Michael D. Resnik
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250142
- eISBN:
- 9780191598296
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250142.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Talk of truth plays a major role in formulating realism, to the point that realist theories are often criticized by attacking the correspondence theory of truth that they are presumed to defend. In ...
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Talk of truth plays a major role in formulating realism, to the point that realist theories are often criticized by attacking the correspondence theory of truth that they are presumed to defend. In this chapter, I claim that there is an alternative theory of truth, which is both non‐epistemic and not based on correspondence relation that suffices to support mathematical realism. I describe the theory as a logical conception of truth because the truth predicate will turn out to be simply a logical operator. The theory has two main features: it is disquotational, and immanent, in that it specifies the extension of the term ‘true’ only for the language in which it applies.Less
Talk of truth plays a major role in formulating realism, to the point that realist theories are often criticized by attacking the correspondence theory of truth that they are presumed to defend. In this chapter, I claim that there is an alternative theory of truth, which is both non‐epistemic and not based on correspondence relation that suffices to support mathematical realism. I describe the theory as a logical conception of truth because the truth predicate will turn out to be simply a logical operator. The theory has two main features: it is disquotational, and immanent, in that it specifies the extension of the term ‘true’ only for the language in which it applies.
Christopher Hookway
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256587
- eISBN:
- 9780191597718
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256586.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Talk of truth as ‘correspondence to reality’ can be a platitude or a substantial and controversial philosophical theory. The chapter argues that pragmatists can accept the platitude of ...
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Talk of truth as ‘correspondence to reality’ can be a platitude or a substantial and controversial philosophical theory. The chapter argues that pragmatists can accept the platitude of correspondence, but that they reject the substantial metaphysics or truth as correspondence and metaphysical realism. The second half of the chapter argues that Peirce's account of the role of iconic representations, such as diagrams—in cognition and ordinary language—can capture some important insights of the traditional correspondence theory of truth.Less
Talk of truth as ‘correspondence to reality’ can be a platitude or a substantial and controversial philosophical theory. The chapter argues that pragmatists can accept the platitude of correspondence, but that they reject the substantial metaphysics or truth as correspondence and metaphysical realism. The second half of the chapter argues that Peirce's account of the role of iconic representations, such as diagrams—in cognition and ordinary language—can capture some important insights of the traditional correspondence theory of truth.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246298
- eISBN:
- 9780191715181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246297.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Davidson explores whether the semantic concept of truth utilized in Essay 2 (i.e. a theory of truth recursively defined on satisfaction) can be developed into a ‘correspondence’ theory of truth, i.e. ...
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Davidson explores whether the semantic concept of truth utilized in Essay 2 (i.e. a theory of truth recursively defined on satisfaction) can be developed into a ‘correspondence’ theory of truth, i.e. into a theory that explains the property of being true ‘by a relation between a statement and something else.’ He shows how reducing truth to either its disquotational function (the redundancy theory of truth associated with Ramsey) or to a notion of correspondence insensitive to more advanced semantic considerations both fail. In the former case, idioms such as ‘everything he said was true’ cannot be analysed without universally quantifying over propositions and defining truth for them recursively on satisfaction; in the latter case, the position of q in the sentential predicate ‘corresponds to the fact that q’ allows coextensive redescriptions to the effect of collapsing all q into one fact (the ‘One Great Fact’, as Davidson calls it). Davidson adds that traditional correspondence theories of the latter sort invariably suffer from assigning distinct entities, such as facts, to sentences as a whole (entities with which to compare sentences); whereas on his preferred theory, such assignments take place at the subsentential level via the apparatus of satisfaction and denotation ( Essay 15).Less
Davidson explores whether the semantic concept of truth utilized in Essay 2 (i.e. a theory of truth recursively defined on satisfaction) can be developed into a ‘correspondence’ theory of truth, i.e. into a theory that explains the property of being true ‘by a relation between a statement and something else.’ He shows how reducing truth to either its disquotational function (the redundancy theory of truth associated with Ramsey) or to a notion of correspondence insensitive to more advanced semantic considerations both fail. In the former case, idioms such as ‘everything he said was true’ cannot be analysed without universally quantifying over propositions and defining truth for them recursively on satisfaction; in the latter case, the position of q in the sentential predicate ‘corresponds to the fact that q’ allows coextensive redescriptions to the effect of collapsing all q into one fact (the ‘One Great Fact’, as Davidson calls it). Davidson adds that traditional correspondence theories of the latter sort invariably suffer from assigning distinct entities, such as facts, to sentences as a whole (entities with which to compare sentences); whereas on his preferred theory, such assignments take place at the subsentential level via the apparatus of satisfaction and denotation ( Essay 15).
