Hume's principal objectives in his discussion of space and time is to discredit the Newtonian doctrine of absolute space and time, which had recently been given a prominent and influential defense by Clarke in his famous correspondence with Leibniz. The significance of this, however, reaches well beyond the immediate issue of space and time. Clarke employed the Newtonian doctrine of absolute space and time as a key part of his “argument a priori.” Considered from this perspective, Hume's critique of Clarke's Newtonian doctrine of absolute space and time serves the deeper purpose of discrediting core features of Clarke's (dogmatic) theological system. So interpreted, Hume's discussion of space has intimate links with his general philosophical system and is an essential component of his wider irreligious intentions.Less
This chapter argues that one of Hume's principal objectives in his discussion of space and time is to discredit the Newtonian doctrine of absolute space and time, which had recently been given a prominent and influential defense by Clarke in his famous correspondence with Leibniz. The significance of this, however, reaches well beyond the immediate issue of space and time. Clarke employed the Newtonian doctrine of absolute space and time as a key part of his “argument a priori.” Considered from this perspective, Hume's critique of Clarke's Newtonian doctrine of absolute space and time serves the deeper purpose of discrediting core features of Clarke's (dogmatic) theological system. So interpreted, Hume's discussion of space has intimate links with his general philosophical system and is an essential component of his wider irreligious intentions.
William Lane Craig
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198263838
- eISBN:
- 9780191682650
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198263838.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Theology
This chapter examines recent criticism of two arguments for the beginning of the universe similar to the kalām cosmological argument. These arguments are about the impossibility of the existence of ...
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This chapter examines recent criticism of two arguments for the beginning of the universe similar to the kalām cosmological argument. These arguments are about the impossibility of the existence of an actual infinite and the impossibility of the successive formation of an actual infinite. This chapter argues in defense in these arguments and concludes that both arguments have yet to be found unsound. It explains that both arguments do seem to furnish philosophical grounds for holding to the finitude of the past and the beginning of the universe.Less
This chapter examines recent criticism of two arguments for the beginning of the universe similar to the kalām cosmological argument. These arguments are about the impossibility of the existence of an actual infinite and the impossibility of the successive formation of an actual infinite. This chapter argues in defense in these arguments and concludes that both arguments have yet to be found unsound. It explains that both arguments do seem to furnish philosophical grounds for holding to the finitude of the past and the beginning of the universe.
Tim Mulgan
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199646142
- eISBN:
- 9780191813993
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646142.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that there is a plausible cosmological argument, where cosmic purpose is introduced to explain why there is something rather than nothing. It then highlights the importance within ...
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This chapter argues that there is a plausible cosmological argument, where cosmic purpose is introduced to explain why there is something rather than nothing. It then highlights the importance within cosmological arguments of evaluative claims about the comparative objective value of different possible worlds. Special attention is paid to Leslie’s axiarchism, where cosmic purpose exists without God. The chapter also argues that Ananthropocentric Purposivism can borrow the best contemporary cosmological arguments. Cosmological arguments support cosmic purpose, while leaving it open whether that purpose is human-centred. This chapter also introduces Leibniz’s claims that God must create the best and that this is the best of all possible worlds. It argues that Ananthropocentric Purposivism breathes new life into Leibniz’s maximalism. Finally, the chapter argues that some empirical questions are more significant to human morality than they might initially appear. Moral philosophers can no longer ignore cosmology!Less
This chapter argues that there is a plausible cosmological argument, where cosmic purpose is introduced to explain why there is something rather than nothing. It then highlights the importance within cosmological arguments of evaluative claims about the comparative objective value of different possible worlds. Special attention is paid to Leslie’s axiarchism, where cosmic purpose exists without God. The chapter also argues that Ananthropocentric Purposivism can borrow the best contemporary cosmological arguments. Cosmological arguments support cosmic purpose, while leaving it open whether that purpose is human-centred. This chapter also introduces Leibniz’s claims that God must create the best and that this is the best of all possible worlds. It argues that Ananthropocentric Purposivism breathes new life into Leibniz’s maximalism. Finally, the chapter argues that some empirical questions are more significant to human morality than they might initially appear. Moral philosophers can no longer ignore cosmology!
David Fergusson
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199569380
- eISBN:
- 9780191702051
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199569380.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter presents different arguments for and against God's existence. There are two widely held beliefs supporting the existence of God. According to the cosmological argument, the existence of ...