Trenton Merricks
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205233
- eISBN:
- 9780191709302
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205233.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The thesis known as ‘Truthmaker’ says that each truth has a truthmaker. That is, it says that, for each claim that is true, there is some entity that, by its mere existence, makes that claim true. ...
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The thesis known as ‘Truthmaker’ says that each truth has a truthmaker. That is, it says that, for each claim that is true, there is some entity that, by its mere existence, makes that claim true. Truthmaker purports to articulate the idea that truth depends substantively on being. So it is primarily motivated by the intuition that truth does indeed depend substantively on being and, similarly, by the desire to rule out theories that violate that dependence. Truthmaker is also sometimes motivated by the belief that it is identical with the correspondence theory of truth, a belief which this chapter shows to be mistaken. This chapter defends a partial account of making true: x makes p true only if, necessarily, if both x and p exist, then p is true.Less
The thesis known as ‘Truthmaker’ says that each truth has a truthmaker. That is, it says that, for each claim that is true, there is some entity that, by its mere existence, makes that claim true. Truthmaker purports to articulate the idea that truth depends substantively on being. So it is primarily motivated by the intuition that truth does indeed depend substantively on being and, similarly, by the desire to rule out theories that violate that dependence. Truthmaker is also sometimes motivated by the belief that it is identical with the correspondence theory of truth, a belief which this chapter shows to be mistaken. This chapter defends a partial account of making true: x makes p true only if, necessarily, if both x and p exist, then p is true.
Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199290932
- eISBN:
- 9780191710445
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290932.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter discusses the relation of theories of truth to the program of truth-theoretic semantics. It reviews briefly three traditional theories of truth and their relation to Tarski-style ...
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This chapter discusses the relation of theories of truth to the program of truth-theoretic semantics. It reviews briefly three traditional theories of truth and their relation to Tarski-style axiomatic truth theories: the coherence theory, the redundancy theory, and the correspondence theory. It also discusses Davidson's views about the relation of Tarski-style truth theories and traditional correspondence theories.Less
This chapter discusses the relation of theories of truth to the program of truth-theoretic semantics. It reviews briefly three traditional theories of truth and their relation to Tarski-style axiomatic truth theories: the coherence theory, the redundancy theory, and the correspondence theory. It also discusses Davidson's views about the relation of Tarski-style truth theories and traditional correspondence theories.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246298
- eISBN:
- 9780191715181
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246297.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of language. Its key insight is that the concept of truth can shed light on various issues connected to meaning: Davidson, who ...
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This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of language. Its key insight is that the concept of truth can shed light on various issues connected to meaning: Davidson, who assumes a partial and primitive understanding of the truth predicate, reverses Tarski who had succeeded in elucidating the concept of truth by taking the notion of ‘translation’ (preservation of meaning) for granted. In the first of five subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson develops the systematic constraints a theory of meaning has to meet and shows how an approach to semantics based on the concept of truth meets these demands better than any rival approach. Sect. 2 explores whether one can give semantic analyses of quotation, intensional contexts, and force within the extensional limitations of the truth‐theoretic framework. Viewing the theories of meaning developed in the first section as empirical, Sect. 3 inquires into their testability: can we verify these theories without presupposing concepts too closely aligned to that of meaning, interpretation, and synonymy? Davidson develops constitutive constraints on applying truth theories to interpret the speech behaviour of others: we have to view utterances for the most part as assertions of the speaker's beliefs and those beliefs as largely true and consistent (he terms this the ‘Principle of Charity’). Sect. 4 combines these interpretative constraints with the semantic concept of truth developed in Sect. 1 to tackle metaphysical issues. Davidson claims that truth is not relative to conceptual schemes but only to languages that can be shown to be largely correct about the world; consequently, by studying those languages via the semantic concept of truth we can derive ontological conclusions. Sect. 5 explores aspects of linguistic usage that form a particular threat to theories of meaning (such as Davidson's) that focus on the literal meaning of sentences: for truth theory to be adequate as a general theory of language, it must give valid accounts of sentence mood, illocutionary force, and metaphorical meaning.Less
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of language. Its key insight is that the concept of truth can shed light on various issues connected to meaning: Davidson, who assumes a partial and primitive understanding of the truth predicate, reverses Tarski who had succeeded in elucidating the concept of truth by taking the notion of ‘translation’ (preservation of meaning) for granted. In the first of five subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson develops the systematic constraints a theory of meaning has to meet and shows how an approach to semantics based on the concept of truth meets these demands better than any rival approach. Sect. 2 explores whether one can give semantic analyses of quotation, intensional contexts, and force within the extensional limitations of the truth‐theoretic framework. Viewing the theories of meaning developed in the first section as empirical, Sect. 3 inquires into their testability: can we verify these theories without presupposing concepts too closely aligned to that of meaning, interpretation, and synonymy? Davidson develops constitutive constraints on applying truth theories to interpret the speech behaviour of others: we have to view utterances for the most part as assertions of the speaker's beliefs and those beliefs as largely true and consistent (he terms this the ‘Principle of Charity’). Sect. 4 combines these interpretative constraints with the semantic concept of truth developed in Sect. 1 to tackle metaphysical issues. Davidson claims that truth is not relative to conceptual schemes but only to languages that can be shown to be largely correct about the world; consequently, by studying those languages via the semantic concept of truth we can derive ontological conclusions. Sect. 5 explores aspects of linguistic usage that form a particular threat to theories of meaning (such as Davidson's) that focus on the literal meaning of sentences: for truth theory to be adequate as a general theory of language, it must give valid accounts of sentence mood, illocutionary force, and metaphorical meaning.
Ilkka Niiniluoto
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251612
- eISBN:
- 9780191598098
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251614.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Semantical realism claims that truth is a semantical relation between language and reality. The view that representation is one of the functions of language can be combined with the thesis that ...
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Semantical realism claims that truth is a semantical relation between language and reality. The view that representation is one of the functions of language can be combined with the thesis that languages as systems of symbolic signs (in the sense of Peirce's semiotics) are human‐made social conventions. This chapter defends, against Quine, the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. Tarski's model‐theoretic approach is argued to be the best explication of the correspondence theory of factual truth. By combining the notions of truth and similarity, a comparative and quantitative concept of truthlikeness is defined for a large variety of statements.Less
Semantical realism claims that truth is a semantical relation between language and reality. The view that representation is one of the functions of language can be combined with the thesis that languages as systems of symbolic signs (in the sense of Peirce's semiotics) are human‐made social conventions. This chapter defends, against Quine, the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. Tarski's model‐theoretic approach is argued to be the best explication of the correspondence theory of factual truth. By combining the notions of truth and similarity, a comparative and quantitative concept of truthlikeness is defined for a large variety of statements.
Martin Kusch
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251223
- eISBN:
- 9780191601767
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251223.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Applies finitism to ’true’ and ’false’. Applying finitism to truth leads to radical and surprising consequences. If ’true’ does not have a fixed extension, then it is simply incoherent to speak of, ...