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This chapter presents different arguments for and against God's existence. There are two widely held beliefs supporting the existence of God. According to the cosmological argument, the existence of the world in general is to be explained by a self-sufficient, eternal creator who brings the universe into being. The other is the design argument. It holds that the regular movement of the planets, the intricacy of body organs, and the ways in which species are well adapted to their environment all attest to a wisdom and design that have been superimposed upon the cosmos. Meanwhile, new atheism offers the following claims: the standard arguments for divine existence are weak and almost entirely lacking in validity; the increasingly successful explanatory power of the natural sciences renders theological explanation redundant; and the counter-evidence of evil tells decisively against any relevant form of theism.Less
This chapter presents different arguments for and against God's existence. There are two widely held beliefs supporting the existence of God. According to the cosmological argument, the existence of the world in general is to be explained by a self-sufficient, eternal creator who brings the universe into being. The other is the design argument. It holds that the regular movement of the planets, the intricacy of body organs, and the ways in which species are well adapted to their environment all attest to a wisdom and design that have been superimposed upon the cosmos. Meanwhile, new atheism offers the following claims: the standard arguments for divine existence are weak and almost entirely lacking in validity; the increasingly successful explanatory power of the natural sciences renders theological explanation redundant; and the counter-evidence of evil tells decisively against any relevant form of theism.
Robert J. Fogelin
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195071627
- eISBN:
- 9780199833221
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019507162X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Aquinas's so‐called Five Ways are usually read as proofs – or at least as sketches of proofs – of God's existence. This chapter suggests that they can profitably be read as a series of responses to ...
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Aquinas's so‐called Five Ways are usually read as proofs – or at least as sketches of proofs – of God's existence. This chapter suggests that they can profitably be read as a series of responses to one of the objections that precedes them: namely, that there is no need to posit the existence of God, because natural effects can be explained by natural causes and contrived effects by human reasoning and will. On this reading, the first three (cosmological) ways are aimed at the claim that science can explain all natural causes. The Fifth (teleological) Way is a response to the claim that all purposes in the world can be explained as human contrivance. The Fourth (degrees of perfection) Way points to a dimension of reality completely outside the scientific worldview.Less
Aquinas's so‐called Five Ways are usually read as proofs – or at least as sketches of proofs – of God's existence. This chapter suggests that they can profitably be read as a series of responses to one of the objections that precedes them: namely, that there is no need to posit the existence of God, because natural effects can be explained by natural causes and contrived effects by human reasoning and will. On this reading, the first three (cosmological) ways are aimed at the claim that science can explain all natural causes. The Fifth (teleological) Way is a response to the claim that all purposes in the world can be explained as human contrivance. The Fourth (degrees of perfection) Way points to a dimension of reality completely outside the scientific worldview.
Graham Oppy
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199603213
- eISBN:
- 9780191725388
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603213.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In Theism and Explanation, Tim O'Connor provides ‘an argument for the existence of a transcendent necessary being as the source and basis of the ultimate explanation of contingent beings and their ...
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In Theism and Explanation, Tim O'Connor provides ‘an argument for the existence of a transcendent necessary being as the source and basis of the ultimate explanation of contingent beings and their interconnected histories’. This chapter argues that O'Connor's argument is unsuccessful: each of the three most plausible naturalistic views concerning ‘the ultimate explanation of contingent beings and their interconnected histories’ is more theoretically virtuous than any account that is committed to transcendent necessary beings. Thus, the chapter argues that naturalists can reasonably refuse to choose between ‘infinite regress’, ‘brute contingency’, and ‘immanent necessity’ (at least insofar as we are concerned with the ultimate explanation of contingent beings and their interconnected histories).Less
In Theism and Explanation, Tim O'Connor provides ‘an argument for the existence of a transcendent necessary being as the source and basis of the ultimate explanation of contingent beings and their interconnected histories’. This chapter argues that O'Connor's argument is unsuccessful: each of the three most plausible naturalistic views concerning ‘the ultimate explanation of contingent beings and their interconnected histories’ is more theoretically virtuous than any account that is committed to transcendent necessary beings. Thus, the chapter argues that naturalists can reasonably refuse to choose between ‘infinite regress’, ‘brute contingency’, and ‘immanent necessity’ (at least insofar as we are concerned with the ultimate explanation of contingent beings and their interconnected histories).
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198239635
- eISBN:
- 9780191598609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198239637.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
The cosmological argument is the argument to God from the existence of a complex physical universe. God can create such a universe (by keeping it in existence as long as it exists ‐ whether for a ...
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The cosmological argument is the argument to God from the existence of a complex physical universe. God can create such a universe (by keeping it in existence as long as it exists ‐ whether for a finite or infinite time) and has some reason to do so because it is a theatre for finite agents which they can shape and in which they can develop. But it is a far less simple beginning of things than is God, and so a priori not to be expected but for the action of God.Less
The cosmological argument is the argument to God from the existence of a complex physical universe. God can create such a universe (by keeping it in existence as long as it exists ‐ whether for a finite or infinite time) and has some reason to do so because it is a theatre for finite agents which they can shape and in which they can develop. But it is a far less simple beginning of things than is God, and so a priori not to be expected but for the action of God.
William J. Wainwright
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199603718
- eISBN:
- 9780191729287
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603718.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter defends the use of theistic proofs in a wide variety of religiously significant contexts; argues that classical proofs such as the ontological or cosmological arguments for God’s ...