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Applies finitism to ’true’ and ’false’. Applying finitism to truth leads to radical and surprising consequences. If ’true’ does not have a fixed extension, then it is simply incoherent to speak of, or tacitly rely on, the idea of ’all true statements’ (or ’all true propositions’, or ’all true beliefs’, or ’all true sentences’). And if this idea is illegitimate, then so are traditional ways of thinking about scientific progress (’we are getting ever closer to the truth’). The finitistic theory of meaning constitutes an important constraint on all theories of truth. The finitistic constraint rules out theories of truth that make use of fixed extensions.Less
Applies finitism to ’true’ and ’false’. Applying finitism to truth leads to radical and surprising consequences. If ’true’ does not have a fixed extension, then it is simply incoherent to speak of, or tacitly rely on, the idea of ’all true statements’ (or ’all true propositions’, or ’all true beliefs’, or ’all true sentences’). And if this idea is illegitimate, then so are traditional ways of thinking about scientific progress (’we are getting ever closer to the truth’). The finitistic theory of meaning constitutes an important constraint on all theories of truth. The finitistic constraint rules out theories of truth that make use of fixed extensions.
Hartry Field
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242894
- eISBN:
- 9780191597381
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242895.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
A correspondence theory of truth explains truth in terms of various correspondence relations (e.g. reference) between words and the world. Quine's doctrine of indeterminacy is often supposed to ...
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A correspondence theory of truth explains truth in terms of various correspondence relations (e.g. reference) between words and the world. Quine's doctrine of indeterminacy is often supposed to undermine correspondence theories of truth, and Quine himself argued this in Ontological Relativity with his doctrine of ‘relative reference’. This chapter argues that the relativization of reference that Quine proposed makes no sense, and that we can accommodate indeterminacy by generalizing the kind of correspondence relations we appeal to; this will save the correspondence theory. Includes an appendix on vagueness and indeterminacy in the metalanguage, and a new postscript.Less
A correspondence theory of truth explains truth in terms of various correspondence relations (e.g. reference) between words and the world. Quine's doctrine of indeterminacy is often supposed to undermine correspondence theories of truth, and Quine himself argued this in Ontological Relativity with his doctrine of ‘relative reference’. This chapter argues that the relativization of reference that Quine proposed makes no sense, and that we can accommodate indeterminacy by generalizing the kind of correspondence relations we appeal to; this will save the correspondence theory. Includes an appendix on vagueness and indeterminacy in the metalanguage, and a new postscript.
Hartry Field
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242894
- eISBN:
- 9780191597381
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242895.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and ...
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This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and truth‐conditions, and their role in a theory of meaning and of the content of our mental states. The next five deal with what I call ‘factually defective discourse’—discourse that gives rise to issues about which, it is tempting to say that, there is no fact of the matter as to the right answer; one particular kind of factually defective discourse is called ‘indeterminacy’, and it gets the bulk of the attention. The final bunch of papers deal with issues about objectivity, closely related to issues about factual defectiveness; two deal with the question of whether the axioms of mathematics are as objective as is often assumed, and one deals with the question of whether our epistemological methods are as objective as they are usually assumed to be.Less
This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and truth‐conditions, and their role in a theory of meaning and of the content of our mental states. The next five deal with what I call ‘factually defective discourse’—discourse that gives rise to issues about which, it is tempting to say that, there is no fact of the matter as to the right answer; one particular kind of factually defective discourse is called ‘indeterminacy’, and it gets the bulk of the attention. The final bunch of papers deal with issues about objectivity, closely related to issues about factual defectiveness; two deal with the question of whether the axioms of mathematics are as objective as is often assumed, and one deals with the question of whether our epistemological methods are as objective as they are usually assumed to be.
Thomas Ricketts
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195139167
- eISBN:
- 9780199833214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019513916X.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Ricketts treats shifts in Russell’s views about truth and judgment between 1905 and 1910, a period during which Russell attempted to articulate an atomistic, pluralist, and realist metaphysical ...
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Ricketts treats shifts in Russell’s views about truth and judgment between 1905 and 1910, a period during which Russell attempted to articulate an atomistic, pluralist, and realist metaphysical alternative to the Idealistic Monism of Bradley in which reality is constituted by a plurality of mind-independent entities standing in relations external to them. Russell did not simply dismiss Idealism; significant aspects of the development of his alternative stem from his attempt to answer Bradley’s criticisms. Ricketts focuses on three elements of Russell’s early metaphysics: propositions not facts are metaphysically fundamental; a proposition is not a mere list of its components; and propositions are not representational, so that truth of propositions is not analyzed in terms of relations to truth-makers. Russell’s problem was to explain the unity of the proposition in face of Bradley’s challenge such that unity cannot be accounted for by external relations. Since for Russell truth is not explained by relation to fact, he was driven to a view in which truth and falsity are two irreducible ways in which propositional constituents are related by a relation that is itself one of these constituents. Unfortunately this position is self-thwarting; any attempt to state that truth is a quality of the relation holding the proposition together will, on Russell’s view, express a proposition in which truth is a constituent independent of that relation. This incoherence, on Ricketts’s reading, is what motivates Russell to a metaphysics in which facts are fundamental, in order to serve the role of truth-makers of propositions.Less
Ricketts treats shifts in Russell’s views about truth and judgment between 1905 and 1910, a period during which Russell attempted to articulate an atomistic, pluralist, and realist metaphysical alternative to the Idealistic Monism of Bradley in which reality is constituted by a plurality of mind-independent entities standing in relations external to them. Russell did not simply dismiss Idealism; significant aspects of the development of his alternative stem from his attempt to answer Bradley’s criticisms. Ricketts focuses on three elements of Russell’s early metaphysics: propositions not facts are metaphysically fundamental; a proposition is not a mere list of its components; and propositions are not representational, so that truth of propositions is not analyzed in terms of relations to truth-makers. Russell’s problem was to explain the unity of the proposition in face of Bradley’s challenge such that unity cannot be accounted for by external relations. Since for Russell truth is not explained by relation to fact, he was driven to a view in which truth and falsity are two irreducible ways in which propositional constituents are related by a relation that is itself one of these constituents. Unfortunately this position is self-thwarting; any attempt to state that truth is a quality of the relation holding the proposition together will, on Russell’s view, express a proposition in which truth is a constituent independent of that relation. This incoherence, on Ricketts’s reading, is what motivates Russell to a metaphysics in which facts are fundamental, in order to serve the role of truth-makers of propositions.
J. L. Austin
J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (eds)
- Published in print:
- 1979
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780192830210
- eISBN:
- 9780191597039
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019283021X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This text collects all Austin’s published articles plus a new one, ch. 13, hitherto unpublished. The analysis of the ordinary language to clarify philosophical questions is the common element of the ...
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This text collects all Austin’s published articles plus a new one, ch. 13, hitherto unpublished. The analysis of the ordinary language to clarify philosophical questions is the common element of the 13 papers. Chapters 2 and 4 discuss the nature of knowledge, focusing on ‘performative utterances’. The doctrine of ‘speech acts’, i.e. a statement may be the pragmatic use of language, is discussed in Chs 6 and 10. Chapters 8, 9, and 12 reflect on the problems the language encounters in discussing actions and consider the cases of excuses, accusations, and freedom. The ‘correspondence theory’, i.e. a statement is truth when it corresponds to a fact, is presented in Chs 5 and 6. Finally, Chs 1 and 3 study how a word may have different but related senses considering Aristotle’s view. Chapters 11 and 13 illustrate the meaning of ‘pretending’ and a Plato’s text respectively.Less
This text collects all Austin’s published articles plus a new one, ch. 13, hitherto unpublished. The analysis of the ordinary language to clarify philosophical questions is the common element of the 13 papers. Chapters 2 and 4 discuss the nature of knowledge, focusing on ‘performative utterances’. The doctrine of ‘speech acts’, i.e. a statement may be the pragmatic use of language, is discussed in Chs 6 and 10. Chapters 8, 9, and 12 reflect on the problems the language encounters in discussing actions and consider the cases of excuses, accusations, and freedom. The ‘correspondence theory’, i.e. a statement is truth when it corresponds to a fact, is presented in Chs 5 and 6. Finally, Chs 1 and 3 study how a word may have different but related senses considering Aristotle’s view. Chapters 11 and 13 illustrate the meaning of ‘pretending’ and a Plato’s text respectively.