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This chapter defends the use of theistic proofs in a wide variety of religiously significant contexts; argues that classical proofs such as the ontological or cosmological arguments for God’s existence are actually parts of wider cumulative case arguments; develops and explores the implications of George Mavrodes’s contention that arguments are “person-relative” in the sense that a good argument for one person may not be a good argument for another; and defends the conception of a rational religious belief that emerges from the discussion against an objection suggested by some recent work of John Schellenberg.Less
This chapter defends the use of theistic proofs in a wide variety of religiously significant contexts; argues that classical proofs such as the ontological or cosmological arguments for God’s existence are actually parts of wider cumulative case arguments; develops and explores the implications of George Mavrodes’s contention that arguments are “person-relative” in the sense that a good argument for one person may not be a good argument for another; and defends the conception of a rational religious belief that emerges from the discussion against an objection suggested by some recent work of John Schellenberg.
Bede Rundle
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199270507
- eISBN:
- 9780191601392
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199270503.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
It is difficult to see how purely philosophical considerations might lead to an understanding of why there should be anything at all. After looking at the cosmological and ontological arguments for ...
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It is difficult to see how purely philosophical considerations might lead to an understanding of why there should be anything at all. After looking at the cosmological and ontological arguments for the existence of God, and considering issues associated with the notions of essence and existence, a negative answer is returned to the question whether it makes sense to suppose that there might have been nothing. No particular being had to be, but there had to be something. This leads on to a discussion of the question whether it can be said that the universe began to exist, as Big Bang cosmologies would appear to imply.Less
It is difficult to see how purely philosophical considerations might lead to an understanding of why there should be anything at all. After looking at the cosmological and ontological arguments for the existence of God, and considering issues associated with the notions of essence and existence, a negative answer is returned to the question whether it makes sense to suppose that there might have been nothing. No particular being had to be, but there had to be something. This leads on to a discussion of the question whether it can be said that the universe began to exist, as Big Bang cosmologies would appear to imply.
R. Kevin Hill
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199285525
- eISBN:
- 9780191700354
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285525.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter discusses that Nietzsche's ‘naturalism’ is best understood as a rejection of the transcendental idea of space and time, as Kant argues for in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’. It notes ...
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This chapter discusses that Nietzsche's ‘naturalism’ is best understood as a rejection of the transcendental idea of space and time, as Kant argues for in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’. It notes that this creates a puzzle about how to understand the relationship between appearances and reality, provided Nietzsche' continuing adherence to Kantian thesis that the mind imposes order on its experiences on the one hand, and his abandonment of things-in-themselves, on the other. It also talks about Nietzsche's employment of ‘cosmological’ argument in association with the doctrine of eternal recurrence.Less
This chapter discusses that Nietzsche's ‘naturalism’ is best understood as a rejection of the transcendental idea of space and time, as Kant argues for in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’. It notes that this creates a puzzle about how to understand the relationship between appearances and reality, provided Nietzsche' continuing adherence to Kantian thesis that the mind imposes order on its experiences on the one hand, and his abandonment of things-in-themselves, on the other. It also talks about Nietzsche's employment of ‘cosmological’ argument in association with the doctrine of eternal recurrence.
William Lane Craig
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190842215
- eISBN:
- 9780190874445
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190842215.003.0024
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
A survey of recent philosophical literature on the kalam cosmological argument reveals that arguments for the finitude of the past and, hence, the beginning of the universe remain robust. Plantinga’s ...
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A survey of recent philosophical literature on the kalam cosmological argument reveals that arguments for the finitude of the past and, hence, the beginning of the universe remain robust. Plantinga’s brief criticisms of Kant’s argument in his First Antinomy concerning time are shown not to be problematic for the kalam argument. This chapter addresses, one by one, the two premises of the kalam, focusing on their philosophical aspects. The notion of infinity, both actual and potential, is discussed in relation to the coming into being of the universe. In addition, the scientific aspects of the two premises are also, briefly, addressed. Among these are the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem, which proves that classical space-time cannot be extended to past infinity but must reach a boundary at some time in the finite past. This, among other factors, lends credence to the kalam argument’s second premise.Less
A survey of recent philosophical literature on the kalam cosmological argument reveals that arguments for the finitude of the past and, hence, the beginning of the universe remain robust. Plantinga’s brief criticisms of Kant’s argument in his First Antinomy concerning time are shown not to be problematic for the kalam argument. This chapter addresses, one by one, the two premises of the kalam, focusing on their philosophical aspects. The notion of infinity, both actual and potential, is discussed in relation to the coming into being of the universe. In addition, the scientific aspects of the two premises are also, briefly, addressed. Among these are the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem, which proves that classical space-time cannot be extended to past infinity but must reach a boundary at some time in the finite past. This, among other factors, lends credence to the kalam argument’s second premise.