Hartry Field
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242894
- eISBN:
- 9780191597381
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242895.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Discusses some issues about indeterminacy of reference and truth, from two points of view about reference and truth: that of a correspondence theory and that of a disquotational theory. It is argued ...
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Discusses some issues about indeterminacy of reference and truth, from two points of view about reference and truth: that of a correspondence theory and that of a disquotational theory. It is argued that a correspondence theorist can continue to accept the usual disquotation schemas for reference and truth, despite the indeterminacy. And it is argued that the disquotationalist can accept indeterminacy even in his own conceptual scheme. Together, these claims mean that the two views on truth are much closer in their treatments of indeterminacy than one might have thought. Also discusses indeterminacy in our logical and mathematical vocabulary.Less
Discusses some issues about indeterminacy of reference and truth, from two points of view about reference and truth: that of a correspondence theory and that of a disquotational theory. It is argued that a correspondence theorist can continue to accept the usual disquotation schemas for reference and truth, despite the indeterminacy. And it is argued that the disquotationalist can accept indeterminacy even in his own conceptual scheme. Together, these claims mean that the two views on truth are much closer in their treatments of indeterminacy than one might have thought. Also discusses indeterminacy in our logical and mathematical vocabulary.
Peter Zachar
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262027045
- eISBN:
- 9780262322270
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027045.003.0003
- Subject:
- Psychology, Clinical Psychology
Instrumental nominalism is the view that it is important to conceptualize what collections of particulars have in common, but as the collections grow larger and the concepts more abstract (e.g., ...
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Instrumental nominalism is the view that it is important to conceptualize what collections of particulars have in common, but as the collections grow larger and the concepts more abstract (e.g., Truth), they become increasingly obscure and applied to a contradictory list of instances. There are three ways of making sense of such abstractions. They can be compared with contrast concepts, decomposed into component concepts, and stratified into more homogeneous sets of cases. Instrumental nominalism is inspired by Charles Peirce's pragmatist view that we are never at the beginning or end of inquiry, but always in the middle. We cannot divest ourselves of all assumptions, including abstract metaphysical assumptions, but we can temporarily isolate and critically analyze any assumption in order to make conceptual progress. The chapter closes by articulating a pragmatist perspective on the coherence and correspondence theories of truth.Less
Instrumental nominalism is the view that it is important to conceptualize what collections of particulars have in common, but as the collections grow larger and the concepts more abstract (e.g., Truth), they become increasingly obscure and applied to a contradictory list of instances. There are three ways of making sense of such abstractions. They can be compared with contrast concepts, decomposed into component concepts, and stratified into more homogeneous sets of cases. Instrumental nominalism is inspired by Charles Peirce's pragmatist view that we are never at the beginning or end of inquiry, but always in the middle. We cannot divest ourselves of all assumptions, including abstract metaphysical assumptions, but we can temporarily isolate and critically analyze any assumption in order to make conceptual progress. The chapter closes by articulating a pragmatist perspective on the coherence and correspondence theories of truth.
Christopher S. Hill
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199665822
- eISBN:
- 9780191766336
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665822.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter presents and defends a deflationary theory of truth and other truth‐related semantic properties. More specifically, it is a theory of the semantic properties of propositions and ...
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This chapter presents and defends a deflationary theory of truth and other truth‐related semantic properties. More specifically, it is a theory of the semantic properties of propositions and concepts, though it also has applications to the semantic properties of sentences and words. According to the theory, the properties in question can be explicitly defined in terms of substitutional quantification. Contact is made with the correspondence theory of truth by showing that substitutional quantification provides the basis for a definition of an appropriate correspondence relation. Attention is given to the charge that the theory is not sufficiently ‘reductive,’ and to the objection that the defined concepts are too ‘thin’ to explain the role that semantic properties play in laws of nature. Both objections are rejected.Less
This chapter presents and defends a deflationary theory of truth and other truth‐related semantic properties. More specifically, it is a theory of the semantic properties of propositions and concepts, though it also has applications to the semantic properties of sentences and words. According to the theory, the properties in question can be explicitly defined in terms of substitutional quantification. Contact is made with the correspondence theory of truth by showing that substitutional quantification provides the basis for a definition of an appropriate correspondence relation. Attention is given to the charge that the theory is not sufficiently ‘reductive,’ and to the objection that the defined concepts are too ‘thin’ to explain the role that semantic properties play in laws of nature. Both objections are rejected.
Tim Button
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199672172
- eISBN:
- 9780191758393
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672172.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter details the faith held by external realists (also known as metaphysical realists). External realists employ the picture of reasoning from a ‘God’s Eye point of view’. Putnam presents us ...
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This chapter details the faith held by external realists (also known as metaphysical realists). External realists employ the picture of reasoning from a ‘God’s Eye point of view’. Putnam presents us with three principles that flow naturally from this picture. The Independence Principle states that the world is (largely) made up of objects that are mind-, language- and theory-independent. The Correspondence Principle tells us that truth involves a correspondence relation between words and the world. The Cartesianism Principle tells us that even an ideal theory might be radically false. Together, these principles enshrine the Credo of external realism. Following post-Quinean orthodoxy in metaphysics, this Credo can and should be treated model-theoretically.Less
This chapter details the faith held by external realists (also known as metaphysical realists). External realists employ the picture of reasoning from a ‘God’s Eye point of view’. Putnam presents us with three principles that flow naturally from this picture. The Independence Principle states that the world is (largely) made up of objects that are mind-, language- and theory-independent. The Correspondence Principle tells us that truth involves a correspondence relation between words and the world. The Cartesianism Principle tells us that even an ideal theory might be radically false. Together, these principles enshrine the Credo of external realism. Following post-Quinean orthodoxy in metaphysics, this Credo can and should be treated model-theoretically.
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226471143
- eISBN:
- 9780226471150
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226471150.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
This chapter distinguishes that the correspondence theory of truth is incompatible with the historical and epistemological picture that the book has been arguing for. Philosophers did not detailed ...
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This chapter distinguishes that the correspondence theory of truth is incompatible with the historical and epistemological picture that the book has been arguing for. Philosophers did not detailed contextualism in order to solve the problems of historical science. It has been emphasized that the ways in which judgments on the acceptability of individual explanations as explanations must be seen as contextualized within a discourse community, such that “like affects like,” cosmic harmonics, and number theory could be offered as satisfying ends to chains of why-questions. It also repeatedly addressed the contexts of politics, education, performance, and intertheoretical criticism and debate, in order to see how broadly ways of thinking about the world reverberate, playing back and forth.Less
This chapter distinguishes that the correspondence theory of truth is incompatible with the historical and epistemological picture that the book has been arguing for. Philosophers did not detailed contextualism in order to solve the problems of historical science. It has been emphasized that the ways in which judgments on the acceptability of individual explanations as explanations must be seen as contextualized within a discourse community, such that “like affects like,” cosmic harmonics, and number theory could be offered as satisfying ends to chains of why-questions. It also repeatedly addressed the contexts of politics, education, performance, and intertheoretical criticism and debate, in order to see how broadly ways of thinking about the world reverberate, playing back and forth.
Tim Button
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199672172
- eISBN:
- 9780191758393
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672172.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 1 showed how to use model theory to understand external realist’s Credo. This chapter presents the model-theoretic results that Putnam brings to bear against external realism. Putnam’s ...
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Chapter 1 showed how to use model theory to understand external realist’s Credo. This chapter presents the model-theoretic results that Putnam brings to bear against external realism. Putnam’s model-theoretic arguments fall broadly into two camps. Indeterminacy arguments show that, if there is any way to make a theory true, then there are many ways to do so. Infallibilism arguments show that, if a theory is ideal, then there must be some way to make the theory true. Together these show that every ideal theory can be made true in many different ways. The immediate challenge for the external realist is to explain what singles out (at most) one of these as capturing the correspondence relation.Less
Chapter 1 showed how to use model theory to understand external realist’s Credo. This chapter presents the model-theoretic results that Putnam brings to bear against external realism. Putnam’s model-theoretic arguments fall broadly into two camps. Indeterminacy arguments show that, if there is any way to make a theory true, then there are many ways to do so. Infallibilism arguments show that, if a theory is ideal, then there must be some way to make the theory true. Together these show that every ideal theory can be made true in many different ways. The immediate challenge for the external realist is to explain what singles out (at most) one of these as capturing the correspondence relation.
Chris Fowler
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- March 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199656370
- eISBN:
- 9780191804724
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199656370.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Ancient History / Archaeology
This chapter examines the relational nature of archaeological evidence by drawing key concepts from relational theories. More precisely, it considers different concepts that can be used in ...
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This chapter examines the relational nature of archaeological evidence by drawing key concepts from relational theories. More precisely, it considers different concepts that can be used in constructing a relational yet realist view of the world, particularly within the context of the ongoing chain of relationships that have produced both the corpus of Chalcolithic and Early Bronze Age mortuary remains from North-East England and the interpretations of such remains. To this end, important terms used in relational thinking are defined and their usefulness and limitations are outlined. The theories discussed in this chapter largely reject a classical positivism and a ‘correspondence theory of truth’. After outlining the key theoretical and practical tenets of an archaeological relational realism, the chapter compares the many different ways that the relational nature of archaeological entities can be appreciated, with particular reference to assemblage, network, meshwork, entanglement, and phenomenon.Less
This chapter examines the relational nature of archaeological evidence by drawing key concepts from relational theories. More precisely, it considers different concepts that can be used in constructing a relational yet realist view of the world, particularly within the context of the ongoing chain of relationships that have produced both the corpus of Chalcolithic and Early Bronze Age mortuary remains from North-East England and the interpretations of such remains. To this end, important terms used in relational thinking are defined and their usefulness and limitations are outlined. The theories discussed in this chapter largely reject a classical positivism and a ‘correspondence theory of truth’. After outlining the key theoretical and practical tenets of an archaeological relational realism, the chapter compares the many different ways that the relational nature of archaeological entities can be appreciated, with particular reference to assemblage, network, meshwork, entanglement, and phenomenon.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- December 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198758716
- eISBN:
- 9780191818639
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198758716.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter shows how this possibility (ineffability) can be incorporated into the logical machinery by adding a fifth value. In the process, the bearers of semantic values are reinterpreted as ...
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This chapter shows how this possibility (ineffability) can be incorporated into the logical machinery by adding a fifth value. In the process, the bearers of semantic values are reinterpreted as states of affairs, which are themselves empty. This is deployed to produce a correspondence theory of conventional truth.Less
This chapter shows how this possibility (ineffability) can be incorporated into the logical machinery by adding a fifth value. In the process, the bearers of semantic values are reinterpreted as states of affairs, which are themselves empty. This is deployed to produce a correspondence theory of conventional truth.
